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Category: Fee Entitlement / Recoverability

Chancery Approves $75M Fee Award in Williams Merger Dispute

August 29, 2022

A recent Law 360 story by Jeff Montgomery, “Chancery Oks $75M Cravath Fee in Williams Merger Dispute” reports that Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP nailed a nearly $75 million fee after a Delaware vice chancellor upheld its 15% contingent pay agreement with The Williams Cos. during much of a long battle with Energy Transfer LP and its affiliates over a $410 million deal-termination damage claim.

Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III also upheld a provision of the agreement that shifted Cravath's fees to Energy Transfer — the losing side of a $410 million battle with Williams over a termination fee triggered when Williams abandoned an earlier deal with one of its affiliates to pursue an eventually doomed, $38 billion Energy Transfer merger.

Energy Transfer, already required to pay Williams' $410 million break fee, fought the reasonableness of Cravath's fee, the 15% contingent arrangement as well as the court's decision to allow quarterly compounding interest for the fee, including a multiyear span while the case was stayed.  According to the decision and a transcript of earlier arguments on the dispute, Cravath's average or "lodestar" rate was $47.1 million for the same hours, compared with $74.8 million under the contingent fee arrangement.

"It is worth pointing out that these sophisticated parties surely were aware that post-merger-agreement litigation, seeking a break fee, could likely include representation on a contingent basis." the vice chancellor wrote in a decision that upheld the Williams side on all points.  Energy Transfer "had every opportunity, therefore, to contract against use of a contingent fee to determine the amount of fees shifted, if they so desired. This they failed to do," the vice chancellor wrote.

"The merger agreement contains no limitation on what kinds of attorneys' fees and expenses may be shifted to the losing party, other than a requirement, which is already implied under Delaware law, that the shifted fees and expenses must be 'reasonable,'" the vice chancellor wrote.  Williams had argued that a new general counsel secured the contingent agreement with Cravath in mid-2017, after Delaware's Supreme Court let stand the vice chancellor's finding that failure of a required tax-treatment for the $1.38 billion merger allowed Energy Transfer to walk away.

Energy Transfer argued that interest should have been suspended during a two-year period between 2019 and 2021 when a Williams' discovery vendor's error brought litigation to a halt. They also argued that litigation time over the interest rate and fees should likewise not count.

The decision also provided for interest at 3.5%, compounded quarterly, with the court observing other decisions that found compound interest "the standard form of interest in the financial market."  In all, according to a court brief filed, Cravath earned $4,358,372.70 prior to the start of the contingent fee terms, $4 million under a contractual fixed fee and $74,846,161 under the contingent fee.

Seventh Circuit Upholds Attorney Fee Win in FMLA Action

August 25, 2022

A recent Law 360 story by Caleb Drickey, “7th Circ. Upholds Teacher’s Win In FMLA Suit” reports that the Seventh Circuit upheld a pair of lower courts' decisions to declare that a Wisconsin governmental entity violated the Family and Medical Leave Act by de facto demoting a concussed teacher, and to grant her attorney fees for her bench trial victory.  In a published opinion, a three-judge panel ruled that the lower court was within its authority to issue a damages-free declaration that the Cooperative Educational Service Agency 5 violated the FMLA by taking away teacher Sarah Simon's work responsibilities after she returned from medical leave. The panel further held that the law mandated the payment of attorney fees in the case of a judgment in favor of workers.

"If this case involved an accomplished neurosurgeon returning from leave to a position that required only tracking the hospital's inventory, we doubt that anyone would question whether the surgeon suffered prejudice," U.S. Circuit Judge Thomas Kirsch said on behalf of the panel. "Simon … suffered harm for which the FMLA provides a remedy."

The opinion stems from the Cooperative's retraction of Simon's job responsibilities after she returned to work in the wake of a workplace concussion.  Although the Cooperative, which provides staff and equipment to 35 school districts in the state, maintained Simon's previous salary, a district court found that Simon's effective demotion to a support staffer prejudiced her, and it granted her a declaratory judgment and roughly $60,000 in attorney fees after a bench trial.

The panel ruled that a court-issued declaration of FMLA violations absent any monetary damages or injunctions to re-hire Simon, who has since taken another job, was within scope of the relief promised by the law.  The FMLA authorized courts to dispense "equitable relief," an undefined term that courts have interpreted to encompass binding orders to hire or promote workers.

The authority to grant declaratory judgments, the panel therefore concluded, could reasonably be inferred.  "It would make little sense for the FMLA to permit courts to grant these heavy-handed remedies yet bar them from using a lighter touch through entry of a declaratory judgment," the panel held.

The panel also affirmed the lower court's finding that the Cooperative prejudiced and harmed Simon even without suffering any cuts to her pay or benefits.  Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide Inc. , the panel held that the demotion of workers returning from medical leave to positions for which they were overly qualified caused injury.

The Commission's remission of Simon's ability to plan lessons and lead classes, the panel therefore concluded, unfairly created a gap in her resume, prejudiced her, and put her employer on the hook for remedies including declaratory judgments and the payment of attorney fees.

The panel affirmed the lower court's separate order of a $59,773.62 attorney fee bill, too.  That fee bill was not an improper imposition of punitive damages, the panel ruled, but was required by the text of the FMLA in the case of a judgment in favor of workers.  "The district judge merely applied the FMLA as written, which expressly requires attorney's fees after a judgment entered in the plaintiff's favor," the panel held.

Feds Ordered to Pay Attorney Fees to Reimburse NY Hospital

August 18, 2022

A recent Law 360 story by Anna Scott Farrell, “Gov’t Ordered To Reimburse NY Hospital $1.7M in Legal Fees” reports that the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ordered the government to reimburse NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital $1.7 million in attorney fees for defending itself against doctors who claimed their payroll taxes were wrongly withheld and eventually settled.

The court's decision answered "a unique question of law" about whether a statute requiring the government to reimburse employers for payroll-tax claims extends to the employer's cost to litigate or negotiate such claims, according to the decision published Friday.

"The short answer is that it does," the court said.

At the center of the decision was a textual parsing of Section 3102(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, which requires the government to indemnify employers against claims for taxes withheld under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act.

The law, as written by Congress, reads, "Every employer required so to deduct the tax shall be liable for the payment of such tax, and shall be indemnified against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any such payment made by such employer."

The court disagreed with the government's position that the phrasing of "any such payment" should apply in a limited context to the payment for "claims and demands" made by the employer. It sided with the hospital's "most natural reading," which included the last part of the sentence — that the payment should apply to "any such payment made by such employer."

Further, the court said, "the plain meaning of 'indemnified' clearly encompasses attorneys' fees and costs."

Friday's decision is a mile marker in a long battle that started in 2013, when three doctors who had worked as residents at the hospital blamed the hospital for the loss of tens of thousands of dollars in FICA payroll taxes on their wages when they were trainees.

The Internal Revenue Service had recently given the trainees a window of time to claw back their tax contributions for the years when they were considered students who weren't required to pay those taxes. In their suit against the hospital, the doctors said it should have helped them recover the wages in time by filing protective FICA tax refund claims on their behalf, according to court filings.

The hospital settled with the residents in 2015, agreeing to pay them $4.5 million toward their lost wages plus their attorney's fees, bringing the total settlement amount to $6.6 million.

A year after the settlement, the hospital sued the IRS, seeking reimbursement of the $6.6 million it had paid the residents. The Court of Federal Claims initially rejected the hospital's bid for reimbursement, but a three-member panel on the Federal Circuit overturned that ruling, saying the hospital was entitled to reimbursement from the government.

Eleventh Circuit Tosses Insurer’s Request for Attorney Fees

June 2, 2022

A recent Law 360 story by Josh Liberatore, “11th Circ. Tosses Insurer’s Bid For Atty Fees After Reversal” reports that an insurer can't seek attorney fees on a $1.6 million judgment it previously won against a Liberty Mutual unit, the Eleventh Circuit confirmed, which comes after the court recently vacated the insurer's win on claims that the Liberty unit breached its contract while defending a fatal accident suit.  In an unpublished opinion, the appellate panel denied Endurance American Specialty Insurance Co.'s bid for attorney fees as moot. 

In May, the Eleventh Circuit reversed Endurance's $1.6 million win, finding that it couldn't show how Safeco Insurance Co. breached an indemnity agreement it had with Comegys Insurance Agency Inc., which was insured by Endurance.  "Safeco did win its appeal," the panel noted, "so, Endurance may not seek attorneys' fees."  Endurance had asked the Eleventh Circuit to overturn a lower court judge's ruling that its claims for attorney fees stemming from the judgment against Safeco were time-barred because Endurance failed to seek the fees within 14 days of the judgment.

The coverage dispute stems from an accident between driver Robert Smith and a motorcyclist, who died.  Safeco insured Smith, who bought his policies through Comegys.  Smith faced a wrongful death suit for which Safeco assigned an attorney who defended the case, and eventually a $7.3 million consent judgment was entered against Smith, according to court documents.  The consent judgment included Safeco paying the motorcyclist's estate the limits of Smith's auto policy, $1.25 million, and assigning the estate Safeco's claim against Comegys for negligent procurement, based on the theory that Comegys failed to find Smith a more robust policy after he had inquired about raising his policy limits.

Endurance insures Comegys under an errors and omissions policy, according to its suit.  The motorcyclist's estate pursued Endurance and Comegys "for the limit of Comegys's policy with Endurance," according to court documents.  The companies eventually paid just over $1.5 million to end the claims, court records show.

Endurance then sought to recoup the money from Safeco, arguing Safeco had breached its contract with Comegys by refusing to indemnify it for the alleged negligence.  Endurance's argument hinged on Safeco assigning an attorney to defend Smith, who allegedly mentioned to the motorcyclist's estate the possibility of a negligent procurement claim against Comegys and recommended an insurance lawyer to the estate.  In July 2019, a jury found in Endurance's favor, and the lower court entered a $1.6 million judgment against Safeco.

While Safeco appealed that decision to the Eleventh Circuit, Endurance launched an appeal of its own, arguing it should be awarded attorney fees for the judgment.  However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment last month, finding that Endurance couldn't show how Safeco had breached its contract with Comegys.  Safeco had acted entirely within the terms of that agreement by providing an insurance policy to Comegys's customers, tendering the policy on time after the accident and providing an attorney to Smith to defend the suit, the Eleventh Circuit panel presiding over that case found.  Safeco can't be held liable for what Smith's attorney decided to do after that, the panel said.

Should Judges Police The Gender Hourly Rate Disparity?

June 1, 2022

A recent Law 360 story by Andrew Stricker, “Should Judges Police The Legal Industry Pay Gap?” reports that as the pay gap between male and female attorneys persists despite industry pledges to do better, the power of judges to potentially bridge the divide is coming into sharper focus.  Following an unusual decision by a federal magistrate, some members of the Philadelphia bar have endorsed the idea that other judges should follow suit and help police gender pay inequities, or at least call them out from the bench.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Timothy R. Rice recently issued the order critiquing elements of a notable employment firm's request and awards that put attorney "status" over performance.  "I don't think it's always my role, but in this instance, I felt I had to set the rates based on the performance of the attorneys who really tried the case, and not a rate that was maybe based more on age or seniority," Judge Rice told Law360 Pulse.

In April, Judge Rice was overseeing the last stage of an age discrimination case brought by Alison Ray, a former sales director at AT&T Mobility Services who was let go at age 49 after more than two decades at the company.  Following a five-day trial, Ray last year secured a $2.3 million award after a jury determined that a company restructuring plan had targeted older employees as "surplus."

In February, lawyers at the firm representing Ray, Console Mattiacci Law LLC, asked for $847,945 in "shifted" fees from AT&T.  That lodestar calculation, based on a 40% contingency agreement, was justified by the complexity of the plaintiff's case, Ray's counsel argued, as well as a "complete and total victory" on her claims that AT&T had willfully violated federal age discrimination law.  The fee petition included nearly 1,570 hours from partners Susan Saint-Antoine and Laura C. Mattiacci, a highly experienced lead trial counsel, and associate Daniel S. Orlow. Saint-Antoine and Mattiacci, who have practiced since 1989 and 2002, respectively, both listed their "usual and customary" rate of $730 an hour. Orlow, who has practiced since 2011, was at $320 an hour.

The petition also included 37 hours contributed by firm principal Stephen G. Console. Console, a nationally recognized employment law expert, charged $900 an hour for consulting on strategy decisions and filings, as well as settlement demands and other key elements of the case.  In an order granting a handful of reductions totaling about $83,000, Judge Rice said Saint-Antoine and Mattiacci should be entitled to the same per-hour rate as Console, who has been practicing for three decades.

"Historically, women in law earn less than their male counterparts, a discrepancy that may reflect hidden bias," he said, citing a 2020 report that found widening pay discrepancies at large law firms.  Referring to a fee schedule used widely in the Third Circuit to determine market rates for Philadelphia-area lawyers, Judge Rice said Saint-Antoine and Mattiacci should be in line for a "premium" over those numbers that put them in line with Console.  Even if the fee schedule "serves as a useful guide on setting hourly rates, its reference to experience should not serve as a cap that precludes exceptionally talented trial lawyers from receiving fair compensation simply because of age or gender," Judge Rice said.

The legal industry pay gap, and its role in women reaching firm leadership and a lack of diversity in many areas of the profession, has been under intense scrutiny for years, but without much in the way of real progress.  In the 2020 report cited by Judge Rice, legal recruiting firm Major Lindsey & Africa found that partner compensation soared between 2010 and 2018.  But in that same period, the pay disparity between male and female equity partners widened significantly, from 24% to 35%.

Nancy Ezold, a veteran Philadelphia employment lawyer, said it was "absolutely" appropriate for Judge Rice to consider rate disparities for lawyers in his court, even though AT&T counsel hadn't raised the issue in its fee-award opposition.  "I don't know of anything in the law that says you have to consider what a law firm pays people," Ezold said.  "But Judge Rice looks at the bigger picture and asks, 'Am I going to do something to perpetuate an inequality and authorize a fee for a male partner over two female partners who really handled this case?'"

Ezold, who once sued her own former law firm in the late 1980s for denying her a partnership based on her gender, argued that fee petitions often provide a substantive overview of who did what work over the history of a litigation.  Depending on the nature of the case, they can also be an opportunity for judges to compare requested rates across different firms and legal teams comprising different gender and experience makeups.

"Here the judge couldn't overlook a difference between male and female in this case because it related directly to the responsibility to decide what would be allowed for each of these attorneys," Ezold said.  "Judges speak out on a lot of things, and I don't see why this should be any different."  Judge Rice served as an assistant U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania before being appointed as a federal magistrate in 2005.  He retired in April, just after issuing the Ray opinion.

In an interview with Law360 Pulse, Judge Rice said the timing was coincidental, noting that the issue of male-female pay disparities had never before been "so squarely presented" to him in a fee petition.  "From the [fee] affidavits I see, and from all I know about law firm pay structures, I do think the pay gap is huge, and there are just so many variables out there that have cut against giving women equal pay," such as lack of trial experience and other opportunities to advance, he said.

"When I see lawyers perform in an exemplary fashion, it's appropriate they be paid at higher rates commensurate with their skills, not just based on the years they've practiced," Judge Rice added.  Alice Ballard, another veteran Philadelphia employment lawyer who provided a fee affidavit in the Ray case, said Judge Rice's prior time as a trial lawyer was evident in the opinion, including in his positive assessment of the hours Console Mattiacci dedicated to mock trial runs and other "essential" advocacy preparation.

Judge Rice "really understands what it means to prepare for a trial like this, and everyone on my beat really appreciates that," she said.  But Ballard took issue with Judge Rice's ultimate reliance on what she described as an outdated fee schedule, rates that don't well reflect the special skills of trial work, Mattiacci's successful track record or the contingency fee model.

She also cautioned against reading the opinion as a critique of the hourly rate request for Console, whom she called a "lion" of the city's employment bar.  Regarding his reference to the legal industry's gender pay disparities,"it's great that he took the opportunity to bring it up, but I just don't think it has much to do with this specific case," Ballard said.