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Category: Scholarship on Fees

Why Elite Law Firms Should Raise Hourly Rates

March 5, 2018

A recent Law.com article by Hugh A. Simons, “Why Elite Law Should Raise Rates,” reports on hourly rates at elite law firms.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Elite law’s self-confidence has taken a beating. First the great recession hit, and now talk of disruption abounds. But the recession is over and disruption is far from an existential threat. It’s time for elite law to rediscover belief in the value it provides and start to raise rates as it did before the recession. Specifically, elite firms should:

Raise rates across the board.
Discount from the higher rates where necessary.
Increase rates more for partners.
Increase rates more for more distinct practices.
Exit, or leverage up, practices where realized rates (i.e. after discounting) don’t rise.

Raise rates across the board

Billing rate increases have been on a roller coaster, see Figure 1. Before the onset of the great recession, standard rates rose 7 to 8 percent annually with realized (collected) rates rising 5 to 6 percent. When the recession hit, the standard rate increase dropped to between 1 and 2 percent and, as economics would predict, realized rates actually declined. Thereafter, things have steadily improved. The market now trundles along with standard rates rising at 3 percent and realized rates at 2.5 percent, comfortably above inflation at 1.5 percent.

The fact that realized rates have gone from declining to rising at a steady rate indicates that bargaining power has shifted back from clients to law firms. The question becomes: must the new steady-state rate of increase be lower than it was before the onset of the great recession? If law firms have the bargaining power to raise standard rates an average of 3 percent, and realize a rate increase of 2.5 percent, then do they have the power to raise rates at, say, 7 percent and realize a 5 percent increase?

Three conditions must be met for increasing rates to work for law firms. The first is that growth in the value clients derive from a firm’s offerings should exceed the increase in rates. On this, the value a client derives is formally equal to the change in the risk-weighted expected value of the outcome of a client’s business venture, or legal-proceeding, that results from the law firm’s services. As the business world grows more uncertain, complex, and volatile, then services which mitigate these new risks create greater value for clients. Mitigating these emerging risks is what the leading-edge offerings of elite law firms do. Hence, these firms are at liberty to raise rates.

The second condition required for raising rates to be effective relates to competition. If Firm A raises rates and Firm B offers the same service at the pre-increase rate then, in theory, clients turn to Firm B. However, in the elite law world, firms’ offerings are not that fungible—in the highly-specialized segments where elite firms play, there simply aren’t that many viable “Firm B” providers. Even where there are other technically-capable firms, different firms offer different levels of reassurance because of clients’ varying history and comfort with the idiosyncratic perspectives of individual lawyers. A related observation is that firms tend to raise rates at comparable rates. Thus, even where there is a viable Firm B, there may be little cost saving incentive for the client to switch firms.

The third condition is evidenced by the historical data: rate increases only stick when the economy is humming along. While there is always much uncertainty about the economy, and by historical standards we are overdue a recession, today’s economic fundamentals look fairly robust. Firms should be assertive in benefitting from today’s strong economic tailwinds, emboldened by the knowledge that they’ll be buffeted by the headwinds when the economy turns.

The reason elite law firms have not been increasing rates assertively may have more to do with the emotional than with the rational. Elite law firms’ belief in the value of the services they provide took a battering through the great recession, and gets beaten down daily by dire warnings of the industry’s imminent disruption. But the recession has ended and disruption is not an existential threat to elite law firms. Nor is it an existential threat to the differentiated service lines within the portfolio of services offered by the broader group of preeminent firms. Yes, it’ll hurt the commodity-only firms and commodity service lines within other firms, and it will require changes in how all firms operate, but it won’t destroy the core of the elite law firm profit engine: big bucks for bespoke mitigation of major risks.

Discount from the higher rates where necessary

When I suggest raising rates assertively some partners respond that their clients won’t pay any increase. True, some clients won’t. But many will and many more will bear part of the increase. Thus, it’s normal for an increase in standard rates to be accompanied by more discounting and hence a decline in realization (i.e. the ratio of realized, or collected, rates to standard, or rate card, rates). This is not of itself a problem as it’s realized rates that drive a firm’s economics. The important point is that, other than in the aftermath of a recession’s onset, the effect of an increase in standard rates is a significant, albeit lower, increase in realized rates. For example, standard rates rose by 33 percent from 2007 to 2017 and, although realization declined from 89 to 82 percent, realized rates still rose by a healthy 22 percent.

It’s instructive to take a closer look at the above realization decline. As shown in Figure 2, by far the biggest component of this decline was in the ratio of worked (i.e. negotiated or agreed) rates to standard rates—5 points of the 7-percentage point fall. This reflects growth of the volume of work being executed not at standard rates but at client or matter-specific discounted rates.

The dynamics of discounts are a competition between two irrationalities. On the one hand, clients have an irrational liking for discounts. They make clients feel they’re getting a bargain and they’re easy for the legal department to explain to management. The irrationality, of course, is that the focus should be on the discounted rate not on the distance between it and some putative standard rate.

On the other hand, firms have an irrational dislike for discounting. Too many firms still think of realization rate as a measure of profitability. It can be absurdly hard to get lawyers to internalize that, in order to assess profitability accurately, you have to look at the combined effect of leverage and realization using measures such as margin per partner hour.  Indeed, higher-leverage and higher-discount work is often more profitable than lower-leverage and zero-discount work. But partners have been conditioned to think of discounts as a demerit, and partners hate demerits. This unhelpful conditioning gets reinforced by finance departments reporting on hours and realization but not on leverage or margin per partner hour.

The look at realization in Figure 2 also shows that two percentage points of decline are due to increased billing write offs. These write offs reflect quality-of-work issues and budget overruns. As quality issues are probably fairly constant, it’s reasonable to attribute this increase to more budget overruns, in turn a reflection of more work being done under fixed, capped, or other alternative fee arrangements (AFAs). But here again, lower realization doesn’t mean lower profitability—increased leverage can more than offset the realization decline. Indeed, over 70 percent of firms say AFAs are as profitable, or more profitable, than work billed at hourly rates, (data source: Altman Weil’s 2017 Law Firms in Transition report).

Increase rates more for partners

Partners are often reticent to raise their own billing rates assertively. This is a problem of itself but also has severe second-order consequences. First, it effectively sets a cap on the billing rates of counsel and senior associates as there has to be headroom between their rates and those of partners. This becomes a constraint not just on revenue but on profitability. While typical businesses have their highest markup on their highest-value offerings, this billing rate cap leads many law firms to have a lower markup (i.e. the number of times a lawyer’s billing rate exceeds their comp on a cost-per-hour basis) on senior associates and counsel than they realize on their relatively low-value junior associates. By compressing markups in this way, firms are leaving money on the table. There’s consistent market feedback that indirectly corroborates this perspective: clients object most to the billing rates of junior lawyers.

Holding back on partner billing rates also makes it harder to raise leverage. Part of the reason some partners push back on raising their own rates is they feel some of the work they do is not truly partner level and hence shouldn’t be billed at full partner-level rates. This underlying failure to delegate is a disservice to clients (by not letting the work flow to the lowest-priced lawyer capable of doing it), to associates (who are left bereft of experience), and to other partners (who contribute disproportionately to a firm’s profit pool by leveraging more). Hence, part of the logic for raising partner rates is to realize the benefits of improved leverage.

Increase rates more for more distinct practices

If you offer customers something they need that you alone can provide then you can set the price close to the value they derive from your service. If, on the other hand, you offer customers something that many others offer, then you are constrained to pricing it at the level set by others. In reality, a law firm’s various offerings fall at different points along a spectrum between these theoretical extremes. This simple observation has a pricing implication that many law firms effectively ignore: billing rates, and hence billing rate increases, should vary markedly across the range of a firm’s offerings. In particular, the billing rates for a firm’s offerings that are most distinct from those competitors can provide should be priced more aggressively than those for its less-distinct offerings.

The low billing rate growth we’ve seen of late may well be a manifestation of firms adhering to a philosophy of a single firm-wide billing rate increase and having this increase be set by the rate that is appropriate for the less-distinct offerings. The reality is that market dynamics have evolved in recent years to the point that a firm’s pricing power varies sharply across its practices; adhering to a single increase set by the less-distinct offerings is now leaving serious money on the table. If internal firm harmony requires a single rate increase, then better to raise standard rates strongly across the board and discount from these as necessary for the less-distinct offerings.

Exit, or leverage up, practices where realized rates don’t rise

There is an old adage in strategy consulting: 80 percent of strategy is deciding what not to do. The ‘what not to do’ for elite law firms is offer commodity services. How does one recognize commodity services? By definition, commodity services are offerings that many other firms can provide. By extension, commodity services are those where a firm effectively cannot set the price but must adhere to the price level set by rivals. This translates to commodity offerings being those where the realized rates (i.e. after discounting) don’t rise following a standard rate increase.

To adhere to a strategy of differentiation, firms should exit practices where realized rates can’t be increased above the rate of inflation. In some circumstances, so doing is more than the fabric of a partnership can bear. Where this is the case, an alternative that may buy some time is to operate the practice at greater leverage than the rest of the firm. So doing mitigates the effect of a commodity practice on per-partner profitability. However, it is really only a holding measure as leverage can’t be increased indefinitely and managing businesses with dramatically different fundamental strategies requires an ambidexterity that few trained business leaders, let alone lawyers, possess.

Action implications

Most people make decisions based on objective facts interpreted through a lens of emotional biases and personal predispositions. Partners are alike most people in that they employ such a lens; partners are unlike most people in that they refuse to recognize they employ such a lens. There is nothing to be gained by leaders trying to get partners to recognize what they’re doing; however, there is value in leaders shaping the lens through which partners interpret the world.

At many firms today, this lens says lawyers are of declining value and the market is stagnating. While this is true perhaps at the middle and lower tiers, this is objectively untrue for elite firms and for the differentiated practices within the broader swath of preeminent firms. This lens issue needs to be addressed first before partners can analyze robustly the case for billing rate increases. Specifically, the lens should be reshaped by restoring and bolstering partners’ confidence in the value of their offerings. To this end, firm leaders should talk to clients (many of them really value you!), share more of the positive client feedback with partners, highlight firm recognition and awards, have clients come and speak at partner meetings, host alumni roundtable discussions of the value of outside counsel, etc. The forthcoming 2017 Am Law results will probably help too: despite the pervasive gloom and doom, the top end of the market is prospering; I suspect we’ll see double-digit percent increases in profitability at most elite firms.

Having reshaped the lens, the next step is to create opportunities for partners to discuss billing rate history, profitability, and future billing rate policy. The key here is to give partners the data and let them chew on it. Don’t lecture them or tell them what to do; rather give them the parameters and let them figure it out for themselves—so doing is the first step toward adoption of the desired changes.

Partners’ deliberations should perhaps start with a review of the firm’s billing rate history and dynamics, including firm-specific versions of Figures 1 and 2 here, supplemented with the same views for individual offices, practices and key clients. It would also be useful to profile how partner rates set a cap on rates for counsel and senior associates, leading to markup compression and, perversely, a firm having the lowest markups on the time of its highest value lawyers.

Partners should then discuss some of the less-obvious dynamics around billing rates. These could include, for example: the connection between leverage and partner billing rates (particularly how low partner rates suppress leverage); the pervasive observation that leverage varies more with individual partners than with practice or client type; and, in cultural contexts where it would help, partners could debate the relationship between compensation and billing rate—the two tend to correlate at professional services firms although it’s sort of misleading as it’s not a causal relationship; rather both are separately reflective of the economic value of a partner’s practice, so proceed with caution.

The final element is for partners to discuss the process by which billing rates are set. While most partners prefer control of their own rates, many recognize that having an abstract committee set the rate allows them some plausible deniability in conversations with clients.

All this is to say it’s a new billing rate world out there. Law firm leaders would do well to buy the option of increasing billing rates assertively at year end by starting to prepare partners for such increases now.

Hugh A. Simons, Ph.D., is a former senior partner and executive committee member at The Boston Consulting Group and the former chief operating officer at Ropes & Gray.

Know the Statutory Limits on Attorney Fees

October 5, 2017

A recent CEB blog article, “Know the Limits on Attorney Fees” by Julie Brook explores the statutory limits on attorney fees in California and federal statutes.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Attorneys can’t always get what they want in attorney fees.  There are statutory limitations, fees subject to court approval, and fee agreements that violate public policy.

Statutory Limitations on Fees. In many instances the ability to negotiate attorney fees is prohibited or limited by statute.  For example:

  • Probate proceedings. Attorney fees in a probate proceeding are strictly statutory and don’t arise from contract.  See Prob C §§10800, 10810, 13660.  An attorney can’t charge more than the statutorily-permitted amount, but may agree to charge or receive less than that amount.
  • Indigent defendants. Attorney fees for counsel assigned to represent indigent criminal defendants are set by the trial court (Pen C §987.2) or by the court of appeals in appellate matters (Pen C §1241).
  • Judicial foreclosures. Attorney fees in judicial foreclosure matters are set by the trial court, regardless of any contrary provision in the mortgage or deed of trust. CCP §730.
  • Workers’ compensation. Attorney fees for representation in Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board matters are set by the Appeals Board (Lab C §5801) and by a court or Appeals Board in third-party matters (Lab C §3860(f)).  But fee agreements for a reasonable amount will be enforced if the amount agreed on coincides with the Appeals Board’s determination of a reasonable fee. Lab C §4906.
  • Contingent fees under federal law. An attorney-client agreement with a plaintiff under the Federal Tort Claims Act calling for a contingent fee in excess of 20 percent of any compromise, award, or settlement, or more than 25 percent of any judgment is not only void, but is an offense punishable by a fine of $2000, or 1 year in jail. 28 USC §2678. See also 42 USC §406 (maximum fee for representing plaintiff in Social Security Administration proceedings is 25 percent of past due benefits; attempt to collect fee in excess of maximum is misdemeanor).
  • Contingent fees in medical malpractice cases. Maximum fee limits have been set under Bus & P C §6146.

This is just a sampling—many statutes limit attorney fees.  When you take on a matter in an unfamiliar area of law, investigate possible limitations on the ability to negotiate fees.

Fees Subject to Court Approval. Court approval of fee agreements is required in some instances. For example:

  • fees for the compromise of the claim of a minor or a person with a disability (Prob C §3601(a));
  • fees for representing a special administrator (Prob C §8547); and
  • fee agreement in workers’ compensation third-party actions (Lab C §3860(f)).

Agreements Violating Public Policy or Ethical Standards. Attorney-client fee agreements that are contrary to public policy, even if not explicitly in violation of an ethical canon or rule, won’t be enforced.  Similarly, fee agreements that violate California Rules of Professional Conduct aren’t enforceable.  The Rules include prohibitions against charging an unconscionable fee (Cal Rules of Prof Cond 4–200), agreeing to share fees between an attorney and a nonattorney (Cal Rules of Prof Cond 1–320), and nonrefundable retainer fees that fail to meet the classification of a “true retainer fee which is paid solely for the purpose of ensuring the availability of the [Bar] member for the matter” (Cal Rules of Prof Cond 3–700(D)(2)).

Class Action Fee Awards Shaped by Circuits and Benchmarks

September 12, 2017

A recent NLJ article by Amanda Bronstad, “Class Action Fees Shaped by Circuit, Benchmark,” reports on attorney fee awards in class action litigation.  The article reads:

When it comes to attorney fees in class actions, it pays to be in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit — and it's tough to get what you want in the Second and Ninth circuits.  That's according to two leading academic research reports that federal judges increasingly cite in determining how much in fees to award plaintiffs attorneys who work on contingency.

New York University School of Law professor Geoffrey Miller and the late Theodore Eisenberg, a professor at Cornell Law School, authored one of the studies.  The second is a 2010 study conducted by Brian Fitzpatrick, a professor at Vanderbilt University Law School.

Both reports found that federal judges tend to determine a percentage of the settlement amount, then crosscheck it against the hours that plaintiffs attorneys spent multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate — called the lodestar.  They also found that as the size of the settlement goes up, the percentage of fees that judges award to plaintiffs attorneys goes down.  That's particularly true when it comes to the largest class action settlements.

But a lot depends on what circuit of the U.S. court of appeals the case ends up.  Here are some key points from the studies:

Fee awards aren't evenly spread out: The vast majority of class action fee awards come in the Second, Ninth, First and Seventh circuits, Fitzpatrick said.  He attributed much of that to the larger cities in those circuits — Boston, New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Los Angeles.  "The lawyers are there, the defendants are often there, and I think judges with a lot of experience are often there, so that attracts these cases," he said.

Benchmarks might matter: The Ninth Circuit is one of the few circuits with a benchmark that judges cite in determining fees — 25 percent based on its 2011 holding in In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation.  Fitzpatrick said "that really limits the number of times a court would award more than 25 percent.  It's working as a ceiling in the Ninth Circuit." Miller said having a benchmark didn't seem to matter when it comes to lower fee awards — his report found the Ninth Circuit stuck to 25 percent for the most part.

The Second Circuit has experience: The Second Circuit handled nearly a third of all the cases, according to the Eisenberg/Miller report.  Many are securities class actions.  The circuit doesn't have a benchmark, but it did set forth six factors for judges to consider in a 2000 ruling called Goldberger v. Integrated Resources.  It's the circuit in which a judge is most likely to reject the original fee request made by lawyers.  "It's a hard road to convince a district judge in the Second Circuit that your fee request ought to be accepted without question," Miller said.

One of the most generous circuits is the Seventh: That's due in large part to a 2001 decision in In re Synthroid Marketing Litigation, in which the Seventh Circuit downplayed the significance of using the percentage of the settlement fund by directing judges to look at market rates when assessing the lodestar component of an attorney fee request.  "They have said clearly you should not lower the percentage over the entire amount of the settlement," Fitzpatrick said.  "You should do it on a marginal basis.  I see more district courts doing it in the Seventh Circuit than anywhere else because of those admonitions."

National Law Journal Cites NALFA Program

September 11, 2017

A recent NLJ article by Amanda Bronstad, “Judges Look to Profs in Awarding Lower Percentage Fees in Biggest Class Actions,” quotes NALFA’s CLE program, “View From the Bench: Awarding Attorney Fees in Federal Litigation” in an article on class action fee awards.  The full article reads:

After reaching a $101 million class action settlement to resolve lawsuits brought over a chemical spill that contaminated a West Virginia river, the plaintiffs lawyers asked a federal judge to grant them 30 percent of the fund as contingency fees.

The judge praised their work but found that fee request to be just too high.  "Even without accounting for fund size, the empirical literature clearly demonstrates that a 30 percent fee is higher than that awarded in the vast majority of class actions," U.S. District Judge John Copenhaver of the Southern District of West Virginia wrote in a July order.  "Courts have found through empirical analysis that larger common funds typically have smaller percentage fees."

The empirical analysis Copenhaver referred to came from the findings of two leading academic reports — both cited in the opinion — that federal judges across the country have used for the past decade to guide them in decisions about attorney fees in some of the nation's largest class action settlements.

New York University School of Law professor Geoffrey Miller and the late Theodore Eisenberg, a professor at Cornell Law School, wrote one of the studies, an updated version of which is set to be published this year.  The second is a 2010 study conducted by Brian Fitzpatrick, a professor at Vanderbilt University Law School.

Both studies have provided critical assistance for federal judges, particularly when it comes to class action settlements of $100 million or more.  The concern for those on the bench is how to award plaintiffs lawyers for their work without granting them excessive fees and leaving class members in the lurch.

"Judges do take the role seriously," said William Rubenstein, a professor at Harvard Law School whose highly regarded "Newberg on Class Actions" has cited the Eisenberg/Miller and Fitzpatrick studies in his 11-volume treatise, alongside data he has used from a former publication called Class Action Attorney Fee Digest.  "And they understand they're a bulwark against excessive fees from the class members' money."

How to determine the exact amount has often been more art than science.  In a webinar earlier this year hosted by the National Association of Legal Fee Analysis, U.S. District Judge David Herndon of the Southern District of Illinois, who has handled several of the nation's largest mass torts and class actions, said a lot depends on the amount of recovery to the class.

"It just depends … on the case and what the benefit is that the lawyers have achieved by their work," he said at the webinar, called "View from the Bench: Awarding Attorney Fees in Federal Litigation."  "If it's reasonable, then you can approve the contingency, but if it's pretty far out of whack maybe you've got to have the lawyers justify the difference or perhaps go with the lodestar.  There are a lot of things to look at."

And there are outside concerns as well.  Judges have increasing scrutiny from appeals courts, which often take up the petitions of objectors to class action settlements, Rubenstein said.  "Public policy generally cautions against awarding too high a fee," Copenhaver wrote in the West Virginia water case.  "The court's challenge is to award a fee that both compensates the attorneys with a risk premium on their skill and labor and avoids a windfall."

Last month, plaintiffs lawyers in the case submitted a renewed motion for settlement approval that lowered their fee request to 25 percent — more in line with what Copenhaver had found was reasonable.

Judges often look to previous case decisions, or their own experience, to determine what amount is appropriate to award lawyers in class actions.  They also get a list of cases from the lawyers — but those often come with vested interests.  For a long time, there was limited statistical data on what other judges had done.  That's where Fitzpatrick said he and the Eisenberg-Miller team tried to give judges a starting point.

"We tried to give the judges the full data instead of just leaving them at the whim of the cherry-picked cases the lawyers give them," he said.  "The judges don't have to replicate what other courts have done, but they have the opportunity to stick within the mainstream of what their colleagues have done if they want it now that they have the power of empirical studies."

Miller said he came up with the idea while serving as an expert witness in cases.  When his first report with Eisenberg published in 2004, one year before the U.S. Class Action Fairness Act passed, the political atmosphere was rife with criticism about attorney fees in class actions.  At the time, only one group had looked at the data — but it wasn't really a controlled study.

"On the issue of fees, the data was there but hadn't been developed," he said.  Eisenberg wasn't an expert on class actions, Miller said, "but he was the leading person probably in the world who was doing empirical studies of legal material."  Their report looked at published data of class action settlements from 1993 to 2002.

By the time of their second report in 2009, which expanded the data through 2008, Miller and Eisenberg had some competition.  Fitzpatrick thought that their report, like those before it, relied too much on "ad hoc" data that focused primarily on bigger, published decisions.  "I really endeavored to find every last one to have the complete and representative picture," he said.

He came up with a wider range of class action settlements within a shorter period of time — just 2006 and 2007.  Combined, both reports have been cited by judges more than 100 times, Miller said.  And they often involve the biggest settlements in dollar amount, he said.  "The issue is that there aren't as many cases," he said.  "There's less data. And that puts an additional premium on getting what data there is, so that's one reason judges look to this research in big cases."

Another came in 2012, he said, when U.S. District Judge Lee Rosenthal of the Southern District of Texas, the former chairwoman of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, endorsed both studies in a case called In re Heartland Payment Systems Customer Data Security Breach Litigation: "District courts increasingly consider empirical studies analyzing class-action-settlement fee awards to set the appropriate percentage benchmark or to test the reasonableness of a given benchmark," she wrote.  "Using these studies alleviates the concern that the number selected is arbitrary."

Economies of Scale

Both studies have come out with slight differences in their specific findings.  But they came to the same conclusions: The vast majority of judges award fees based on a percentage of the total settlement amount — then cross-check that amount against the total number of hours the lawyers billed multiplied by the hourly rate, referred to as the lodestar.  There's a good reason for that trend.

"It's economies of scale," Miller said.  "Judges understand that to get a $1 billion settlement is not 1,000 times harder for an attorney to get a $1 million settlement.  It's a lot harder, but not 1,000 times harder."

Herndon, in the webinar, said that's just common sense.

"If they got a third of $1 billion, and compared to their lodestar, it would be an astronomical per hour figure," he said.  "There's some common sense in doing something like that, and I don't really have a particular feeling one way or the other, but I think there's certainly authority in the law for doing it."

In fact, many judges who cite the Eisenberg-Miller and Fitzpatrick reports look specifically to the data as it pertains to the size of the settlement in front of them and what the case is about.

But Fitzpatrick questioned whether judges were doing the right thing in lowering the percentages as the settlements get bigger.  "I think the judges are responding to perception when they do that and they're not responding to good economic policy analysis," he said.  "Because why would we want to punish lawyers with lower percentages for getting their clients more money?"

Not all judges agree with the conclusions made by the professors, who sometimes go up against each other as paid experts in individual cases.  In a $415 million settlement of "no poach" claims involving high-tech workers, U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh of the Northern District of California weighed Fitzpatrick's report against the Eisenberg/Miller study in awarding $40 million in fees.  In that case, Fitzpatrick was a paid expert for the lead plaintiffs attorneys, while Rubenstein cited the Eisenberg-Miller report in a declaration filed on behalf of one of the lead firms that had submitted a separate fee request.

"The court finds the Eisenberg & Miller study more persuasive than the Fitzpatrick study," Koh wrote in a 2015 order, concluding that the "length and large sample size of the Eisenberg & Miller study suggest that its results are entitled to greater weight."

Fitzpatrick said he's working on an updated report, likely to be drafted next year.  "Whenever I hear from these judges, they say the same thing: We love your study but we need more recent data," Fitzpatrick said.  "So that's what I'm trying to give them."  But gathering the data takes a lot of time and money, he said.  He's hired research assistants to code all the data.

The latest Eisenberg-Miller report, co-authored with research scholar Roy Germano at NYU's law school, uses data through 2013.  Without Eisenberg, who died in 2014, Miller said he's not certain he'll keep publishing the report.  "I don't think I'll do it anymore," he said. "It is a lot of work."

How to Determine When Litigation Costs Include Attorney Fees

September 7, 2017

A recent Texas Lawyer article by Trey Cox and Jason Dennis, “How to Determine When Litigation Costs Include Attorney Fees,” covers attorney fee recovery in Texas.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Under the American Rule, a party may only recover attorney fees on certain narrow claims.  When a party has some claims that support the award of attorney fees and some claims that do not, then the party must segregate the recoverable attorney fees from the nonrecoverable attorney fees, as in Tony Gullo Motors I v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Tex. 2006).  The need to segregate fees is a question of law, and the courts of appeals apply a de novo standard of review.

Similarly, when a plaintiff has multiple related claims against multiple defendants, the plaintiff is required to segregate the fees owed by one defendant from any fees incurred while prosecuting the claim against any settling defendants, according to Stewart Title Guaranty v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Tex. 1991).

Generally, where a party has failed to properly segregate their claims, and an award of attorney fees has been erroneously awarded, the case requires remand in order to determine what attorney fees are recoverable.  However, it is important to note that the subsequent decision in Green International v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. 1997), did state that a failure to segregate fees "can result in the recovery of zero attorneys' fees."  The court did not explain the circumstances under which an award of zero attorney fees would result from a failure to segregate.  The evidence of unsegregated fees requiring a remand on the issue of attorney fees is more than a scintilla of evidence.

The party seeking fees may only present evidence relating to services that were necessarily rendered in connection with the claims for which attorney fees are recoverable, as in Flint & Associates v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, 739 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987).  If a party tries to present evidence relating to services that were rendered in connection with claims that attorney fees are not recoverable, a party must object.  Failure to object to nonrecoverable attorney fees constitutes waiver (see Green International, at 389).  The issue of failing to segregate is generally preserved "by objecting during testimony offered in support of attorneys' fees or an objection to the jury question on attorneys' fees," as in McCalla v. Ski River Development, 239 S.W.3d 374, 383 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007).

Inexorably Intertwined Damages

In Texas, an exception to segregating evidence of attorney fees developed over the years.  Where the attorney fees rendered were in connection with claims arising out of the same transaction, and were so interrelated that their "prosecution or defense entails proof or denial of essentially the same facts," it was held that the segregation requirement could be avoided (see Stewart Title at 11).  The initial exception was phrased such that if an attorney could claim that the "causes of action in the suit are dependent on the same set of facts or circumstances, and thus are 'intertwined to the point of being inseparable,' the parties suing for attorney fees may recover the entire amount covering all claims."

After the holding in Stewart, which first acknowledged an exception to the requirement of segregating fees for claims that are intertwined, the courts of appeals were flooded with claims that recoverable and unrecoverable attorney fees are so intertwined that they could not be segregated. (See, e.g., Tony Gullo at 312.)  For many years after the recognition of the exception to segregation, parties tried to escape the segregation requirement by generically claiming that they could not segregate the claims.  They relied on the recognized exception to the duty to segregate when the attorney fees rendered were in connection with claims arising out of the same transaction and were so interrelated that their prosecution or defense entailed "proof or denial of essentially the same facts."

The Texas Supreme Court has now reined in this exception, providing that if attorney fees relate solely to a claim for which such fees are not recoverable, a claimant must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable fees, but when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined, they need not be segregated.

For example, the court explained that certain legal services such as: "requests for standard disclosures, proof of background facts, depositions of the primary actors, discovery motions and hearings, [and] voir dire of the jury" wouldn't be barred from recovering attorney fees just because they served multiple purposes.  However, the court was careful to point out that the mere presence of intertwined facts will not make tort fees recoverable. The new exception to the necessity of segregating fees is that "only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim" then they can be considered as being so intertwined as to not need segregation.  The segregation requirement can be met by offering expert opinion as to how much time was spent in relation to the recoverable claims versus the unrecoverable claims.

Defending Against Segregation

Whether supporting or attacking an award of attorney fees, the expert must deal specifically with segregation of fees.  The party must segregate fees incurred in connection with nonrecoverable claims, claims against other parties, or other lawsuits.

Trey Cox is a partner at Lynn Pinker Cox & Hurst.  He has spent nearly 20 years helping clients, from Fortune 500 corporations to entrepreneurs, resolve large, complicated and often high-profile business disputes.  Jason Dennis is a partner at the firm.  He has trial and appellate experience representing a diverse group of clients from Fortune 500 companies, to bankruptcy trustees, to individuals both as plaintiffs and defendants.