A recent Reuters article by Alison Frankel, “Appeals Court Will Decide If Lawyers Can Evade Common Fund Fees in Consolidated Cases,” reports on common fund fees in class actions and MDLs.  The story reads:

Can a plaintiffs lawyer who was a member of the steering committee in consolidated multidistrict litigation get out of paying common benefit fees for cases resolved outside of the MDL’s confines?  That’s the question that will be argued before the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in a case arising from consolidated litigation over C.R. Bard Inc’s blood clot filter implants.  The 9th Circuit punted last year in a similar case addressing common fees in the Roundup MDL because the fee ruling on appeal was not a final order.

But assuming there are no jurisdictional problems in the Bard case – as both parties assured the appeals court in a joint supplemental brief filed earlier this month – the 9th Circuit will be just the third federal appeals court in the last decade to offer answers to vexing questions about the scope of MDL judges’ power to order fees in cases they do not oversee.

Common benefit fees, as you know, are intended to compensate MDL lead counsel who expend significant time and money to conduct discovery and litigate legal issues that affect all of the cases in the MDL.  The fees address what might otherwise be the problem of “free-riding” by lawyers trying to capitalize on the efforts of MDL leaders without paying for it.

There’s little doubt that MDL judges have the authority to order plaintiffs lawyers whose cases are part of the consolidated proceeding to turn over a share of their clients’ settlements to MDL leadership.  (In the Bard MDL, common benefit fees have been held back in an escrow account before ever reaching plaintiffs and their lawyers.)  But what about cases outside of the MDL, such as state-court lawsuits, claims that were settled before they were formally filed or cases filed after the closure of the MDL?  Can MDL judges require plaintiffs lawyers to pay common benefit fees in those cases?

Federal circuits have reached different conclusions.  In 2014, the 8th Circuit ruled in In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation that the MDL judge did not have authority to order fees from plaintiffs’ lawyers in state-court GMO suits.  But in 2015’s In re Avandia, the 3rd Circuit ruled that MDL courts are entitled to enforce their own orders, so an MDL judge had authority to order a plaintiff’s firm that participated in the MDL to pay a common benefit fee on all of its settled cases.

Two highly-regarded MDL judges also recently diverged on the scope of their authority. U.S. District Judge Jesse Furman of Manhattan ruled in 2020’s In re: General Motors that his MDL orders required lawyers who had litigated before him to pay common benefit fees from settlements of unfiled cases.  But U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria of San Francisco held in 2021’s In re: Roundup that his power to order fees was limited to cases within the MDL.

Like I said, this is a vexing issue.  The twist in the Bard case is that plaintiffs lawyer Ben Martin of Martin Baughman was appointed to the MDL’s steering committee at the very beginning of the case in 2015.  He and the lawyers at his firm settled about 200 cases in the MDL.  But they also settled an additional 300 or so cases that were never formally filed, were brought in state court, or were filed after U.S. District Judge David Campbell of Phoenix closed the Bard MDL.

Martin’s counsel, Howard Bashman of the indispensable How Appealing blog, told the 9^th Circuit that Campbell erred when he ruled in 2022 that all of Martin’s cases – and not just those settled within the MDL -- were subject to a fee holdback.  Bashman argued that MDL judges simply do not have a right, under their inherent case management power or common fund doctrine, to order fees in cases that are not before them.

In a phone interview, Bashman acknowledged the free rider problem, but said that the 9th Circuit must distinguish between the legitimate goal of deterring abusive case-filing by plaintiffs lawyers who want to avoid common benefit fees and the limited power of MDL judges to accomplish that end.  “Those are two different questions,” Bashman said. (He emphasized that Martin and his firm were not trying to avoid common benefit fees by settling cases outside of the MDL.)

The other lawyers on the Bard MDL steering committee, who are represented by Shannon Clark of Gallagher & Kennedy, assert that MDL judges have inherent power to assess fees on cases outside of their court.  But the lawyers' primary argument is that Martin and his firm agreed to common benefit fee holdbacks for all of their cases when Martin accepted an MDL leadership role, based on a participation agreement attached to a Campbell case management order. (Martin has also received common benefit fees under those orders.)  Clark, who did not respond to my email query, argued that Martin waived his right to challenge the fees by failing to object to Campbell’s orders.

Bashman told the 9th Circuit that there is no evidence Martin signed the relevant participation agreement.  And even if he did, Bashman said, the MDL judge is not entitled to exceed his authority by imposing an impermissible condition on Martin’s ability to represent his clients.

In some ways, the stakes in the Bard appeal are small. Martin’s briefing does not say precisely how much money has been held back but says his clients’ 2% share amounts to less than $1 million.  The overall holdback is 10%, so this fight seems to involve between $5 and $10 million.  On the other hand, common benefit fees affect every MDL, and surely total hundreds of millions of dollars across all of the consolidated multidistrict cases being litigated in U.S. court.

Moreover, Bashman said, the 9th Circuit panel – 9th Circuit judges John Owens and Bridget Bade and Judge Miller Baker of the U.S. Court of International Trade – might not be the last word on the fee question, regardless of who wins.  “This does seem like the kind of issue the U.S. Supreme Court would be interested in,” he said.

A recent Law 360 article by Tyler Brown, Jason Harbour and Justin Paget of Hunton Andrews Kurth LLP, “How Ch. 11 Ruling Ends War Between National, Local Rates” reports on a recent ruling on hourly rates in Chapter 11 cases.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

On Oct. 18, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia approved the professional fee applications in the Nordic Aviation Capital bankruptcy cases, including the rates of each of the professionals as appropriate market rates.  This settles any remaining uncertainty in how professionals' hourly rates will be considered for approval in bankruptcy courts in the district. In particular, the bankruptcy court noted that

[m]uch ink has since been spilled differentiating so-called "local" rates from "national" rates. The distinction is much ado about nothing.  The market for professional services cannot be predetermined by geography alone.

Instead of relying on geography alone, the bankruptcy court stated that

the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code directs the Court to consider the "customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under [Title 11]."  The Court must, therefore, look at whether the rates charged are consistent with those set in the relevant market.

To determine the relevant market, the court noted that the market rate will be set for the most part by the amount clients are willing to pay for professional services.  The factors clients may consider in the selection process might include the reputation of the professional, the specialization of the professional, the need for the professional's experience and expertise, the stakes of the transaction and the time pressures of the engagement.

The court also stated that a good understanding of the relevant market in any given case could be gleaned from the rates of professionals other than those engaged by:

    The debtor;

    Debtor-in-possession financing budgets;

    Monthly operating reports of the debtor;

    Information required by the U.S. trustee program guidelines; and

    The checks and balances built into the fabric of the reorganization process to police the market.

The bankruptcy court also reiterated that the applicable factors for approving professional fee applications are those enumerated in Title 11 of the U.S. Code, Section 330(a)(3), and the Johnson factors.

Additionally, the bankruptcy court noted that in applying the Johnson factors, "it must heed the Fourth Circuit's admonition against per se rules beyond those legislatively mandated," noting that the court cannot "abdicate the equitable discretion granted to it by establishing rules of broad application which fail to take into account the facts of a particular case and the overall objectives of the bankruptcy system."[6]

After identifying the applicable legal standard, the bankruptcy court addressed the evidence that was relevant to the approval of the professional fee applications, including the rates of the professionals.  As the fee applications were uncontested, the court stated that it issued the memorandum opinion to provide guidance to practitioners on the facts they need to develop in support of fee applications filed in bankruptcy cases pending before that court.

In taking the unusual step of issuing a lengthy memorandum opinion for uncontested fee applications, the bankruptcy court put to rest what one commentator recently suggested was a war between national and local rates in the Eastern District of Virginia in mega Chapter 11 cases.  The issue arose in connection with the appeal of the plan confirmation order in the Mahwah Bergen Retail Group Inc. cases on unrelated grounds.

After vacating confirmation in that case, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ordered that the bankruptcy court issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on any further fee applications in the case and questioned whether attorney rates should exceed the prevailing market rates in the Richmond division of the Eastern District of Virginia.

The district court's order created uncertainty as to how the bankruptcy court might subsequently analyze the rates of professionals from outside the Richmond division.  That uncertainty was short-lived.  Importantly, the memorandum opinion represented one of the bankruptcy court's first opportunities to address professional fee applications in a large Chapter 11 case since the entry of the district court order adopting the bankruptcy court's report and recommendation in the Mahwah Bergen bankruptcy cases.

In the memorandum opinion and the bankruptcy court's report and recommendation, two bankruptcy judges from the Eastern District of Virginia have extensively detailed the legal precedent in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the appropriate factual predicates for approving market rates.

In sum, the memorandum opinion provides comfort to all practitioners, including those from outside the Eastern District of Virginia, that the appropriateness of attorney rates in cases filed in the district will continue to be assessed through application of the factors identified in Section 330(a)(3) and the Johnson factors on a case-by-case basis, without any additional requirements or per se rules.

A recent Law 360 article by Joshua Wurtzel, “A Lawyer’s Guide To Collecting Fees From Nonpaying Clients,” reports on collecting unpaid fees.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

You've done the work and sent the bill, but haven't been paid. What do you do?  This is unfortunately a question that lawyers, from solo practitioners to BigLaw partners, confront all too often.  But most lawyers struggle with the answer.  And even worse, many end up doing nothing — leaving significant receivables on the table from clients who have the ability to pay.  Struggle no longer.  Here, I offer some recommendations on how to deal with a nonpaying client. The article focuses on the law on account stated in New York.  These principles and advice are generally applicable in most U.S. jurisdictions, though you should of course consult the specific law in your jurisdiction.

Make Sure Your Retainer Agreement Gives You Adequate Protection

Good collection starts with a good retainer agreement.  There are several important clauses any retainer agreement should have.

Thirty Days to Object

Your retainer agreement should include a clause stating that if a client has an objection to an invoice, the client must make a specific objection in writing within 30 days.  Courts have upheld these types of clauses, and have further held that a client that fails to make a specific, timely objection in accordance with this clause waives objections to the invoice.

Fee Shifting

Many lawyers avoid suing clients for unpaid fees because the time spent doing so can be better spent on other, billable tasks.  But if you include a fee-shifting clause in your retainer agreement, a nonpaying client could end up being responsible for fees you incur in bringing the suit.  Make sure, however, that the fee-shifting clauses run in favor of the client as well if he or she is the prevailing party, or else it will be unenforceable.

Choice of Forum and Acceptance of Service of Process

Your retainer agreement should also include a forum selection clause in the state in which you practice so you don't have to go out of state to sue a nonpaying client.  And it should also include a clause stating that the client agrees to accept service of process by mail or email, in case you have trouble serving the client personally.

Rely on the Retaining Lien and Charging Lien

New York law strongly favors attorneys who are stiffed by their clients.  So there are some tools you can use to try to collect without having to bring a lawsuit.

Retaining Lien

When a client has an outstanding balance with his or her former lawyer, the lawyer can assert a retaining lien over the client's file. This allows the lawyer to refuse to turn over the file to the client or his or her new counsel until the outstanding balance is paid or otherwise secured.  To lift the retaining lien, the former client must either pay the amount owed to the lawyer or post a bond for that amount.

Charging Lien

Under Section 475 of the New York Judiciary Law, "from the commencement of an action," the lawyer who "appears for a party has a lien upon his or her client's cause of action," which attaches to a verdict, settlement, judgment or final order in his or her client's favor.

This section gives the lawyer a lien on the proceeds of the former client's case to the extent of the amount owed to the lawyer, with the result that no proceeds can be distributed to the former client or his or her new counsel until the former lawyer is paid.

In 1995, the New York Court of Appeals in LMWT Realty Corp. v. Davis Agency Inc. held that this lien "does not merely give an attorney an enforceable right against the property of another," but instead "gives the attorney an equitable ownership interest in the client's cause of action."

Sue for Account Stated

If all else fails and you need to sue a nonpaying client, the account stated cause of action will be your best friend.  Indeed, in New York, this cause of action allows a professional services provider to sue a client for nonpayment of an invoice if the client has retained the invoice for at least a few months and has failed to make timely, specific, written objections.  This cause of action thus provides lawyers with a substantial tool to pursue a nonpaying client.

Invoice Requirement

To state a claim for account stated, you must show only that you sent the invoices to the client and the client retained them — usually for at least a few months — without making specific, written objections.  It is thus important to maintain a record of when invoices are sent and to whom — ideally by email to an email address the client gave to receive invoices.

Oral Objections

Generally, a client must make specific, written objections to an invoice; general or oral objections will not be enough to defeat a claim for account stated. Nor will general claims by a client that he or she is dissatisfied with a particular outcome suffice.

Reasonableness of Fees

Many nonpaying clients will defend against a nonpayment suit by claiming that they were overbilled or that the quality of the work was not to their liking.  But if these objections are not made in a timely way, with specificity and in writing, courts generally hold that they are waived.

This is significant for a lawyer pursuing a nonpaying client, as most clients will defend by claiming that there was something wrong with the work done by the lawyer.  And so if an account is stated by virtue of the client's retention of the invoices, the reasonableness of the fees and the quality of the work has no bearing on the merit of the account stated claim.

Underlying Agreement to Pay

While account stated is a powerful cause of action, it works only if there is an underlying agreement to pay for the services rendered.  So a person who randomly sends out invoices without having an underlying agreement with the recipients of the invoices can obviously not rely on account stated.

But if you have a retainer agreement that properly covers the scope of the work you will be doing, you shouldn't have a problem.  Nor is there a requirement that the client has agreed to pay for the specific invoices at issue, as long as the client has agreed to pay for your services generally.

The Dreaded Malpractice Claim

Most nonpaying clients faced with a lawsuit by their former lawyer will assert counterclaims for malpractice — even if the malpractice claim has no merit.  While the lawyer must, of course, still deal with the malpractice claim, courts generally go out of their way to sever a lawyer's account stated claim from a nonpaying client's malpractice counterclaim.  This is especially so if the alleged malpractice relates to different work from what is at issue on the unpaid invoices.

Further, as a strategic matter, unless the malpractice counterclaim has merit, most nonpaying clients will drop it after the lawyer obtains a quick judgment on summary judgment at the outset of the case.

Conclusion

Suing a former client is never pleasant, and is a last resort after the attorney-client relationship has broken down. But using efficient, streamlined ways to collect from nonpaying clients can allow a law firm to provide greater value to the rest of its clients.

Joshua Wurtzel is a partner at Schlam Stone & Dolan LLP in New York.

A recent article, “Judge Posner Called It a ‘Racket’” by Gregory Markel, Daphe Morduchowitz, and Sarah Fedner reports on mootness fees in federal merger litigation.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

In a recent decision from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, a federal Judge pushed back against the common but abusive practice of “mootness fee” payoffs in public M&A deals. In the February 2022 opinion, Judge Oetken denied a $250,000 attorneys’ fee demand by plaintiff’s counsel in an investor challenge to Microsoft’s $19.7 billion acquisition of Nuance Communications. The decision is by a court which took the opportunity to both consider and reject a widespread phenomenon that many call a meritless shakedown or transaction tax on public M&A deals. This decision is significant in that it is fairly rare for mootness fee payments to be subject to court scrutiny despite the increasingly common voluntary dismissals by plaintiffs in this type of case. For more information about the history of mootness fee and disclosure only settlements and the need for reform click here. 

The Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2016 decision in In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, which criticized so called “disclosure only settlements” paid to plaintiffs’ counsel in exchange for supplemental disclosures that do not provide any material additional information, led to a steep decline in filings of merger litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery.[1] Following the Trulia decision,  there was a sharp increase in merger challenges filed in  federal court. A number of plaintiffs’ firms filed cases in federal court very similar to the ones criticized in Trulia with the apparently sole purpose of obtaining attorneys’ fees in exchange for voluntary dismissals and non-material supplemental disclosures. These voluntary dismissal cases, because they are dismissed prior to class certification, generally are not subject to court approval.

Background

Beginning in 2009, filings of class action claims challenging mergers increased substantially. As of 2015, the year before the Trulia decision, roughly 95% of merger transactions valued at more than $100 million were challenged.[2] 60% of these challenges were filed in Delaware courts, and more often than not in Chancery Court, while only 19% were filed in federal courts in other states.[3]

These cases were typically resolved in early settlements with corrective disclosures and broad releases of future class claims for defendants that required court approval. Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee requests were often approved by the courts under the common law, corporate benefit doctrine. The disclosures supposedly provided shareholders with information material to making an informed investment decision. In reality, however, the added disclosure they provided  was not meaningful and most often a makeweight to justify plaintiffs’ counsels’ attorneys’ fees. In many cases, the corrective disclosures were nearly pointless and did not affect many shareholder votes. Thus, many class actions filed in connection with M&A deals became a vehicle for plaintiffs’ firms to obtain attorneys’ fees with little, if any, meaningful benefit for shareholders. Since class actions were created to benefit a class of injured claimants, there was a fairly obvious disconnect between the theoretical purpose and the reality of the motive behind many merger cases. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit referred to this practice by plaintiffs as “no better than a racket.” [4]

The Trulia Decision

The Delaware Chancery’s Court decision in Trulia sought to put an end to this practice by limiting disclosure-only settlements to those that resulted in disclosures that added significant value to class members and provided releases of sensible scope. The Trulia court refused to approve a proposed settlement, which included supplemental disclosures and attorneys’ fees in exchange for a broad release, finding that the proposed disclosure was not “plainly material” as defined under Delaware law.[5] The Trulia court cautioned that, unless there was “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available,”[6] proposed disclosure-only settlements and accompanying attorney’s fees would not be approved going forward by the Chancery Court.[7]

Federal Merger Litigation Post-Trulia

Trulia came as the culmination of several then recent Delaware Chancery Court decisions and it made clear there was a new regime in Delaware Chancery Court for settlements of merger cases. However, Trulia did not apply in other forums. As a result, certain plaintiffs’ firms took advantage of this by challenging mergers in alternative jurisdictions. In 2016, the rate of merger litigation plummeted in Delaware state court by almost 50% and continued to decrease thereafter.[8] This trend was accompanied by an immediate uptick in merger litigation in federal courts.[9] As of 2018, only 5% of completed deals were challenged in Delaware Chancery Court, while 92% were challenged in federal court.[10]

Not only did the rate of filings increase in federal court, but the number of class action cases resolved through voluntary dismissals before a class was certified skyrocketed. Starting in 2016, many merger case filings were followed by voluntary dismissals and a payment of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs. By 2018, 92% of the federal merger challenges resulted in  voluntary dismissals and payment of mootness fees.[11]

These mootness fees cases generally do not require court approval as the cases are generally dismissed prior to class certification, and therefore without a requirement of court approval, and the fees are infrequently challenged by defendants who often elect to pay the mootness fee demands, even in  the often frivolous cases, in order to avoid delays in completing merger transactions and the costs of  fully litigating  a case on the merits.

Serion v. Nuance Communications, Inc.

In the recent Nuance decision, Judge Oetken denied plaintiff’s counsel’s fee petition, finding that  plaintiff’s counsel had not shown a “substantial benefit” to shareholders from the supplemental disclosures finding that the additional disclosure which was provided of  underlying metrics for data already disclosed did not confer a substantial benefit.” The holding is notable because the supplemental disclosures demanded by plaintiffs are typical of the truly marginal information added in connection with most cases involving mootness fee dismissals.

Conclusion

The payment of plaintiff's baseless fee demands, which individually are not large but in total are much more than trivial, to end frivolous deal challenges continues despite the Trulia decision that criticized a nearly identical practice. The cost of this frivolous deal tax is borne not just by the companies who pay them but also are passed along to consumers and other companies who do business with the payor company and the practice provides little or no benefit to shareholders in most instances. The Nuance ruling is an exception to the more common result of no court review of mootness fee settlements.  Plaintiffs, because of the procedural posture, were required to petition for court approval of the fee. Because mootness fees are not typically reviewed by the courts,  there is a strong need for legislative reform to deal with this practice. In the meantime, the “racket”  in Judge Posner’s terms likely will continue.

Gregory Markel and Daphne Morduchowitz are partners and Sarah Fedner is a senior associate at Seyfarth LLP in New York.  Partners Giovanna Ferrari, Andrew Escobar and associate Meryl Hulteng also contributed to this article.

Every year, NALFA conducts an hourly rate survey of civil litigation in the U.S.   Today, NALFA released the results from its 2021 hourly rate survey.  The survey results, published in The 2021 Litigation Hourly Rate Survey & Report, shows billing rate data on the very factors that correlate directly to hourly rates in litigation:

City / Geography
Years of Litigation Experience / Seniority
Position / Title
Practice Area / Complexity of Case
Law Firm / Law Office Size

This empirical survey and report provides micro and macro data of current hourly rate ranges for both defense and plaintiffs’ litigators, at various experience levels, from large law firms to solo shops, in regular and complex litigation, and in the nation’s largest markets.  This data-intensive survey contains hundreds of data sets and thousands of data points covering all relevant billing rate categories and variables.  This is the nation’s largest and most comprehensive survey or study on hourly billing rates in litigation.

This is the second year NALFA has conducted this survey on billing rates.  The 2021 Litigation Hourly Rate Survey & Report contains new cities, additional categories, and more accurate variables.  These updated features allow us to capture new and more precise billing rate data.  Through our propriety email database, NALFA surveyed thousands of litigators from across the U.S.  Over 8,400 qualified litigators fully participated in this hourly rate survey.  This data-rich survey was designed to aid litigators in proving their lodestar rates in court and comparing their rates to their litigation peers.

The 2021 Litigation Hourly Rate Survey & Report is now available for purchase.  For more on this survey, email NALFA Executive Director Terry Jesse at terry@thenalfa.org or call us at (312) 907-7275.

A recent Law 360 article by Elizabeth Hopkins, “Courts Are Right To Reject Insurer ERISA Atty Fee Award” reports on ERISA attorney fee awards.  This article was posted with permission.  The...

Read Full Post

A recent article by William F. Cobb, “Do We Really Need An Attorney Fee Expert?” discusses the need to hire an attorney fee expert.  This article was posted with permission.  The article...

Read Full Post

A recent article by Alan D. Wingfield, David Anthony, Timothy St. George, Ethan Ostroff, Scott Kelly, and Sarah Siu of Troutman Pepper LLP, “The Holder Rule and Attorneys’ Fees: The FTC Speaks”...

Read Full Post

A recent article by Gregg I. Strock, “No Need to Panic – Attorney Fee Provisions in Florida Are Safe” reports on attorney fee provisions in Florida.  This article was posted with permission. ...

Read Full Post