A recent Law 360 story by Emily Lever, “NY Firm Says Enviro Co. Failed To Pay Legal Fees” reports that Bochner IP PLLC sued environmental company Global Thermostat in New York state court over allegedly skipping out on a $102,000 bill for its work on intellectual property transactions aimed at fending off bankruptcy, saying Global Thermostat "never intended to pay" in full.

When Global Thermostat found itself at risk of bankruptcy, the company's co-founder agreed to grant it the use of her intellectual property, according to a complaint filed in New York Supreme Court.  Bochner handled the IP transactions, for which Global Thermostat paid the first few installments of the six-figure legal bill — a deliberate deception to create a false sense that Global Thermostat intended to and could pay the full bill, according to Bochner.

"Defendants successfully closed on the transactions and avoided bankruptcy, without having to fulfill their obligations to plaintiff," the complaint says.  Global Thermostat, a startup billing itself as being able to suck carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere and stop climate change, was co-founded in 2010 by Graciella Chichilnisky based on technologies she patented.

Global Thermostat PBC, Global Thermostat Operations LLC and Global Thermostat Licensing LLC sought new investors to save them from a possible bankruptcy, according to the complaint.  The companies paid Chichilnisky royalties for her technology, but potential investors insisted Chichilnisky transfer the patents to the companies as a condition of investment, according to the complaint.

Chichilnisky agreed, and the companies agreed to pay her legal fees in connection with the transfer of IP as compensation for the loss of royalties.  Bochner, a civil litigation and intellectual property firm, represented Chichilnisky in the transaction.  Bochner drafted a settlement that allowed the companies to avoid bankruptcy, according to the complaint.

Global Thermostat paid Bochner's first three invoices, which were each for $20,000, before the settlement closed.  But once the settlement was finalized Aug. 12, they stopped paying, leaving $102,679.25 worth of invoices unpaid, according to the complaint.  The companies "failed to disclose material information of their intent and/or ability to pay" to give Bochner the impression they would pay the full legal bill and to keep the firm working on the settlement that would preserve their business, according to Bochner.

"Defendants made these assertions and payments in order to induce plaintiff into believing it would be paid for all further work done in negotiating and finalizing the transactions," the complaint says.  Global Thermostat also ignored demands for payment from other firms that worked on the transaction, according to the complaint.

A recent Law 360 story by Emily Johnson, “Ford Asks Judge to Punt $550M Fee Bid in $1.7B Crash Case” reports that, as the company challenges a record-shattering $1.7 billion punitive damage verdict in a lawsuit over a fatal truck crash, Ford Motor Co. has urged a Georgia state judge to deny as premature a request for at least $549 million in attorney fees being sought in the case.  Ford asked a Gwinnett County State Court judge to delay weighing the request for attorney fees until its post-trial motions in the case are considered.

Ford has requested a new trial on both liability and damages after a Georgia jury awarded $24 million in compensatory damages and $1.7 billion in punitive damages in August to the children of Voncile and Melvin Hill, who were crushed by the roof of their 2002 Ford Super Duty F-250 when it rolled over in a 2014 accident on a rural Georgia road.

The jury in the design defect case found Ford 70% to blame for the deaths, and assigned 30% of the blame to Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack Inc. and three employees, who settled with the Hills' children in 2018. Kim and Adam Hill claimed the Pep Boys defendants placed the wrong tire on their parents' truck, causing it to lose control.

Following the verdict, the Hills' children went on to file a motion last month seeking anywhere from $549 million to $686 million in attorney fees, offering the court three options for calculating the amount, plus more than $500,000 in litigation costs.  But Ford argued that the possibility of the verdict being either reduced or overturned meant it was too soon to decide how much it should pay in fees.

"These motions could moot or materially impact resolution of the fee motion, and Ford will appeal the verdicts if its motions are denied," Ford said in its response to the fee motion.  "The court should therefore refrain from ruling on the fee motion until, at a minimum, it has resolved Ford's post-trial motions."

Whether or not the court opts to wait to consider the fee request, Ford said the Hills' attorneys weren't eligible for an award under Georgia law.  Ford argued that the Hills didn't recover a final judgment that was more than 125% of the $50 million settlement offer that Ford rejected to resolve the siblings' wrongful death claims prior to trial.  Ford said that the compensatory damage verdict on the pair's wrongful death claims, which included a $6 million award for Melvin Hill and $10 million for Voncile Hill, did not meet the threshold.

"Plaintiffs had to recover more than $62.5 million on their wrongful death claims (or $31.25 million for each decedent) to satisfy the statutory requirements," Ford said. "They did not."  Ford also said that the Hills' attorneys don't qualify for attorney fees because they have not given specifics on hours spent working on the case from the time Ford rejected the Hills' settlement offer to the time of final judgment.  "Plaintiffs improperly have relied solely on the contingency fee agreement rather than providing evidence of hours, rates or other objective indications of value," Ford said.

A recent Law 360 story by Jeff Montgomery, “Del. Court Demands Info on $2.7M Atty Fee in Opioid Deal” reports that, citing unsatisfactory answers to questions about a flat, $2.7 million attorney fee payout request as part of Delaware's $100 million share of a nationwide opioid damage settlement, Delaware's chancellor cautioned she might sever the fee from the deal pending a fuller explanation.  In a letter to Cross & Simon LLC, Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick gave those seeking to wrap up the deal a choice between severing the fee award from the settlement for now or accepting a three-day deadline for briefs on the issue.

The chancellor said the request to direct the state's Prescription Opioid Distribution Commission to pay $2.7 million to unnamed outside attorneys "gave me pause for a few reasons."  Among the concerns, the chancellor said, is that "in analogous circumstances, this court exercises its own business judgment when approving attorneys' fees in representative litigation from a settlement fund."

At issue is Delaware's share of a $4 billion fund for state and local governments, carved out of an overall $26 billion settlement that, for Delaware, resolves investigations and litigation over the role that Johnson & Johnson and distributors Cardinal, McKesson and AmerisourceBergen played in creating and accelerating the opioid crisis.  Delaware Attorney General Kathleen Jennings announced the state's portion of the settlement in July 2021.  A complaint and final consent judgment were filed together in the Court of Chancery on Aug. 24, 2022.

Funds from the settlement will finance addiction treatment and prevention as well as other services and programs.  The agreement also mandates producer, distributor and health care reforms to prevent a recurrence of the crisis, including Johnson & Johnson's exit from opioid production.  Attorneys for Delaware told the chancellor that "court approval is not required," but said in a letter earlier this month that they are prepared to submit documents for a traditional court fee analysis if required.

Michael L. Vild of Cross & Simon said in a letter Oct. 13 that "this matter involves a two-party contract between the state and its counsel, unrelated to the state's agreement with the defendants.  There are no unrepresented or absent third parties."  That explanation, the chancellor said, "gave me pause."  Included in the overall settlement, the chancellor said, are provisions for establishment of an outside counsel fund, and statements in some parts of the settlement agreement say that payment of fees from the settlement fund is "disfavored."

A related agreement, "Remediating Opioids Across Delaware through State-Municipal Abatement Partnership," also discourages attorney fee payments from the settlement fund, the chancellor observed, adding that a multistep review and approval process is called for under some provisions.  "The parties effectively ask that I shortcut the statutory process for authorizing distributions by ordering the commission to distribute the $2.7 million to the state's outside counsel, without any opportunity for public comment or investigation by the commission, without any role of the consortium, and without the requisite approvals," the chancellor wrote.  "Maybe that is warranted and appropriate, but the parties did not expressly address this aspect of the relief requested."

Acknowledging concerns about delaying the payment, the chancellor suggested a three-day window for supplemental briefs on the issue or severing the fee provisions from the order, allowing the rest of the funds to go forward, pending a resolution on fee terms.

A recent Law 360 story by Jeff Montgomery, “Chancery Oks $75M Cravath Fee in Williams Merger Dispute” reports that Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP nailed a nearly $75 million fee after a Delaware vice chancellor upheld its 15% contingent pay agreement with The Williams Cos. during much of a long battle with Energy Transfer LP and its affiliates over a $410 million deal-termination damage claim.

Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III also upheld a provision of the agreement that shifted Cravath's fees to Energy Transfer — the losing side of a $410 million battle with Williams over a termination fee triggered when Williams abandoned an earlier deal with one of its affiliates to pursue an eventually doomed, $38 billion Energy Transfer merger.

Energy Transfer, already required to pay Williams' $410 million break fee, fought the reasonableness of Cravath's fee, the 15% contingent arrangement as well as the court's decision to allow quarterly compounding interest for the fee, including a multiyear span while the case was stayed.  According to the decision and a transcript of earlier arguments on the dispute, Cravath's average or "lodestar" rate was $47.1 million for the same hours, compared with $74.8 million under the contingent fee arrangement.

"It is worth pointing out that these sophisticated parties surely were aware that post-merger-agreement litigation, seeking a break fee, could likely include representation on a contingent basis." the vice chancellor wrote in a decision that upheld the Williams side on all points.  Energy Transfer "had every opportunity, therefore, to contract against use of a contingent fee to determine the amount of fees shifted, if they so desired. This they failed to do," the vice chancellor wrote.

"The merger agreement contains no limitation on what kinds of attorneys' fees and expenses may be shifted to the losing party, other than a requirement, which is already implied under Delaware law, that the shifted fees and expenses must be 'reasonable,'" the vice chancellor wrote.  Williams had argued that a new general counsel secured the contingent agreement with Cravath in mid-2017, after Delaware's Supreme Court let stand the vice chancellor's finding that failure of a required tax-treatment for the $1.38 billion merger allowed Energy Transfer to walk away.

Energy Transfer argued that interest should have been suspended during a two-year period between 2019 and 2021 when a Williams' discovery vendor's error brought litigation to a halt. They also argued that litigation time over the interest rate and fees should likewise not count.

The decision also provided for interest at 3.5%, compounded quarterly, with the court observing other decisions that found compound interest "the standard form of interest in the financial market."  In all, according to a court brief filed, Cravath earned $4,358,372.70 prior to the start of the contingent fee terms, $4 million under a contractual fixed fee and $74,846,161 under the contingent fee.

A recent Law 360 story by James Boyle, “Philly, Pa. Bar Clarify How Attys Can Handle Advance Fees” reports that Pennsylvania attorneys can deposit advance fees into their operating accounts as long as the client clearly consents, according to a new ethics opinion jointly released by the Pennsylvania and Philadelphia Bar associations.

The PBA's Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Committee issued the opinion with the Philadelphia Bar's Professional Guidance Committee.  The opinion was issued as a clarification to a PBA ethics opinion from 1995, which said nonrefundable retainers from a new client were permissible, but it must be accompanied by a clear written agreement or deposited into a client escrow account.

According to Sarah Sweeney, co-chair of the Philadelphia Bar's Professional Guidance Committee, attorneys were confused whether there was a difference between a retainer fee that is earned upon receipt and an advance payment for legal services.  The new opinion makes that distinction.

"The [two committees] worked together in an effort to provide some clarity on the proper handling of legal fees paid at the outset of an engagement," Sweeney said in a statement.  "Specifically, the Opinion distinguishes fees that are earned upon receipt from fees that are simply paid in advance, and concludes that the former may be deposited in the attorney's operating account."  In other words, fees that are not earned upon receipt are considered advance fees, which are typically placed into an escrow account and drawn upon by the attorney as they represent the client.

Under the newly issued opinion, if there is an informed, written consent from the client, that fee can be placed into the attorney's operating account.  Fees that are considered earned upon receipt can be deposited into the operating account, as long as the attorneys clearly inform clients of the fee agreements.

"Ethics opinions are one of the most valuable services that we provide as Philadelphia's premier trade association for attorneys," Philadelphia Bar Association Chancellor Wesley R. Payne IV said in a statement.  "We were happy to partner with the Pennsylvania Bar Association in providing valuable clarity for our community on a common practice management issue."

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