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Category: Fee Expert / Member

The Nation’s Top Attorney Fee Experts of 2024

March 14, 2024

NALFA, a non-profit group, is building a worldwide network of attorney fee expertise. Our network includes members, faculty, and fellows with expertise on reasonable attorney fees and ethical billing practices. We help organize and recognize qualified attorney fee experts from across the U.S. and around the globe. Our attorney fee experts also include court adjuncts such as bankruptcy fee examiners, special masters, and fee dispute neutrals.

Every year, we announce the nation's top attorney fee experts. Attorney fee experts are retained by fee-seeking or fee-challenging parties in litigation to independently prove outside attorney fees and expenses in court or arbitration. The following NALFA profile quotes are based on bio, CV, case summaries and case materials submitted to and verified by us. Here are the nation's top attorney fee experts of 2024:

"The Nation's Top Attorney Fee Expert"
John D. O'Connor
O'Connor & Associates
San Francisco, CA

"ABOTA Trial Attorney With Over 35 Years of Legal Fee Audit Expertise"
Andre E. Jardini
KPC Legal Audit Services, Inc.
Glendale, CA

"Widely Respected as an Attorney Fee Expert"
Elise S. Frejka
Frejka PLLC
New York, NY

"Experienced on Analyzing Fees, Billing Entries for Fee Awards "
Robert L. Kaufman
Woodruff Spradlin & Smart
Costa Mesa, CA

"Highly Skilled on a Range of Fee and Billing Issues"
Daniel M. White
White Amundson APC
San Diego, CA

"Excellent at Communicating Her Fee Analysis to Juries, Triers of Facts, and Clients"
Jacqueline S. Vinaccia
Vanst Law LLP
San Diego, CA

"Real World Billing Review Combined With Over 40 Years of Trial Experience"
Fred M. Blum
Edlin Gallagher Huie + Blum
San Francisco, CA

"Nation's Top Scholar on Attorney Fees in Class Actions"
Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Vanderbilt Law School
Nashville, TN

Epic Games Calls Apple’s $73M Attorney Fee Request An Overreach

February 27, 2024

A recent Law 360 story by Bryan Koenig, “Epic Calls Apple’s $73M Fee Bid An Overreach”, reports that Epic Games blasted Apple for seeking $73.4 million in legal fees following the pair's California federal court antitrust battle over App Store payment fees, arguing that antitrust claims like Epic's are immune from legal fees and that Apple cannot wrap its demands in successful contract breach counterclaims.

Apple's fee bid, according to Epic, "overreaches at every turn" after the U.S. Supreme Court refused to consider a Ninth Circuit decision upholding a district court ruling largely siding with the iPhone maker, except on Epic's California state law claims targeting Apple rules barring app developers from steering users to alternative payment options.

"Apple seeks recovery of unrecoverable fees and costs incurred in defending against Epic's antitrust claims; it seeks recovery of fees and costs it incurred in defending against other plaintiffs' antitrust claims; and it seeks recovery of categories of expenditures that go beyond what the Ninth Circuit's ruling in this case permitted," Epic said in its opposition brief. "Apple even seeks its fees and costs incurred in seeking its fees and costs, even though the vast majority of those fees and costs it seeks are not recoverable and Apple made no effort to meet and confer with Epic to determine the scope of any dispute before filing the motion."

According to Epic, Apple's mid-January bid for legal costs is grounded in the latter's win on claims that Epic breached its developer program licensing agreement when offering users an in-app workaround for the up to 30% commission that Apple charges on in-app purchases, such as through Epic's Fortnite game juggernaut. Epic is only the most prominent of multiple plaintiffs to target those commissions.

The problem with a fees bid based on the contract breach claims, Epic said, is that a California state appeals court held in Carver v. Chevron USA Inc. that defendants, even ones who successfully defeat antitrust claims, cannot claim any fees incurred in that defense.  According to the brief, it doesn't matter that the developer program licensing agreement otherwise calls for plaintiffs to reimburse Apple.

"Moreover, any fees and costs that are 'inextricably intertwined' with those incurred in defending against antitrust claims also cannot be recovered, even if they were incurred also in connection with a breach of contract claim," Epic said.  "Apple may thus recover only those fees and costs it incurred specifically to litigate separable, non-antitrust claims — i.e., fees and costs attributable to work performed for Apple's contract claims that did not overlap with its defense against Epic's (or other plaintiffs') antitrust claims."

But Apple hasn't tried to separate or identify those costs, according to the brief. "To the contrary, Apple completely ignores this binding precedent and seeks primarily and specifically the unrecoverable fees and costs it incurred in defending against Epic's antitrust claims," it said.

Epic also assailed Apple for seeking to recover costs incurred in defending against other plaintiffs who'd also targeted the Apple rules leaving the App Store as the only way to get apps on iPhones.  It attacked Apple for going beyond the Ninth Circuit mandate to pursue only attorney fees; according to Epic, around 40% of the fees Apple has claimed cover costs for things like expert witness and consulting fees, travel and logistical support.  And it assailed Apple for seeking costs incurred from putting together the motion for costs.

"Moreover, Apple did not meet and confer with Epic prior to filing its motion as required by Civil Local Rule 54-5, and, as a result, incurred attorneys' fees and costs that it could well have avoided," Epic said.  "Specifically, Apple unilaterally engaged two experts and a team of nine analysts from an expert consulting shop to review its invoices, without so much as checking whether Epic intended to dispute any of its calculations or the reasonableness of the fees and costs it incurred."

Epic said it hasn't tried to assess the accuracy of Apple's fees bid, preferring to leave that issue until after the court determines the appropriate scope of any fees bid.  It further called a detailed review "wasteful when Apple has sought to sweep in much to which it is not legally entitled" and it assailed Apple for providing "only an incomplete set of materials just days before this opposition was due."

Chapter 11 Fee Examiner OKs $20.4M in Fees for 15 Firms

February 8, 2024

A recent Law 360 story by Alex Wittenberg, “Kidde-Fenwal’s Ch. 11 Fee Examiner Oks $20.4M for 15 Firms”, reports that the fee examiner appointed in fire-suppression company Kidde-Fenwal's Chapter 11 case has recommended that a Delaware bankruptcy judge approve $20.4 million in pay for 15 firms working on the proceedings, after they agreed to cut their requested compensation by about $333,000.

In a report submitted, examiner Diana G. Adams detailed interim fees requested by law firms and others working on behalf of Kidde-Fenwal Inc., its unsecured creditors committee and an ad hoc group of governmental claimants.  The fees cover work conducted from Aug. 1 to Oct. 31 by professionals for the debtor and the creditors committee, and work done from mid-May or June 1 to July 31 by firms representing the ad hoc group.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein ordered the appointment of a fee examiner in July to help avoid duplication of efforts by counsel for unsecured creditors in the case.  Kidde-Fenwal is one of the companies at the center of massive multidistrict litigation over the sale and use of toxic firefighting foams.

The debtor's attorneys, from five separate firms, requested about $9.61 million in total for their work during the period and agreed to reduce their fees to $9.49 million following discussions with Adams, according to the report.  Sullivan & Cromwell LLP stands to be the highest-paid firm representing the debtor, with reduced fees of $5.27 million and an hourly rate of $1,347.

Seven firms representing unsecured creditors asked for $10.1 million in total and agreed to reductions of about $187,000. Brown Rudnick LLP's reduced fees for representing the committee amount to about $4.05 million.  Three companies working for the ad hoc committee of governmental claimants would reap $1.01 million after cuts of around $23,000.

Kidde-Fenwal filed for Chapter 11 protection in May 2023, saying it faced more than $1 billion of liability tied to claims arising from a former subsidiary's manufacture and sale of aqueous film-forming foam.  The chemical foams have given rise to thousands of lawsuits alleging the companies caused lingering pollution of public waterways and aquifers, and to billions of dollars in toxic exposure claims tied to cancers, thyroid diseases, elevated liver enzymes and decreased fertility among those exposed.

After Judge Silverstein ordered the appointment of an examiner in July, Kidde-Fenwal asked the court to approve its request to pay the ad hoc group of governmental claimants, an atypical arrangement.  The debtor said doing so was necessary in part because of prohibitions against government-entity membership in regular unsecured creditor committees.

ALM Covers NALFA’s 2023 Litigation Hourly Rate Survey & Report

February 2, 2024

A recent Law.com story by Michael Mora, “Where Miami Ranks in States Litigators Charge Highest Attorney Fee Rates,” reports on NALFA's 2023 Litigation Hourly Rate Survey & Report.  The story reads:

The National Association of Legal Fee Analysis released new intelligence providing micro and macro data of hourly rate ranges for both defense and plaintiff lawyers, which one attorney-fees expert said is the confluence of the coronavirus pandemic changing the geography in which people are living and working and the emergence of Miami on the national scene.

And that expert, Edward Mullins, a partner at Reed Smith in Miami, is not involved in the study.  The Am Law 100 firm attorney said he was surprised by the portion of all rates in Miami being at 18% in the most expensive tier and suspected that it is due to the influx of major law firms entering into the market in the last few years.

“Many of the new lawyers coming in are working not on local work, but more likely are doing work that is based in other areas like New York or other areas from where they are emigrating,” Mullins said.  “These new lawyers are integrating their N.Y. rates into the market and increasing the rates, but I don’t think that the rates charged for local work are increasing at the same pace.”

The NALFA empirical survey and report provides that micro and macro data, which, in addition to ranging from defense and plaintiff attorneys, does so at various experience levels, from the largest law firms to solo shops, in regular and complex litigation, and in the nation’s largest markets.  Over 24,800 qualified litigators participated in the survey.

Here, there are four categories: tier one, which ranges from $250 to $450; tier two, which runs from $451 to $700; tier three, which ranges from $701 to $950; and, tier four, which runs from $951 to over $1,300.

Nationally, Washington, DC, has the largest tier four percentage at 25%; then falling to a tie in second at 18% with Miami and New York.  For tier three, Washington has the highest percentage by far, at 51%; with San Francisco in second at 32%, and New York tied for third at 30% with multiple cities, including Boston and Los Angeles.

As for tier two, New Orleans and Las Vegas garnered the highest percentage at 44%; followed by Phoenix, Arizona, and San Francisco, at 43%; and, several cities fell closely behind, including Dallas and Denver with 42%.  And, for tier one, New Orleans has the most, standing at 39%, while Phoenix sits at 35% followed by Las Vegas at 33%.

Article: How Plaintiffs’ Counsel Can Avoid Common Benefit Fund Fee Disputes

December 14, 2023

A recent article by Judge Marina Corodemus and Mark Eveland, “Four Ways Plaintiffs’ Firm Can Prevent Common Benefit Fund Fee Disputes”, reports on ways plaintiffs’ firms can prevent common benefit fund fee disputes.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Common benefit funds (CBFs) ensure fairness and equity in the distribution of legal fees and expenses in aggregate and complex litigation, including class actions, mass torts, trust and securities, and multidistrict litigations (MDLs), where the litigation is prosecuted by either an ad hoc or judicially appointed committee or team of attorneys.  Their primary purpose is to recognize and compensate the plaintiffs’ attorneys who contribute their time, expertise, and resources to advancing the interests of most, if not all, of the plaintiffs in a particular litigation, including litigants who are not their clients but are benefited by the attorneys’ work product prosecuting the suit.

CBFs provide a compensation mechanism that enables large scale, highly expensive complex class actions and mass torts to proceed.  They provide the financial incentive for plaintiffs’ attorney groups to organize and then collect and centralize financial contributions and disbursements necessary to fund critical litigation activities like document management and reviews, scientific or factual investigations, expert recruitment, and, where needed, retention of specialized legal experts (such as bankruptcy, tax, and transactional practitioners).  CBFs help ensure that no single attorney or firm shoulders the entire financial burden of the legal work that puts the plaintiffs in complex litigation in position to resolve the litigation favorably.  When appropriately managed, CBFs reward attorneys and firms for doing work that benefits the greater good.

Certainly, attorneys who take on the risks and leadership roles in complex litigation deserve fair compensation for their efforts.  But lately, there seems to be a larger number of disputes over disbursements from CBFs among the plaintiffs’ firms involved in complex litigation (so called “Common Benefit Attorneys”) when and where such disbursements are forthcoming.  These disputes often garner public attention, perpetuating a narrative that plaintiffs’ attorneys are motivated solely by greed and self-interest.  Certain defense firms whose clientele often are mass tort defendants and advocacy organizations—the entities most responsible for creating this narrative in the first place—are happy to use those disputes as part of their public relations efforts supporting “tort reform.”

The pelvic mesh MDL, established in 2010 and which involved over 100,000 female plaintiffs suing seven companies in what is undoubtedly one of the most complicated MDLs in history because it is a series of seven MDLs (MDL nos. 2187, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2387, 2440 and 2511) consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, is an example of how a highly publicized CBF dispute can cast a shadow on the legal profession.  That dispute, like so many other CBF disputes, centered on whether certain law firms deserved the allotted fees from the CBF that the members of the plaintiffs’ executive committee in that litigation allocated to them.

And, just this past August, the Ninth Circuit settled a dispute—for now—in the Bard IVC filters litigation, In Re Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 2641 (D. Ariz.), established in 2015, regarding whether plaintiffs’ attorneys who agree to contribute to common benefit funds in MDLs are bound by those deals if they settle cases that were not part of an MDL.

In our view, there are four principal causes of CBF disputes.  We list them below, along with strategies for preventing them.

1.  A lack of billing standards and concurrent billing and time/expense review can be readily avoided through precise case management orders (CMOs) and clear billing guidelines.

Many CBF disputes are caused by the absence of well-defined requirements and standards for billing common benefit time and expenses.  Ambiguity surrounding billing practices leads to inconsistencies in the way attorneys record and submit their costs, giving rise to misunderstandings and disputes when fees are allocated.  Additionally, the lack of a standardized framework and mechanics for billing and expenses complicates attorneys’ perceptions of the fairness and validity of fee requests, in turn potentially eroding trust among plaintiffs’ firms.  Without clear and precise billing standards in place, and an evenhanded administration of those standards, it becomes challenging to objectively gauge the contributions of each attorney and firm.

Implementing comprehensive case management orders (CMOs) and clear billing guidelines can prevent CBF disputes.  CMOs should not only specify the tasks that qualify for compensation but also the allowable rates and expenses.  In doing so, they will provide an independent standard to reference when disputes arise.

For instance, a standardized CMO might include a provision stating that research tasks directly related to the case, such as reviewing medical records or consulting with expert witnesses, are billable, while unrelated tasks, like administrative work, are not.  (Of course, in highly complicated cases requiring extensive coordination and collaboration, administrative work may certainly be deemed permitted billable time.)  In addition, it is well established that there is a hierarchy of value for work that has a greater impact on the litigation and generates more “common benefit.”  Such work deserves greater compensation.  A CMO and related agreements can specify this hierarchy, providing guidelines for determining what kind of work generates a common benefit, and calculating the fees to be paid for this work.

CMOs and agreements as to billing guidelines are binding and provide clarity needed during fee allocation in MDL cases, potentially preventing major fee disputes.

For example, the CBF dispute in the pelvic mesh litigation arose in part because of a disagreement over what work provided more of a common benefit: the settlement of cases quickly and for relatively small dollar amounts or high-dollar jury verdicts.  Ultimately, Judge Joseph R. Goodwin of the Southern District of West Virginia granted a request from a fee and cost committee in that litigation that deemed the former to provide more common benefit than the latter.

The Bard IVC filters litigation provides another useful illustrative case.  There, some plaintiffs’ attorneys moved to reduce and exempt their clients’ recoveries from common benefit and expense assessments, arguing that no assessment should be paid by clients whose cases were filed in federal court after the MDL closed, were filed in state court, or were never filed in any court. U.S. District Judge David G. Campbell of the District of Arizona denied this motion.  As we noted above, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Campbell’s ruling, holding that these attorneys, who had agreed to pay a share of their fees to the MDL leaders, were required to abide by those agreements even if they settled cases outside of the consolidated proceeding.

Agreed-upon CMOs that set forth procedures, guidelines, and limitations for submitting applications for reimbursement of litigation fees and expenses inuring to the claimants’ common benefit can be instrumental in resolving or avoiding CBF disputes.

2.  The problems caused by late submissions of billing records can be avoided by requiring attorneys to make regular, contemporaneous submissions.

Another frequent cause of CBF disputes is attorneys delaying their submission of billing records.  Too often, attorneys and their support teams, engrossed in all-consuming complex litigation, fail to timely submit their time and expense records.  Attorneys sometimes submit crucial billing details months or even years after the fact, making it necessary for others to “forensically” reconstruct this information, a practice that not only jeopardizes the accuracy of time and expense submissions but may result in crucial work being overlooked or submitted without adequate supporting documentation. 

Delayed submissions also prevent courts and plaintiffs’ leadership teams from performing comprehensive and accurate assessments of work described in billing submissions.

CMOs or fee committees that mandate the regular submission of time and expense records can put an end to this problem.  As was the case in the pelvic mesh MDL, adopting CMOs that include specific provisions requiring attorneys to submit their time and expense records at regular intervals throughout a litigation significantly enhances efficiency and transparency.  These CMOs may, for instance, stipulate that detailed records must be submitted monthly or quarterly, with a reduction in potential compensation for any submissions beyond agreed-upon deadlines. 

This practice ensures that time and expense records are submitted relatively promptly after attorneys perform the work described in them, capturing the most accurate information (and fresh memories).  The regular submission of records also enables the court and MDL leadership to compare billing records with case calendars to determine if the work completed and the time spent completing it is consistent with expectations of when that work should have been completed and how long it should have taken.

3.  The lack of independent oversight can be remedied by bringing on a neutral.

When plaintiffs’ leadership teams collect, review, and approve CBF allocations, and stand to benefit personally from those decisions, it is easy to see how this lack of independent oversight can cause CBF disputes and give rise to accusations of conflicts of interest and self-dealing.  Appointing a neutral third party to oversee time and expense submissions to the CBF and mediate disputes can remedy this problem. 

This impartial overseer should be an independent legal expert or mediator with no vested interest in the litigation outcome, which should preclude accusations of conflicts of interest and self-dealing.  This neutral party should also be empowered to enforce deadlines for submissions, review and evaluate the reasonableness of time and expenses submissions, disallow submissions containing excessive time and expenses, and swiftly address any discrepancies that arise during the allocation process.

Some attorneys and judges are satisfied with handing off the issues at the center of a CBF dispute to an accountant.  We would suggest that the calculations necessary to resolve such a dispute require more than a bookkeeping background.  We believe hiring a neutral who is experienced in mass torts litigation and awarding attorneys’ fees, and who recognizes the worth of litigation roles, is a superior selection method.

4.  Disputes caused by an opaque process could be reduced by making it more transparent.

Inadequate transparency is a major cause of CBF disputes.  Those attorneys and firms that are not in leadership positions often have limited knowledge of the fees and expenses incurred as the litigation progresses, which could make them feel blindsided when their allocated fees are less than those they submitted.  Without ongoing and timely communication regarding billing submissions and allocations, attorneys and firms outside the leadership circle may question the fairness and reasonableness of both.

The solution to this problem is simple.  Leadership committees in complex litigation should provide all law firms that pay assessments into the CBF with regular reports that explain time and expense submissions.  In addition, every firm could ask questions of the people responsible for submitting those bills and allocating distributions from a CBF.

Attorneys whose inquiries are addressed by leadership and a court-appointed neutral throughout the process are far less likely to contest fee allocations at the conclusion.  Plus, increased transparency enhances confidence among plaintiffs’ firms, fostering greater trust and a more cooperative environment.

Simple solutions to a complex problem?

Given the time plaintiffs’ attorneys spend litigating complex litigation, it is not surprising that they want to ensure they are paid for the work they did that went to the common benefit of the plaintiffs in a litigation.  But given the number of attorneys and firms representing clients in these litigations, and the sizes of CBFs in complex litigation today—the CBF in the Vioxx litigation, In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1657 (E.D. La.), established in 2005, was $315 million—disputes over whether those attorneys’ contributions are fairly reflected in their CBF allocation are practically inevitable.

In our view, the core four causes of CBF disputes can be reduced in frequency and severity, if not outright eliminated, by implementing standardized billing practices, promoting timely billing submissions, and instituting impartial oversight and increasing transparency concerning the CBF allocation process.

Unless plaintiffs’ attorneys can eliminate CBF disputes, the positive social change they can bring about through complex litigation will be overshadowed by what the public—thanks in part to the corporate defense bar and advocacy organizations—will perceive as greedy attorneys bickering over millions of dollars.  That, in and of itself, should motivate more plaintiffs’ leadership teams to adopt these methods for reducing CBF disputes.

Judge Marina Corodemus is a former New Jersey Superior Court judge who helped establish New Jersey Mass Torts court (MCL).  She is now the managing partner of the ADR practice at Corodemus & Corodemus.  She has served as a special master in numerous MDLs and complex litigation in federal and state courts.  Mark Eveland is the CEO of Verus, a leading mass tort litigation support services firm.