A recent Law 360 by Ganesh Setty, “11th Circ. Says No Attorney Fees for Cos. In Tossed Insurance Suit,” reports that a home builder and contractor accused of faulty stucco work can't seek attorney fees from their insurance company after a Florida federal court found the insurer lacked standing to litigate whether it had a duty to defend the companies, the Eleventh Circuit ruled.  Under the circuit's 1984 decision in Certain British Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Jet Charter Serv. Inc. , statutory attorney fees are an element of damages and are therefore part of the merits of a case itself, U.S. Circuit Judge Elizabeth L. Branch wrote in the court's unpublished opinion.

Thus, when U.S. District Judge Timothy J. Corrigan tossed Southern-Owners Insurance Co.'s suit because it failed to meet the federal $75,000 amount-in-controversy threshold, the court lacked the subject-matter jurisdiction to hear any ensuing dispute over attorney fees, Judge Branch found. U.S. Circuit Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat penned a separate concurrence, while U.S. Circuit Judge Britt C. Grant issued a dissent.

According to the decision, the dispute began in August 2013, when the home builder, Maronda Homes Inc. of Florida, sold a house to a couple who later complained of various construction defects related to the home's stucco installation. Maronda had hired JROD Plastering LLC to perform the installation, which held a commercial general liability policy with Southern-Owners that listed Maronda as an additional insured.

The insurer subsequently sued Maronda and JROD in Florida federal court seeking a declaration it had no coverage obligations over the alleged construction defects.  But Judge Corrigan dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the insurer failed to meet the $75,000 amount-in-controversy threshold for federal litigation.

Maronda and JROD sought attorney fees under the now-repealed Florida statute § 627.428, which allowed a court to award attorney fees to insureds who prevailed in coverage litigation against their insurer.  The district court further dismissed those motions, citing in part the Jet Charter decision.  In that case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that "attorney's fees recovera[bl]e by statute are to be regarded as 'costs' only when made so by statute," and are otherwise "treated as an element of damages," according to excerpts included in Friday's decision.

Though the Eleventh Circuit in Prime Insurance Syndicate Inc. v. Soil Tech Distributors Inc. ruled the opposite way in 2008, finding that attorney fees are "collateral issues" within the court's purview even if the underlying case isn't, that decision was not published, Judge Branch noted.  And even if it were, circuit precedent holds that in the case of conflicting published panel decisions, the oldest one controls, she said.

"All in all, while some Florida courts have reached a different result than we did in Jet Charter, these decisions are too varied to constitute a definitive change in law," Judge Branch added in a footnote.  "As such, we decline to exercise our discretionary power to rewrite our circuit's precedent which means that we are bound to follow Jet Charter."

A recent Business Insurance by Judy Greenwald, “Insureds Can’t Recover Attorney Fees for Work on Their Own Behalf,” reports that, under California law, insureds may not recover attorneys fees for work they performed on their own behalf, a federal appeals court ruled in affirming a lower court decision in Travelers Cos. Inc. units’ favor.

Kathleen March and Patrick Bright, a married couple who are both attorneys and owners of Walking U Ranch LLC  in New Cuyama, California, were involved in an underlying property dispute with a neighbor for which Travelers Cos. units had a duty to defend under the insureds’ primary and excess agribusiness policies, according to court papers in The Travelers Indemnity Co. of Connecticut; Travelers Casualty Insurance Co. of America v. Walking U Ranch LLC, Katheen P. March; Patrick Bright.

The U.S. District Court in Pasadena ruled in Travelers’ favor on the couple’s bad faith breach claim and request for attorneys fees.  A three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco affirmed the lower court ruling, saying, “Under California law … attorneys may not recover for work performed on behalf of themselves and another party with identical interests.”

Because Ms. March and Mr. Bright are married and Walking U Ranch’s sole owners, they “therefore all shared the same interest in the outcome of the underlying action.  “There is also no indication that March or Bright spent any extra time in the underlying action representing Walking U Ranch LLC rather than themselves,” the panel said in affirming the lower court’s summary judgment rejecting the bad faith claim.

A recent Law 360 story by Josh Liberatore, “11th Circ. Tosses Insurer’s Bid For Atty Fees After Reversal” reports that an insurer can't seek attorney fees on a $1.6 million judgment it previously won against a Liberty Mutual unit, the Eleventh Circuit confirmed, which comes after the court recently vacated the insurer's win on claims that the Liberty unit breached its contract while defending a fatal accident suit.  In an unpublished opinion, the appellate panel denied Endurance American Specialty Insurance Co.'s bid for attorney fees as moot. 

In May, the Eleventh Circuit reversed Endurance's $1.6 million win, finding that it couldn't show how Safeco Insurance Co. breached an indemnity agreement it had with Comegys Insurance Agency Inc., which was insured by Endurance.  "Safeco did win its appeal," the panel noted, "so, Endurance may not seek attorneys' fees."  Endurance had asked the Eleventh Circuit to overturn a lower court judge's ruling that its claims for attorney fees stemming from the judgment against Safeco were time-barred because Endurance failed to seek the fees within 14 days of the judgment.

The coverage dispute stems from an accident between driver Robert Smith and a motorcyclist, who died.  Safeco insured Smith, who bought his policies through Comegys.  Smith faced a wrongful death suit for which Safeco assigned an attorney who defended the case, and eventually a $7.3 million consent judgment was entered against Smith, according to court documents.  The consent judgment included Safeco paying the motorcyclist's estate the limits of Smith's auto policy, $1.25 million, and assigning the estate Safeco's claim against Comegys for negligent procurement, based on the theory that Comegys failed to find Smith a more robust policy after he had inquired about raising his policy limits.

Endurance insures Comegys under an errors and omissions policy, according to its suit.  The motorcyclist's estate pursued Endurance and Comegys "for the limit of Comegys's policy with Endurance," according to court documents.  The companies eventually paid just over $1.5 million to end the claims, court records show.

Endurance then sought to recoup the money from Safeco, arguing Safeco had breached its contract with Comegys by refusing to indemnify it for the alleged negligence.  Endurance's argument hinged on Safeco assigning an attorney to defend Smith, who allegedly mentioned to the motorcyclist's estate the possibility of a negligent procurement claim against Comegys and recommended an insurance lawyer to the estate.  In July 2019, a jury found in Endurance's favor, and the lower court entered a $1.6 million judgment against Safeco.

While Safeco appealed that decision to the Eleventh Circuit, Endurance launched an appeal of its own, arguing it should be awarded attorney fees for the judgment.  However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment last month, finding that Endurance couldn't show how Safeco had breached its contract with Comegys.  Safeco had acted entirely within the terms of that agreement by providing an insurance policy to Comegys's customers, tendering the policy on time after the accident and providing an attorney to Smith to defend the suit, the Eleventh Circuit panel presiding over that case found.  Safeco can't be held liable for what Smith's attorney decided to do after that, the panel said.

A recent Law 360 story by Ganesh Setty, “Mass. Justices Told Atty Fee Award Must Be Covered” reports that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court heard oral arguments on whether an attorney fee award constitutes damages "because of" bodily injury, with the dispute appearing to hinge on whether a reasonable policyholder would interpret their policy that way in light of a narrow, inapplicable exclusion exception for such payments.

Vermont Mutual Insurance Co. argued the attorney fee award against its insureds falls outside its "because of" causation standard with respect to bodily injury claims.  The recipient of the yet-to-be-paid award, Phyllis Maston, meanwhile highlighted how the policy did not specifically define the term "damages."  The Massachusetts high court appeared hesitant to side with Maston, given the award originated from a state consumer protection statute, and Vermont Mutual's policy is a standard form insurance contract used nationwide.

According to court documents, Vermont Mutual insured Paul and Jane Poirier, franchisees of damage restoration chain Servpro, under a business owners policy between December 1998 and December 2001.  Phyllis Maston and her late husband, Douglas, hired Servpro to clean out their basement, and Phyllis Maston later suffered a nasal infection she attributed to the cleaning solution Servpro used.  The Mastons sued Servpro, and a trial court ultimately found in 2009 that Servpro violated Massachusetts' consumer protection law, Chapter 93A, through its breach of warranty.

As part of Chapter 93A, which empowers consumers to sue businesses for unfair or deceptive practices, a successful petitioner can recover their own attorney fees.  The law treats attorney fee awards as separate from awards for damages.  Vermont Mutual paid nearly $700,000 to Maston, but refused to cover her award of more than $215,000 in attorney fees, along with another $21,600 in attorney fees following Servpro's unsuccessful appeal of the original judgment, according to court documents.

The insurer subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Poiriers and Maston seeking a court declaration that the total attorney fee award is not covered since it does not constitute insured damages "because of" bodily injury as required by its policy.  A lower court sided with Maston in July 2016, noting there are no other cases in Massachusetts directly addressing a coverage dispute like Vermont Mutual's.  The court instead pointed to the 2010 Ohio Supreme Court decision in Neal-Pettit v. Lahman, which involved language similar to Vermont Mutual's policy, and found that attorney fees do qualify as damages because of bodily injury.

Vermont Mutual maintained in its high court briefs that since the policy used "because of," rather than a broader term like "arising out of," the attorney fee award is not covered, especially since Chapter 93A treats damages and attorney fee awards as separate remedies.  The insurer further argued that an exception to a contractual liability exclusion in the policy explicitly treats an attorney fee award as damages because of bodily injury only when there's an insurance contract between its insured and another party, and the parties can be jointly represented in a civil dispute.

While a policyholder reading the policy may initially think an attorney fee award constitutes covered damages, "you can't find ambiguity just because you stopped reading," Peter E. Heppner, counsel for the insurer, told the high court's seven justices.  Although inapplicable, the exclusion exception illustrates that the policy did not intend to broadly treat attorney fees as damages because of bodily injury, he said.  Justice Scott L. Kafker asked Heppner, with respect to Maston's attorney fee award: "I understand that it's two or three steps removed, but it all arises out of the fact that there's an injury, doesn't it?"

"'Arises out of' is an interesting choice of words," Heppner responded. "When the policy has 'arising out of' in several exclusions, and then 'because of' here — and we know that the Supreme Court has said 'because of' is 'but for' — there has to be a distinction between those words."

When asked by Justice Dalila Argaez Wendlandt why the exclusion exception didn't put a reasonable insured on notice that the attorney fees may not otherwise be covered, Timothy P. Wickstrom, an attorney representing Maston, said the exclusion exception was inapplicable to the case to begin with.  It only concerns defense costs for the insured and the other party it contracts with, not attorney fee awards adverse to an insured, he argued.  If Vermont Mutual wanted to broadly bar coverage for attorney fees, one sentence stating so would have sufficed, he added.  The insurance policy at issue is a standard form insurance policy, Justice Kafker further noted. "That's where it gets me nervous."

"Here [in] Massachusetts, we've got this particular 93A attorney fee provision that's idiosyncratic, and we're applying it to these nationwide forms, right?" he asked.  The coverage dispute is not about Chapter 93A's separate treatment of damages and attorney fees, but whether attorney fees are covered under the policy, Wickstrom responded. Wickstrom further highlighted that part of the total attorney fee award under Chapter 93A includes Servpro's unsuccessful appeal of the judgment in the underlying case.

"In a situation where Vermont Mutual had a duty to defend, had a duty to indemnify — the defendants, their insureds, were on the hook for the appeals court fees," he said.  "How unfair is that?"  "Just create all the complexities of 93A attorneys fees, which probably no one ever thought about when they created this sort of extra remedy for everybody," Justice Kafker quipped.

A recent Law 360 story by Eli Flesch, “Property Cos. Says Insurer Blew Notice to Recoup Suit Costs” reports that a Markel unit can't recoup costs it spent defending a property owner and manager in a discrimination suit because the insurer failed to properly reserve their right for reimbursement, the real estate companies told a California federal court.  In a trial brief, Winstar Properties LLC and Manhattan Manor LLC said Evanston Insurance Co. sent its first explicit reservation of rights letter on the eve of a trial over coverage for the discrimination suit, which alleged the companies increased rents only for immigrant-headed households in Southern California.  That lack of timeliness should bar Evanston from being able to recoup its defense costs, Winstar and Manhattan said.

"Had Winstar and Manhattan knew that Evanston was going to deny coverage, they would have had the opportunity to seek independent counsel, or made other settlement decisions," the real estate companies wrote in their four-page brief to the court.  Evanston sued the companies in September 2018, stating it had no duty to defend them in the underlying suit because the discrimination occurred before the policy's effective date.  The discrimination suit was filed two days before the start of the policy, which ran from June 30, 2016, to June 30, 2017, according to court records.  The insurer said it received notice of the suit from the companies on July 17, 2017, and sent a letter three days later acknowledging receipt and reserving its rights to recoup defense costs.

The insurer won a summary judgment in October 2019, which the Ninth Circuit upheld in May 2021, ruling Evanston was not required to defend the companies. However, the appellate court noted there was insufficient evidence that the July 2017 letter had been sent, which would affect the insurer's ability to recoup costs it paid before Feb. 16, 2018 — the date on which the companies claim they received the first letter from Evanston.

In their brief, Winstar and Manhattan said there was an abundance of evidence showing Evanston never sent a letter on July 20, 2017.  It was months later, on February 16, 2018, that the insurer first attempted to reserve its rights for a reimbursement of costs, the real estate companies argued, noting Winstar didn't even receive that letter until two days after it was signed, on February 18, 2018.

In December, U.S. District Court Judge R. Gary Klausner sanctioned the law firm representing the two property companies, the Wilshire Law Firm, when he decided that the firm's own motion for sanctions against the insurer was unfounded.  To deter the firm from future frivolous sanctions requests and to compensate Evanston for time spent combating the unwarranted motion, the judge ordered the defendants to pay the insurer's attorney fees associated with their cross-motion for sanctions.

A recent Law 360 story by Emily Sides, “Ga. Judge Finds Atty Fees Must Be Public After $200M Verdict” reports that a Georgia state judge has rejected arguments that a Florida couple could keep...

Read Full Post

A recent Reuters story by Barbara Grzincic, “Insurer Off the Hook for Legal Tab in Dish’s Copyright Battles,” reports that Dish Network Corp is stuck with the legal bills it ran up defending...

Read Full Post

A recent Law360 story by Emily Lever, “Ill. Bar Insurer Can’t Ditch Law Firm Defense in Fees Fight,” reports that the Illinois State Bar Association Mutual Insurance Company can't avoid...

Read Full Post

A recent Law 360 story by Eli Flesch, “Harvard Sues Insurer For Legal Fees in Affirmative Action Suit,” reports that Harvard University sued Zurich American Insurance Co. for excess coverage of...

Read Full Post