A recent Law.com story by Emily Saul, “’Policyholders May Recoup Attorney Fees If Insurer Fails in Contesting Duty to Indemnify”, reports that an insurer defending a policyholder in litigation must also reimburse the insured party’s coverage action costs if the insurer loses a legal challenge to its indemnity obligation, a judge has ruled.  Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Gerald Lebovits, in a case without a definitive decision from the state’s highest court, affirmed that when an insured “is cast in a defensive posture by the legal steps an insurer takes in an effort to free itself from its policy obligations,” and the insured party then prevails, the policyholder may recover attorney fees “incurred in defending against the insurer’s action.”  Little New York appellate precedent exists on this specific fee issue, Lebovits noted in his 10-page order, issued.  The decision increases insurance companies’ risk, should companies seek to deny coverage.

The underlying litigation—which continues—involves construction in two mixed-use commercial and residential buildings in Manhattan.  Plaintiffs sued defendants Crystal Curtain Wall System Corp. and other affiliated entities in 2011 over water damage caused by alleged construction defects.  Utica Mutual Insurance Company and Utica National Assurance Company sued their policyholder Crystal entities in 2022, asking a judge to define the scope of its duty to indemnify the client.

Crystal subsequently moved to dismiss the action not yet ripe and sought an award of attorneys fees, should their motion prevail. Utica cross-moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to find it had no duty to indemnify Crystal as to the costs of repair or replacement of the curtain wall.  “This attorney fee request implicates a legal question about the parameters of a prevailing insured’s entitlement to attorney fees from its insurer that New York appellate courts appear not to have considered,” the judge wrote.

“The parties do not cite, and this court has not found, any decision of the Court of Appeals or the Appellate Division discussing whether a prevailing policyholder is entitled to attorney fees when the insurer has acknowledged a duty to defend but contested the duty to indemnify,” the order states.  Absent precedent, Lebovitz said the court concludes for itself that a policyholder is entitled to attorneys fees when it prevails in an action brought by the insurance company challenging its duty to indemnify.

“New York doctrine in this area rests on the insurer’s duty to defend its insured in ‘any action arising out of the occurrence, including a defense against an insurer’s declaratory-judgment action.’ (City Club Hotel, 3 NY3d at 598 [emphasis added].)  This is true when an insurer contests both the duty to defend and to indemnify,” the judge wrote.  “No logical reason exists why it should be different—why an insurer’s duty to defend its insured should suddenly cease—when the insurer disputes only the duty to indemnify.  And the Court of Appeals’ holdings in this area have always been phrased in broad terms that would encompass an insurer’s indemnification-only challenge: They permit recovery by the insured that prevails against ‘the legal steps an insurer takes in an effort to free itself from its policy obligations,’ period—not merely the insurer’s policy obligation to defend.”

A recent Law 360 story by Katie Buehler, “’Petition Watch: NLRB GC Authority, Copyright Atty Fees”, reports that Toy maker Hasbro Inc. asked the justices in a Nov. 20 petition to reverse a First Circuit panel's June refusal to award its lawyers $1.9 million in attorney fees after defeating a copyright suit over the Game of Life.  The appellate panel found the copyright claims brought against Hasbro and heirs of the game developer Reuben Klamer were not objectively "unreasonable," and therefore didn't warrant the requested attorney fees under Section 505 of the Copyright Act.

Lorraine Markham, widow of game developer BIll Markham, and her husband's company, Markham Concepts Inc., had sued Hasbro and Klamer's heirs for royalties for the iconic 1960s board game and control of its intellectual property.  The First Circuit panel uses a highly restrictive test to determine whether prevailing parties in copyright lawsuits are entitled to attorney fees and costs, Hasbro argued in its petition.  Unlike the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth circuits, the First Circuit views fees as available "only if the plaintiff's position was 'objectively quite weak,'" according to the company's petition.

The Supreme Court should address this circuit split and determine the proper standard for reviewing attorney fee requests under Section 505 of the Copyright Act, Hasbro said.  "The conflict is intractable, and the only resolution is this court's intervention," the company said.  Lorraine Markham and Markham Concepts haven't filed a response to the Hasbro and Klamer high court petition yet.

At the First Circuit, the Markham entities argued against the attorney fee awards by pointing to a Rhode Island federal judge's ruling, which sided with Hasbro and found the game was made on a "work for hire" basis, but also found the claims "objectively reasonable."

The case is Hasbro Inc. et al. v. Markham Concepts Inc. et al., case number 23-565.

A recent Law 360 story by Beverly Bank, “’Vague’ Billing Justifies 10% Cut in Atty Fees, Judge Says”, reports that a federal magistrate judge recommended slashing an Iron Workers' benefits funds' request for attorney fees in a case over an employer's unpaid contributions, saying there are "vague" billing entries from the plaintiffs' counsel as part of a $2.2 million judgment.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Kimberly G. Altman issued a report and recommendation, suggesting the district court cut a nearly $111,000 attorney fee request from Iron Workers Local No. 25's benefit funds by 10%.  The attorney fees dispute is connected with U.S. District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds' order, requiring Next Century Rebar LLC to pay more than $2.2 million in unpaid contributions with interest and liquidated damages.  The company filed a notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit.

"Portions of the trustees' itemized hourly work are described insufficiently to prove that the work 'was performed with reasonable diligence and efficiency,'" Judge Altman said.  The judge said many of the funds' billing entries linked to an audit are "vague," necessitating a drop in proposed attorney fees from around $110,900 to roughly $99,800.  Judge Altman did not disturb the funds' request for more than $18,200 in costs.

The judge pointed to billing entries connected with an audit, saying some entries about the correspondence and emails with the auditor "provide the court with little information as to the necessity of the work."  The benefit funds requested around $110,900 in October, saying the plaintiffs' counsel spent 388.8 attorney hours in pursuing the case.

Next Century Rebar called billing entries linked to the attorney fees request "excessive, duplicative, and vague" as part of the company's Oct. 30 response. The company challenged the funds' bid for fees over review of the audit.  "Excessive review of the audit is ongoing throughout the time entries of multiple persons without any detail or reason for the excessive amount of time spent reviewing, re-reviewing, and again revisiting the audit report," Next Century Rebar said.

The company said the funds were seeking fees for clerical work that could have been undertaken by a legal clerk or assistant to the plaintiffs' attorneys.  Judge Altman found that some of Next Century Rebar's complaints about the clerical work entries were valid and warranted lower attorney fees.  "Next Century has highlighted instances where parts or all of the described work was clerical in nature and could have been handled by paralegals or other staff at much lower rates," the judge said.

The judge took on arguments from Next Century that the request related to audit costs of about $13,000 was "outrageous," saying the company didn't raise evidence to back up this claim.  Judge Altman said an affidavit "from an attorney that worked closely on this case and on the review of the audit" corroborated the cost of the audit.

A recent Law.com article, “’Exploring the American Rule on Attorney Fees”, reports on the American Rule doctrine and the limits of the offer of judgment rule in New Jersey.  The article reads:

In the recent J.P. Electric, Inc. v. LPMG Construction Management, LLC case, approved for publication on Nov. 2, a trial judge granted defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal at the conclusion of plaintiff’s proofs.  Prior to trial, defendant had made an offer for judgment to be taken against it under the offer of judgment rule, R.4:58.  After dismissal of plaintiff’s case, defendant filed a motion to have plaintiff pay its fees and costs.  The trial judge denied the motion, holding that where a plaintiff’s claim is dismissed, without plaintiff having secured a favorable verdict and money judgment, as required by the rule, defendant had no right to collect its fees from the plaintiff. Defendant appealed the court’s denial of its fee application.

The Appellate Division opinion, affirming the trial judge, held that for a defendant who has invoked R.4:58 by offering to have judgment taken, it would be necessary for plaintiff to have recovered a money judgment to compare the amount of the judgment with the monetary offer made by defendant.  That comparison requirement is specifically set forth in R.4:58-2 and R.4:58-3 but, of course, there was no money judgment because of the dismissal as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division’s two-page opinion affirming the trial court contained emphatic language: “Lest there be any doubt, a mid-trial involuntary dismissal does not entitle a defendant offeror to fee-shifting under the Rule.”  No doubt the reason for a two-page opinion to be published.  A forceful reminder to trial courts and trial bar of the specific limitations of the offer of judgment rule.

The appellate court held that the policy reasons inherent in the rule’s language would be undermined if such fee shifting were permitted, because the rule is not one designed to transform an offer of judgment into a general fee-shifting rule.  Further, R.4:58-3(c) also provides that no allowances shall be granted if a plaintiff’s claim is dismissed or if a no-cause verdict is returned.

Of course the Supreme Court by rule or the Legislature by statute could provide that in an offer-of-judgment context, dismissal of plaintiff’s case after an offer of judgment is made might also allow defendant to recover fees and costs on post-trial application to the trial judge by creating a new exception to the American Rule of fee payment.

Under the American Rule, the prevailing party is ordinarily not entitled to collect fees from the adversary.  This is based upon the policy that, “Sound judicial administration will be best advanced if litigant’s bear their own counsel fees.” See, Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Saltman, 217 N.J. Super. 604, 609-610 (App. Div. 1987), which furnishes a concise history of the rule and its application.  There are some exceptions to the ordinary application of the American Rule, as when it is permitted by court rule or statute; or pursuant to the terms of a contract; or when counsel fees are a traditional element of damages in the action; or where an insured has incurred counsel fees in defending an action under a disclaimed liability or indemnity policy.

The first reported case in which counsel for plaintiff made application for fees from the insurer after plaintiff’s success in requiring the insurer to defend and indemnify a workers’ compensation claim against its insured because of convoluted policy language was Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Co., 48 N.J. 291 (1966).

In Gerhardt, Justice Jacobs, writing for a unanimous court, rejected arguments that Ms. Gerhardt should qualify for reimbursement of her fees in the successful coverage action under the inherent equitable power of the court and by analogy to fee payments where a coverage claim on a liability policy had been successful.  Justice Jacobs pointed out that exceptions to the American Rule, that each party bear its own fees, generally rests on statutory provisions which have no counterpart in New Jersey law.  He wrote that when the New Jersey rules were originally adopted, they embraced the view that sound judicial administration would be best advanced by having each litigant bear counsel fees incurred, except in a few specially designated instances.

The American Rule and its exceptions have been argued to the court over the years.  The argument for awarding fees to a successful plaintiff is based on equitable considerations, i.e., to give the successful party full benefit of the sums to which it was found entitled. Sears Mortgage Corp. v. Rase, 134 N.J. 326, 3540356 (1993); Shore Orthopedic Group v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 199 N.J. 310 (2009); In re Estate of Vayda, 184 N.J. 115 (2005).  “The American Rule prohibits recovery of counsel fees by the prevailing party against the losing party … The purposes behind the American Rule are threefold: (1) unrestricted access to the courts for all persons; (2) ensuring equity by not penalizing persons for exercising their right to litigate a dispute, even if they lose; and (3) administrative convenience.” Occhifinto v. Olivo Constr. Co., 221 N.J. 443, 449 (2015).

On through the years and to present, the courts as indicated have expressed their support of the American Rule.  If there are proceedings in J.P. Electric seeking relief from the Supreme Court, chances for success are indeed bleak based on the judicial history of New Jersey.

A recent Law.com story by Allison Dunn, “Judge Rejects Quinn Emanuel’s $1700 Hourly Rate Request, Slashing Fees for Virginia Settlement By Nearly 80%”, reports that a federal judge in Virginia drastically reduced Quinn Emanuel attorneys’ requested fees related to enforcing a $6 million settlement agreement they successfully obtained for a client over a fraud scheme involving the Model Tobacco Building in Richmond, Virginia.  Some of the rates requested by Quinn Emanuel—$1,690 per hour for a lead partner or $1,385 per hour for associates—were unrealistic for the Richmond market in the present case, the court found.

Quinn Emanuel attorneys based out of Washington, D.C., who served as plaintiffs’ counsel, sought prejudgment interest at a rate of 6%, as well as $236,641.18 attorney fees and costs relating to enforcing a $6 million settlement agreement between the plaintiffs, SS Richmond and MK Richmond, against Christopher A. Harrison, the owner and manager of several entities including, The C.A. Harrison Cos., CAH Model Tobacco and the McKenzie Blake Development Co.  Under the settlement agreement, the Harrison defendants were obligated to pay the $6 million payment by June 8, but the plaintiffs maintain that they have failed to do so, according to the district court’s opinion.

The plaintiffs had accused the defendants of “‘a pattern of bank fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud and money laundering in an effort to seize control and interest in a project to purchase and refurbish’” the Model Tobacco Building, which previously served as a factory for the United States Tobacco Co.  Harrison’s counsel from midsize firms Mahdavi Bacon Halfhill & Young, as well as Fraim & Fiorella, opposed the plaintiffs’ request.  The defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to establish the reasonableness for such hourly rates.

The judge agreed in part with the plaintiffs that, in addition to the prejudgment interest, they were also entitled to attorney fees and costs, but Novak also sided with the defendants in finding Quinn Emanuel’s more than $1,000-per-hour rates for both partners and associates in post-settlement motions were ”not reasonable in accordance with the Court’s prior decisions and the Richmond legal market,” the opinion said.  Considering the reasonable rates for attorneys in Richmond with comparable skills, experience, reputation, as well as other factors, Novak reduced Quinn Emanuel’s total fee award to $50,380.

“Our client is focused on the Model Tobacco project.  As to fees, we don’t agree with everything the judge wrote, but Judge Novak obviously took the time to write a thoughtful opinion,” said George R. A. Doumar, an attorney with Mahdavi Bacon, representing the defendants.  “The local market dictates hourly rates awarded, and Quinn Emanuel was seeking rates far higher than I’ve encountered for fee awards in Virginia courts.  The lawyers I see day in and day out are billing at much lower rates.  The judge also seemed to be aware of law firm billing practices such as block billing and multiple reviews, and took that into account.”

Novak concluded that a rate of $650 for the lead partner and $400 for associates was a reasonable rate based 12 factors such as time and labor expended; the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; the customary fee for like work; the amount in controversy and the results obtained; the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; attorney fee awards in similar cases and more.

“Here, Plaintiffs have failed to rebut the presumption that the hourly rates should be derived from the community in which the court sits. While Plaintiffs argue that this case has factual connections to Washington, D.C., and that the underlying case involved ‘complicated, high-stakes claims in financial fraud and RICO claims,’ … they present no evidence that a local attorney could not have provided competent representation,” Novak wrote, citing Rehabilitation Association of Virginia, Inc. v. Metcalf (1998).  “Because Plaintiffs have not made the requisite showing to apply out-of-town rates, the Court will consider the proper market from which to determine reasonable hourly rates as the market where the Court sits—Richmond, Virginia.”

The plaintiffs failed to file any affidavits from other law firms regarding “the prevailing market rates in Richmond for similar work,” and said Quinn Emanuel proffered no cases concerning fee awards within the district, Novak held.  Additionally, the law firm cited a news article from Law.com publication The American Lawyer titled, “What $1,000 an Hour Gets You in the AM 200 Today.”  The judge, however, said the article didn’t weigh in the law firm’s favor since it “cut against the reasonableness of the Plaintiff’s requested fees.”

In one of the cases cited by the plaintiffs, Proofpoint v. Vade Secure, a 2020 opinion by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, the requested hourly rates ranged from $590 to $675 per hour for associates, and $880 to $915 per hour for more senior attorneys, the opinion said.

“Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs charged $1,305 per hour (Paul Henderson) and $1,385 per hour (Nicholas Inns) for the associates who performed most of the work and $1,690 per hour (Keith H. Forst) for the lead partner. … Even after accounting for inflation and the 15 percent discount applied here, Proofpoint does not support the hourly rates requested in this case,” Novak wrote, further concluding no fee would be awarded for paralegal work because the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of the customary rates billed in Richmond.  Novak concluded that the majority of the plaintiffs’ expenses were reasonable and included them in the award, bringing the total to $51,271.86 in fees and costs.

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