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Category: Litigation Financing / Funding

Article: 5 Reasons Lawyers Often Fail to Secure Litigation Funding

August 24, 2021

A recent Law 360 article by Charles Agee, “5 Reasons Lawyers Often Fail To Secure Litigation Funding,” reports on litigation funding.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

It's no secret that parties seeking litigation funding face steep odds in securing a deal.  How steep?  According to my firm's research, more than 95% of commercial litigation funding deals presented to any particular funder never advance to closing.  Experience tells me one of the overarching reasons the litigation finance deal closure rate is so low is that lawyers and their clients drastically underestimate the challenges and nuances of obtaining this specialized form of financing.

For many, the downside of trying and failing to secure funding is simply that — not obtaining the funding.  So why not approach a few funders and see if one bites?  On the surface, this approach has appeal; in reality, it is fraught with hidden costs.  The litigation fundraising process can be extremely laborious, and the time sunk into an unsuccessful deal typically is not billable.  Each year, leading law firms squander millions of dollars in time alone seeking funding for deals that do not bear fruit.

Even more concerning, lawyers who are unsuccessful in obtaining funding for their clients almost always damage their credibility with the client.  The good news is that these challenges can be anticipated and, in many instances, overcome.  To overcome those challenges, however, it is important to also examine why so many parties fail to obtain litigation funding. Here are the top five reasons why.

1. Misunderstanding the Funders' Acceptance Standards

Funders reject the lion's share of deals that they are shown because most of them should never have been brought to the market in the first place.  My colleagues and I have seen that far too many lawyers and clients present litigation opportunities that make no sense to pursue, regardless of who is funding the case.  Nothing can be done to change the substance of the underlying matter, and short of committing fraud, you are not going to sneak into a funder's vault with a meritless deal.

The best — and only — advice for these weak opportunities is to avoid the litigation fundraising process altogether.  But we also see that funders also reject a significant number of matters that are meritorious and economically viable enough for experienced litigation counsel to be willing to risk their own legal fees on a successful outcome.

Why are these opportunities declined?  The reason — and it may not be a satisfactory one — is that a litigation funder's diligence process and investment criteria are generally more rigorous than that of most law firms.  Unless a lawyer has a great deal of experience with funding, this disparity can be jarring and more than a little ego-bruising, especially when clients or colleagues are watching.

To appreciate why the litigation funders' bar is set so high, it is helpful to consider the investment proposition from their perspective.  The funder must develop a high degree of confidence in a financially successful outcome of a legal dispute — usually involving complex subject matter — because it will only receive an investment return if the underlying matter resolves favorably.

As a purely passive investor, the funder also must structure the deal in a way that achieves alignment with both counsel and client, and often the economics of even the strongest of cases are insufficient to do so.  Further, unlike a venture capital fund that can accept high levels of losses because of their upside in successful investments, litigation funders' more modest returns are too low to subsidize VC-level loss rates.

Because most litigation funders are relatively new and have not yet established substantial track records, this dynamic fosters a stronger bias toward risk aversion within the industry.  A litigation funder's diligence process is designed to find reasons not to invest in an opportunity. It also tends to follow a leave-no-stone-unturned approach, which can be exhausting for the party seeking funding.  However, even the most discriminating funders' processes can be successfully navigated with proper preparation and analysis before approaching the funder.

What are the main challenges counsel will face in the litigation, and how will these be overcome? What is counsel's track record in similar matters? What level of financial risk is counsel prepared to assume?  These are just a few of the questions that parties should consider before approaching funders. Lawyers and their clients are well-served to anticipate these and other questions that a skeptical investor might ask, and be prepared with clear and thoughtful responses.

2. Failing to Approach the Most Suitable Funders for the Opportunity

Parties seeking funding often fail to approach the funders most likely to invest in their claim.  There are currently 46 active commercial litigation funders in the U.S., each with different funding criteria, risk appetites, structuring preferences and return profiles.  Most parties seeking funding only present their opportunity to a few of these funders. This is a mistake, because even the largest funders in the world are not configured to accommodate every potential type of deal.

Without adequate knowledge of the market, it is difficult to know which funders are most suitable for a particular deal. It is critical to know what a funder's investment criteria are, including preferred deal size, type of litigation, jurisdictions and stage of litigation, among others.  Too often, parties meet resistance from funders that were never a good fit for the opportunity and elect to abandon the fundraising process altogether.  If they had only identified the right audience, they might have been able to secure funding.

3. Inadequately Packaging the Presentation of the Opportunity

First impressions matter, especially in litigation finance.  Our conversations with funders inform that the largest litigation funding firms see more than 1,000 opportunities a year and don't have the bandwidth to wade through poorly packaged opportunities.  Still, parties often fail to spend the time necessary to appropriately present an opportunity. The failure to properly present an opportunity often is the difference between a yes and a no.

What are the most common deficiencies in litigation fundraising presentations?  Most lawyers are more than capable of presenting the legal merits of an opportunity; however, we have observed time and again that they tend to fall short in demonstrating a thorough approach to the economics, i.e., the damages model and the budget.  Lawyers and clients may also downplay or omit entirely a case's potential challenges, whereas a funder expects these downsides to be soberly acknowledged and addressed.

Another similar mistake is to leave too many analytical black boxes in the presentation, such as factual questions that could be investigated now but are proposed to be left for discovery, or assumptions underlying the damages model that have not been rigorously researched.  The negative impression left by these and many other deficiencies is difficult to overcome.  Parties seeking funding should prepare a thoughtful and complete presentation of their financing opportunities.

4. Lacking Awareness of Norms That Guide Negotiations With Funders

A common misconception is that litigation funding deals are easy to negotiate and that funding agreements are relatively uniform.  In reality, these deals have several peculiarities and are governed by particular legal and ethical parameters.  Even parties with experience in other types of financing or business dealings struggle to extend their acumen to litigation financing deals.

Indeed, the process is guided by certain industry norms that outsiders may not necessarily appreciate or even be aware of. Parties that neglect to understand these nuances run a considerable risk of derailing the litigation fundraising process, sometimes after many months have been spent.  Each funder approaches the investment diligence and documentation processes differently.

For instance, some will provide parties a term sheet and, after the term sheet is executed, proceed to deeper diligence and final deal documents.  Other funders might have a three-phase negotiation process where the party is expected to execute a term sheet, a letter of intent and then a litigation funding agreement. Parties should be prepared to negotiate with the funder at each phase of the process.

Prior to closing, the last document to be negotiated is the definitive litigation funding agreement, or similarly named instrument.  While no two funding agreements are identical, most agreements have certain types of provisions that are essential to the funder, given the contingent-repayment, no-control nature of the investment.  Parties seeking funding should understand that these types of provisions are nonnegotiable and that pressing too hard can sour an otherwise fruitful closing process.

5. Prematurely Agreeing to Exclusivity With a Funder

Perhaps the most critical decision in the litigation fundraising process involves granting exclusivity to a funder.  Once a term sheet has been negotiated, a funder will nearly always require a period of exclusivity — sometimes more than 60 days — to complete its diligence and documentation of the transaction. After granting exclusivity, you are largely at the funder's mercy.

Parties seeking funding almost universally misread the significance of obtaining a term sheet from a funder, mistakenly believing that the probability of closing is far higher than it actually is.  Depending on the funder and the extent of its preliminary due diligence, the term sheet can merely be a hope certificate describing what a transaction might look like. Terms may be retraded or, as is often the case, the funder declines to proceed with the deal following a deeper dive into the opportunity.

Selecting the wrong funder for exclusivity may also hamper a party's future prospects of securing a deal with another funder, if negotiations with the original funder stall.  Funders will often assume that the deal with the original funder stalled because of a fatal flaw in the deal.

In an industry that is already risk-averse by nature, this kind of red flag in the middle of a fundraising process is extraordinarily difficult to overcome.  The key to avoiding this mistake — aside from refusing to grant exclusivity — is to understand the approach, process and track record of any funder requesting exclusivity.

The party seeking funding should also assess the extent of the funder's preliminary diligence and the degree to which the funder grasps the key issues.  Of course, ensuring that all material facts have been disclosed to the funder prior to exclusivity also helps avoid surprises. But candor may not be enough to avoid this pitfall.  Exclusivity is a necessary evil in the litigation finance industry — for now — and parties seeking funding should be extremely judicious in granting it.

Conclusion

While securing litigation funding may seem daunting, there are ways to beat those odds and maximize the chances of securing funding.  Parties that approach the market in a thoughtful and informed manner have a much higher likelihood of success and of avoiding wasteful dead ends.  As the market continues to mature, funders should innovate and improve their processes to make the experience more predictable and user-friendly.  Until then, experience in the market and knowledge of the funders and their approaches will remain the key to improving the odds of obtaining litigation financing.

Charles Agee is managing partner at Westfleet Advisors.

Law Firm Wants Attorney Fee Dispute in Arbitration

August 18, 2021

A recent Law 360 story by Caroline Simson, “King & Spalding Says Fee Fight Must Be Arbitrated”, reports that King & Spalding is urging a Texas court to force a former client to arbitrate allegations that the firm fraudulently colluded with Burford Capital to maximize fees while representing him ​​in a treaty claim​ against Vietnam, pointing to an arbitration clause in the underlying fee agreement.  Fighting back against Trinh Vinh Binh's arguments earlier this month that the clause is inapplicable because the firm didn't sign the funding agreement with Burford, King & Spalding argued in a brief that the clause is broad enough to encompass the dispute.

Binh, who's accused the firm and two of its international arbitration partners in Houston of making a "mockery of the fiduciary obligations an attorney owes to their clients," told the court that the funding agreement doesn't contain any reference to King & Spalding.  In fact, the firm had already inked a deal with him that laid out all the terms of their relationship and did not include an arbitration clause, he said.

But the firm pointed in its brief to the wording of the clause, noting that it applies to "any controversy or claim" that is "relat[ed] to" the funding agreement.  The clause also applies to "any other transaction document," which includes a "counsel letter" through which Binh instructed the firm to distribute any arbitration proceeds in accordance with the funding agreement, according to the brief.  "Plaintiff cannot reasonably dispute that his claims 'relate to' the [funding agreement] and the counsel letter," according to the brief, which notes that Binh is seeking damages based on the firm's alleged failure to allocate the arbitration proceeds in compliance with the funding agreement.

"While plaintiff attempts to characterize these claims as arising out of the engagement agreement, that agreement does not address the allocation of arbitration proceeds," the firm continued. "The terms cited in the petition were set forth in the [funding agreement] and 'agreed to' by defendants through the counsel letter, bringing those claims squarely within the ambit of the [funding agreement]'s arbitration agreement."

Counsel for Binh declined to comment, saying they will file a response with the court.  Binh sued King & Spalding and two of its partners, Reggie R. Smith and Craig S. Miles, in June, alleging they made a "mockery of the fiduciary obligations an attorney owes to their clients" by "colluding" with litigation funder Burford to take more of the arbitration proceeds than Binh had agreed to.

The law firm had represented Binh in a treaty claim against Vietnam over the confiscation of certain real estate that ended in a $45 million award against the country in 2019.  In the arbitration, filed in 2015, Binh accused the country of improperly taking several valuable properties he says were worth an estimated $214 million.  Under their deal, the law firm agreed to hold back 30% of billings for fees and defer the payment of those amounts until work had concluded in the arbitration.

At the same time, Binh entered into a funding agreement with Burford Capital with a $4.678 million spending cap, according to the suit.  Binh claims that King & Spalding told him the firm could complete the arbitration work within that cap.  But by May 2016, the firm had already billed and been paid some $1.9 million, leaving about $1.8 million after initial costs and expenses had been paid out.  Binh alleges that at that point the firm, "motivated by securing continued, guaranteed immediate payment of their fees, colluded with Burford" to contrive a scheme to increase the amount potentially owed by Binh by increasing the cap on King & Spalding's legal fees and, consequently, increasing Burford's potential entitlement to an increased return.

Binh says that the way the agreement worked was that the more King & Spalding billed against the cap amount in legal spending, the more he was at risk of paying a so-called success return, to be paid if he prevailed in the arbitration.  The success return was to be split between King & Spalding and Burford based on the relative portion of their investments in the arbitration, Binh said.  Binh alleges that King & Spalding tried to make him agree to increase the cap on expenditures for legal fees — and potentially, provide more of a return for Burford — but that he refused.  Thereafter, Burford and the law firm allegedly executed a side agreement between themselves.

In addition to accusing King & Spalding of breaching its fiduciary duty, Binh's lawsuit includes claims for negligence if the overpayment of fees was due to a mistake, as well as claims of misrepresentation and fraud.  He also accuses the firm of negligence after the tribunal in the case against Vietnam rejected an expert report the firm provided stating that Binh's property was worth some $214 million.  The tribunal instead awarded $45.4 million.

No Arbitration for Attorney-Client Fee Dispute

August 11, 2021

A recent Law 360 story by Caroline Simson, “No Arbitration For King & Spalding Client Fight, Court Hears”, reports that a Dutch citizen who accuses King & Spalding LLP of fraudulently colluding with Burford Capital to maximize fees ​​in a treaty claim​ against Vietnam​ is fighting the law firm's efforts to send the fee dispute to arbitration, arguing that an arbitration clause in the funding agreement is inapplicable.

Trinh Vinh Binh sued King & Spalding and two of its international arbitration partners in Houston, Reggie R. Smith and Craig S. Miles, in June, alleging they made a "mockery of the fiduciary obligations an attorney owes to their clients" by "colluding" with litigation funder Burford to take more of the arbitration proceeds than Binh had agreed to.  The law firm had represented Binh in a treaty claim against Vietnam over the confiscation of certain real estate that ended in a $45 million award against the country in 2019.

King & Spalding pressed a federal court in Houston last month to send the dispute with Binh to arbitration, citing an arbitration clause in the funding agreement and alleging that Binh excluded Burford from his suit in an attempt to skirt the clause.  The law firm claims that even though it is not a signatory to the funding agreement, the broad scope of the clause provides for arbitration of any dispute arising out of the pact.

But Binh argued that the clause governs disputes only between him and Burford, and not with any third parties. He said that the engagement agreement he signed with King & Spalding when he retained the firm for the Vietnam matter makes no mention of arbitration for disputes.  "Defendants are attorneys, and they certainly know how to draft an arbitration clause.  But the engagement agreement between Binh and defendants contains no arbitration clause," Binh's attorneys said. "Try as they might, defendants have not shown — and cannot show — that they may properly invoke the [funding agreement's] arbitration clause.  Binh therefore respectfully requests that this court deny defendants' motion."

King & Spalding had represented Binh in an arbitration matter filed against Vietnam in 2015, in which Binh accused the country of improperly taking several valuable properties he says were worth an estimated $214 million.  Under their deal, the law firm agreed to hold back 30% of billings for fees and defer the payment of those amounts until work had concluded in the arbitration.  At the same time, Binh entered into a funding agreement with Burford Capital with a $4.678 million spending cap, according to the suit.

Binh claims that King & Spalding told him the firm could complete the arbitration work within that cap.  But by May 2016, the firm had already billed and been paid some $1.9 million, leaving about $1.8 million after initial costs and expenses had been paid out.

Binh alleges that at that point the firm, "motivated by securing continued, guaranteed immediate payment of their fees, colluded with Burford" to contrive a scheme to increase the amount potentially owed by Binh by increasing the cap on King & Spalding's legal fees and, consequently, increasing Burford's potential entitlement to an increased return.  The way the agreement worked was that the more King & Spalding billed against the cap amount in legal spending, the more Binh was at risk of paying a so-called success return, to be paid if Binh prevailed in the arbitration.  The success return was to be split between King & Spalding and Burford based on the relative portion of their investments in the arbitration.

Binh alleges that King & Spalding tried to make him agree to increase the cap on expenditures for legal fees — and potentially, provide more of a return for Burford — but that he refused.  Thereafter, Burford and the law firm allegedly executed a side agreement between themselves.

In addition to accusing King & Spalding of breaching its fiduciary duty, Binh's lawsuit includes claims for negligence if the overpayment of fees was due to a mistake, as well as claims of misrepresentation and fraud.  He also accuses the firm of negligence after the tribunal in the case against Vietnam rejected an expert report the firm provided stating that Binh's property was worth some $214 million.  The tribunal instead awarded $45.4 million.

Litigation Funder Seeks Share of Attorney Fees

February 16, 2021

A recent Law 360 story by Carolina Bolado, “Litigation Funder Wants Cut of $350M Shire Deal,” reports that law firm lender Counsel Financial Services asked a Florida federal judge for permission to intervene in a dispute over divvying up attorney fees from a $350 million whistleblower settlement with biotech company Shire, alleging the law firm Barry A. Cohen PA should be forced to direct any fees it receives to pay back a $43.8 million line of credit.

Counsel Financial says it loaned money to the Cohen firm in February 2009 in exchange for a secured interest in the firm's assets, which includes legal fee proceeds.  In January 2019, the company obtained a $43,778,684 judgment against the Cohen firm, which previously represented whistleblower Brian Vinca in his suit against Shire.

"Counsel Financial thus has an interest in the legal fees that will be awarded to [the Cohen firm] in this action," the company said in the motion.  "Consequently, Counsel Financial seeks to intervene to ensure that its interest in the legal fees obtained by [the Cohen firm] in connection with this matter are rightfully directed by this Court to Counsel Financial directly from the court registry."

The motion is the latest development in a fight over fees from the $350 million settlement, which was announced in August 2016 and resolved claims stemming from Shire's sales and marketing practices around Dermagraft, a skin substitute the company picked up when it acquired Advanced BioHealing Inc. — now known as Shire Regenerative Medicine Inc. — as part of a $750 million deal in 2011.  Vinca and co-plaintiff Jennifer Sweeney filed the first of the six False Claims Act suits against Shire that led to the settlement.

Kevin J. Darken, who represents Vinca's former counsel, says Vinca's current attorneys, Noel McDonell of Macfarlane Ferguson & McMullen and Bryen Hill of Mahany Law, have tried to cut him and the Cohen firm out of a fee award.  Darken has asked the court to disqualify McDonell and Hill for allegedly using stolen confidential emails to challenge the charging lien filed by Darken, Cohen and Saady & Saxe PA for a cut of the attorney fees.

McDonell and Hill have accused Darken and Kevin M. Cohen, the representative for Barry Cohen's estate, of conspiring to a fee-splitting scheme of the proceeds.  Vinca, who fired his attorneys in March 2018, is suing Darken, the Cohen firm and Saady & Saxe for malpractice, claiming they cost him the full whistleblower's cut of the Shire settlement.  Vinca claims his former counsel's failures forced him to share the whistleblower award of the Shire settlement with the five other relators who filed FCA suits after he did.

Generally, the first whistleblower to file gets about 20% of the government's recovery, and any subsequent whistleblowers do not receive a cut. But in this case, U.S. District Judge James Moody Jr. decided to divvy up the proceeds, in part because of deficiencies in the initial eight-page complaint from Vinca and Sweeney, according to McDonell.  Vinca and Sweeney shared more than $50 million from the settlement, while the other whistleblowers shared approximately $30 million.

The six whistleblower lawsuits that led to the settlement all alleged misconduct by Shire from 2007 through the beginning of 2014, including that it paid illegal kickbacks to get health care providers to use or overuse Dermagraft, marketed Dermagraft for uses not approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, inflated the price of the drug and spurred the coding of Dermagraft-related reimbursement claims for payouts higher than what was appropriate.

McDonell told Law360 that Counsel Financial's claim has no bearing on this lawsuit because Vinca was not a party to the financing contract between Counsel Financial and the Cohen firm.  "As Magistrate Judge Porcelli noted in June of 2019, the matter at issue is the merits of a charging lien filed against relator Brian Vinca by former counsel, and to what extent compensation is appropriate," McDonell said.  "Accordingly, on behalf of Brian Vinca, we are confident that CFS has, as Judge Porcelli so aptly put it, 'no dog in this fight.'"

UK Ruling Bolsters Contingency Fee Arrangements

January 21, 2021

A recent Law 360 story by Richard Crump, “Contingency Fee Ruling Paves Way For Hybrid Arrangements,” reports that a recent appellate ruling has made damages-based agreements in the U.K. more attractive and could herald a new era for litigation funding by permitting a wide array of hybrid arrangements that lawyers say would make it easier to take advantage of the contingency fee structure.  In a Jan. 15 ruling, three Court of Appeal judges unanimously found that a damages-based agreement — a form of retainer in which a lawyer working on the case can charge a share of the recoveries if the claim succeeds — can be enforced if it is terminated by the client.

"There can be little doubt that this is a seminal moment in litigation funding and that the road has now been paved for DBAs to be used more widely in appropriate cases," said Matthew Waszak, a barrister at Temple Garden Chambers.  "Undoubtedly, there is likely to be an increased appetite to consider and use DBAs in appropriate cases."  Judges Peter Coulson, Kim Lewison and Guy Newey dismissed an attempt by a Lexlaw Ltd. client to withhold payment from the London law firm for its work on a misselling claim against Royal Bank of Scotland by seeking to terminate the DBA before the case concluded.

In doing so, the Court of Appeal removed a long-standing source of uncertainty that had prevented the more widespread use of DBAs since they were introduced in 2013 as part of a sweeping overhaul of the funding arrangements for civil litigation.  "One key obstacle preventing their wider use has been the fear among the legal profession that if a client terminates a retainer, the lawyer will end up being paid nothing for what might have been months or even years of work," Waszak said.  "The Court of Appeal has now put that concern to bed."

The uncertainty in relation to termination was one of the reasons the Bar Council the and Law Society have yet to offer a model form for DBAs.  The Bar Council, which intervened in the appeal, said it expects to publish further guidance on DBAs shortly.  DBAs were created to let would-be litigants hire counsel who would share the risks of litigation in return for a percentage of the proceeds.  But flaws in the drafting of the regulations created confusion over whether a DBA could allow for other kinds of fees if terminated early.

Lexlaw filed its suit against former client Shaista Zuberi in February 2016 after she failed to pay a £125,123 invoice the firm issued in July 2015 when she reached a settlement with Royal Bank of Scotland to end her claim over an interest rate hedging product sold at the height of the financial crisis.  On appeal, Zuberi argued that the DBA, which gave Lexlaw 12% of any sum recovered plus expenses, was unenforceable because it violated DBA regulations by including an obligation to pay legal costs and expenses to Lexlaw on its hourly rates up to the date of termination.

The Court of Appeal held that the inclusion of termination provisions is not a breach of the regulations — which Judge Coulson said were "designed to encourage the use of DBAs, not make them commercial suicide for the lawyer" — but arrived at the conclusion by different routes.  In a majority decision, Judges Lewison and Couslon adopted a narrow interpretation of the meaning of a DBA, so that other elements of the retainer, such as termination provisions or the responsibility for a law firm's expenses, are not connected to the sharing of recoveries and fall outside the regulation's scope.

Judge Lewison recognized that this conclusion meant that the current regulations do not deal with a lawyer's fees in the event the client takes a case to trial and loses.  That, the judge said, is a matter that could be legislated separately so that a DBA could prevent or limit a lawyer from charging fees if the claim were lost.  The regulations, which Judge Coulson dryly observed that "nobody can pretend ... represent the draftsman's finest hour," appeared to preclude so-called hybrid DBAs, which combine a share of recovered proceeds with another form of payment, such as hourly rates.

4 New Square's George McDonald said this narrow interpretation has "startling consequences," most notably that opens the possibility of hybrid fee arrangements.  "This means that a solicitor can still charge a client time-based charges even if the claim is unsuccessful and in addition to the DBA payment," McDonald said.  "This is contrary to the widely held beliefs that DBAs were pure contingency agreements which fell under the 'no win, no fee' banner."

While the ruling is significant and will go a long way to putting DBAs back on the table, Signature Litigation LLP's Johnny Shearman said the regulations would benefit from revisions proposed in 2019 that have not yet been adopted.

"Definitive wording on the use of hybrid DBAs would still be welcomed along with a number of other revisions," Shearman said.

Among other things, the proposed switch from paying costs out of the DBA fee rather than on top of it to a success fee model would be helpful, he said.

"Further reforms are needed to the regulations before we get to the watershed moment that this judgment is being referred to as," Shearman said.

The case is Lexlaw Ltd. v. Zuberi, case number A3/2020/1270, in the Court of Appeal of England and Wales.