A recent Law 360 story by Kelly Lienhard, “Traxcell Asks High Court To Review Atty Fee Fight”, reports that Traxcell Technologies LLC has asked the U.S. Supreme Court to take up an appeal concerning attorney fees owed to Sprint and Verizon after the telecommunication companies beat its infringement suit, arguing that the alleged "exceptional" litigation conduct occurred before a final ruling.

A  petition for a writ of certiorari from Traxcell, which filed for bankruptcy earlier this year, claimed that the Federal Circuit erred when it affirmed attorney fee awards to units of Sprint Corp. and Verizon Communications Inc. based on so-called "baseless" litigation conduct from Traxcell's attorney, William Ramey III of the Houston firm Ramey LLP, as the conduct in question occurred before the court adopted a magistrate judge's ruling.

"It is black letter law that a Magistrate's ruling is not final until approved by a district court.  It was [an] error for the Panel to base its fee award entirely upon rulings that were not final and could not have been final until December 11, 2019," Traxcell said.  "None of the conduct that was found to be "exceptional" under [federal law] occurred after the Magistrate Judge's recommendation was made final on December 11, 2019."

Texas-based Traxcell, which has been accused of being a "patent troll" by groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, is on the hook for about $784,000 in fees owed to Sprint and $132,000 in fees owed to Verizon, after the companies won rulings that Traxcell's patent lawsuits were legally frivolous.  AT&T Inc., which had also been named in those lawsuits, did not request any fees, as it ended its litigation with Traxcell back in 2019.  A panel of Federal Circuit judges ruled in July without comment that the lower court was right to order Traxcell to pay legal fees incurred by lawyers for the major telecom firms.

Traxcell is now appealing that decision based on arguments that the Federal Circuit departed from typical proceedings and court precedent by issuing fee awards based on conduct that occurred before U.S. Magistrate Judge Roy Payne's ruling in a separate, but related, case was finalized.

Traxcell is asking the high court to either vacate or reverse the attorney fees granted to both Sprint and Verizon and find that the case was not exceptional.  Verizon and Sprint, the latter now owned by T-Mobile, moved to dismiss the bankruptcy attempt, telling the court that it was filed in bad faith.

A recent Law 360 story by Beverly Bank, “’Vague’ Billing Justifies 10% Cut in Atty Fees, Judge Says”, reports that a federal magistrate judge recommended slashing an Iron Workers' benefits funds' request for attorney fees in a case over an employer's unpaid contributions, saying there are "vague" billing entries from the plaintiffs' counsel as part of a $2.2 million judgment.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Kimberly G. Altman issued a report and recommendation, suggesting the district court cut a nearly $111,000 attorney fee request from Iron Workers Local No. 25's benefit funds by 10%.  The attorney fees dispute is connected with U.S. District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds' order, requiring Next Century Rebar LLC to pay more than $2.2 million in unpaid contributions with interest and liquidated damages.  The company filed a notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit.

"Portions of the trustees' itemized hourly work are described insufficiently to prove that the work 'was performed with reasonable diligence and efficiency,'" Judge Altman said.  The judge said many of the funds' billing entries linked to an audit are "vague," necessitating a drop in proposed attorney fees from around $110,900 to roughly $99,800.  Judge Altman did not disturb the funds' request for more than $18,200 in costs.

The judge pointed to billing entries connected with an audit, saying some entries about the correspondence and emails with the auditor "provide the court with little information as to the necessity of the work."  The benefit funds requested around $110,900 in October, saying the plaintiffs' counsel spent 388.8 attorney hours in pursuing the case.

Next Century Rebar called billing entries linked to the attorney fees request "excessive, duplicative, and vague" as part of the company's Oct. 30 response. The company challenged the funds' bid for fees over review of the audit.  "Excessive review of the audit is ongoing throughout the time entries of multiple persons without any detail or reason for the excessive amount of time spent reviewing, re-reviewing, and again revisiting the audit report," Next Century Rebar said.

The company said the funds were seeking fees for clerical work that could have been undertaken by a legal clerk or assistant to the plaintiffs' attorneys.  Judge Altman found that some of Next Century Rebar's complaints about the clerical work entries were valid and warranted lower attorney fees.  "Next Century has highlighted instances where parts or all of the described work was clerical in nature and could have been handled by paralegals or other staff at much lower rates," the judge said.

The judge took on arguments from Next Century that the request related to audit costs of about $13,000 was "outrageous," saying the company didn't raise evidence to back up this claim.  Judge Altman said an affidavit "from an attorney that worked closely on this case and on the review of the audit" corroborated the cost of the audit.

A recent Law.com story by Allison Dunn, “Judge Rejects Quinn Emanuel’s $1700 Hourly Rate Request, Slashing Fees for Virginia Settlement By Nearly 80%”, reports that a federal judge in Virginia drastically reduced Quinn Emanuel attorneys’ requested fees related to enforcing a $6 million settlement agreement they successfully obtained for a client over a fraud scheme involving the Model Tobacco Building in Richmond, Virginia.  Some of the rates requested by Quinn Emanuel—$1,690 per hour for a lead partner or $1,385 per hour for associates—were unrealistic for the Richmond market in the present case, the court found.

Quinn Emanuel attorneys based out of Washington, D.C., who served as plaintiffs’ counsel, sought prejudgment interest at a rate of 6%, as well as $236,641.18 attorney fees and costs relating to enforcing a $6 million settlement agreement between the plaintiffs, SS Richmond and MK Richmond, against Christopher A. Harrison, the owner and manager of several entities including, The C.A. Harrison Cos., CAH Model Tobacco and the McKenzie Blake Development Co.  Under the settlement agreement, the Harrison defendants were obligated to pay the $6 million payment by June 8, but the plaintiffs maintain that they have failed to do so, according to the district court’s opinion.

The plaintiffs had accused the defendants of “‘a pattern of bank fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud and money laundering in an effort to seize control and interest in a project to purchase and refurbish’” the Model Tobacco Building, which previously served as a factory for the United States Tobacco Co.  Harrison’s counsel from midsize firms Mahdavi Bacon Halfhill & Young, as well as Fraim & Fiorella, opposed the plaintiffs’ request.  The defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to establish the reasonableness for such hourly rates.

The judge agreed in part with the plaintiffs that, in addition to the prejudgment interest, they were also entitled to attorney fees and costs, but Novak also sided with the defendants in finding Quinn Emanuel’s more than $1,000-per-hour rates for both partners and associates in post-settlement motions were ”not reasonable in accordance with the Court’s prior decisions and the Richmond legal market,” the opinion said.  Considering the reasonable rates for attorneys in Richmond with comparable skills, experience, reputation, as well as other factors, Novak reduced Quinn Emanuel’s total fee award to $50,380.

“Our client is focused on the Model Tobacco project.  As to fees, we don’t agree with everything the judge wrote, but Judge Novak obviously took the time to write a thoughtful opinion,” said George R. A. Doumar, an attorney with Mahdavi Bacon, representing the defendants.  “The local market dictates hourly rates awarded, and Quinn Emanuel was seeking rates far higher than I’ve encountered for fee awards in Virginia courts.  The lawyers I see day in and day out are billing at much lower rates.  The judge also seemed to be aware of law firm billing practices such as block billing and multiple reviews, and took that into account.”

Novak concluded that a rate of $650 for the lead partner and $400 for associates was a reasonable rate based 12 factors such as time and labor expended; the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; the customary fee for like work; the amount in controversy and the results obtained; the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; attorney fee awards in similar cases and more.

“Here, Plaintiffs have failed to rebut the presumption that the hourly rates should be derived from the community in which the court sits. While Plaintiffs argue that this case has factual connections to Washington, D.C., and that the underlying case involved ‘complicated, high-stakes claims in financial fraud and RICO claims,’ … they present no evidence that a local attorney could not have provided competent representation,” Novak wrote, citing Rehabilitation Association of Virginia, Inc. v. Metcalf (1998).  “Because Plaintiffs have not made the requisite showing to apply out-of-town rates, the Court will consider the proper market from which to determine reasonable hourly rates as the market where the Court sits—Richmond, Virginia.”

The plaintiffs failed to file any affidavits from other law firms regarding “the prevailing market rates in Richmond for similar work,” and said Quinn Emanuel proffered no cases concerning fee awards within the district, Novak held.  Additionally, the law firm cited a news article from Law.com publication The American Lawyer titled, “What $1,000 an Hour Gets You in the AM 200 Today.”  The judge, however, said the article didn’t weigh in the law firm’s favor since it “cut against the reasonableness of the Plaintiff’s requested fees.”

In one of the cases cited by the plaintiffs, Proofpoint v. Vade Secure, a 2020 opinion by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, the requested hourly rates ranged from $590 to $675 per hour for associates, and $880 to $915 per hour for more senior attorneys, the opinion said.

“Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs charged $1,305 per hour (Paul Henderson) and $1,385 per hour (Nicholas Inns) for the associates who performed most of the work and $1,690 per hour (Keith H. Forst) for the lead partner. … Even after accounting for inflation and the 15 percent discount applied here, Proofpoint does not support the hourly rates requested in this case,” Novak wrote, further concluding no fee would be awarded for paralegal work because the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of the customary rates billed in Richmond.  Novak concluded that the majority of the plaintiffs’ expenses were reasonable and included them in the award, bringing the total to $51,271.86 in fees and costs.

A recent Law 360 story by Dorothy Atkins, “’Alcon’s $1.2M Sanctions Fee Bid For Its MoFo Attys Slashed”, reports that a New York federal judge slashed Alcon Vision's $1.17 million fee request for its attorneys at Morrison Foerster LLP after securing sanctions against Lens.com over its bad faith counterclaims in a trademark dispute, instead awarding $227,000 after finding "glaring deficiencies" in the fee request.  In a 20-page opinion, U.S. District Judge Nina Gershon rejected Alcon Vision LLC's seven-figure request for attorney fees due to the numerous deficiencies and lack of supporting documentation provided by its legal team at Morrison Foerster.

Instead, the judge reduced the fee request as proposed by Lens.com, and she gave the company and its counsel 60 days to pay the fee award.  The sanctions award and fight over fees is the latest development in hotly contested intellectual property litigation that Texas-based Alcon, which was once owned by Novartis AG, kicked off in January 2018.  Alcon accused Las Vegas-based rival Lens.com of selling its trademarked products without permission and with outdated packaging in New York.

Lens.com hit back with antitrust counterclaims in February 2019, claiming Alcon was attacking it just to "ingratiate itself" with eye care providers that would "reward" Alcon by prescribing their customers its lenses.  But in July 2022, the judge slapped Lens.com Inc. and its attorneys with sanctions for filing bad faith counterclaims.  The judge found that the website's counterclaims served no legitimate purpose and were filed to "harass, and cause delay, expense and vexation to Alcon."  The judge ordered Lens.com and its counsel to pay Alcon's costs and attorney fees "caused by its bad faith and vexatious filing and maintaining" of its counterclaims, as well as fees arising from Lens.com's refusal to produce discovery.

The judge also called Lens.com's counterclaims in the dispute "problematic from the start," and ordered Alcon "to file an affidavit setting forth the costs and attorneys' fees for which I have found Lens.com and its counsel jointly and severally liable."  In response, Alcon's lead counsel of Morrison Foerster filed a seven-page declaration seeking $1.17 million in attorney fees for approximately 1,700 hours of work on behalf of 14 attorneys, including partners and associates, and four paralegals.

But Lens.com fired back, arguing that the fee request is excessive, unsupported and doesn't include time records or invoices.  Lens.com also argued that the declaration improperly seeks a single blended rate for its attorneys and an unidentified "standard hourly rate" for its paralegals, rather than the prevailing rate in the district, among other purported deficiencies.  Lens.com argued that it shouldn't have to pay anything in fees due to the legally deficient fee bid, but at most, Alcon should only be entitled to $227,000 in fees.

Judge Gershon mostly sided with Lens.com on the matter.  Her order noted that Morrison Foerster's declaration had "no supporting documentation and little detail" to support the fee calculation.  She rejected Alcon's assumption in the declaration that it is entitled to recover fees that it already paid to Morrison Foerster in connection with the sanctioned conduct, regardless of whether those fees were reasonable.  The judge concluded that ultimately Alcon's fee bid has "glaring deficiencies," including "vague" billing entries, and hundreds of hours of work invoiced in impermissible block billing, or lumping multiple distinct tasks into a single billing entry.

"Here, Alcon has not even attempted to justify, let alone sufficiently justified, as reasonable the hours or rates sought," the order says.  Although the judge noted that she could deny the fee request in its entirety due to the declaration's lack of support, she declined to do so.  However, she also refused to let Alcon submit additional support for its fee request, because the company didn't request permission to supplement the record, and it would require another round of briefing.

Instead, Judge Gershon agreed to adopt Lens.com's proposal to reduce the billable hours across the board by 62.4% and use a blended hourly rate of $355 for all attorneys and paralegals.  "Lens.com's proposal is well within the range of percentage reductions other courts have applied to requested hours for similar fee application deficiencies," the judge wrote, citing a New York federal judge's decision to slash a fee request by 80% earlier this year in Williamsburg Climbing Gym Co. v. Ronit Realty LLC.

A recent Law.com story by Riley Brennan, “3^rd Circ. Clarifies When District Courts Can Award Attorney Fees on Remand”, reports that, in a precedential decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that district courts lack the authority to award attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c) when a case has been properly removed from state court but subsequently remanded based on a forum-selection clause.  In an opinion, authored by Third Circuit Judge David J. Porter, the court vacated a district court’s awarding of attorney fees to the Medical Associates of Erie, concluding that, because a forum-selection clause isn’t a removal defect and doesn’t deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, the court can’t remand and award attorney fees under 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(c).

The Medical Associates of Erie (MAE) and Michael B. Zaycosky originally entered into an employment contract but couldn’t agree on when Zaycosky promised to start his employment, leading MAE to sue Zaycosky in the state court, as prescribed in the contract between the two parties.  However, Zaycosky removed the suit to federal court, leading MAE to move for remand to enforce the contract’s forum-selection clause and for an award of attorney fees.  The district court had remanded and granted MAE 30 days to petition for costs and fees, with MAE timely submitting a petition for $29,517.25.

Zaycosky opposed the petition, arguing the district court “lacked authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to award costs and attorney fees for a remand based on a forum-selection clause, and, alternatively, that a fee award was not warranted because he had an objectively reasonable basis for removal.”  The district court rejected Zaycosky’s arguments and awarded MAE its requested amount.

On appeal, the Third Circuit looked to answer whether courts can award attorney’s fees against the “American Rule,” which holds that court’s presume “[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.”  “Courts may award fees when Congress provides ‘a sufficiently ‘specific and explicit’ indication of its intent to overcome the American Rue’s presumption against fee shifting,’” the court said, determining the question on appeal was whether “§ 1447(c) specifically and explicitly indicates Congress’s intent to allow fee shifting when courts enforce a forum-selection clause.”

Ultimately, the court agreed with Zaycosky’s argument that “§ 1447(c) allows fee shifting only for remands where removal failed to meet the statutory requirements or where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the removed case.”

According to the court, Section 1447(c) limits a plaintiff’s ability to challenge the removal of a case and limits a district court’s authority to remedy abuses of the removal procedure.  Further, while plaintiffs “may move for remand at any time if the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,” “they must challenge removal defects within thirty days after the filing of the notice to remove.”

“Courts, meanwhile, may issue ‘[a]n order remanding’ and ‘may require payment of the just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal,’” noted Porter.  And as a result of the Supreme Court maintaining that “the distinction between ‘properly removed’ cases and cases ‘failing in subject-matter jurisdiction,” since Congress amended § 1447 in 1996, the court reads § 1447(c) as authorizing “courts to shift fees when remanding cases removed without subject matter jurisdiction and cases defectively removed.”

The court further examined whether an order remanding to enforce a forum-selection clause authorizes courts to shift fees, holding that “a remand pursuant to a forum selection clause does not fall within the reasons for remand listed in § 1447(c),” per the court’s 2015 decision in Carlyle Investment Management v. Moonmouth.

The court applied the Supreme Court’s holding that a “forum-selection clause has no bearing” regarding whether a case meets the statutory requirements of venue, to the case, ultimately determining that the district court “had subject matter jurisdiction under § 1332, so it may not remand and award fees under § 1447(c) for a failure of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Further, Mae didn’t identify a defect in the removal, with MAE failing to argue before the district court that Zaycosky failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of removal, arguing instead “that the forum-selection clause was the single obstacle to removal.”

According to the court, “an enforceable forum-selection clause is not a removal defect,” with Zaycosky having “had a statutory right to remove, and he did so according to the statutory requirements, so his removal was proper.”  Therefore, the district court could not award fees under § 1447(c) based on a defective removal.  However, the inability to award fees under the statute didn’t foreclose the power to remand, as Section 1447(c) doesn’t occupy the filed for permissible remands.

Per the court’s 1991 ruling in Foster v. Chesapeake Insurance, “a forum-selection clause an be ‘a proper, non-statutory ground for remand.’”  Since the Third Circuit’s Foster ruling, the Supreme Court has declared that the appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a state forum is through the doctrine of forum non conveniens, of which the “traditional remedy” of outright dismissal.  However, according to the court, it doesn’t eliminate remand as an available remedy for removed cases.

“Nor is Section 1447(c) the only deterrent against abusing removal. Rule 11 requires attorneys and unrepresented litigants to certify that every pleading, written motion, or other paper presented to the court is not presented ‘for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation,’” said the court.

“We presume each litigant bears its own fees and costs, and we do not see a specific and explicit indication of Congress’s intent to displace that presumption for remands not specified in § 1447(c),” concluded the court, vacating the fee award.  “A remand to enforce a forum selection clause is not a remand specified in § 1447(c).  Accordingly, we hold that the District Court lacked the authority to award attorney fees under § 1447(c) when Zaycosky properly removed a case within the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”

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