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Category: Fee Award

Defense ‘Prevailing Party’ in DVPA Case Dropped by Plaintiff

October 9, 2021

A recent Metropolitan News story, “Defendant Was ‘Prevailing Party’ in Action Under DVPA Where Plaintiff Dropped Case,” reports that a judge erred in finding that a defendant was not the “prevailing party” in a civil action brought to impose a domestic violence restraining order on him, the Court of Appeal for this district has held, proclaiming that he did prevail even though the circumstances were that the plaintiff dismissed her petition after gaining such an order in a separate criminal proceeding.

But, Justice Anne H. Egerton of Div. Three said in an unpublished opinion, that does not mean that the order by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Jonathan L. Rosenbloom denying an award of attorney fees to the defendant in the civil case need be reversed.  Such an award is discretionary, she noted, and, under Art, VI, §13 of the state Constitution, reversal is called for only where an error has resulted “in a miscarriage of justice” which, she declared, did not occur.

Burbank attorney David D. Diamond—a two-time unsuccessful candidate for the Los Angeles Superior Court who has announced his candidacy in the 2022 election—represented defendant Joshua Nathaniel Rivers in the trial court and on appeal. In seeking an award of $6,300 in attorney fees in favor of his client, sued by Marcia Bennett under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (“DVPA”), Diamond said in an April 2, 2019 notice of motion that his client was “was compelled to respond to and defend a frivolous action,” and set forth in his memorandum of points and authorities: “Petitioners case was adjudicated in favor of Respondent. On November 20, 2018 the Petitioner asked for an additional hearing date to retain an attorney.  On December 10, 2018, the new hearing date, she failed to appear.”

He added in a declaration: “It is my belief that Petitioner should pay for the Respondent’s attorney’s fees because she [sic] is the prevailing party.”  In an opposing declaration dated May 29, 2019, Northridge attorney Bernal P. Ojeda (who also represented Bennett in the appeal) protested:

“The Respondent’s claim as a prevailing party is misleading.  Respondent at the present time has a four year criminal restraining order against him, not mentioned in the current motion….[T]his was the reason Petitioner did not appear for the hearing in the instant case. The criminal case is a related case and the criminal protective order should have been mentioned to this court but was not.  Given the fact that there is an existing restraining order against Respondent and protecting Petitioner, Respondent cannot claim he is a prevailing party nor can he have that status.”  (Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Peter Mirich granted the restraining order on Nov. 30, 2018, 10 days before the hearing at which Bennett did not appear.)

Ojeda said in his memorandum of points and authorities: “The criminal action now pending is a related case, involving the same parties, same incident and set of facts.”  The minute order of the June 4 hearing before Rosenbloom on the motion for attorney fees simply recites: “The Court finds Respondent is not the prevailing party.  “Motion Hearing re attorney fees is denied with prejudice.”

In her opinion upholding the outcome, Egerton said: “Rivers has not demonstrated the trial court’s erroneous prevailing party determination resulted in a miscarriage of justice….[B]ecause Rivers was the respondent on Bennett’s petition for a domestic violence restraining order, the trial court had discretion to deny his request for prevailing party attorney fees under [Family Code] section 6344, subdivision (a).”

She continued: “On the record before us, it is not reasonably probable that the court would have awarded Rivers the attorney fees he requested, even if the court had properly deemed him the prevailing party on the petition. And, based on this record, we cannot say the court’s denial of prevailing party attorney fees would have been an abuse of discretion.”  The judge went on to say: “And, given that Bennett dismissed her petition only after already obtaining the protection she sought under the DVPA, we cannot say the trial court’s denial of attorney fees on this ground would have been an abuse of discretion.”

Judge Acted Arbitrarily in Setting ADA Attorney Fee Award

October 8, 2021

A recent Metropolitan News story, “Judge Acted Arbitrarily in Setting ADA Attorney Fee Award,” reports that a District Court judge, in setting an attorney fee award, acted arbitrarily in disregarding the services of three of five lawyers who represented the plaintff in securing a settlement of his action under the federal Americans With Disabilities Act and the state Unruh Act and by making a 10 percent deduction as a penalty for the law firm inflating its fees, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held.

Its memorandum opinion comes in a case bought by the Center for Disability Access, a division of the San Diego law firm of Potter Handy LLP, on behalf of Antonio Fernandez, who is wheelchair-bound.  The center brings hundreds of ADA and Unruh actions each year, using a stable of plaintiffs, including Fernandez.  The appeal came in a case instituted in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Roberta A. Torres, who owned real property in Whittier and against CBC Restaurant Corp., which operated the Corner Bakery Café on Torres’s property. The suit was brought over the height of the counter.

In making his award of attorney fees, Judge Fernando M. Olguin said in a July 14, 2020 order: “Despite many years of experience litigating the two claims in this case in virtually hundreds of cases, and a docket that reflects little, if any, litigation in this case, plaintiff seeks $15,762.50 for the work performed by five attorneys….Further, the cases filed by plaintiff include nearly identical complaints and subsequent filings.”  Olguin made note of three of the several ADA-based actions the center has recently brought in the Central District with Fernandez serving as the plaintiff.

The judge opined that the “assignment of so many experienced attorneys to such a simple case replete with boilerplate documents resulted in substantial task padding, duplication, over-conferencing, attorney stacking, and overall excessiveness,” declaring: “Given the simplicity of the case and ADA accessibility cases in general, the quick settlement and apparent lack of any contested litigation matters in this case, and the lack of any dispositive motions, no more than one partner and one associate was necessary to prosecute this case.  Thus, the court will reduce the fee award by cutting the fees for three of the five attorneys.”

He opted to take cognizance only the services of the lead attorrney, Christina “Chris” Carson, who was admitted to practice on Dec. 2, 2011, and Mark D. Potter, whose State Bar membership goes back to Dec. 1, 1993.

Potter sought recompense at an hourly rate of $595 and Carson wanted to be paid $450 an hour. Olguin said that taking into account the various factors customarily assessed in setting attorney fees, “$425 is reasonable for attorney Potter, and an hourly rate of $275 is reasonable for attorney Carson.”  Noting that there was a “quick settlement of this routine, non-complex case, where plaintiff did not file or oppose any dispositive motions,” Olguin declared that “the court will apply a ten percent reduction.”  After subtracting “10% of the time billed for general excessiveness,” he awarded $3,897 in attorney fees—slightly less than 25 percent of what was sought.  Olguin allowed the $642.50 in costs that were claimed.

Reversal came in an opinion signed by Circuit Judges Susan P. Graber and John B. Owens and by District Court Judge Charles R. Breyer of the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. The judges said: “While we agree with the district court that Fernandez’s lawyers overbilled, it was ‘arbitrary’ to ignore entirely the time billed by three of the five lawyers….These three appear to have performed at least some necessary work….To the extent that overstaffing resulted in inefficiencies, the district court should reduce the fee award in proportion to those inefficiencies, rather than Through a ‘shortcut.’ ”

The opinion continues: “The district court also abused its discretion in calculating the hours of the two attorneys whose work it considered.  The court provided cogent reasons for its specific cuts as to various tasks, but its final additional 10% reduction for ‘general excessiveness’ lacked any justification.”  Olguin did not abuse his discretion in setting the rates for Carson and Potter, the Ninth Circuit said, because they had nor provided evidence substantiating the higher value they ascribed to their services.

Article: What is a Legal Fee Audit?

October 7, 2021

A recent article by Jacqueline Vinaccia of Vanst Law LLP in San Diego “What is a Legal Fee Audit?,” reports on legal fee audits.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Attorneys usually bill clients by the hour, in six minute increments (because those six minutes equal one tenth of an hour: 0.1).  Those hours are multiplied by the attorney’s hourly rate to determine the attorney’s fee.  There is another aspect of attorney billing that is not as well known, but equally important — legal fee auditing.  During an audit, a legal fee auditor reviews billing records to determine if hourly billing errors or inefficiencies occurred, and deducts unreasonable or unnecessary fees and costs.

Both the law and legal ethics restrict attorneys from billing clients fees that are unreasonable or unnecessary to the advancement of the client’s legal objectives.  This can include analysis of the reasonableness of the billing rate charged by attorneys.  Legal fee audits are used by consumers of legal services, including businesses, large insurance companies, cities, public and governmental agencies, and individual clients.  Legal fee audits can be necessary when there is a dispute between an attorney and client; when the losing party in a lawsuit is required to pay all or part of the prevailing party’s legal fees in litigation; when an insurance company is required to pay a portion of legal fees, or when some issues in a lawsuit allow recovery of  attorneys’ fees and when other issues do not (an allocation of fees). 

In an audit, the auditor interviews the client, and reviews invoices sent to the client in conjunction with legal case materials to identify all fees and costs reasonable and necessary to the advancement of the client’s legal objectives, and potentially deduct those that are not.  The auditor also reviews all invoices to identify any potential accounting errors and assure that time and expenses are billed accurately.  The auditor may also be asked to determine if the rate charged by the attorney is appropriate.

The legal fee auditor can be an invaluable asset to parties in deciding whether to file or settle a lawsuit, and to the courts charged with issuing attorneys’ fee awards.  The court is unlikely to take the time to review individual invoice entries to perform a proper allocation of recoverable and non-recoverable fees leaving the parties with the court’s “best approximation” of what the allocation should be.  The fee audit provides the court and the parties with the basis for which to allocate and appropriately award reasonable and necessary fees. 

Audits are considered a litigation best practice and a risk management tool and can save clients substantial amounts of money in unnecessary fees.  It has been my experience, over the past two decades of fee auditing, that early fee auditing can identify and correct areas of concern in billing practices and avoid larger disputes in litigation later.  In many cases, I have assisted clients and counsel in reaching agreement on proper billing practices and setting litigation cost expectations. 

In other cases, I have been asked by both plaintiffs and defendants to review attorneys’ fees and costs incurred and provide the parties and the court with my expert opinion regarding the total attorneys’ fees and costs were reasonably and necessarily incurred to pursue the client's legal objectives.  While the court does not always agree with my analysis of fees and costs incurred, it is usually assisted in its decision by the presentation of the audit report and presentation of expert testimony on the issues.

Jacqueline Vinaccia is a San Diego trial attorney, litigator, and national fee auditor expert, and a partner at Vanst Law LLP.  Her practice focuses on business and real estate litigation, general tort liability, insurance litigation and coverage, construction disputes, toxic torts, and municipal litigation.  Her attorney fee analyses have been cited by the U.S. District Court for Northern California and Western Washington, several California Superior Courts, as well as various other state courts and arbitrators throughout the United States.  She has published and presented extensively on the topic of attorney fee invoicing, including presentations to the National Association of Legal Fee Association (NALFA), and is considered one of the nation’s top fee experts by NALFA.

Federal Judge Cites NALFA Survey in Attorney Fee Award

October 1, 2021

A federal judge has cited a NALFA survey in a class action attorney fee award.  U.S. District Judge Amos L. Mazzant of the U.S. District for the Eastern District of Texas referenced NALFA’s hourly rate survey in awarding attorney fees and expenses in Cone v. Porcelana Corona de Mexico, S.A.de C.V. et. al (“Vortens”).  The NALFA survey independently showed prevailing market rate data of class counsel in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. 

“To support its submitted rates, Class Counsel commissioned and submitted a survey conducted by the National Association of Legal Fee Analysis ("NALFA").  The sample of the NALFA survey was Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area plaintiffs’ counsel practicing in consumer related or product liability class-action work.  Class Counsel’s submitted hourly rates, while on the higher side, falls within the accepted range,” wrote Judge Mazzant.

NALFA conducts custom hourly rates for clients such as law firms to independently prove billing rates in court.  Lead plaintiffs’ counsel commissioned NALFA to conduct a billing rate survey of plaintiffs’ rates in class actions in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.  NALFA conducted this survey via email, employing its best practices measures.  In his 26-page fee order (pdf), Judge Mazzant accepted the hourly rate data and survey results and awarded over $4.3 million in attorney fees in the Vortens class settlement.

$22.5M in Fees in $100M Asbestos Settlement in NJ

September 27, 2021

A recent Law 360 story by Mike Curley, “BASF, Cahill Gordon To Pay $22.5M Atty Fees in Asbestos Suit,” reports that a New Jersey federal judge granted final approval to a $100 million settlement to resolve claims that BASF Catalysts LLC's predecessor and its former counsel at Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP concealed that industrial and commercial talc from a Vermont mine may contain asbestos.  As part of the deal, class counsel will receive $22.5 million in attorney fees, as well as $1.2 million for costs and expenses incurred during the case and for the administration of the settlement, according to the order.  The six named plaintiffs, led by Kimberlee Williams, will each receive a $50,000 incentive award.

Christopher M. Placitella of Cohen Placitella & Roth PC, representing the plaintiffs, told Law360 that the total settlement comes to $100 million between the attorney fees and costs, incentive awards, $3.5 million for administering notice to the class, and the $72.5 million fund to be paid to the class.  He added that class members will be able to seek between $3,500 and $300,000 from the fund.  U.S. District Judge Brian R. Martinotti also certified a settlement class consisting of anyone who brought an asbestos suit against Englehard Corp. between 1984 and 2011 over the talc products in question, and who had either voluntarily dismissed or settled the suit or had it involuntarily dismissed before March 2011.

According to the lawsuit, Englehard, which was acquired by BASF in 2006, retained Cahill Gordon to defend it against claims that the Emtal Talc it produced between 1967 and 1983 contained asbestos.  The plaintiffs said Cahill Gordon and Englehard falsely said there was no evidence or testimony that the products contained asbestos, and had used those assertions to dismiss or settle thousands of claims.

Judge Martinotti said that the deal was entered into in good faith following substantial discovery and is a fair, reasonable and adequate method of resolving the claims at issue in the suit.  Williams and the other named plaintiffs asked the court for preliminary approval of the deal in July 2020, and the court granted preliminary approval in September of that year, according to court documents.