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Category: Fee Request

Judge May Not Base Fee Award On Previous Awarded Rates

November 8, 2021

A recent story by Metropolitan News, “Judge May Not Base Fee Award on Previous Awards to Firm,” reports that a judge must make a fresh determination in each case of whether attorney fees that are sought are in line with prevailing rates in the community, rather than comparing the amounts claimed with those awarded to the same law firm in other cases of the same nature, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held.  Circumstances unique to that case must also be weighed, according to the memorandum opinion.  A three-judge panel—comprised of Ninth Circuit Judges Daniel Aaron Bress and Lawrence VanDyke, joined by Tenth Circuit Judge David M. Ebel, sitting by designation—reversed a $11,349 award in favor a client of the Center for Disability Access (“CDA”).  The amount sought was $20,459.

CDA—which files torrents of actions throughout the state under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act and Callifornia’s Unruh Civil Rights Act—is a division of the San Diego firm of Potter Handy, LLP.  The plaintiff, Brian Whitaker, according to defendants SMB Group and Yoon Jeong Row, has filed more than 1,100 for in the Central District of California since 2014 claiming disability discrimination.  In the present case, the Ninth Circuit declared, District Court Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald of the Central District made some reasonable downward adjustments in the amount awarded, but erred in relying on past awards in actions brought by CDA “instead of considering other evidence of the prevailing community rates.”

The opinion says: “We cannot discern that, in its explanation of why it reduced the hourly rates sought by CDA, the district court analyzed the complexity of the case, the type of work involved, rates for non-CDA lawyers of comparable skill in the relevant community, whether the legal work was performed by lawyers at the appropriate levels of seniority, or other relevant factors….  “It may be that the district court here considered the above factors and thus the hourly rates the district court applied were appropriate.  But we cannot make that determination on the current record.  Accordingly, the district court’s fee award is vacated and the case is remanded for review consistent with this memorandum.”

The appellate judges said Carter did justify his reduction in hours spent—including subtracting hours supposedly spent at a hearing that did not take place and on an unnecessary motion—and paring block-billed hours.  At oral argument on Aug. 8, Dennis J. Price II of Potter Handy argued that the lodestar system of calculating attorney fees—multiplying hours spent times the hourly rate—“is not advisor—it’s a mandatory system” that judges must use.  He alleged that Fitzgerald “effectively ignored these rules.”

The hourly rates that were sought ranged from $450 to $595.  Those awarded went from $350 to $425.  Bress questioned whether the rates that were set by the judge would have been supportable had Fitzgerald “put in more than he did in his order.”  Price responded that the evidence would not support the lower rates.  However, asked the same question by VanDyke, he said that if Fitzgerald had “done the leg work,” he “wouldn’t have any argument that the rate was incorrect,” later reverting to his original position that “the evidence doesn’t support” the rates that were set.  Janice Ryan Mazur of the El Cajon firm of Mazur & Mazur argued for SMB Group and Row.  She said Fitzgerald did apply the lodestar method, but then adjusted it downward.

Article: Recovering Attorney Fees in Arbitration

November 1, 2021

A recent article by Charles H. Dick, Jr., “Recovering Attorney Fees in Arbitration,” reports on recovering attorney fees in arbitration.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

An accurate assessment of damages is crit­ical for case evaluation, and the cost of dispute resolution plays an important role in deciding to pursue claims.  Even strong liability cases can fail to make economic sense.  That is why a thorough case appraisal should thoughtfully consider the attorney fees to be incurred.  And equally important, an objective case valuation should assess the likelihood of recovering attor­ney fees.

The “American Rule,” which specifies that each party must bear its own attorney fees, is a lesson for law school’s first year, and though the rule has been slightly modified to encour­age certain litigation in the public interest, fee-shifting remains the exception rather than the rule.  Against this background, professional responsibility obliges counsel to keep clients informed about litigation economics (Cal. Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.4)—something critically important as a case approaches the in­evitable mediation.  Unfortunately, experience teaches that an exacting analysis of litigation cost and exposure to fee-shifting often is an afterthought, and that the development of case strategies, discovery plans, and tactical maneu­vers occurs without thoughtfully weighing the implications of the American Rule and its ex­ceptions.  This is a recurring issue in arbitration.

Perhaps litigators approach attorney fee recovery casually, thinking there will be ample time to deal with the question before a final judgment is entered.  Arbitration, however, is different.  The binding nature of arbitration makes appellate relief unlikely.  An arbitrator’s award of attorney fees is unlikely to be sec­ond-guessed by a court, even if there is no stat­utory or contractual basis for the award. (See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 33; id. at p. 11 [“it is the general rule that, with narrow exceptions, an arbitrator’s decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law.  In reaffirming this general rule, we recognize there is a risk that the arbitrator will make a mistake.”].)  When it comes to recovering attor­ney fees in arbitration, counsel needs to get the issue correct from the beginning.

California has codified the American Rule in Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.  Con­tractual arrangements can modify the rule and provide for fee-shifting, but a careful study of the parties’ language is critical. (See Valley Hard­ware, LLC v. Souza (Nov. 20, 2015, D067076) 2015 Cal.App.Unpub. Lexis 8347 [affirming arbitrator fee award in face of inconsistent contract provisions].)  Contractual language inevitably varies: Some agreements provide for recovery of fees “when permitted by law”; some say fees “actually incurred” are recoverable; some limit attorney fees to a percentage of the damages awarded; some say the prevailing party “shall” recover fees, while others use the uncertain “may.” Civil Code section 1717 de­fers to the contracting parties, subject to minor tweaks that limit fees to a “reasonable” amount and require that fee recovery be reciprocal.

In addition to carefully scrutinizing con­tract language, one also needs to know the procedural rules that will be applied in arbi­tration.  For example, in a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration regarding the investment brokerage industry, the arbitral panel is directed to determine the “costs and expenses,” yet absent some statutory exception to the American Rule, fee-shifting still depends on the parties’ underlying agree­ment (see FINRA rule 12902(c)).  Unless the parties’ agreement forbids fee-shifting, the rules of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) authorize the arbitration tribunal to apportion costs for “legal representation and assistance … incurred by a party to such extent as the Tribunal may deem appropriate” (see CPR 2019 Adminis­tered Arbitration Rules, rule 19.1(d) & 19.2). Rule 24(g) of the JAMS Comprehensive Arbi­tration Rules & Procedures is the mirror image: “[T]he Arbitrator may allocate attorneys’ fees and expenses … if provided by the Parties’ Agreement or allowed by applicable law” (ac­cord, Uniform Arbitration Act, § 21).

If all parties request an award of attorney fees, rule 47(d)(ii) of the American Arbitra­tion Association’s Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures authorize an award of attorney fees even if the underlying agreement is silent on the issue.  Throwing in a boilerplate prayer for attorney fees and costs without considering the consequences can result in fee-shifting.  And during arbitration, even casual discourse about attorney fees can be a basis for fee-shifting, absent an express agreement to the contrary.  (Marik v. Univ. Vill. LLC (Oct. 3, 2013, B247171) 2013 Cal.App. Unpub. Lexis 7143 [brief asserting entitlement to recover fees provided basis for arbitrator’s fee award]; see Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Tanner (1st Cir. 1995) 72 F.3d 234, 242-243 [“costs and expenses” under New York Stock Exchange Rules interpreted to permit award of attorney fees when both sides to dispute requested attorney fee award].)

Counsel should be mindful of an arbitra­tor’s predisposition to produce an award that is “fair to all concerned,” and this may include fee-shifting as an exercise in equity. (See Co­hen v. TNP 2008 Participating Notes Program, LLC (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 840, 877 [absent parties’ agreement limiting arbitrator power, award of attorney fees on basis of equity and conscience affirmed].)  Further, misconduct of counsel may be a reason to “sanction” a party by reducing an attorney fee award. (E.g., Karton v. Art Design & Const., Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734 [fees reduced for incivility of counsel].)  And consider JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration rule 24(g), which authorizes an arbitrator to consider noncompliance with discovery orders when awarding attorney fees.

Attorney fees incurred prosecuting or defending a complaint to compel arbitration may be recoverable, but the procedural posture of the civil court action will determine when fee-shifting may occur. (E.g., Otay River Const. v. San Diego Expressway (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 796.)  Though there is authority to the contrary (Benjamin, Weill & Mazer v. Kors (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 40 [allowing recovery of fees even though liability on claim awaited arbitration]), the better-reasoned view is expressed in Roberts v. Packard, Packard & Johnson (2013) 217 Cal. App.4th 822.  In that case, clients filed suit against their former lawyers, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and conversion in connection with settlement of qui tam litigation.  The law firm’s motion to compel arbitration was grant­ed, and the trial court awarded the firm its fees as the prevailing party.  On appeal, the court was persuaded the phrase “an action” means an entire judicial proceeding; procedural steps in the course of a lawsuit, such as a motion to compel arbitration, are steps in the prosecution or defense of an action, but they are not the entirety of an action on a contract.  The Roberts case stands for the proposition only one side can “prevail” in a lawsuit, and fee-shifting had to await the arbitrator’s final determination of the clients’ professional liability claims. (Id. at p. 843.)

Civil Code section 1717 defines the “pre­vailing party” as the person who recovers the greater amount on a contract.  Yet, Hsu v. Ab­bara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, makes it clear this involves more than a mathematical calculation.  The “court is to compare the relief awarded on the contract claim or claims with the parties’ demands on those same claims and their liti­gation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources.” (Id. at p. 876.)  Thus, it is possible for a party to prevail by achieving litigation objectives, even though an opponent may have obtained a favorable verdict on liability theories.  Generally, however, when a verdict on contract claims is good news for one party and bad news for another, a court is obligated to treat the happy litigant as the prevailing party.

The identity of a prevailing party becomes more complicated when results of an arbitra­tion are mixed. In this regard, Marina Pacific Homeowners Association v. Southern California Financial Corp. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 191, is instructive.  This case between a homeowners’ association and a finance institution exempli­fies litigation that produces some wins and some losses for both sides.  The case involved a claim by the homeowners that they did not owe monthly fees the financial institution contended amounted to $97 million over the life of a lease.  The trial court found against the homeowners and declared there was an obligation to make monthly payments.  But the court also found the monthly payment rate was only 40% of the financial institution’s demand.  On appeal, the court declined to consider settlement communications as being a reliable expression of a party’s litigation objectives and concluded the “substance” of the result was a $58 million loss for the defendant.  Invoking the decision in the Hsu case, the court con­cluded there was no simple, unqualified result pointing to either side as a prevailing party, and the trial court had acted within its discretion in denying recovery of attorney fees.

One lesson regarding “prevailing parties” is the need for caution in over-pleading one’s case. Some counsel cannot resist converting a straight-forward breach of contract action into a fraud case with overtones of unfair business practices and assorted tort claims.  Pleading multiple claims that eventually are discarded for want of proof can be dangerous, especially unsubstantiated allegations of fraud.  In De La Questa v. Benham (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1295, an appellate court acknowledged the practice of overstating one’s claims, which makes it more difficult to determine the victor.  In a case producing mixed results, unsupported claims may lead to an opponent’s recovery of fees.

Counsel in arbitration need to address fee-shifting with a laser focus, beginning with the preliminary hearing, which is the first op­portunity to meet the arbitrator and learn his or her preferences.  Arbitrators can be expected to employ the lodestar method recognized as acceptable by a long line of California cases (e.g., PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094).  Several issues can be dis­cussed at the hearing: What procedures will the arbitrator use to deal with attorney fee and cost issues?  Will these matters be bifurcated until an interim or tentative award on the merits is de­livered? Does the arbitrator have requirements for form, style, and specificity of time records? Will “block billing” be accepted? If more than one law firm will be appearing for a party, the conference also is an opportunity to explain why and set the stage to defuse a later argument about duplicated efforts.

In a case with both contract and tort claims, counsel should consider keeping a separate re­cord of time spent on matters that may not be entitled to recovery of attorney fees.  Counsel should be prepared to demonstrate that time records were prepared contemporaneously with the work reported, since there often is a lack of daily time recordation, let alone contem­poraneous reporting.  The fee application also should explain how the litigation team was de­ployed and why individual tasks were assigned to team members.

Proving the reasonableness of time and rates ordinarily can be accomplished by declarations of counsel regarding the usual, customary, and regular timekeeping and billing practices of the law firm.  Resumes of the personnel involved and a summary of the work may be useful.  (See, e.g., Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 702.)  And this informa­tion can be supplemented by the opinions of other lawyers objectively knowledgeable about actual practices within the community.  Survey data often is available for firms in metropolitan areas, and those reports also carry credibility.  But counsel should be alert to differences between posted or rack rates and hourly rates actually realized, because there often is a ma­terial difference.  As with hotels and rental cars, there may be a significant disparity between the advertised rate and what people actually pay.

Nemecek & Cole v. Horn (2012) 208 Cal. App.4th 641 makes it clear that a calculation of “reasonable fees” does not hinge on what fees actually were paid.  In that case, defense counsel had been compensated on the basis of negotiat­ed insurance panel rates.  The arbitrator refused to be controlled by such rate structures and declined to use the Laffey Matrix employed by the United States Department of Justice in de­termining rates the federal government believes are reasonable.  Instead, the award of attorney fees was based on an independent assessment of what would be reasonable, and the appellate court affirmed confirmation of that award. (See Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1260 [awarding reasonable rate $50 greater than counsel’s regular rate].)

There are three important things to remember about recovering attorney fees in arbitration.  First, carefully study the parties’ agreement to understand the rights it extends and the limitations it imposes.  Second, avoid pleading unnecessary claims that make it seem the end result tips in favor of one’s opponent.  Third, vacating an erroneous fee award is unlikely, so make your best case regarding fee-shifting before the entry of a final award.

Charles H. Dick, Jr. is a neutral with JAMS, and he serves as a mediator and an individual arbitrator or member of multi-arbitrator panels in complex commercial matters, securities and investment disputes, professional liability cases, products liability issues, and other business-related controversies.

Defense ‘Prevailing Party’ in DVPA Case Dropped by Plaintiff

October 9, 2021

A recent Metropolitan News story, “Defendant Was ‘Prevailing Party’ in Action Under DVPA Where Plaintiff Dropped Case,” reports that a judge erred in finding that a defendant was not the “prevailing party” in a civil action brought to impose a domestic violence restraining order on him, the Court of Appeal for this district has held, proclaiming that he did prevail even though the circumstances were that the plaintiff dismissed her petition after gaining such an order in a separate criminal proceeding.

But, Justice Anne H. Egerton of Div. Three said in an unpublished opinion, that does not mean that the order by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Jonathan L. Rosenbloom denying an award of attorney fees to the defendant in the civil case need be reversed.  Such an award is discretionary, she noted, and, under Art, VI, §13 of the state Constitution, reversal is called for only where an error has resulted “in a miscarriage of justice” which, she declared, did not occur.

Burbank attorney David D. Diamond—a two-time unsuccessful candidate for the Los Angeles Superior Court who has announced his candidacy in the 2022 election—represented defendant Joshua Nathaniel Rivers in the trial court and on appeal. In seeking an award of $6,300 in attorney fees in favor of his client, sued by Marcia Bennett under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (“DVPA”), Diamond said in an April 2, 2019 notice of motion that his client was “was compelled to respond to and defend a frivolous action,” and set forth in his memorandum of points and authorities: “Petitioners case was adjudicated in favor of Respondent. On November 20, 2018 the Petitioner asked for an additional hearing date to retain an attorney.  On December 10, 2018, the new hearing date, she failed to appear.”

He added in a declaration: “It is my belief that Petitioner should pay for the Respondent’s attorney’s fees because she [sic] is the prevailing party.”  In an opposing declaration dated May 29, 2019, Northridge attorney Bernal P. Ojeda (who also represented Bennett in the appeal) protested:

“The Respondent’s claim as a prevailing party is misleading.  Respondent at the present time has a four year criminal restraining order against him, not mentioned in the current motion….[T]his was the reason Petitioner did not appear for the hearing in the instant case. The criminal case is a related case and the criminal protective order should have been mentioned to this court but was not.  Given the fact that there is an existing restraining order against Respondent and protecting Petitioner, Respondent cannot claim he is a prevailing party nor can he have that status.”  (Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Peter Mirich granted the restraining order on Nov. 30, 2018, 10 days before the hearing at which Bennett did not appear.)

Ojeda said in his memorandum of points and authorities: “The criminal action now pending is a related case, involving the same parties, same incident and set of facts.”  The minute order of the June 4 hearing before Rosenbloom on the motion for attorney fees simply recites: “The Court finds Respondent is not the prevailing party.  “Motion Hearing re attorney fees is denied with prejudice.”

In her opinion upholding the outcome, Egerton said: “Rivers has not demonstrated the trial court’s erroneous prevailing party determination resulted in a miscarriage of justice….[B]ecause Rivers was the respondent on Bennett’s petition for a domestic violence restraining order, the trial court had discretion to deny his request for prevailing party attorney fees under [Family Code] section 6344, subdivision (a).”

She continued: “On the record before us, it is not reasonably probable that the court would have awarded Rivers the attorney fees he requested, even if the court had properly deemed him the prevailing party on the petition. And, based on this record, we cannot say the court’s denial of prevailing party attorney fees would have been an abuse of discretion.”  The judge went on to say: “And, given that Bennett dismissed her petition only after already obtaining the protection she sought under the DVPA, we cannot say the trial court’s denial of attorney fees on this ground would have been an abuse of discretion.”

Judge Acted Arbitrarily in Setting ADA Attorney Fee Award

October 8, 2021

A recent Metropolitan News story, “Judge Acted Arbitrarily in Setting ADA Attorney Fee Award,” reports that a District Court judge, in setting an attorney fee award, acted arbitrarily in disregarding the services of three of five lawyers who represented the plaintff in securing a settlement of his action under the federal Americans With Disabilities Act and the state Unruh Act and by making a 10 percent deduction as a penalty for the law firm inflating its fees, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held.

Its memorandum opinion comes in a case bought by the Center for Disability Access, a division of the San Diego law firm of Potter Handy LLP, on behalf of Antonio Fernandez, who is wheelchair-bound.  The center brings hundreds of ADA and Unruh actions each year, using a stable of plaintiffs, including Fernandez.  The appeal came in a case instituted in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Roberta A. Torres, who owned real property in Whittier and against CBC Restaurant Corp., which operated the Corner Bakery Café on Torres’s property. The suit was brought over the height of the counter.

In making his award of attorney fees, Judge Fernando M. Olguin said in a July 14, 2020 order: “Despite many years of experience litigating the two claims in this case in virtually hundreds of cases, and a docket that reflects little, if any, litigation in this case, plaintiff seeks $15,762.50 for the work performed by five attorneys….Further, the cases filed by plaintiff include nearly identical complaints and subsequent filings.”  Olguin made note of three of the several ADA-based actions the center has recently brought in the Central District with Fernandez serving as the plaintiff.

The judge opined that the “assignment of so many experienced attorneys to such a simple case replete with boilerplate documents resulted in substantial task padding, duplication, over-conferencing, attorney stacking, and overall excessiveness,” declaring: “Given the simplicity of the case and ADA accessibility cases in general, the quick settlement and apparent lack of any contested litigation matters in this case, and the lack of any dispositive motions, no more than one partner and one associate was necessary to prosecute this case.  Thus, the court will reduce the fee award by cutting the fees for three of the five attorneys.”

He opted to take cognizance only the services of the lead attorrney, Christina “Chris” Carson, who was admitted to practice on Dec. 2, 2011, and Mark D. Potter, whose State Bar membership goes back to Dec. 1, 1993.

Potter sought recompense at an hourly rate of $595 and Carson wanted to be paid $450 an hour. Olguin said that taking into account the various factors customarily assessed in setting attorney fees, “$425 is reasonable for attorney Potter, and an hourly rate of $275 is reasonable for attorney Carson.”  Noting that there was a “quick settlement of this routine, non-complex case, where plaintiff did not file or oppose any dispositive motions,” Olguin declared that “the court will apply a ten percent reduction.”  After subtracting “10% of the time billed for general excessiveness,” he awarded $3,897 in attorney fees—slightly less than 25 percent of what was sought.  Olguin allowed the $642.50 in costs that were claimed.

Reversal came in an opinion signed by Circuit Judges Susan P. Graber and John B. Owens and by District Court Judge Charles R. Breyer of the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. The judges said: “While we agree with the district court that Fernandez’s lawyers overbilled, it was ‘arbitrary’ to ignore entirely the time billed by three of the five lawyers….These three appear to have performed at least some necessary work….To the extent that overstaffing resulted in inefficiencies, the district court should reduce the fee award in proportion to those inefficiencies, rather than Through a ‘shortcut.’ ”

The opinion continues: “The district court also abused its discretion in calculating the hours of the two attorneys whose work it considered.  The court provided cogent reasons for its specific cuts as to various tasks, but its final additional 10% reduction for ‘general excessiveness’ lacked any justification.”  Olguin did not abuse his discretion in setting the rates for Carson and Potter, the Ninth Circuit said, because they had nor provided evidence substantiating the higher value they ascribed to their services.

Article: What is a Legal Fee Audit?

October 7, 2021

A recent article by Jacqueline Vinaccia of Vanst Law LLP in San Diego “What is a Legal Fee Audit?,” reports on legal fee audits.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Attorneys usually bill clients by the hour, in six minute increments (because those six minutes equal one tenth of an hour: 0.1).  Those hours are multiplied by the attorney’s hourly rate to determine the attorney’s fee.  There is another aspect of attorney billing that is not as well known, but equally important — legal fee auditing.  During an audit, a legal fee auditor reviews billing records to determine if hourly billing errors or inefficiencies occurred, and deducts unreasonable or unnecessary fees and costs.

Both the law and legal ethics restrict attorneys from billing clients fees that are unreasonable or unnecessary to the advancement of the client’s legal objectives.  This can include analysis of the reasonableness of the billing rate charged by attorneys.  Legal fee audits are used by consumers of legal services, including businesses, large insurance companies, cities, public and governmental agencies, and individual clients.  Legal fee audits can be necessary when there is a dispute between an attorney and client; when the losing party in a lawsuit is required to pay all or part of the prevailing party’s legal fees in litigation; when an insurance company is required to pay a portion of legal fees, or when some issues in a lawsuit allow recovery of  attorneys’ fees and when other issues do not (an allocation of fees). 

In an audit, the auditor interviews the client, and reviews invoices sent to the client in conjunction with legal case materials to identify all fees and costs reasonable and necessary to the advancement of the client’s legal objectives, and potentially deduct those that are not.  The auditor also reviews all invoices to identify any potential accounting errors and assure that time and expenses are billed accurately.  The auditor may also be asked to determine if the rate charged by the attorney is appropriate.

The legal fee auditor can be an invaluable asset to parties in deciding whether to file or settle a lawsuit, and to the courts charged with issuing attorneys’ fee awards.  The court is unlikely to take the time to review individual invoice entries to perform a proper allocation of recoverable and non-recoverable fees leaving the parties with the court’s “best approximation” of what the allocation should be.  The fee audit provides the court and the parties with the basis for which to allocate and appropriately award reasonable and necessary fees. 

Audits are considered a litigation best practice and a risk management tool and can save clients substantial amounts of money in unnecessary fees.  It has been my experience, over the past two decades of fee auditing, that early fee auditing can identify and correct areas of concern in billing practices and avoid larger disputes in litigation later.  In many cases, I have assisted clients and counsel in reaching agreement on proper billing practices and setting litigation cost expectations. 

In other cases, I have been asked by both plaintiffs and defendants to review attorneys’ fees and costs incurred and provide the parties and the court with my expert opinion regarding the total attorneys’ fees and costs were reasonably and necessarily incurred to pursue the client's legal objectives.  While the court does not always agree with my analysis of fees and costs incurred, it is usually assisted in its decision by the presentation of the audit report and presentation of expert testimony on the issues.

Jacqueline Vinaccia is a San Diego trial attorney, litigator, and national fee auditor expert, and a partner at Vanst Law LLP.  Her practice focuses on business and real estate litigation, general tort liability, insurance litigation and coverage, construction disputes, toxic torts, and municipal litigation.  Her attorney fee analyses have been cited by the U.S. District Court for Northern California and Western Washington, several California Superior Courts, as well as various other state courts and arbitrators throughout the United States.  She has published and presented extensively on the topic of attorney fee invoicing, including presentations to the National Association of Legal Fee Association (NALFA), and is considered one of the nation’s top fee experts by NALFA.