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Category: Fee Award

Judge to Award $1.5M in Fees in Walgreens Wage Settlement

November 26, 2020

A recent Law 360 story by Lauren Berg, “Calif. Walgreens Workers Bag $4.5M Wage Deal,” reports that Walgreens and a class of workers have received a California federal judge's approval for their $4.5 million settlement to resolve claims that the pharmacy chain broke Golden State labor law by not paying all wages to employees at its distribution centers.  U.S. District Judge William B. Shubb granted preliminary approval to the class action settlement that will see about 2,600 workers split $2.8 million, finding that the deal is fair and gives the workers a good recovery that might have been at risk had the case gone to trial.

Lucas Mejia, who worked as an hourly stocker for about seven years at a Walgreens distribution center in California, launched the class action in November 2018 in the Superior Court for the County of Yolo, alleging that the company failed to pay employees for all of the compensable time they worked.  Mejia said Walgreens rounded down employees' hours on their timecards, required employees to pass through security checks before and after their shift without paying them for that time and didn't pay premium wages to workers who were denied meal breaks.

The suit also included a claim for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act based on Walgreens' alleged violations of California labor law.  The case was eventually removed to federal court in Sacramento.  In December, the parties started talking with a mediator, which produced the current settlement.

In exchange for releasing all of the claims, Walgreens has agreed to pay up to $4.5 million to create a common fund, from which $2.8 million will be distributed to the estimated 2,648 class members, according to the order filed.  Each class member who does not opt out is estimated to receive about $1,200, the judge noted.

Also out of the pot, $1.5 million, or 33% of the fund, will be set aside for attorney fees, while $150,000 will go to pay PAGA penalties and $7,500 will be used as an incentive award for Mejia.  Another $50,000 will be used to pay litigation costs incurred by class counsel and settlement administration costs, according to the order.  Judge Shubb gave preliminary approval to the deal, finding that it is in the best interest of the class.

While Mejia's counsel said the labor claims could be worth up to $20.2 million and the PAGA claim up to $16 million, they said Walgreens had legitimate defenses that risked reducing the amount Mejia and the class could recover at trial, according to the order.  With that in mind, the settlement is a strong result for the class, the attorneys said, with the $4.5 million representing 22% of the potential damages.

The judge also noted that, while the deal sets aside 33% of the fund for attorney fees, Mejia's counsel said they will seek 25% of the fund in a separate motion for fees.  "The court will defer consideration of the reasonableness of counsel's fees until the fee motion is filed," the judge wrote.  "Class counsel is cautioned that the reasons for the attorney's fees should be explained further in that motion."

$45M Fee Award in $187M LIBOR MDL Settlement

November 25, 2020

A recent Law.com story by Nadia Dreid, “NY Judge ‘Surprised’ By Fee Application in Libor Rigging Case,” reports that a New York federal judge wasn't happy with the amount of hours or law firms on the attorney fee bill she received in the wake of a $187 million deal with JPMorgan and other major financial institutions over claims of interbank rate rigging, but she granted $45 million in fees anyway.  U.S. District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald said in her opinion that she was "to say the least, surprised to learn from their fee application that [exchange-based plaintiff] class counsel involved twelve additional law firms" and that the work from those firms made up nearly a fifth of the submitted hours.

"The court cannot divine any reason why it was necessary, efficient or in the best interests of the class to have twelve additional law firms litigate this case," the opinion read.  "If anything, the hours were claimed for work that was duplicative, unnecessary and easily could have been performed by the two appointed firms."

Those firms were Kirby McInerney LLP and Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP, who were appointed as class counsel to the exchange-based plaintiffs in the multidistrict litigation accusing JPMorgan, Deutsche Bank and a handful of other big banks of conspiring to rig the London Interbank Offered Rate, or Libor.  Judge Buchwald preliminarily approved the $187 million deal in March and gave it her final blessing in September, but she had yet to come to a final decision on attorney fees.  Ultimately, she decided that none of the 15,000 hours of additional work done by outside firms would be used in the lodestar calculations.

The court also had issues with the amount of hours billed by class counsel themselves.  Although she agreed to accept all of the more than 65,000 hours of work from the two firms, the court noted that their bill listed 10,000 hours more than their sister counsel claimed "in support of their fee application for a case of similar magnitude."  It would take a four-person law firm working on the case full-time for roughly nine years — minus a month annually for vacation — to reach the 65,000 mark, according to the court.

"While the sheer quantum of hours suggests some amount of over-litigation, the court will credit [class counsel] the full amount of time they claim," Judge Buchwald said.  The fees that the firms will walk away with comes out to 25% of the $187 million settlement, after the deduction of around $5.6 million in expenses, according to the opinion.

DC Judge Slams DOJ’s Fee Agreement with Arnold & Porter

November 24, 2020

A recent Law 360 story by Hailey Konnath, “DC Judge Slams DOJ’s $212K Fee Payment to Arnold & Porter,” reports that a District of Columbia federal judge criticized a deal in which the Trump administration will pay Arnold & Porter more than $212,000 in legal fees to resolve a battle over expedited traveler security clearance programs, calling the fees excessive and the government's conduct "embarrassing."

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security in August backed down from its defense of the policy barring New Yorkers from enrolling in some of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Trusted Traveler Programs, including Global Entry, SENTRI, NEXUS and FAST.  The government also admitted that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking process in instituting the policy and admitted that it made "inaccurate or misleading statements" about the policy.

As part of the agreement ending the case, DHS said it would not stop New Yorkers from participating in Global Entry or other traveler programs on the basis of the state's refusal to provide the federal government with access to the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles' records, according to the settlement.  The government also agreed to cover the plaintiffs' counsel's fees.  To be clear, the parties don't need court approval to move forward with their agreement, U.S. District Judge Richard J. Leon noted in the order.  However, the government and Arnold & Porter were seeking a court order incorporating the deal into a final order of dismissal.

Judge Leon declined to do so, saying that while the other provisions of the agreement are fair and reasonable, "I am quite concerned, and have been from the outset, about the reasonableness of the amount of attorney fees agreed to by the parties."  In particular, the judge knocked the U.S. Department of Justice for not requesting the actual billing records from Arnold & Porter.  Those records show that eight total attorneys billed time on the case, a number of attorneys that he deemed "entirely unnecessary to the needs of the case."  The DOJ also chose not to suggest that attorney fees be calculated according to anything other than the firm's standard corporate rates, Judge Leon said.

Had the DOJ pushed for using rates established in the U.S. Attorney's Office's Laffey Matrix — and only covered the fees for four attorneys — the fee award would be just $82,562, he said.  "The court believes the Department of Justice should have been more aggressive in protecting the public fisc," the judge said.

Judge Lean added that "[p]erhaps, however, it is not so surprising that they weren't in this case.  After all, it is not every day the Department of Justice and their clients have to confess to written and oral misrepresentations on the record in a high profile case!"  It appears that Arnold & Porter — "unfortunately at the taxpayer expense" — simply capitalized on the government's desire to put the matter to rest as quickly as possible, he said in the order.  Judge Leon said he hopes that in the future, the DOJ's leadership will take the necessary steps to ensure that attorney fees it agrees to are indeed fair and reasonable.

As far as the conclusion of the Global Entry case, Judge Leon said the parties have two options: they can file a stipulation of dismissal or they can reduce the fees portion of their deal and get it incorporated into his final order of dismissal.  "The parties have made it clear to the court that their settlement agreement does not require judicial approval and is in fact self-executing," he said. "Fine."

He added, "Negotiating an agreement in a pro bono case that bypasses judicial approval and requires defendants to pay in excess of $200,000 in attorney fees might warrant a tip of the proverbial cap from fellow practitioners, but it is irrelevant to a judicial analysis of whether to incorporate the parties' agreement into an order of dismissal."

Stanton Jones, one of the Arnold & Porter attorneys on the case, told Law360 that it was "illegal for the federal government to try to deny Global Entry to New Yorkers in retaliation for its refusal to participate in immigration enforcement."  In a statement provided to Law360, Jones added that "all fees recovered in this case will be contributed to the Arnold & Porter Foundation, a tax-exempt private foundation that provides scholarships to minority law students, funds fellowships for recent law school graduates at tax-exempt organizations, and awards grants to other charitable and educational organizations."

Article: Courts Finally Taking Unreasonable Contest Counsel Fees Seriously

November 20, 2020

A recent Law.com article by Christian Petrucci, “Courts Finally Taking Unreasonable Contest Counsel Fees Seriously,” reports on attorney fee claims in workers’ compensation cases.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Absent the legal mechanism to pursue a bad faith claim against a workers’ compensation carrier, one of the only weapons in a claimant’s arsenal to discourage the baseless denial of claims is that of the unreasonable contest counsel fee demand.  Tragically, it is commonplace for an overly aggressive defendant to deny a claim with no factual or legal basis to do so.  Claimants are routinely forced to needlessly prosecute a petition for benefits or otherwise oppose baseless defense petitions, which causes precious judicial resources to be misallocated and inflicts significant undue stress, mental anguish and financial distress on the injured worker.

Of course, the humanitarian nature of the Workers’ Compensation Act is supposed to prevent any delay in the payment of benefits or the baseless denial of claims.  The law directs that the act be liberally construed to be remedial in nature, although one would never know it from the paucity of unreasonable contest counsel fee awards at the trial level.  The actual law provides that awarding counsel fees is to be the rule and excluding fees the exception to be applied only where the factual record establishes a reasonable contest. See Millvale Sportmen’s Club v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 393 A.2d 49 (Pa. Commw.1978).  It is also important to note that the question of whether a reasonable basis exists for an employer to have contested liability is fully reviewable on appeal as a question of law to be based upon findings supported by substantial evidence.  See Kuney v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 562 A.2d 931 (Pa. Commw. 1989).

The Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act provides in pertinent part: In any contested case where the insurer has contested liability in whole or in part … the employee, or his dependent, as the case may be, in whose favor the matter at issue has been finally determined in whole or in part shall be awarded, in addition to the award for compensation, a reasonable sum for costs incurred for attorney fee, witnesses, necessary medical examination, and the value of unreimbursed lost time to attend the proceedings: Provided, That cost for attorney fees may be excluded when a reasonable basis for the contest has been established by the employer or the insurer.

Despite the plain reading of the statue, unreasonable contest attorneys fees are almost never awarded and even in the most egregious situations, are awarded in a nominal amount which is stayed pending appeal in every instance.

Given this background, Gabriel v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Procter and Gamble Products), decided by the Commonwealth Court in September, offers significant hope that the tide will be turning in the effort to police instances of bad faith in the workers’ compensation world.  At a minimum, Gabriel affords a heightened expectation that an attorney can be compensated in cases which lack a wage-loss benefit award, which is the normal corpus on which contingency fees are based.

In Gabriel, the claimant injured his arm at work and notified his employer.  The claimant treated with doctors based at the company’s plant and the employer’s insurance carrier actually paid medical expenses associated with the claim.  However, the employer inexplicably failed to file a bureau document either accepting or denying the claim within 21 days, as required by the act.  Consequently, the injured worker was forced to retain an attorney and file a claim petition, which was summarily denied by the employer.

Before the WCJ, both parties presented evidence over the course of a number of hearings and the record was eventually closed.  Perhaps sensing what was about to happen, the employer finally issued a medical only notice of compensation payable toward the end of the litigation.  The filing date was more than two years after the date of injury.

The WCJ granted the claim petition, but as is normally the case consistent with the above background, did not award unreasonable contest counsel fees or grant a penalty for failure to file a bureau document within 21 days as required by law.  The WCJ reasoned that the employer “was paying the claimant’s medical bills,” and “it was not until the last hearing in this matter that the claimant produced any medical evidence establishing a specific diagnosis for his work injury other than a puncture wound.”

The claimant appealed the denial of attorney fees and penalties, but the board affirmed the WCJ’s decision.  The board held that the WCJ did not err or abuse his discretion in not awarding a penalty or attorney fees since although the employer paid for the claimant’s medical  expenses, doing so is not an admission of liability.  The board also found that the claimant was seeking a description of injury different than what was listed on the NCP.

Following the board decision, the claimant petitioned for review by the Commonwealth Court.  The court reversed the decisions of the WCJ and the board, finding that the employer presented an unreasonable contest in defending the claim petition because it had, in fact, violated the act by failing to timely issue a bureau document.  The court also noted that the employer denied all allegations in the claim petition, including ones it knew to be true, forcing the claimant to commence needless litigation.  Moreover, the employer did not  present any evidence to contest the claim petition.  Had the employer filed a bureau document timely, the claim petition would have had to be filed.

Similarly, the court found a penalty award to be appropriate, since the employer violated the act when it did not timely issue the medical only NCP as required under Section 406.1(a) of the act, thus forcing the claimant to hire an attorney, produce evidence of the injury of which it had notice, and hire an expert to review the medical records of the employer’s own company doctors who had treated him.  The act was intended to avoid this.

As a practice tip, it is vital that claimants’ attorneys zealously demand the imposition of unreasonable contest counsel fees in almost every case.  Until insurance companies actually begin to risk the forfeiture of entire counsel fee awards during the pendency of a two-year petition, they will continue to have little incentive to voluntarily accept claims that have no defense but are denied anyway for a variety if bogus reasons.  Gabriel demonstrates that a new day may have arrived in this battle.

Christian Petrucci of the Law Offices of Christian Petrucci, concentrates his practice in the areas of workers’ compensation and Social Security disability.  He also counsels injured workers in matters involving employment discrimination and unemployment compensation benefits.

Quinn Emanuel Seeks to Collect $15M in Unpaid Fees

November 18, 2020

A recent Law 360 story by Diamond Naga Siu, “Quinn Emanuel Looks to Collect $15M in Unpaid Fees,” reports that Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP urged a D.C. federal judge to confirm and enforce a $15 million arbitration award for unpaid legal fees after the Indian textile manufacturer it previously represented ignored documents to confirm the amount for more than a year.  CLC Industries Limited — formerly known as Spentex Industries Limited — used the law firm when it initiated a failed cotton investment claim against Uzbekistan in 2013 for bankrupting three cotton processing plants it invested in.

After the case was tossed, CLC Industries allegedly did not pay Quinn Emanuel its legal fees, and the firm initiated arbitration in the United States with the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc., or JAMS, against the textile company to receive payment.  JAMS awarded the fees in 2018, according to Quinn Emanuel's affidavit, ruling that the law firm could collect them as described under a letter of engagement the law firm and company entered ahead of the arbitration against Uzbekistan.

"More than 500 days elapsed since Respondents were served with the Petition," Quinn Emanuel wrote in its filing, referring to how long the firm's petition to confirm the award amount has been ignored.  "Petitioner respectfully requests the entry of a default against Respondents."  "Petitioner served the Petition and accompanying exhibits on Respondents by Federal Express on July 3, 2019, pursuant to Respondents' consent to service of process 'by regular mail or courier' in the Engagement Agreement," the firm added.

Quinn Emanuel said that CLC Industries received and signed for the documents at its New Delhi, India, office within the week the petition was sent.

CLC Industries opened a case in the Delhi High Court in India, asking Judge Jayant Nath to dismiss certain fees in its letter of engagement with Quinn Emanuel.  CLC and the law firm had signed the original agreement in 2013 but amended it in 2015 after they realized the case would be complex and expensive to fight, according to Judge Nath's opinion.

He ruled in favor of the law firm in May, saying that the textile company was responsible for paying Quinn Emanuel's contingency fees, which aren't permitted in India.  The judge ruled that since the letter of engagement was governed by U.S. laws, the fee arrangement was allowed.  "They have chosen to abstain themselves from the arbitration proceedings and the award has already been passed," Judge Nath wrote, referring to the award of legal fees.  "They are free to take appropriate steps as per law against the award."