A recent Law 360 by Sydney Price, “Attys Get $37M For Landing Forex Rigging Deals,” reports that a New York federal judge awarded $36.8 million in attorney fees to counsel for investors who accused a group of banks of rigging foreign exchange markets, about $10.4 million less than the lawyers wanted, for securing nearly $186 million in settlements for their clients.  U.S. District Judge Lewis A. Kaplan said in a letter that class counsel sought legal fees of $47.2 million, which represents 25.4% of the settlement fund, and litigation expenses of $845,471.57.  Judge Kaplan decided to apply a lodestar method to evaluate the payout, which removed some billable hours counsel included in its request.

Counsel submitted a proposed lodestar of $29.9 million for over 53,000 hours worked.  This calculation included over 3,000 hours by four non-lawyer analysts, including a derivatives expert.  Judge Kaplan said counsel did not provide enough data on the rates charged by these analysts to include them in his final calculation. The litigation expenses of $845,471.57 were granted without objections.

"After approximately six years of hard-fought litigation, counsel obtained eight class action settlements and twelve settling defendants, creating a common fund of $185,875,000," Judge Kaplan said.  "This was a good result for the class and counsel deserve to be compensated adequately."  The attorneys previously noted that no other firms attempted to represent the class in the case, contending that was "likely because of the ... high risks" the investors knew they would face in the matter.

The suit accused the banks of coordinating a "horizontal conspiracy to manipulate prices in favor of the defendants' derivatives trading positions" and cites investigations by Australia's securities regulator, which showed certain banks had worked together to fix derivative contract prices.

The parties reached a final settlement in the case last May. Credit Suisse had agreed to pay $8.88 million, and a group of five other banks, comprising BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, the Royal Bank of Canada, the Royal Bank of Scotland and UBS, had agreed to pay a total of $40 million to end the claims they face in the matter.

The settlement sum also includes $137 million in settlements reached earlier in the matter, including December 2021 agreements that Australia and New Zealand Banking and Commonwealth Bank of Australia would each pay $35 million, National Australia Bank would pay $27 million and Morgan Stanley would pay $7 million.  Westpac Banking Corp. agreed to pay $25 million in March 2021, and JPMorgan struck a $7 million settlement deal in November 2018.

A recent Law 360 by Hayley Fowler, “Milberg Nets $85K in Fees on NC Data Breach Deal with CPAs,” reports that a North Carolina judge awarded about $85,000 in attorney fees — a reduced amount — to Milberg Coleman Bryson Phillips Grossman PLLC after the firm secured a class action settlement with an accounting office over a data breach that affected nearly 16,000 clients.  Chief Judge Louis A. Bledsoe III of the North Carolina Business Court said in an order that the hourly rates sought by three Milberg partners who worked on the case were slightly higher than average for the state.  But he said their ability to secure a speedy settlement against the accounting office of Gerald O. Dry PA had "required high legal skill" meriting an award of attorney fees.

"This case revolves around rapidly evolving legal questions of digital security, data breaches and digital privacy, which are at the cutting edge of the interplay between new technology and the law," Judge Bledsoe wrote.  "Pursuing these actions is therefore complicated, difficult and fraught with risk, for both clients and attorneys, and such was the case here."  Taking into account comparable hourly rates in similar complex business disputes, the judge awarded the firm roughly $85,000 in fees and costs — down from the $110,000 Milberg had sought.

The fee award comes on the heels of Judge Bledsoe's decision to grant final approval of a class action settlement Milberg secured on behalf of roughly 15,855 clients of Gerald O. Dry PA whose personal information was allegedly compromised in a data breach announced last year.  Gerald O. Dry PA reached an agreement to settle the proposed class action almost immediately, court documents show, and the parties received early approval in November.

Under the terms of the agreement, Gerald O. Dry PA will reimburse out-of-pocket expenses related to the data breach of up to $400 per class member, lost time of up to five hours at $20 per hour, and monetary losses of up to $5,000.  Those benefits are capped at $200,000 total.  The accounting firm also agreed to give class members two years of identity theft protection services with a potential retail value of more than $3.4 million, as well as implement a host of new cybersecurity protections, including a new firewall, antivirus software and third-party verification, among others.

Milberg had based its $110,000 fee request, which it said represented about 26% of the total deal, on a total settlement value of $419,189.  The firm highlighted "substantial hurdles" and the complex nature of cybersecurity law it faced in pursuing the case, saying that it was never guaranteed the class would be certified and that the requested rates were in line with similar data breach class action settlements in other states.

But Judge Bledsoe said Friday he would not consider rates charged in other jurisdictions when the "relevant locality is North Carolina."  "The North Carolina state courts have generally not approved hourly rates as high as those sought" by the three Milberg partners, the judge said, though he conceded that "hourly rates have risen since many of the North Carolina state cases that speak to reasonable rates were decided."

Taking all of that into account, Judge Bledsoe reduced the hourly rate of lead counsel David Lietz to $700, down from his requested rates of $919 per hour for work performed in 2022 and $979 per hour for work performed this year.  Milberg partners Scott Harris and Gary Klinger were, by comparison, awarded $575 an hour. Harris had initially sought $764 per hour for last year's work and $829 per hour for this year's work. Klinger had requested an hourly rate of $850.

In addition to the partner-level fees, Judge Bledsoe signed off on the requested hourly rates for an associate and four paralegals, finding them to be more in line with recent state business court fee decisions in comparable suits.  The resulting fee award of $85,252 takes into account those adjusted rates as well as roughly $1,000 in expenses and costs.

A recent Law 360 by Jeff Montgomery, “Chancery Oks $1B Dell Class Suit Deal; $285M Fee Pending,” reports that a record $1 billion settlement of a stockholder class suit that challenged a $23.9 billion Dell Technologies Inc. stock swap in 2018 won Delaware Court of Chancery approval, while a proposed $285 million class attorney fee got sidelined for further consideration.  Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster described the deal — announced in November and the largest on record for the court — as the result of "a huge effort" on the part of class attorneys who battled through nearly 4½ years of litigation and racked up more than 53,000 attorney hours to reach the hearing.

Waiting at the hearing, however, were arguments by a large shareholder and a friend-of-the-court brief filed by law professors urging the court under some proposals to slash the fee by $100 million or more.  Pentwater Capital Management LP, which holds 1.6% of the shares at issue, argued that the 28.5% fee award would be excessive and urged the court to adopt a sliding, or diminishing, rate for mega-settlements.  A group of law professors also backed a declining scale, saying a $150 million fee would be defensible while keeping $135 million for stockholders.  "I do think the objectors have raised important points that I'm going to think about," the vice chancellor said after a 2½-hour hearing.

The class suit accused Dell and controlling investors Silver Lake Group and its affiliates of shortchanging regular shareholders by some $10.7 billion in a deal that converted Class V stock — created to finance much of Dell's $67 billion acquisition of EMC Technologies in 2016 — to common shares.

When the challenged conversion closed on December 28, 2018, VMware stock closed at $158.38 per share, and DVMT, or Class V, stockholders received just $104.27 per share because Dell's Class C stock had been overvalued.  "The simple fact is, defendants would not settle for a billion dollars unless there was a real, credible risk of much higher damages at trial," said David Cooper of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, counsel to the class, while explaining the decision to settle rather than pursue a much larger share of the stockholders' short-changing.

"There were an enormous number of obstacles, and this was very far from a typical case," Cooper said.  "In determining whether $1 billion is fair value for the class, whether it reflects positively on the performance of counsel, it simply did not make sense to look at $10.7 billion while ignoring risk" that there would be nothing recovered, as happens in many deal challenges.

Stephen B. Brauerman of Bayard PA, counsel to Pentwater, said it would be "credibility killing" to call the settlement unimpressive, but told the court there are concerns that the deal did not fully compensate the stockholder class for the potential $10.7 billion in damages.  "All were requesting the court to consider in its exercise of discretion" the potential for "adversely impacting the class, impacting substantially their recovery," Brauerman said.

Ned Weinberger of Labaton Sucharow LLP, also counsel to the class, told the vice chancellor that stockholder attorneys logged more than 53,000 hours on the case, with nearly $4.3 million in expenses, with the fee and expense award reflecting an implied hourly rate of about $5,268 per hour.  If the court is entertaining a size adjustment, Weinberger said, "we have already done it for you.  All of the precedents support a fee award on the eve of trial of 30% or more.  We sought only 28.5%," or a 5% reduction.

Anthony A. Rickey of Margrave Law LLC, counsel to the law professor group, advocated in part bringing Chancery Court litigation fees more in line with relatively lower payouts for large cases in U.S. District Court securities actions.  Rickey said a 15% fee would be more appropriate, providing a still large $150 million fee while earmarking another $135 million for shareholders.  "There is a considerable amount of decreased risk after motions to dismiss," Rickey said, "even in Chancery practice."

Vice Chancellor Laster said federal securities cases seldom go to trial and often settle after motions to dismiss.  "Why isn't that a fair distinction?" the vide chancellor said.  "It makes sense" in federal court, when there is similar work in each case "and people are benefiting from the size of the issuer rather than actual value added" in litigation.  In contrast, the vice chancellor said, the Dell counsel "had to litigate against the army of the excellent until they got to the verge of trial, where they had to settle."

A recent Law 360 by Gina Kim, “Joint Juice Maker Rips Class Attys’ ‘Overstated’ $8.3M Fee Bid,” reports that Premier Nutrition asked a California federal judge to cut $2.4 million from class counsel's "bloated and unreasonable" $8.3 million fee request in litigation over allegedly misleading advertising claims about its Joint Juice, citing block billing, overstaffing, lavish hotel stays and fringe expenses for "boba and coffee runs dating back to 2013."  In a 33-page opposition, Premier Nutrition's attorney Steven E. Swaney of Venable LLP accused class counsel, except for Iredale & Yoo, of presenting to the court "a bloated and unreasonable application asking this court to award $8,274,516" in combined fees, expenses and costs.

Premier argued the lodestar calculation of the two other class counsel firms, Blood Hurst & O'Reardon and Lynch Carpenter "betray a lack of 'billing judgment,'" as they propose a fee award that doesn't approximate what a paying client is willing to approve.  Their lodestar calculation is "massively overstated" since it includes time spent for other related Joint Juice class actions, Premier argued, pointing out the plaintiffs only prevailed in one of 11 related cases but are now submitting a fee bid as if they prevailed on all of them.

Excluding Eugene Iredale and Grace June of Iredale & Yoo, Premier complained that Blood Hurst and Lynch Carpenter's billing records are riddled with inefficiencies, including "top-heavy administration of work," block billing, billing in quarter-hour increments, overstaffing, nontravel work billing and other things.  Examples include Blood Hurst lawyers billing 24 or more hours per day and submitting several duplicative entries on a single day, staffing six lawyers on the trial, "two of whom sat passively in the gallery of the courtroom" and charging $575 per hour for a contract attorney, Craig Straub, doing document review, the opposition states.

"As explained in the declaration of Premier's fee expert Steven Tasher, a 40% across-the-board percentage reduction to BHO's and Lynch Carpenter's lodestar is warranted to account for these inefficiencies," Premier said.  "The total lodestar for class counsel should be reduced to $2,406,809.  This constitutes approximately 29% of the judgment amount, which aligns with the Ninth Circuit's 25% benchmark for reasonable fees."

Premier balked at class counsel's suggestion for the court to apply a multiplier to pump their fee award if their lodestar is reduced, and also took issue with their "extravagant expenses" that it said warrants an across-the-board cut in their claimed charges.

"Class counsel also seek reimbursement from Premier for every sundry or fringe expense they encountered over this decade-long litigation, including boba and coffee runs dating back to 2013," the opposition states. "Class counsel even tries to bill Premier for hundreds of dollars in laundry expenses incurred during trial — even though they apparently traveled back home to San Diego that same day."

The opposition references defense's expert, Tasher, who reviewed the billing entries and opined the class counsel's requests costs also reveal "a 'spare no expense' approach" to the case along with double billing and "phantom charges."  "In my opinion, while the dollar value for many of these items may seem small, they reflect a big attitude of no cost being too great to throw onto the bill and eat, drink and be merry on someone else's dime," Tasher wrote.  "No paying client would tolerate class counsel's lifestyle expenses or lavishness."

Premier said that Blood Hurst and Lynch Carpenter's proposed lodestar figure was grossly inflated and warrants dramatic cuts across the board, arguing that the firms can't include time spent on class representative depositions in other related actions in their calculation.  Blood Hurst's proposed lodestar also includes nearly 1,000 hours for trial prep spent in Mullins, which Premier said should be removed since the Mullins trial never occurred.  It's inappropriate for Blood Hurst to get 100% of the fees for work common to the related cases based on the successful outcome of just one case, the opposition states.

Premier also sought a 40% cut to Blood Hurst's remaining lodestar account for several deficiencies in their billing practices, noting that  the firm's Timothy Blood and Thomas Joseph O'Reardon billed for work done in 2013 at their current hourly rate, which is significantly higher.

While Blood, partner Paula Brown and Straub billed 1,000 hours for trial prep, Blood was the only one who had an active role at trial, and O'Reardon and Straub "sat passively in the gallery," Premier alleged.  Premier also accused Straub and O'Reardon of billing extra hours after trial each day and erroneously adding entries that exceed 24 hours a day "or are obvious duplicates," totaling $62,207.50.

Premier also attacked Lynch Carpenter's fee bid of $392,392.50, arguing the billed work was entirely spent on Mullins.  The fee should be apportioned among the related cases and then cut by 40% due to excessive time and top-heavy administration work, Premier said.  That should leave Lynch Carpenter with $20,842.77.  "As an initial matter, in what can only be described as a shocking act of chutzpah, Mr. Carpenter — who has not worked on these cases since 2020 — includes in his fee petition 13.7 hours to fly to San Francisco to observe one day of trial on May 25, 2022," the opposition states.

Nor should class counsel recover fees and deposition costs for experts that weren't used in the Montera suit, Premier said.  Furthermore, several charges from the two firms weren't only lavish and extravagant, but also "purely wasteful," Tasher said.

"Each of these issues is exacerbated by the level of staffing," Tasher wrote. "Had the trial been staffed with attorneys Iredale, Jun and Blood, (the three attorneys who actually appeared on the record to try the case), the expenses would also have been much more modest.  However, given the excessive staffing (and related trial expenses) of attorneys [Todd] Carpenter, O'Reardon and Straub, the costs grew exponentially, considering the additional flights, Uber/taxi charges, meals/alcohol, and snacks brought about by these three additional timekeepers (essentially double the trial team.)"

A recent Law.com by Riley Brennan, “Nearly $700K in Attorney Fees and Costs Awarded Following $8M Judgment in Wrongful Incarceration Case,” reports that, following an $8 million civil rights judgment his favor, a former Massachusetts prisoner and his Chicago-based counsel were awarded an additional $743,395.87 in attorney fees and costs.  U.S. District Judge Timothy S. Hillman of the District of Massachusetts partially granted and partially denied a former prisoner’s motion for attorney fees and costs, awarding the plaintiff $675,194.88 in fees and $68,200.99 in costs in an April 7 opinion.

The case originated from plaintiff Natale Cosenza’s Section 1983 action, which alleged constitutional claims against various defendants, including the city of Worcester and multiple Worcester police officers, “stemming from his conviction and 16-year incarceration for armed burglary.”

 A jury ultimately found two of the defendants—Kerry Hazelhurst and John Doherty—liable for violations of plaintiff’s civil rights and awarded $8 million in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages.  Cosenza then moved for the awarding of attorney fees and costs, with defendants arguing against the proposed rates, billing, hours, and costs.  Hillman determined that most of the billing was appropriate, with the majority of the plaintiff’s attorneys’ rates being reasonably allocated.  However, there were three exceptions.

According to Hillman, “three partners spent a significant amount of time drafting motions, work that is typically done by associates and reviewed by partners.  Those three partners will be reimbursed at the mid-level associate rate of $300 for those hours.  Similarly, work on the ministerial portions of fee petitions is reimbursed at a reasonable paralegal rate of $100 an hour.”

Further, Hillman determined from the three attorneys’ descriptions that “only one described their work as legal,” and thus only that attorney’s hours should be “reimbursed at the associate rate, as there are substantive legal issues raised in the fee petition.  The other attorneys will be reimbursed at a paralegal rate for those hours.”

Plaintiff’s also requested for reimbursement of the services of an investigator, which defendants argued against, finding “that there should be no reimbursement for the services of an investigator where the case ultimately turned on the evidentiary record from the original criminal case.”  However, the court didn’t agree.

According to Hillman, the defendants failed to cite any case law for their argument.  Additionally, it did not strike the court as “unreasonable to hire an investigator in a case where the plaintiff’s allegations were that the police lied and destroyed evidence, even if the plaintiff is unable to point to a specific piece of evidence the investigator discovered that was introduced at trial.”  Thus the court, in factoring the investigator’s travel costs to serve defendants and conduct her investigation, determined $100 an hour was a reasonable rate.

In terms of the plaintiff’s counsel’s hours, defendants argued that the case was severely overstaffed, and that two attorneys would have been sufficient.  According to the court, this assertion was on the theory that the case as the case was defended by two attorneys, two attorneys was sufficient for plaintiffs.

“First, reasonable staffing for bringing and prosecuting a civil rights case is not identical to reasonable staffing for defending a civil rights case.  Apart from the normal burden of proof the plaintiffs must shoulder, they must overcome qualified immunity and evidentiary hurdles. But more importantly, the defendants’ objection to facing down 11 opposing attorneys is misleading,” said Hillman.

Hillman disagreed with the defendants’ assertion, highlighting that five of the total eleven attorneys requested minimal hours.  The remaining attorneys, that requested substantial hours, “were split into pre-trial and trial teams of three attorneys each.  Thus, at any given time in the litigation, plaintiff had three counsel and defendants had two—given the structural differences noted above, not an unreasonable staffing discrepancy.”

A similar structure was set up amongst the counsel’s paralegals, leading the court to conclude that a reduction for overstaffing was not warranted.  The court also rejected the defendants’ argument “that because their counsel worked 536 hours between May 4, 2022, and February 13, 2023, and the plaintiff’s counsel worked 770 hours during that time period, the time spent by defendants’ counsel is reasonable and a 30% reduction is in order.”

“Defendants cite no case law to support this position, which would allow an across-the-board reduction for a discrepancy in hours that is not even reflective of the total time spent on the case nor, in the court’s view, particularly egregious,” said Hillman.  “The relevance of that time period is also unclear to this court.  This court does not find a reduction for overbilling warranted on that ground.”

Defendants’ assertion that the time spent “getting attorneys up-to-speed on the case or discussing and strategizing about the case are not billable and request a 10% reduction,” was also rejected by Hillman, who didn’t find the “conferencing” hours for such a complex case unreasonable.  However, the plaintiff’s request for a 50% increase for their success was rejected.  “This was an unusual case, but this court does not find it justifies an increase.  And while this court recognizes the skill of plaintiffs’ counsel, that is reflected in the lodestar,” said Hillman .

The court also rejected the defendants’ counterargument, that due to the plaintiff’s “mixed success,” a 50% decrease was appropriate.  The court rejected the defendants’ theory that a downward variance was appropriate as the plaintiff achieved “nominal success,” finding that an $8 million judgment wasn’t merely considered a “nominal” success.

“Still, the plaintiff’s losses along the way must be accounted for,” determined the court.  “The plaintiff’s counsel did not delineate what they were working on in their fee petition.  That means a blanket reduction is necessary if the claims are not severable.”

“The legal theories and facts in this litigation are neither wholly severable nor so overlapping that they are incapable of independent analysis,” Hillman continued.  “The failure to intervene and malicious prosecution legal theories, for instance, largely overlap factually and overlap to some extent legally with the conspiracy claims insofar as they are all somewhat parasitic on a due process violation.  The doctrine of qualified immunity permeated this litigation, and while this court analyzed it claim-by-claim, it would be difficult for plaintiff’s counsel to separate research done on the doctrine in that way.  That said, although the underlying alleged facts were all of a similar type—they all supported allegations that plaintiff’s conviction was the result of the bad actions of law enforcement—they were all distinct from each other.”

The court issued a 20% reduction for pretrial work and a 5% reduction for post-trial work, to account for the “minor losses” plaintiff suffered after summary judgment.  Thus, the plaintiff’s fees, after the 25% reduction, and after applying the local Worcester rates and reductions for mixed success and overbilling, is reduced from $1,766,002.50 to $675,194.88.

In regards to the plaintiff’s cost requests of $86,605.41 under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, defendants objected “to costs on several broad grounds, requesting an 80% reduction” without citing any case law.

The court rejected “defendants’ across-the-board reduction,” examining their objections in turn.  The defendants pointed to what they described as plaintiffs counsel’s “remarkable” travel costs, including repeated flights “back and forth from Chicago, railway travel, hotel, car rental and other costs for client meetings, ‘investigation,’ and deposition preparation.”

According to the court, a Chicago law firm incurring travel costs to litigate in Worcester isn’t remarkable, but the “out-of-state law firms must justify out-of-state costs by showing that no similar in-state services exist.”

“Plaintiff’s counsel argues Loevy & Loevy is a specialized firm that specializes in wrongful incarceration cases, but this court finds that plaintiff could have found comparable representation in Boston,” Hillman said.  “Therefore, only travel costs from Boston to Worcester are justified.”  Therefore, Hillman said, a reduction of $15,858.06 in travel costs was appropriate.

The court also deducted $1,001.36 for the plaintiff’s counsel using a rental car for the week of the trial to go from their hotel to the courthouse, after concluding that “a taxi or ride-share service would cost an average of $40 a day, and so over a six-day trial transportation should have cost them $240.”

Costs were further reduced by $1,145, after defendants alleged that the deposition costs were duplicative, as plaintiffs had requested costs the recordings of depositions and the transcripts.  The court determined that for at least one of the witnesses the video deposition was shown at trial, and the costs of the other video recordings were deducted.  $400 in costs were deducted as not all of the plaintiff’s attorneys granted pro hac vice filed motions or argued in the court, in response to defendants objection to all ten of the attorneys receiving reimbursement for pro hac vice admission.

Thus, after “reducing out-of-state costs ($15,858.06), the car rental ($1,001.36), recordings of depositions ($1,145), and excessive pro hac vice applications ($400), this Court finds $68,200.99 in costs proper,” the plaintiff was awarded a total of $743,395.87 in fees and costs.

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