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Category: Bar Rules / Advisories

Philadelphia Bar Clarifies Advancement of Attorney Fees

August 24, 2022

A recent Law 360 story by James Boyle, “Philly, Pa. Bar Clarify How Attys Can Handle Advance Fees” reports that Pennsylvania attorneys can deposit advance fees into their operating accounts as long as the client clearly consents, according to a new ethics opinion jointly released by the Pennsylvania and Philadelphia Bar associations.

The PBA's Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Committee issued the opinion with the Philadelphia Bar's Professional Guidance Committee.  The opinion was issued as a clarification to a PBA ethics opinion from 1995, which said nonrefundable retainers from a new client were permissible, but it must be accompanied by a clear written agreement or deposited into a client escrow account.

According to Sarah Sweeney, co-chair of the Philadelphia Bar's Professional Guidance Committee, attorneys were confused whether there was a difference between a retainer fee that is earned upon receipt and an advance payment for legal services.  The new opinion makes that distinction.

"The [two committees] worked together in an effort to provide some clarity on the proper handling of legal fees paid at the outset of an engagement," Sweeney said in a statement.  "Specifically, the Opinion distinguishes fees that are earned upon receipt from fees that are simply paid in advance, and concludes that the former may be deposited in the attorney's operating account."  In other words, fees that are not earned upon receipt are considered advance fees, which are typically placed into an escrow account and drawn upon by the attorney as they represent the client.

Under the newly issued opinion, if there is an informed, written consent from the client, that fee can be placed into the attorney's operating account.  Fees that are considered earned upon receipt can be deposited into the operating account, as long as the attorneys clearly inform clients of the fee agreements.

"Ethics opinions are one of the most valuable services that we provide as Philadelphia's premier trade association for attorneys," Philadelphia Bar Association Chancellor Wesley R. Payne IV said in a statement.  "We were happy to partner with the Pennsylvania Bar Association in providing valuable clarity for our community on a common practice management issue."

Client Drops Attorney Fee Dispute Against Law Firm

May 16, 2022

A recent Law 360 story by Caroline Simson, “Taiwanese Co. Says It Won’t Arbitrate Fisch Sigler Fee Dispute” reports that a Taiwanese manufacturer of smartphone camera lenses is pressing a DC federal court to quash arbitration initiated by intellectual property boutique Fisch Sigler LLP seeking millions in additional fees for its work on a "meandering, inconclusive" and expensive patent lawsuit that settled last year.  Largan Precision Co. Ltd. told the court in the lawsuit filed May 10 that it never gave its informed consent to arbitrate the dispute with Fisch Sigler, which is set to be heard by the DC Bar Attorney/Client Arbitration Board, or the ACAB.

The company noted that while the DC Court of Appeals requires any attorney who is a DC Bar member to submit to arbitration before the ACAB if a client chooses that venue to pursue a fee dispute in matters with some connection to DC, there has never been any such rule for clients.  Largan argued that since it intends to challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement that was "quietly added" to its engagement agreement with the firm near the end of their negotiations, that question should be left to the court.

"[G]overning precedent makes plain that only a court, and not an arbitration panel, can decide the threshold issue of whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to have that question decided by the arbitrators," the company wrote.  "There is nothing here to suggest that the parties ever discussed, let alone agreed to, the ACAB deciding the specific issue of arbitrability."

Largan alleges in the litigation that the firm has already gotten $4.5 million in "fixed fee" payments.  It's now seeking an additional $5.6 million in success fees — despite the fact that Largan agreed to settle the litigation in Texas due to the outcome of parallel litigation in Taiwan that Fisch Sigler had not worked on, according to the brief.  The underlying dispute for which Largan engaged Fisch Sigler involved another Taiwanese company called Ability Opto-Electronics Technology Co. Ltd., which Largan accused of misappropriating its trade secrets in 2013.

While litigation was ongoing in Taiwan, Largan hired Fisch Sigler to file a patent infringement lawsuit in the U.S. against Ability Opto-Electronics Technology and two other entities in Texas.  Largan alleges that while the lawsuit was ongoing, Fisch Sigler charged a fixed fee despite not doing all the work that was supposed to be included under that fee.  That included depositions and a hearing in mid-2020 that Largan says never took place.

Largan won some $50 million in the Taiwanese litigation in early 2021, and it subsequently approached Fisch Sigler about settling the Texas litigation.  The company claims that the litigation had gone poorly, and that there was no reason to continue with it at that point.  It was then that the firm attempted to collect the success fee "based on the resolution of a litigation in Taiwan in which it had no role — and despite achieving nothing resembling success from the meandering, inconclusive, yet very expensive litigation it had pursued for Largan against [Ability Opto-Electronics Technology] and others in Texas and, later, California," according to the suit.

Article: Do We Really Need An Attorney Fee Expert?

April 18, 2022

A recent article by William F. Cobb, “Do We Really Need An Attorney Fee Expert?” discusses the need to hire an attorney fee expert.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

In 2002, the Fourth District Court of Appeal issued a decision in Island Hoppers Ltd. v. Keith 820 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) discussing whether or not expert testimony should be required to support an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party.  The decision questioned the necessity and wisdom of the longstanding judicially-created requirement.

Justice Polen, who authored the opinion in Island Hoppers, recognized that an award of attorneys’ fees must be supported by competent substantial evidence and Florida courts have required testimony by the attorney performing the services, together with testimony by an expert fees witness as to the time and value of those services.  The expert in that case spent a scant three hours in preparation of his opinion in this wrongful death case and is accused of lacking a sufficient factual predicate to form an opinion.  Although Justice Polen and the court allowed the testimony, claiming the testimony went to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility, the opinion questions whether the longstanding rule requiring the corroborative testimony of an expert fees witness is always the best or most judicious practice. 

The opinion recognizes that expert witnesses are presented to assist with guidance to the trier of fact and fails to see what “guidance” if any a fees expert provides to judges who see various levels of skill and experience in the courtroom on a regular basis.  The opinion does recognize the expert may provide some assistance to the court in terms of a multiplier determination in the market, but distinguished the more fundamental issues of determining appropriate hours expended and rates charged and states the trial judge has greater insight and understanding regarding what is reasonable.   The Island Hoppers decision prompted a Florida Bar Journal article, authored by Robert J. Hauser, Raymond E. Kramer III and Patricia A. Leonard, of Beasley & Hauser, P.A., in January 2003 regarding the same topic, (Vol. 77, No. 1, page 38) essentially agreeing the requirement should be revisited and perhaps eliminated.  In virtually every case decided by the Florida Supreme Court, both before and subsequent to the Island Hoppers decision, the Court has found, or at least commented upon, the requirement for an expert to testify regarding the reasonableness of the time and amount of attorney’s fees being sought, together with a multiplier determination in the relevant market area, especially where there was a fee-shifting provision involved. 

In Roshkind v. Machiela, decided in 2010, the Fourth District Court of appeal again addressed the long-standing requirement of independent expert witness testimony to support a claim for attorney’s fees.  The Court recognized generally “where a party seeks to have the opposing party in a lawsuit pay for attorney’s fees incurred . . . independent expert testimony is required” and “case law throughout this state has adhered to the requirement of an independent expert witness to establish the reasonableness of fees, regardless of whether a first or third party is responsible for payment.”  Although the opinion recognizes Island Hoppers and the previously questioned judicially-created requirement of independent expert testimony to establish the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, it ruled the judicially-created requirement “remains etched in our case law.”  The Fourth District certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court regarding whether or not an expert witness is required to testify to establish attorney’s fees, seeking a final determination of the issue.  The Florida Supreme Court initially accepted jurisdiction but later issued an opinion “upon further consideration, we have determined to deny review and discharge jurisdiction” thereby denying a review and ruling on the issue.

In 2007, In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, The Florida Bar Civil Procedure Rules Committee recommended adding Rule 1.526 to The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.  The proposed rule was entitled “Expert Opinion Testimony on Costs and Attorneys’ Fees” and included “[e]xpert opinion is not required to support or oppose a claim or an award of costs, attorneys’ fees, or both, unless by prior order of the court.”  Essentially, the proposed rule would leave it to the trial judge to determine whether or not he or she would require “guidance” in the form of an expert’s opinion regarding the determination of attorneys’ fees.  In rejecting the proposed rule, the Florida Supreme Court opined “that the issue of whether expert opinion testimony is required in this context is not one that is appropriately addressed in a rule of procedure” and declined to adopt the proposed rule.

From a review of the foregoing, although at least one District Court of Appeal has questioned the judicially-created requirement for and independent attorneys’ fee expert to testify in a fee determination hearing, it is clear the Florida Supreme Court consistently has supported and recognized the longstanding requirement and has further refused to adopt a rule of procedure that would allow the trial court to determine the need for expert testimony.  In order to support an award of attorney’s fees, the attorney for the party seeking the fees, whether first or third party obligation for payment is present, is required to retain the services of an expert to offer testimony regarding the reasonableness of the hours expended and amount being sought in recovery in order to prevail.

William F. Cobb is a Partner at Cobb Gonzalez in Jacksonville, FL.

Article: The Holder Rule and Attorneys’ Fees

February 24, 2022

A recent article by Alan D. Wingfield, David Anthony, Timothy St. George, Ethan Ostroff, Scott Kelly, and Sarah Siu of Troutman Pepper LLP, “The Holder Rule and Attorneys’ Fees: The FTC Speaks” reports on attorney fees and the FTC’s Holder Rule.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

On January 20, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued an advisory opinion on the impact of the Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses (Holder Rule) on the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs above the amount paid on a consumer receivable arising out of a financed sale of goods or services.  Siding with consumers and rejecting the reading put forward by loan holders, the FTC declared that the Holder Rule does not prevent a plaintiff from recovering attorneys’ fees and costs against a “loan holder” where another state, local, or federal law permits the recovery.

The Holder Rule is a regulation issued by the FTC that allows consumers to bring any legal claims against the “holder” of a retail installment sales contract or other credit contract that it could assert against the original seller of the good or service, even if the claim springs from the seller’s misconduct alone.  This situation frequently arises in auto finance litigation or litigation under state deceptive acts and practices laws — for example, where a consumer sues both the car dealer as the seller and the bank as the loan provider and “holder” of the retail installment sales contract, for the seller’s failure to disclose a defect or repair the vehicle.  The Holder Rule, however, states that a plaintiff’s recovery from the holder for those claims “shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor” under the sales contract.

Multiple courts nationwide have ruled that the Holder Rule’s recovery cap prevented courts from requiring holders to pay a plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs over and above the plaintiff’s previous payments to the seller.  See, e.g., Reyes v. Beneficial State Bank, No. BCV-17-100082 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Kern Co., Dec. 5, 2019), appeal docketed, No. F080827 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2020); State ex rel. Stenberg v. Consumer’s Choice Foods, Inc., 276 Neb. 481, 495–96 (2008).  But other courts have disagreed.  See In re Stewart, 93 B.R. 878 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); Home Sav. Ass’n v. Guerra, 733 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1987).  The California Supreme Court is currently considering an appeal of one recent decision that rejected a Holder Rule cap in Pulliam v. HNL Automotive, Inc., No. S267576 (Cal. 2021).

The FTC’s new opinion sides with courts that have refused to automatically cap attorneys’ fees and costs, stating that applying the Holder Rule to preempt state laws and limit recovery of fees and costs “misconstrues” the FTC’s prior statements.  The FTC previously voted 5-0 to issue a confirmation of the Holder Rule in 2019, which noted that several commenters had asked whether the Holder Rule’s limitation on recovery to “amounts paid by the debtor” allows consumers to recover attorneys’ fees above that cap.  The rule confirmation stated, “The Commission does not believe that the record supports modifying the Rule to authorize recovery of attorneys’ fees from the holder, based on the seller’s conduct, if that recovery exceeds the amount paid by the consumer.”  Three of those five commissioners are still serving on the FTC.

Now, in a 180 degree turn, the FTC has voted 4-0 (including aye votes from the three commissioners who were already serving in 2019) to adopt this opinion that if the applicable state or federal law allows an attorneys’ fee award against any defendant, whether holder or seller, then the Holder Rule places no limit on the amount of fees and costs the plaintiff may recover from a holder.  For example, if the law allows the prevailing party to recover fees from any party that opposes its claims, and the holder opposed the prevailing plaintiff’s claims, the Holder Rule would not cap a plaintiff’s recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs.  Additionally, even if the law in question allows attorneys’ fee awards against the seller exclusively and expressly, the Holder Rule allows the plaintiff to recover those fees from the holder instead, though that award would be subject to the Holder Rule cap and limited to the amounts the consumer had previously paid.

In other words, litigants will have to narrowly examine the language and framing of the various state and federal statutes allowing recovery of attorneys’ fees to determine whether the Holder Rule’s cap will apply to fees and costs under the applicable statute, and courts may interpret broader fee recovery statutes that do not expressly apply only to sellers to allow unlimited fee recovery from holders as well.  This advisory opinion thus raises holders’ risk exposure and potential costs in litigation where the dealer has not indemnified the holder or the dealer is judgment proof.  It also will likely impact the California Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision on this question in Pulliam.