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Category: Expenses / Costs

Jenner Wins Fees in Contingency Agreement

May 23, 2017

A recent the NLJ story by Marcia Coyle, “Skadden Loses a Tax Dispute, and Jenner Wins Fee Fight,” reports that Jenner & Block won fees in a case, Parallel Networks v. Jenner & Block, that stemmed from a 2007 contingency fee arrangement in which Jenner agreed to represent Parallel Networks in two patent cases.

The fee arrangement contained a provision that allowed the law firm to withdraw from the representation and still get fees whenever it “determine[d] at any time that it is not in its economic interest to continue the representation.”  If the firm withdrew, Parallel Networks was to pay “an appropriate and fair portion of the Contingent Fee Award” at “the conclusion of any” patent lawsuit.  The agreement also called for arbitration of any disputes.

Jenner & Block did withdraw.  New counsel entered and settled the two patent cases.  In 2011, Jenner submitted a $10 million fee request that Parallel Networks would challenge.  The dispute went to arbitration and Jenner was awarded $3 million and a 16 percent future contingent stake.  On appeal, Parallel Networks argued the withdraw-and-still-pay provision was prohibited under Texas law.  Texas state courts upheld the award.

In the high court, Parallel Networks, represented by Daniel Geyser of Stris & Maher, argued the circuit courts were divided over whether public policy challenges are viable under the Federal Arbitration Act and also are confused about the permissible grounds for vacating arbitration awards following the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel.  “There is simply no indication that Congress intended to intrude on the power of state courts, acting under settled state law, to resist arbitration awards that violate core state public policies,” Geyser wrote.

Jenner & Block waived its right to respond to Parallel Network’s petition.  In earlier litigation, the law firm had argued that it had invested 24,000 hours in the patent litigation, which formed the basis for the later successful outcome.  The firm said it had reason to withdraw because Parallel Networks was habitually late reimbursing litigation expenses.

“We’re obviously disappointed,” Geyser said.  “There was an acknowledged conflict on an important issue that has caused substantial confusion in the lower courts.  This case was an appropriate vehicle, and we wish the court had decided to take it up.”

Judge Denies Fee Requests in VW Diesel Emission Litigation

April 25, 2017

A recent the Recorder story by Amanda Bronstad, “Breyer Denies Fee Motion in VW Diesel Fraud Case, But Opens Door for Lawyer to Seek Payment From Client,” reports that the federal judge in the Volkswagen diesel emissions litigation has denied 244 motions for attorney fees but lifted an earlier injunction which had prevented law firms from suing their own clients for payment.

The order was an unusual twist in the class actions that Volkswagen settled last year for $14.7 billion to resolve claims by consumers of 475,000 "clean diesel" vehicles that cheated emissions tests.  In a separate arrangement, Volkswagen agreed to pay an additional $175 million in attorney fees and costs to 22 law firms that were appointed to the plaintiffs steering committee heading up more than 1,200 class actions.

Seeking a portion of that award, nearly 60 law firms not on the committee sought fees and costs, many citing work they did on behalf of 3,642 class members.  In rejecting the fees, U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer of the Northern District of California concluded the firms did work for their clients, but not for the class.

"Because Volkswagen did not agree to pay these fees and costs as part of the settlement, and because non-class counsel have not offered evidence that their services benefited the class, as opposed to their individual clients, the court denies the motions," Breyer wrote.  He also said their work had not been authorized by the plaintiffs steering committee, unlike nearly 100 other firms that were granted fees as part of the $175 million award.

Among the firms requesting fees were Nagel Rice in Roseland, New Jersey; Davis Law Firm in San Antonio; Locks Law Firm in New York; Robbins Ross Alloy Belinfante Littlefield in Atlanta; and Conrad & Scherer in Fort Lauderdale.  Many of the firms claimed their liens had been left out of the emissions settlement intentionally in a rush to reach a deal in which lawyers could assure class members would not see their awards reduced to pay attorney fees.

The order, Breyer lifted an earlier order which had alarmed many attorneys because it barred them from submitting liens against their clients' awards.  That order had required Volkswagen to pay class members their full awards regardless of liens and invoked the federal All Writs Act to enjoin all state court proceedings involving attorney liens.

Acknowledging this time that the fee disputes were "a matter of contract law, subject to the codes of professional conduct," Breyer vacated the order, allowing law firms to enforce their client agreements by suing in state courts.  Volkswagen had opposed the fee requests, which ranged from a few thousand dollars to hundreds of thousands of dollars, noting that $175 million "more than generously compensates" plaintiffs lawyers in the litigation.

Earlier this month, in another fee request opposed by Volkswagen, Breyer slashed by nearly 90 percent a fee request made by Seattle's Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro in a separate $1.2 billion settlement involving Volkswagen's franchise dealerships.

Ninth Circuit Upholds Fees for Fees Under Statute

April 24, 2017

A recent Metropolitan News story by Kenneth Ofgang, “Panel Upholds Award of ‘Fees-on-Fees’ Under Statute” reports that a statute that permits federal judges to sanction attorneys for vexatious litigation permits an award of fees to opposing counsel for litigating the right to fees, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled.

In a published order, the panel—Judges Alex Kozinski, Richard A. Paez, and Marsha S. Berzon—denied reconsideration of the appellate commissioner’s ruling calculating sanctions against Boston attorney Michael J. Flynn and his client, Timothy Blixseth.  The two were ordered to pay nearly $192,000 in fees and costs incurred by several creditors of Blixseth, a co-founder of the bankrupt Yellowstone Mountain Club.  Blixseth was found jointly liable for all but around $34,000 of the award, for which Flynn was found separately liable by statute.

Blixseth and one of his ex-wives developed the Yellow Mountain Club as an exclusive resort for “ultra-wealthy” golfers and skiers.  He has blamed the 2008 mortgage crisis for the collapse of his finances.  His wealth was estimated by Forbes magazine at $1.3 billion when it named him one of the 400 wealthiest Americans in 2006.  Creditors have claimed Blixseth has hidden assets.

Blixseth, represented by Flynn, appealed the denial of a motion to recuse the District of Montana bankruptcy judge assigned to his case.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the district judge that Blixseth’s accusations were “a transparent attempt to wriggle out of an unfavorable decision by smearing the reputation of the judge who made it.”

In August 2015, the Ninth Circuit panel said Blixseth and Flynn were subject to attorney fees incurred by creditors on that appeal, citing Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §1927.  “If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.”

Section 1927 provides: “Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”

In the order, the panel agreed with the appellate commissioner that fees incurred in litigating the right to fees, or “fees on fees,” cannot be awarded under Rule 38, but may be awarded under §1927.  The panel also denied, without comment, Flynn’s motion that the judges recuse themselves.

Because Rule 38 refers to “damages,” the judges said, it is not a fee-shifting statute, and the only attorney fees that may be awarded under the rule are those “incurred in defending against the frivolous issues or frivolous portions of an appeal.”

Section 1927, by contrast, “may be characterized as a fee-shifting provision, despite its sanctions trigger,” the panel said.  The legislation’s purpose, the judges said, it to shift the burden of the vexatious litigation onto the vexatious lawyer, noting that fee-shifting statutes generally are interpreted as permitting the award of “fees on fees.”

The case is Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 12-35986.

US Airways Defends $122M Fee Request in Sabre Antitrust Case

April 20, 2017

A recent Law 360 story by Rick Archer, “US Airways Defends $122M Fee Bid in Sabre Antitrust Suit” reports that US Airways defended its request for $122 million in attorneys' fees for its $15 million victory against trip-planning giant Sabre Inc. in a suit over a contract giving booking access to all of the airline's seats, saying the fees are reasonable and in line with Sabre’s own legal costs.

Refuting Sabre’s argument that the fee request should be trimmed by nearly 90 percent because of unnecessary expenses, failure to get the full award sought and the dismissal of three-fourths of its claims, US Airways said the recommendation would make its fee award $40 million less than Sabre’s own reported defense costs.

“Although Sabre begrudgingly concedes that US Airways is entitled to some of what it incurred in this lengthy and aggressively defended case, reading Sabre’s opposition, one would think that Sabre — not US Airways — had won,” US Airways said.

The airline won a $5 million verdict, automatically tripled to $15 million, late last year in its case accusing Sabre — which controls 58 percent of the ticket distribution market — of restraining trade by forcing unfavorable terms on US Airways in a 2011 contract that required the airline to give Sabre access to all of its seats in order to reach the large cadre of travel agents that use the Sabre system.

US Airways has requested $122 million in attorneys’ fees and costs, arguing last month that the lengthy and complex nature of litigation justified fees that are more than eight times the amount of damages.  Sabre had argued US Airways should receive only $13 million in fees, noting three of its four original claims were rejected and the award was less than US Airways had asked for, and claiming a number of specific decisions in the airline’s legal strategy had generated unnecessary fees.

US Airways replied that the claim it ultimately won on was always the focus of their efforts, saying two of the claims were dismissed at the beginning of the case when minimal work had been done and the third had required only a fraction of the work.  “The Clayton Act does not require a plaintiff to prevail on all motions and claims in order to be entitled to a full recovery, particularly where it wins what it set out to achieve,” the airline said.

The airline said the reasonableness of the fees was justified by Sabre’s own $53 million in reported attorneys' fees, and argued this number was deceptively low because defense counsel Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP agreed to work at a discount in exchange for a success fee.

“Sabre refused our request to see Bartlit’s success-fee rate, but it appears to be nearly 50 percent based on the bonus Sabre paid for defeating declaratory relief,” it said.  “Even a 30 percent bonus would have increased Sabre’s fees to roughly $70 million had it, not US Airways, won.  That approximates US Airways’ roughly $85 million in attorneys’ fees.”

The case is US Airways Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp. et al., case number 1:11-cv-02725, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

SCOTUS Rules Fee Awards from Bad Faith Must Be Compensatory, Not Punitive

April 18, 2017

A recent The Recorder by Ross Todd, “At Odds With 9th Circuit, SCOTUS Nixes $2.7M in Discovery Sanctions,” reports that the U.S. Supreme Court held on Tuesday that attorney fee awards resulting from acts of bad faith in litigation must be causally linked to the underlying misconduct.

In a unanimous 13-page opinion (pdf), Justice Elena Kagan reversed a $2.7 million fee award against the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. finding that sanctions in civil cases “must be compensatory rather than punitive in nature.”  The upper end of fee award sanctions, Kagan wrote, should be “limited to the fees the innocent party incurred solely because of the misconduct—or put another way, to the fees that party would not have incurred but for the bad faith.”

Goodyear’s case drew amicus support from the American Bar Association and the National Association of Manufacturers.  Both warned that failure to require a direct causal link between penalties and a litigant’s discovery abuses could lead to outsized and abusive sanctions awards.

Tuesday’s decision reverses a 2015 ruling from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that put Goodyear on the hook for all $2.7 million in legal fees incurred by Leroy, Donna, Barry, and Suzanne Haeger after an alleged discovery violation in their personal injury case.  The Haegers claimed that faulty Goodyear tires caused a 2003 accident involving their motor home in which they all suffered serious injuries.

For years with the case pending at the trial court, the Haegers’ lawyer had asked the company to hand over all test results for the tire model in question.  But only after the case settled pretrial in 2010 for an undisclosed sum did the Haegers’ lawyer learn from a newspaper article that Goodyear had disclosed test results in separate litigation that he’d never seen.

In response to a motion for sanctions U.S. District Judge Roslyn Silver in Phoenix issued an order in 2012 forcing Goodyear to pay its opponents legal fees and costs from the moment when she found Goodyear made its first dishonest discovery response.  Although the judge acknowledged that sanctions are limited to fees caused by the misconduct in the “usual” case, she wrote that Goodyear’s sanctionable conduct rose “to a truly egregious level.”

A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed Silver’s finding that she could grant attorney’s fees incurred “during the time when” Goodyear was acting in bad faith.  But in dissent, Circuit Judge Paul Watford wrote that his colleagues had mistakenly pointed to “a temporal limitation, not a causal one” to justify the sanction.  “A sanctioning court must determine which fees were incurred because of, and solely because of, the misconduct at issue (however serious, or concurrent with a lawyer’s work, it might have been),” wrote Watford, in a section quoted by Kagan.

Justice Neil Gorsuch did not take part in Tuesday’s decision.