A recent Law 360 story by Chart Riggall, “Flint Class Firms Say Atty Fee Dispute Already Decided”, reports that two law firms that helped negotiate a $626 million settlement over the Flint, Michigan, water crisis urged a Michigan federal judge to dismiss a suit from their former co-counsel claiming the firm had its rightful proceeds from the litigation arbitrarily slashed.  Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC and Pitt McGehee Palmer Bonanni & Rivers PC told the court that their former ally in McAlpine PC had ample opportunities to take issue with the fee split, but the firm instead "sat on its hands for years" before bringing a claim.

"McAlpine had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the amount of any attorneys fee award in the appropriate place to do so — the federal Flint class action," the defendants said, arguing McAlpine's claims are barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  A construction firm based in suburban Detroit, McAlpine filed suit — initially in state court — earlier this month claiming it had been paid a paltry sum for its contributions to the litigation.

The class action itself was settled in 2021 when U.S. District Judge Judith Levy gave final approval to a $626 million settlement, a deal expected to provide payments to more than 100,000 people affected by water contaminated by lead.  Government officials were accused of switching the city's water supply to the Flint River despite information cautioning them against doing so, and working to cover up the ensuing public health crisis.

McAlpine argued its work was instrumental to the litigation, contributing about $16 million worth of labor, or about 24% of the total lodestar figure of $84.5 million. But Cohen Milstein and Pitt McGehee offered to pay just $500,000, McAlpine said.  "Defendants breached the co-counsel agreement by failing to distribute an attorney fee award reflecting McAlpine's respective lodestar, in favor of distributing a greater share to themselves," the firm alleged.

The defendant firms, however, said McAlpine should have raised any issues with the fee split first during the negotiations before Judge Levy, which entailed "extensive additional briefing and argument" for nearly a year.  McAlpine could have also raised the issue when a group of objectors appealed Judge Levy's fee order to the Sixth Circuit, where it was later upheld, but failed to do so.

"McAlpine is precluded from asserting this separate action for increased attorneys fees for its work in the federal Flint class action," the firms said.  "McAlpine's [complaint] is, in essence, a collateral attack on the federal Flint class action's fee award order."

A recent Law 360 story by Jack Karp, “Wachtell Wins Bid to Arbitrate X’s $90M Fee Dispute”, reports that a California state judge granted Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz's request to send to arbitration a dispute with X Corp. over $90 million in legal fees tied to the fight over Elon Musk's purchase of Twitter.  The master retention agreement between Wachtell and X, formerly called Twitter, clearly delegates all disputes over arbitrability issues to an arbitrator, Superior Court Judge Richard B. Ulmer said in minutes issued after a brief remote hearing at which neither party appeared for Wachtell's motion to compel arbitration.

"The master retention agreement only carves out actions 'enforcing claims for injunctive or equitable relief.'  It did not carve out any other issue or circumscribe the scope of the parties' broad delegation clause," the judge said in adopting the tentative order.  X sued the firm in July, accusing Wachtell of exploiting "lame duck fiduciaries" as it "ran up the tab" and earned a $90 million fee helping the company defeat Musk's effort to back out of a $44 billion deal to acquire the company.

The firm ultimately helped Twitter obtain an expedited trial that put pressure on Musk before he finally agreed to close the deal on its original terms.  Wachtell moved to compel arbitration of X's claims in September.  The arbitration clause in question delegates jurisdiction over what kinds of claims can be arbitrated to the arbitrator in two places, and uses language derived from a Ninth Circuit decision on the topic, undercutting X's claims that the issue was left unclear by the contract, Wachtell argued.

X pushed back in early October, arguing that it is seeking only equitable relief since it wants the court to void its closing-day letter agreement and any associated excess fee payment in addition to restitution or disgorgement of the fees charged by Wachtell.  X also sought attorney fees and pre- and post-judgment interest.

"Once this court has set aside the closing day letter agreement, X Corp. will recover its payment to Wachtell, less Wachtell's 'reasonable fee.'  What is 'reasonable' under the circumstances will necessarily encompass various considerations and equitable principles," it said.  That means the "sole method" for X to win relief in the case requires the "application of equitable principles" to determine Wachtell's reasonable compensation, it said.

But Wachtell countered that the rescission X is seeking is "an action in equity" only when the recovery sought by the plaintiff through rescission involves something other than the money paid by the plaintiff.  "Here, every dollar of the final fee that X Corp. seeks to recover from Wachtell Lipton is a dollar that Twitter paid. That is restitutionary disgorgement — which is legal relief," the firm said in its Oct. 10 motion to compel arbitration.

A recent Law 360 story by Adrian Cruz, “Attorneys Seek $94 Million From DuPont PFAS Settlement”, reports that attorneys representing municipalities suing DuPont and other chemical companies over contaminated drinking water from PFAS chemicals have asked a South Carolina federal judge for $94 million in attorney fees.  In a memorandum, the group of attorneys from FeganScott LLC, Douglas & London PC, Napoli Shkolnik PLLC and Baron & Budd PC said their request of $94.8 million in fees is only 8% of the $1.19 billion settlement that was reached with Chemours, DuPont and Corteva in June.  The attorneys added that the 8% request is significantly below the 25% limit allowed by the Fourth Circuit.

Some of the reasons cited for the attorneys' fee request include a workload of nearly 415,000 combined billed hours, the novelty and complexity of the questions being asked throughout the litigation progress, the added challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the end result, which settled one of the nation's largest multidistrict litigations, which they said benefits over 100 million Americans due to the drinking water improvements that will be made as a result.

"The DuPont settlement was the result of a years-long, multitrack effort by plaintiffs' counsel who expended hundreds of thousands of combined hours on multiple fronts, including settlement efforts, litigation efforts and MDL case administration, without any guarantee of a recovery," the memorandum said.  "This three-pronged approach was necessary given the highly complex nature of this MDL involving so many defendants, and in order to meet the challenges and obstacles presented by this MDL, including, of course, litigating in the midst of a global pandemic."

Along with the $94.8 million in fees, the attorneys also requested $2.1 million in costs, noting that the amount covers about 10% of the total out-of-pocket costs spent on the litigation.  The attorneys added that because of the case's size and the involvement of large corporations, it was a risky one for the firms involved as they ultimately spent over $21 million without any guarantee of recouping those costs.

"Considering the expense and time involved in prosecuting this case against well-resourced defense counsel on a purely contingent basis, with no guarantee of a positive result and ever-mounting litigation costs in excess of $21 million, risky cases such as this are not for the faint of heart," the memorandum said.  "Whereas many shied away from this litigation, the court-appointed counsel poured their heart and soul into this litigation and should be rewarded accordingly."  In June, the municipalities reached a $10.3 billion settlement with 3M, which was also sued for its role in manufacturing products using PFAS and the ensuing water contamination that allegedly happened as a result of the chemicals.

"Addressing the PFAS settlements with DuPont and 3M, this wasn't just a case for us at the PEC [plaintiffs' executive committee], but a long, uphill battle spanning half a decade," plaintiffs' attorney Paul Napoli told Law360.  "For five strenuous years, we worked relentlessly without immediate compensation, pouring significant financial resources into the case.  This endeavor saw us navigating vast expanses of documents, managing an overwhelming amount of data, and facing formidable defenses that often seemed insurmountable.  Our proposed 8% fee is not just competitive within the industry, but it reflects the hardships we faced, the risks we took, and the substantial investments we made."

Lead plaintiffs’ counsel spent nearly 415,000 hours on the litigation, according to their fee motion, with a lodestar of more than $300 million, far more than what they were asking for in the DuPont settlement.  The lodestar is the number of hours spent on a case multiplied by the average hourly rate of the lawyers.

In a declaration attached to the fee motion, Vanderbilt Law School Professor Brian Fitzpatrick said the fee request was below the norm, even for settlements worth $1 billion or more.  The average award in 36 class action settlements of that size, between 2006 and 2023, was 12.1%, he wrote.  “Arguably, an even greater percentage fee is warranted,” the motion says, “but class counsel recognizes that their efforts to resolve these claims against DuPont parallel the claims being resolved against 3M.  To request a different percentage of the fund simply because of the size of the fund was not deemed justified.”

The motion states that the fees would be considered common benefit fees and deducted from retainer fees that firms already received through their own contingency contracts.  Lead plaintiffs’ lawyers also asked for $2.1 million in costs relating to the DuPont settlement, about 10% of their total expenses when including the 3M deal.

A recent Law 360 article by Hilary Gerzhoy and Julienne Pasichow, “Avoiding The Ethical Pitfalls of Crowdfunded Legal Fees”, reports on the ethics of crowdfunding for legal fees.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Within two days of being charged with manslaughter in the death of Jordan Neely, Daniel Penny had crowdfunded over $1.5 million to cover his legal fees.  Penny was charged with killing Neely, a Michael Jackson impersonator, on a New York City subway after placing him a fatal chokehold.  The case was widely covered and highly politicized.

Democrats, including Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, D-N.Y., and New York Gov. Kathy Hochul, called for charges against Penny and justice for Neely's family.  Republicans, including Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, R-Ga., and Rep. Matt Gaetz, R-Fla., voiced their support for Penny.

Crowdfunding legal services is a relatively new phenomenon.  It's most often used to fund litigation involving individuals — as opposed to corporate entities — that implicates human rights issues, the environment and judicial review.

In one widely publicized case, two Yemeni refugees with valid immigrant visas were intercepted at Dulles International Airport, handcuffed and sent out of the country — the result of former President Donald Trump's temporary seven-country travel ban, which had been signed just a few hours earlier while the brothers were en route.  The crowdfunding campaign raised $36,600 in its first week.

While crowdfunding legal services provides a way for many to access lawyers when representation would otherwise be unaffordable, it also comes with a bevy of ethics risks.  This article will examine the key ethical rules governing crowd-sourced legal funds and the steps lawyers can take to mitigate their risk.

The Daniel Penny Case

In May, the Manhattan District Attorney's office charged Penny, a 24-year-old U.S. Marines veteran, with second-degree manslaughter after he killed Neely on a New York City subway earlier that month.  For more than three minutes, Penny placed Neely in a fatal chokehold leading to his death.  Penny claimed self-defense, stating that Neely was threatening passengers on the train.  It was later learned that Neely had been suffering from a mental health crisis and was experiencing homelessness at the time he was killed.  Penny was released on $100,000 bond.  On June 28, he appeared in court in Manhattan to plead not guilty.

The law firm representing Penny — Raiser & Kenniff PC — arranged for a fundraiser on the Christian crowdfunding site GiveSendGo to cover Penny's legal fees.  As of Sept. 29, the fundraiser has collected nearly $3 million.  How can Penny's legal team use those crowd-sourced funds? What restrictions are imposed by the ethics rules?

This article will examine the critical steps to ensure compliance with the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which are largely adopted in most jurisdictions.

Confidentiality Runs to the Client, Not the Funders

Perhaps the most fundamental feature of the lawyer-client relationship is the protection of client confidences.  Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 prohibits a lawyer from revealing "information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted [under certain enumerated circumstances]."

A lawyer must make reasonable efforts to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized access to the information, a standard that is highly fact-dependent and considers the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which additional safeguards would enhance security versus hinder the representation.  Lawyers who organize fundraisers, manage crowdfunded donations and apply them toward legal fees must ensure that they neither represent nor imply that they will provide information about the representation to donors in exchange for donations.

It is best to obtain informed consent for any information that will be disclosed to donors and to steer clear of "providing specific information about how the funds will be used to effectuate the legal strategy," as articulated by the D.C. Bar in a 2018 ethics opinion.  To avoid any ambiguity, lawyers should note in the narrative section of the fundraiser that they will not provide any information about the objectives of the representation, actions taken, specific uses of the funds or developments in the case.

When donors fund a lawyer's representation of a client through crowd-sourcing, they must do so with the understanding that they will receive no information about the representation.  We recommend including the proposed narrative language for the fundraiser in the engagement letter signed by the client, which should also describe the fundraising arrangement and the fact that the collected funds will be applied to legal fees and expenses as they are earned or incurred.

There may be instances in which a client wants a lawyer to provide case updates to donors or specific individuals.  To do so, the lawyer must obtain informed consent from the client.  This requires that the lawyer explain the risks of disclosure to the client and have the client approve of the exact information to be disclosed.

Most importantly, the client must understand that disclosing privileged and confidential information about the representation to third parties will destroy the attorney-client privilege and prevent the lawyer from later claiming privilege over the disclosed information.  The same warning should also be given to a client who is managing the fundraiser themselves and wishes to disclose case information or updates to donors.

Crowd-sourced Funds Cannot Interfere with a Lawyer's Professional Independence

Before accepting crowd-sourced funds as payment for legal services, a lawyer must obtain informed consent from the client.  This is true regardless of whether the lawyer is self-administering the funds as they are earned or whether the client is paying the lawyer's invoices using crowd-sourced funds.  Lawyers should consider including relevant language providing for this arrangement in their engagement letter with the client.  Under the Model Rules, even if such an arrangement is in place, a lawyer may not, under any circumstances, allow the person or persons paying the lawyer's fees to "direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services."

While donors' generosity often enables a client to pursue legal claims or defenses where it would otherwise be financially impossible, donors cannot control how the fundraised money is used within the representation.  Only the client determines the objectives of the representation and whether to follow the lawyer's recommended strategy.

Ensuring that the narrative statement on the fundraising website contains language informing donors that they will not be permitted to exert control or influence over the objectives of the representation or the methods by which they are carried out — in addition to not being entitled to case information — may prove helpful in warding off donors who believe that their dollars earn them a say in the representation.  There may be situations in which the donors' interests differ from those of the client — for example, where donors may wish to minimize the amount spent on the representation to get more for less or avoid taking steps in the representation that may be costly.

In circumstances where the lawyer is aware of divergent interests between the donors and the client, the lawyer cannot accept the representation or continue the crowdfunded payment arrangement unless the lawyer is certain that they can exercise independent judgment and will not allow the donors to interfere with their professional decision making.

Be Circumspect About Trial Publicity

Crowdfunded cases are often those that are highly publicized, political and involve public figures. They tend to come with an increased public desire for publicity and insider information.  Many of these cases go to trial, which further extends the period in which the public remains interested and heightens public intrigue.

Model Rule 3.6 governs trial publicity and warns lawyers against making statements that are likely to prejudice the proceedings in any way.  This is all the more true in highly publicized cases, where a lawyer's statements about a case are likely to be widely disseminated.  While media attention on a case does not change lawyers' confidentiality obligations under Model Rule 1.6, Model Rule 3.6 provides that lawyers can provide concrete facts about the case if they are unlikely to cause prejudice.

Lawyers can reveal basic information about the claim at issue, people involved, public records, the existence of a pending investigation, the scheduling or results of litigation, and requests for help in obtaining evidence, and they can offer warnings of danger to an individual or to the public.  In criminal cases, lawyers can provide additional information to the public, including, among other things, information about the residence and occupation of the accused, and the location, time and place of the arrest.

Where a client has suffered prejudice due to recent bad publicity, the lawyer can make statements to mitigate that prejudice.  A lawyer should not speak publicly about a case, however, without the consent of their client after the client weighs the risks and benefits of such disclosures.

Treat Cowdfunded Legal Fees as Advanced Fees, Safeguarding Them in a Trust Account

The two most prominent ethics opinions to address crowdfunded legal fees, a 2015 Philadelphia Bar opinion and a 2018 D.C. Bar opinion, emphasize the importance of safeguarding crowdfunded fees in a trust account and not moving them over to an operating account until they are earned.

As the D.C. Bar opinion notes, because crowdfunding can "trigger areas of confusion that may not be present in a traditional client-self pay situation," lawyers should establish, in a written fee agreement, the rate of their fees, the scope of the representation and specific plans for crowdfunded money, such as the ownership of excess crowdfunds and responsibility for payment if the crowdfunds do not fully cover legal fees and expenses.

Critically, funds collected by a lawyer on a client's behalf through crowdfunding should be treated as advanced fees and placed in a trust account for the client.  In the crowdfunded legal fees context, lawyers need to be especially cognizant of their duty not to charge excessive fees under Rule 1.5.  For example, if a matter resolves quickly, a lawyer would be hard-pressed to claim all of the proceeds of the fundraiser as fees.

Conclusion

The crowdfunding of legal fees represents an exciting opportunity to provide access to legal services to those for whom it might be otherwise unattainable.  With a principled approach — paying special attention to your obligations to maintain confidentiality and your professional independence, and safeguarding funds in a trust account — you can protect yourself from ethics mishaps while serving a wider array of clients.

Hilary Gerzhoy is a partner and vice chair of the legal ethics and malpractice group at HWG LLP.  Julienne Pasichow is an associate at the firm.

A recent Law 360 story by Travis Bland, “Missing Word Sinks $2.65M Honeywell Fee Bid in Royalty Row”, reports that Honeywell lost out on $2.65 million in attorney fees following a win in a scanner royalties dispute with a Japanese competitor in part because an agreement between the two companies didn't use the word "attorney" in a provision the American company invoked to try to receive the award.  In an order, a North Carolina federal court told Honeywell that it would not be awarding the attorney fees after the company prevailed in a jury trial against OPTO Electronics Co., reasoning that while other parts of the partners' contract referenced attorney fees, the part Honeywell cited to try to recover the money only says "fees."

"That provision, drafted by sophisticated counsel, does not mention 'attorney fees' (like every other case under governing Delaware law that has awarded attorney fees under a contract)," U.S. District Judge Kenneth D. Bell wrote in his order.  Judge Bell also reasoned that the provision doesn't have the "prevailing party" language that is the "hallmark" of contracts under Delaware law for a winning litigant to force an opponent to pay attorney fees.  The provision Honeywell cited might not even apply to court actions, Judge Bell said.

Evidence in the case made it clear that Honeywell knew how to craft a contract so that attorney fees would be awarded when it won a case, but it didn't do that in the agreement with OPTO Electronics, according to Judge Bell.  OPTO Electronics was also let down by Judge Bell's order.  He punted the Japanese company's requests to throw out the jury verdict, award it a victory or, at least, to grant a new trial.

OPTO Electronics had a "full and fair opportunity to present its evidence and arguments to the jury and the court," Judge Bell said. "While OPTO's arguments were potentially persuasive and the court would have upheld a jury verdict in OPTO's favor, the court finds that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's and the court's verdicts."  In denying the company a new trial, Judge Bell also rejected arguments that the court made an error when it did not allow certain evidence that OPTO Electronic asserted was favorable to it.

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