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Category: Lodestar Multiplier

Apple Challenges $87M Fee Request in iPhone Settlement

February 18, 2021

A recent Law 360 story by Dorothy Atkins, “Apple, Ky. AG Rip Class Attys’ $87M Fee Bid in IPhone Deal,” reports that Apple and the Kentucky attorney general joined objectors in urging a California federal judge to reject class counsel's $87.7 million fee bid for cutting a $310 million deal resolving claims over slowed iPhones, slamming it for being millions above the benchmark and padded by unsupported rates.  During a three-hour hearing, Christopher Chorba of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, counsel for Apple, argued that awarding the fee request would set a "very bad precedent" because class counsel overlitigated the case and shouldn't be awarded for its conduct.

He also said it would result in a net reduction of between $19 and $20 for class members who would otherwise receive more than $100 per claim.  Chorba also argued that class counsel failed to go through the factors warranting its large fee request and that its lodestar calculation is unsupported by the billing submissions.  "We're not saying they shouldn't get any fees," Chorba said.  "The fees are just so outside the norm and so in excess of what would be appropriate."

If approved, the settlement would resolve dozens of consumer protection lawsuits that were filed in 2018 after Apple admitted to issuing software updates that slowed certain iPhones.  The suits allege that Apple designed its software updates to slow down some phone models, nudging consumers to buy newer iPhones.

In May, Apple reached a deal to settle the case for $500 million but objected to the plaintiffs' request for $87 million in attorney fees, asking the court to cut it down by at least $7 million.  Since the settlement was announced, dozens of people have objected, arguing that it doesn't do enough for class members and doles out too much to class attorneys.  In December, the federal government also made clear in a filing that it does not object to the proposed settlement itself but views the fee request as over the top.

During a hearing on the deal's final approval, class counsel Mark Molumphy of Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy LLP argued that the fee award is warranted because the case was exceptional and the risks were great, particularly since the plaintiffs' firms were working on a contingency basis.  He also noted that it's the "first and largest" settlement of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claims at issue and that class counsel secured significant recovery that's nearly half of the potential $1 billion damages at issue.

Molumphy argued that a 28% fee award is supported by a lodestar cross-check for the three years of litigation, which included "World War III" discovery, 18 motions, including a motion to dismiss, and what he called Apple's unreasonable litigation demands.  "Frankly there was no roadmap.  There's not a case in which there was a government investigation or plea.  We were the leaders in this case," he said.  "We created a roadmap for others, including government investigation that followed us."

But Apple, the state of Kentucky and multiple class members objected to the size of the fee award and how class counsel proposed to calculate it.  Four attorneys representing objecting class members argued that the 3.5% claims rate was "puny" and the fee request should not be based on the initial $500 million deal because Apple is only paying $310 million due to the low claims rate.

The objectors also argued that a fee recovery of between 10% and 18% is more in line with case precedent, and they slammed class counsel for not submitting detailed billing.  They said the information class counsel provided appears to inflate the hourly rate of staff attorneys to $350 per hour when those attorneys likely received less than $50 per hour for their work and that it appeared to include work by dozens of attorneys who weren't authorized to bill for their time.

John Pentz, counsel for two objectors, pointed out that the alleged billing padding caused U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh to "hit the roof" when she presided over Anthem's $115 million data breach deal, and noted that of the eight contract attorneys billed by Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP only one is listed on the firm's website.  He also said class counsel didn't explain why those who first filed lawsuits in state court were entitled to a cut of the fees.

Another attorney, Robert William Clore of Bandas Law Firm PC, argued on behalf of objector Alexis West that based on class counsel's own information, the aggregate potential damages at issue were over $4 billion, not $1 billion, and the $310 million represents only 5% of the potential $4 billion damages.

Philip R. Heleringer of the Office of the Kentucky Attorney General echoed other objectors' comments and emphasized that the court has a fiduciary duty to step in for absent class members in situations in which there is a "tension" between class counsel and class members.  Heleringer pointed out that in In re. Yahoo litigation, a court rejected a fee request that had a $10 million discrepancy between the lodestar and fee request, but class counsel's fee request in this case is five times larger than the lodestar.

Heleringer also argued that the settlement does not guarantee class members will receive $310 million.  He said the court should use base lodestar without a multiplier.  He added that there are no rare or exceptional circumstances here and that it's not enough that class counsel is going up against a well-heeled, well-resourced opponent to warrant a multiplier or that it's fighting on a contingent basis, particularly since 81 firms initially filed lawsuits over it.

Apple Challenges $87M Fee Request in iPhone Settlement

February 18, 2021

A recent Law 360 story by Dorothy Atkins, “Apple, Ky. AG Rip Class Attys’ $87M Fee Bid in IPhone Deal,” reports that Apple and the Kentucky attorney general joined objectors in urging a California federal judge to reject class counsel's $87.7 million fee bid for cutting a $310 million deal resolving claims over slowed iPhones, slamming it for being millions above the benchmark and padded by unsupported rates.  During a three-hour hearing, Christopher Chorba of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, counsel for Apple, argued that awarding the fee request would set a "very bad precedent" because class counsel overlitigated the case and shouldn't be awarded for its conduct.

He also said it would result in a net reduction of between $19 and $20 for class members who would otherwise receive more than $100 per claim.  Chorba also argued that class counsel failed to go through the factors warranting its large fee request and that its lodestar calculation is unsupported by the billing submissions.  "We're not saying they shouldn't get any fees," Chorba said.  "The fees are just so outside the norm and so in excess of what would be appropriate."

If approved, the settlement would resolve dozens of consumer protection lawsuits that were filed in 2018 after Apple admitted to issuing software updates that slowed certain iPhones.  The suits allege that Apple designed its software updates to slow down some phone models, nudging consumers to buy newer iPhones.

In May, Apple reached a deal to settle the case for $500 million but objected to the plaintiffs' request for $87 million in attorney fees, asking the court to cut it down by at least $7 million.  Since the settlement was announced, dozens of people have objected, arguing that it doesn't do enough for class members and doles out too much to class attorneys.  In December, the federal government also made clear in a filing that it does not object to the proposed settlement itself but views the fee request as over the top.

During a hearing on the deal's final approval, class counsel Mark Molumphy of Cotchett Pitre & McCarthy LLP argued that the fee award is warranted because the case was exceptional and the risks were great, particularly since the plaintiffs' firms were working on a contingency basis.  He also noted that it's the "first and largest" settlement of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claims at issue and that class counsel secured significant recovery that's nearly half of the potential $1 billion damages at issue.

Molumphy argued that a 28% fee award is supported by a lodestar cross-check for the three years of litigation, which included "World War III" discovery, 18 motions, including a motion to dismiss, and what he called Apple's unreasonable litigation demands.  "Frankly there was no roadmap.  There's not a case in which there was a government investigation or plea.  We were the leaders in this case," he said.  "We created a roadmap for others, including government investigation that followed us."

But Apple, the state of Kentucky and multiple class members objected to the size of the fee award and how class counsel proposed to calculate it.  Four attorneys representing objecting class members argued that the 3.5% claims rate was "puny" and the fee request should not be based on the initial $500 million deal because Apple is only paying $310 million due to the low claims rate.

The objectors also argued that a fee recovery of between 10% and 18% is more in line with case precedent, and they slammed class counsel for not submitting detailed billing.  They said the information class counsel provided appears to inflate the hourly rate of staff attorneys to $350 per hour when those attorneys likely received less than $50 per hour for their work and that it appeared to include work by dozens of attorneys who weren't authorized to bill for their time.

John Pentz, counsel for two objectors, pointed out that the alleged billing padding caused U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh to "hit the roof" when she presided over Anthem's $115 million data breach deal, and noted that of the eight contract attorneys billed by Kaplan Fox & Kilsheimer LLP only one is listed on the firm's website.  He also said class counsel didn't explain why those who first filed lawsuits in state court were entitled to a cut of the fees.

Another attorney, Robert William Clore of Bandas Law Firm PC, argued on behalf of objector Alexis West that based on class counsel's own information, the aggregate potential damages at issue were over $4 billion, not $1 billion, and the $310 million represents only 5% of the potential $4 billion damages.

Philip R. Heleringer of the Office of the Kentucky Attorney General echoed other objectors' comments and emphasized that the court has a fiduciary duty to step in for absent class members in situations in which there is a "tension" between class counsel and class members.  Heleringer pointed out that in In re. Yahoo litigation, a court rejected a fee request that had a $10 million discrepancy between the lodestar and fee request, but class counsel's fee request in this case is five times larger than the lodestar.

Heleringer also argued that the settlement does not guarantee class members will receive $310 million.  He said the court should use base lodestar without a multiplier.  He added that there are no rare or exceptional circumstances here and that it's not enough that class counsel is going up against a well-heeled, well-resourced opponent to warrant a multiplier or that it's fighting on a contingent basis, particularly since 81 firms initially filed lawsuits over it.

Article: Five Lessons for Recovering Attorney Fees in Texas

February 13, 2021

A recent article by Amanda G. Taylor, “Recovering Attorney’s Fees in Texas: Five Lessons” in BizLit News Blog reports on recovering attorney fees in Texas.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Obtaining an award of attorneys’ fees might be the final step in a long-waged litigation battle but to do so successfully requires careful planning and diligence from the outset of a case.  The Texas Supreme Court recently clarified the evidence required to obtain and affirm such an award.  Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2019).  The Texas Supreme Court also recently confirmed that these evidentiary standards apply equally when fees are sought to be recovered as a sanction.  Nath v. Texas Children’s Hosp., 576 S.W.3d 707, 710 (Tex. 2019).  To best serve a client’s interests of recovering attorneys’ fees in Texas, whether as a prevailing party or as a sanction, lawyers should adhere to five lessons from Rohrmoos.

Lesson One:  Confirm a legal entitlement to recover fees.  “In Texas, as in the federal courts, each party must pay its own way in attorney’s fees … unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.”  Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 484.  Certain claims, such as a breach of contract claim brought under Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, entitle a prevailing party to recover attorneys’ fees.  Other claims, such as a common law fraud claim, do not afford such a remedy.  In establishing your initial case strategy, it is important to consider which claims will and will not allow for recovery of fees, and advise your client about the pros and cons of pursuing each claim accordingly.  Also, be aware of fee-shifting procedural tools (such a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act) and various Texas statutes and rules that allow for recovery of fees as a sanction (such as Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapters 9-10, and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215).

Lesson Two: Keep accurate, contemporaneous billing records.  Although billing records are not absolutely required to prove the amount of reasonable and necessary fees, it is “strongly encouraged” to submit such proof in support of attorneys’ fees.  Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 502.  It is much easier to review, summarize, and testify about the work performed (often years later) if you have been diligent in your billing practices throughout.  Time should be kept in a manner that demonstrates the “(1) particular services performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when those services were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing the services.”  Id.  It is also advisable to keep time in a manner that is specific enough to cover the topic but without legalese and without so much detail that heavy redactions become necessary.  Fact finders prefer to read invoices in plain English without the interruption of hidden text.

Lesson Three:  Your fee agreement does not control the amount awarded.  “[A] client’s agreement to a certain fee arrangement or obligation to pay a particular amount does not necessarily establish that fee as reasonable or necessary.”  Id. at 488.  Translation: even if you have agreed to handle the matter for a flat fee or contingency fee, you still must demonstrate that the amount of fees sought for recovery are reasonable and necessary based on the work performed and the time incurred.  Regardless of the fee arrangement with your client, keeping accurate and contemporaneous billing records is important.

Lesson Four: Remember to timely designate fee experts.   “Historically, claimants have proven reasonableness and necessity of attorney’s fees through an expert’s testimony—often the very attorney seeking the award.”  Id. at 490.  “[C]onclusory testimony devoid of any real substance will not support a fee award.”  Id. at 501.  Because expert testimony will be required, the attorney must remember to designate herself and any other attorney who will offer an opinion about the reasonableness and necessity of the fee amount(s) as an expert witness in compliance with the scheduling order or discovery control plan governing the case.

Lesson Five: Understand the “Texas two-step” calculation method.  At step one, calculate the “base” or “lodestar” amount by multiplying the “reasonable hours worked” by a “reasonable hourly rate.”  Id. at 498.  This is an “objective calculation” that yields a “presumptively reasonable” amount.  Id. at 497-98, 502.  The determination of what is a reasonable market rate and what is a reasonable amount of time will typically include consideration of the following factors: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill required to perform the legal service properly, (4) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, (5) the amount involved, (6) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services, (7) whether the fee is fixed or contingent and the uncertainty of collection, and (8) the results obtained.  Id. at 500.  At step two, “adjust[] the base calculation up or down based on relevant considerations … [that were not] subsumed in the first step.”  Id.  “If a fee claimant seeks an enhancement, it must produce specific evidence showing that a higher amount is necessary to achieve a reasonable fee award.”  Id. at 501. Remember that only “rare circumstances” justify such an adjustment.  Id. at 502.

Following these five lessons from the outset of a case will be beneficial to the expert testifying about the amount of fees at the end of a case.  More importantly, it will benefit your client’s best interest in obtaining a monetary award and being able to have that award affirmed on appeal.

Amanda G. Taylor serves as Practice Group Leader of Butler Snow LLP’s Appellate Group and practices from the firm’s Austin, TX office. As a Board-Certified Civil Appellate specialist, Amanda helps to shape successful case strategy from the outset of litigation through the end of an appeal.  Amanda is a detail-oriented lawyer who represents her clients with passion, stays current on emerging trends and issues, and brings a practical perspective to problem solving.  She has a broad range of experience handling complex civil disputes regarding contracts, fraud, tax, insurance, products, employment, real property, and trust and estates.  Amanda is also committed to community service through a number of positions in her State and Local Bar Associations.

Judge Properly Awards Regular Hourly Rate for Clerical Tasks

February 12, 2021

A recent Metropolitan News Enterprise story, “Judge Properly Awards Attorney’s Fees, at Lawyer’s Normal Rates, for Clerical Work”, reports that the Court of Appeal for this district ruled yesterday that a judge did not abuse his discretion for including in an award of attorney fees recompense, at the lawyer’s usual rate for legal services, for the time he spent in performing clerical tasks.  Justice Halim Dhanidina of Div. Three wrote the opinion which affirms a $84,107.50 award by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Michael L. Stern, except for a $552.50 component.  Plaintiff Albino Ojeda, who was the prevailing party in his action over Labor Code violations against Michelle and Eric Azulay, had agreed to that amount being remitted but it somehow wasn’t.

The Azulay’s complained that Ojeda should not paid for amounts charged by Encino labor lawyer Seth E. Tillmon, at his regular hourly rate of $425, for performing purely administrative chores.  Dhanidina said these tasks included “scanning, printing, and downloading documents; preparing proofs of service; preparing mailings; formatting documents; calendaring dates; and traveling to mailboxes or postal centers to mail documents.”

He wrote: “As an initial matter, necessary overhead support services that secretaries and paralegals provide to attorneys may be included in an attorney fees award….Therefore, so-called administrative tasks are recoverable in the trial court’s discretion.”

Dhanidina continued: “Although charging for purely clerical tasks at an attorney’s hourly rate is questionable, the trial judge nonetheless was the best judge of the value of the services rendered, and to reverse that judgment we must be convinced it is clearly wrong….Especially in the absence of the reporter’s transcript, which may have shed light on the time spent on so-called administrative tasks, we are reluctant to second guess the trial court.”

He noted that Tillmon is a sole practitioner, without support staff “and had to do everything himself.” The jurist observed: “His detailed time records largely show that when arguably clerical tasks were combined with clearly legal ones, the total time charged would not have been facially unreasonable for the legal task alone. 

On February 14, 2018, for example, counsel drafted 15 sets of discovery, printed copies of each, drafted proofs of service, printed mailing labels, and stuffed manila envelopes.  To do all this he spent 5.4 hours.  Spending that time on drafting discovery alone would be facially reasonable.  Further, it is possible that the trial court denied Ojeda’s request for a 1.5 multiplier, which the trial court might have otherwise awarded, as a way of ensuring that Ojeda was not compensated for performing clerical tasks.”  The Azulays also argued that fees amounting to $84,107.50 were impermissibly disproportionate to the $30,929.94 in damages Ojeda obtained.

“Azulay cites no authority for the proposition that a fee award that exceeds the client’s recovery is per se unreasonable or that California imposes a proportionality rule,” Dhanidina responded.  The case is Ojeda v. Azulay, B302440.  Armen Shaghzo of the Glendale law firm of Shaghzo & Shaghzo represented the Azulays.  There was no appearance for Ojeda.

$11M Fee Request in Home Health Care FCA Case

January 19, 2021

A recent Law 360 story by Sarah Jarvis, “Attys Want $11M After Record Home Health Care FCA Deal,” reports that a whistleblower is seeking more than $11 million in attorney fees and costs for a $57 million deal in his suit alleging the Visiting Nurse Service of New York defrauded the government, saying the figure is reasonable for the scope and outcome of the case.

Former VNSNY executive Edward Lacey asked a New York federal court for an order requiring the agency to pay him more than $11,147,000 in fees, costs and expenses incurred in Constantine Cannon LLP's successful litigation of the case, which resulted in a record deal last June to resolve Lacey's False Claims Act suit.  Lacey had claimed that VNSNY, the largest not-for-profit home health care agency in the U.S., billed for services it never provided and disregarded patients' formal treatment plans.

"Relator is seeking payment for a total attorneys' fee lodestar of $10,110,337.50," Lacey said.  "This amount is reasonable by any objective measure based on [Constantine]'s hourly rates and the hours the firm worked to secure this historic result."  Lacey said the firm spent 17,374 hours in attorney and legal support time on the case and used the smallest team possible to avoid duplicating resources, noting that only two lawyers worked on the case for its first 18 months.  After that, another lawyer joined in October 2015 and another in January 2016, but that principal team didn't expand again for almost two years to handle an accelerated schedule, according to Lacey's memorandum.

In support of his request, Lacey also noted the quality of the result, saying the $57 million settlement is one of the largest home health care fraud settlements ever and the only one to successfully challenge the failure to comply with patient plans of care.  Lacey said the settlement "hopefully remedies — or at least turns a regulatory spotlight on — a practice that adversely affects millions of sick and elderly patients across the country."

June's settlement ended Lacey's claims that VNSNY billed Medicare and Medicaid for therapy and services that doctors never provided and maintained an "accept all referrals" policy regardless of capacity constraints. VNSNY did not admit liability as part of the deal and maintains that it didn't bill for visits doctors never provided.  As part of the settlement, the federal government was stipulated to receive $50.1 million of the settlement, with New York state getting about $6.8 million.  Lacey was then awarded a 29% share of the total $57 million award, his counsel said, and Lacey noted in his memo that this amount was the outer limit of what the government was allowed to award.