A recent Law.com story by Amanda Bronstad, “Roundup MDL Lead Counsel Defend Fee Allocations: ‘Limited Funds Available’”, reports that lawyers doling out fees in Roundup litigation stood by their decisions on how to allocate the funds, despite objections raised by other firms.

The fee committee, which is comprised of the three lead plaintiffs firms in the Roundup multidistrict litigation, allocated 81% to themselves and the rest to four other firms, including those who helped win the only bellwether trial, which ended in an $80 million verdict in 2019.  Three of those firms objected to their share of the so-called common benefit fund, which totaled $20.23 million.

Lead counsel originally had sought an order that would have granted about $800 million in common benefit fees, enough for the firms to “each afford to buy their own island,” U.S. District Judge Vince Chhabria wrote in a 2021 order significantly trimming the scope of common benefit fees in the Roundup litigation.

Several firms had objected to the original request, which they called a “money grab,” but lead counsel insisted that Bayer, which owns Monsanto, would not have entered into settlements but for their work.  In 2020, Bayer announced it planned to settle about 125,000 Roundup claims for an estimated $10.9 billion, but thousands of cases remained unsettled.

The significant reduction in the common benefit fund appeared to influence the committee’s allocation amounts.  For instance, San Francisco’s Andrus Anderson, whose partner Lori Andrus served as co-liaison counsel in the Roundup multidistrict litigation, had wanted closer to $550,000, the amount the firm actually billed, rather than the allocated $200,000, or 1% of the common benefit fees.  The committee, in a response, acknowledged that Andrus Anderson’s request was reasonable.  “But, unfortunately, the limited funds available for distribution in this litigation do not allow this to happen,” the committee wrote.

The committee members are co-lead counsel Aimee Wagstaff, of Wagstaff Law Firm in Denver; Robin Greenwald, of New York’s Weitz & Luxenberg; and David Dickens, who took over following partner Michael Miller’s 2021 death, at the Miller Firm in Orange, Virginia.  Among the fee committee members, Wagstaff Law Firm is set to receive the most, with 30%.

‘Thousands of Hours of Common Benefit Work’

Common benefit fees are used in multidistrict litigation to compensate lead counsel for costs and fees associated with discovery, trials and settlements, while preventing “free riders,” or lawyers who collect fees on cases they generate but don’t necessarily litigate.  Lawyers with related state court cases, in past years, have challenged common benefit fees, which are funded through assessments against their settlements.

Chhabria, in the Northern District of California, called common benefit fees in multidistrict litigation “totally out of control,” sending shock waves through the mass tort bar.  In his Roundup order, he excluded a large amount of the legal work, including state court cases, from being reimbursed through common benefit fees.

Los Angeles-based Wisner Baum and its predecessor, Baum Hedlund Aristei & Goldman, focused heavily on Roundup cases in California state courts, where partner R. Brent Wisner won verdicts of $289 million, in 2018, and $2 billion, in 2019.  But the firm is set to receive 10% of the fees because “no other firm contributed more to the common benefit of the MDL,” according to the committee’s response, filed on Friday.

The allocation, the committee wrote, is based on Wisner Baum’s “good faith effort” to estimate its time.  But the firm didn’t have adequate billing records that divided up the hours tied to the multidistrict litigation versus state court cases.  The fee committee, as a result, was forced to reduce Wisner Baum’s requested amount.  “Applying such a reduction is consistent with how courts typically handle attorney fee determinations for firms that have failed to submit time records,” the committee wrote.

Jennifer Moore, of Moore Law Group, based in Louisville, Kentucky, was co-lead counsel with Wagstaff in the bellwether trial, which Monsanto appealed all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Moore had argued that 6% was not enough given her work in that case or the $3.4 million her firm contributed to the common benefit fund, but the fee committee countered that the Miller Firm and Weitz & Luxenberg, both lead counsel firms, also anticipate receiving less than they paid.

“Moore Law contributed to the advancement of this MDL.  There is no question about that,” the committee wrote.  “But Moore Law also greatly benefitted from the thousands of hours of common benefit work that was done before it had any involvement in this MDL.”

Another objection came from David Diamond, of Diamond Law in Tucson, Arizona, who insisted he did not rely on lead counsel’s work in his Roundup cases.  He was joined by David Bricker, of Thornton Law Firm in Beverly Hills, California.  Diamond suggested returning the money to lawyers, like them, who took their own risks.

But the committee disputed his characterization.  “Diamond Law was able to resolve 300 MDL cases without having to draft and issue general discovery, brief and argue preemption and other general dispositive motions, depose a single Monsanto employee, or retain general experts in epidemiology, toxicology, pathology, and regulatory affairs,” the committee wrote.  “With this backdrop, it is difficult to comprehend how Diamond Law can boldly declare that it received no assistance from MDL leadership.”

A recent Law.com story by Aleeza Furman, “Judge Greenlights $28.4M in Contingency Fees to Firms Representing Pa. Opioid Plaintiffs”, reports that lawyers for Pennsylvania plaintiffs who signed onto a major 2022 opioid settlement are set to receive a cumulative $28.4 million in contingency fees from the deal.  Judge Barry Dozor of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, who oversees Pennsylvania’s coordinated opioid litigation, approved the fee awards Dec. 14.  The fees are slated to be paid out of the Pennsylvania Opioid Fee Fund—a chunk of money allotted for lawyers from Pennsylvania’s $1.07 billion share of the $26 billion global settlement between state and local governments and Johnson & Johnson, Cardinal Health, McKesson and AmerisourceBergen.

Dozor’s Dec. 14 order greenlit recommendations from retired Judge Joel Schneider, a special master charged with overseeing the allocation of the Pennsylvania Opioid Fee Fund.  Schneider divided $28.4 million in contingency fees among 11 law firms to be paid in annual increments over the course of five years.  The awards range from around $4,000 (to Philadelphia-area Levy Baldante Finney & Rubenstein) to $10.7 million (to Pensacola, Florida-based Levin Papantonio Rafferty).

The 11 firms Schneider listed are designated payees, which will go on to distribute portions of their respective awards among the host of other plaintiffs firms with clients involved in the settlement, according to one attorney involved in the litigation.

Saltz Mongeluzzi Bendesky partner Patrick Howard, who represents plaintiff Delaware County,  said Dozor’s order marks the first of two determinations regarding fees from the opioid fee fund.

Howard said the fund includes one portion for contingency fees—what Dozor just approved—and one portion for common benefit fees to be determined in 2024.  Howard said the second portion of fees would be awarded to a smaller group of lawyers who were actively involved in the litigation.  Dozor also already approved a $16.65 million payout from the fund in December 2022 reimbursing costs and expenses firms incurred in the litigation.

According to Howard, the fee determinations are part of a broader winding down of Pennsylvania’s long-running opioid litigation.  He said attorneys are currently hammering out the allocation details of a second wave of multibillion-dollar settlements with pharmacies and other drug companies, and most parties’ claims are resolved.  “As far as litigating against defendants,” Howard said, “I would say 95% of the commonwealth’s litigation is over.”

A recent Law 360 article by Hilary Gerzhoy and Julienne Pasichow, “Avoiding The Ethical Pitfalls of Crowdfunded Legal Fees”, reports on the ethics of crowdfunding for legal fees.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Within two days of being charged with manslaughter in the death of Jordan Neely, Daniel Penny had crowdfunded over $1.5 million to cover his legal fees.  Penny was charged with killing Neely, a Michael Jackson impersonator, on a New York City subway after placing him a fatal chokehold.  The case was widely covered and highly politicized.

Democrats, including Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, D-N.Y., and New York Gov. Kathy Hochul, called for charges against Penny and justice for Neely's family.  Republicans, including Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, R-Ga., and Rep. Matt Gaetz, R-Fla., voiced their support for Penny.

Crowdfunding legal services is a relatively new phenomenon.  It's most often used to fund litigation involving individuals — as opposed to corporate entities — that implicates human rights issues, the environment and judicial review.

In one widely publicized case, two Yemeni refugees with valid immigrant visas were intercepted at Dulles International Airport, handcuffed and sent out of the country — the result of former President Donald Trump's temporary seven-country travel ban, which had been signed just a few hours earlier while the brothers were en route.  The crowdfunding campaign raised $36,600 in its first week.

While crowdfunding legal services provides a way for many to access lawyers when representation would otherwise be unaffordable, it also comes with a bevy of ethics risks.  This article will examine the key ethical rules governing crowd-sourced legal funds and the steps lawyers can take to mitigate their risk.

The Daniel Penny Case

In May, the Manhattan District Attorney's office charged Penny, a 24-year-old U.S. Marines veteran, with second-degree manslaughter after he killed Neely on a New York City subway earlier that month.  For more than three minutes, Penny placed Neely in a fatal chokehold leading to his death.  Penny claimed self-defense, stating that Neely was threatening passengers on the train.  It was later learned that Neely had been suffering from a mental health crisis and was experiencing homelessness at the time he was killed.  Penny was released on $100,000 bond.  On June 28, he appeared in court in Manhattan to plead not guilty.

The law firm representing Penny — Raiser & Kenniff PC — arranged for a fundraiser on the Christian crowdfunding site GiveSendGo to cover Penny's legal fees.  As of Sept. 29, the fundraiser has collected nearly $3 million.  How can Penny's legal team use those crowd-sourced funds? What restrictions are imposed by the ethics rules?

This article will examine the critical steps to ensure compliance with the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which are largely adopted in most jurisdictions.

Confidentiality Runs to the Client, Not the Funders

Perhaps the most fundamental feature of the lawyer-client relationship is the protection of client confidences.  Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 prohibits a lawyer from revealing "information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted [under certain enumerated circumstances]."

A lawyer must make reasonable efforts to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized access to the information, a standard that is highly fact-dependent and considers the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which additional safeguards would enhance security versus hinder the representation.  Lawyers who organize fundraisers, manage crowdfunded donations and apply them toward legal fees must ensure that they neither represent nor imply that they will provide information about the representation to donors in exchange for donations.

It is best to obtain informed consent for any information that will be disclosed to donors and to steer clear of "providing specific information about how the funds will be used to effectuate the legal strategy," as articulated by the D.C. Bar in a 2018 ethics opinion.  To avoid any ambiguity, lawyers should note in the narrative section of the fundraiser that they will not provide any information about the objectives of the representation, actions taken, specific uses of the funds or developments in the case.

When donors fund a lawyer's representation of a client through crowd-sourcing, they must do so with the understanding that they will receive no information about the representation.  We recommend including the proposed narrative language for the fundraiser in the engagement letter signed by the client, which should also describe the fundraising arrangement and the fact that the collected funds will be applied to legal fees and expenses as they are earned or incurred.

There may be instances in which a client wants a lawyer to provide case updates to donors or specific individuals.  To do so, the lawyer must obtain informed consent from the client.  This requires that the lawyer explain the risks of disclosure to the client and have the client approve of the exact information to be disclosed.

Most importantly, the client must understand that disclosing privileged and confidential information about the representation to third parties will destroy the attorney-client privilege and prevent the lawyer from later claiming privilege over the disclosed information.  The same warning should also be given to a client who is managing the fundraiser themselves and wishes to disclose case information or updates to donors.

Crowd-sourced Funds Cannot Interfere with a Lawyer's Professional Independence

Before accepting crowd-sourced funds as payment for legal services, a lawyer must obtain informed consent from the client.  This is true regardless of whether the lawyer is self-administering the funds as they are earned or whether the client is paying the lawyer's invoices using crowd-sourced funds.  Lawyers should consider including relevant language providing for this arrangement in their engagement letter with the client.  Under the Model Rules, even if such an arrangement is in place, a lawyer may not, under any circumstances, allow the person or persons paying the lawyer's fees to "direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services."

While donors' generosity often enables a client to pursue legal claims or defenses where it would otherwise be financially impossible, donors cannot control how the fundraised money is used within the representation.  Only the client determines the objectives of the representation and whether to follow the lawyer's recommended strategy.

Ensuring that the narrative statement on the fundraising website contains language informing donors that they will not be permitted to exert control or influence over the objectives of the representation or the methods by which they are carried out — in addition to not being entitled to case information — may prove helpful in warding off donors who believe that their dollars earn them a say in the representation.  There may be situations in which the donors' interests differ from those of the client — for example, where donors may wish to minimize the amount spent on the representation to get more for less or avoid taking steps in the representation that may be costly.

In circumstances where the lawyer is aware of divergent interests between the donors and the client, the lawyer cannot accept the representation or continue the crowdfunded payment arrangement unless the lawyer is certain that they can exercise independent judgment and will not allow the donors to interfere with their professional decision making.

Be Circumspect About Trial Publicity

Crowdfunded cases are often those that are highly publicized, political and involve public figures. They tend to come with an increased public desire for publicity and insider information.  Many of these cases go to trial, which further extends the period in which the public remains interested and heightens public intrigue.

Model Rule 3.6 governs trial publicity and warns lawyers against making statements that are likely to prejudice the proceedings in any way.  This is all the more true in highly publicized cases, where a lawyer's statements about a case are likely to be widely disseminated.  While media attention on a case does not change lawyers' confidentiality obligations under Model Rule 1.6, Model Rule 3.6 provides that lawyers can provide concrete facts about the case if they are unlikely to cause prejudice.

Lawyers can reveal basic information about the claim at issue, people involved, public records, the existence of a pending investigation, the scheduling or results of litigation, and requests for help in obtaining evidence, and they can offer warnings of danger to an individual or to the public.  In criminal cases, lawyers can provide additional information to the public, including, among other things, information about the residence and occupation of the accused, and the location, time and place of the arrest.

Where a client has suffered prejudice due to recent bad publicity, the lawyer can make statements to mitigate that prejudice.  A lawyer should not speak publicly about a case, however, without the consent of their client after the client weighs the risks and benefits of such disclosures.

Treat Cowdfunded Legal Fees as Advanced Fees, Safeguarding Them in a Trust Account

The two most prominent ethics opinions to address crowdfunded legal fees, a 2015 Philadelphia Bar opinion and a 2018 D.C. Bar opinion, emphasize the importance of safeguarding crowdfunded fees in a trust account and not moving them over to an operating account until they are earned.

As the D.C. Bar opinion notes, because crowdfunding can "trigger areas of confusion that may not be present in a traditional client-self pay situation," lawyers should establish, in a written fee agreement, the rate of their fees, the scope of the representation and specific plans for crowdfunded money, such as the ownership of excess crowdfunds and responsibility for payment if the crowdfunds do not fully cover legal fees and expenses.

Critically, funds collected by a lawyer on a client's behalf through crowdfunding should be treated as advanced fees and placed in a trust account for the client.  In the crowdfunded legal fees context, lawyers need to be especially cognizant of their duty not to charge excessive fees under Rule 1.5.  For example, if a matter resolves quickly, a lawyer would be hard-pressed to claim all of the proceeds of the fundraiser as fees.

Conclusion

The crowdfunding of legal fees represents an exciting opportunity to provide access to legal services to those for whom it might be otherwise unattainable.  With a principled approach — paying special attention to your obligations to maintain confidentiality and your professional independence, and safeguarding funds in a trust account — you can protect yourself from ethics mishaps while serving a wider array of clients.

Hilary Gerzhoy is a partner and vice chair of the legal ethics and malpractice group at HWG LLP.  Julienne Pasichow is an associate at the firm.

A recent Law 360 story by Celeste Bott, “7^th Circ. Scraps $57M Chicken Price-Fixing Atty Fee”, reports that the Seventh Circuit threw out a $57 million attorney fee award in a $181 million deal for chicken buyers in sprawling antitrust litigation, saying that the district court failed to consider bids made by class counsel in auctions in other cases and fee awards in different circuits.  Objector John Andren had taken issue with the roughly one-third cut of the settlement that Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP and Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC were to receive in a deal the firms had struck with Fieldale Farms, Peco Foods, George's, Tyson Foods, Pilgrim's Pride and Mar-Jac Poultry in the sprawling antitrust case.

A three-judge Seventh Circuit panel complimented the lower court for its "fine job of shepherding" the complex litigation, but said it made a mistake when it discounted bids made by one of the two firms serving as class counsel in other cases because the proposals had declining fee scale award structures.  The published opinion concluded that "it was error to suggest that this court has cast doubt on the consideration of declining fee scale bids in all cases."

"In the district court's view, this court has explained that these awards do not reflect market realities and impose a perverse incentive insofar as they ensure that attorneys' opportunity cost will exceed the benefits of seeking a larger recovery, even when the client would otherwise benefit," the panel said.  "Yet, this court has never categorically rejected consideration of bids with declining fee scale award structures.  Rather, the nature of the typical costs in litigation must be assessed in determining whether counsel and plaintiffs would have bargained ex ante for such a structure."

The Seventh Circuit has observed that such a fee structure, where the amount being awarded in fees goes down as the settlement amount goes up, can present certain advantages, and the appellate court took that approach in another case — In re: Synthroid Marketing Litigation — which was a class action suit against the manufacturer of a synthetic thyroid drug.

"Fees do not always decline for securing a larger recovery, and in those instances, counsel will have an incentive to seek more," the panel said.  "Accordingly, the appropriateness of a declining fee scale award structure may depend on the particulars of the case.  It was an abuse of discretion to rule that bids with declining fee structures should categorically be given little weight in assessing fees."

Andren had also argued that the lower court should have taken into account that class counsel frequently did work in Ninth Circuit district courts, which employ a lower 25% "benchmark" for presumptively reasonable attorney fees.  The appellate panel agreed that the district judge shouldn't have categorically assigned less weight to Ninth Circuit cases in which counsel was awarded fees under a mega-fund rule.

"It is true that this court has rejected the application of a mega-fund rule.  Yet, continued participation in litigation in the Ninth Circuit is an economic choice that informs the price of class counsel's legal services and the bargain they may have struck," the panel said.  "The district court should have considered where class counsel's economic behavior falls on this spectrum and assigned appropriate weight to fees awarded in out-of-circuit litigation."

In addition to vacating the fee award, the panel remanded the matter for "greater explanation and consideration" of the factors it laid out, noting that it expressed no preference as to the amount or structure of the award, just the need for further review.

A recent Law 360 story by Carolyn Muyskens, “Mich. Blasts $5M Fee Ask in Flint Water Case as ‘Overreach’”, reports that the state of Michigan is urging the judge presiding over Flint water crisis litigation to deny residents' request for $5 million in settlement funds to be set aside for the future litigation expenses, with the state saying the settlement "was never intended to be a litigation fund for plaintiffs' counsel."  In a filing, the state opposed plaintiffs' requests for fee distributions from the $626 million settlement, which resolved claims against the state government and the city of Flint for their roles in the disaster set off when the city, under a state-appointed manager, changed its water source to save money.

The state said attorneys' new batch of fee requests, which follows their first payout from the settlement fund, were either premature or not authorized by the agreement.  Class counsel and liaison attorneys got the first payment from the settlement fund approved in May, when U.S. District Judge Judith E. Levy ordered a distribution of $40 million as a common benefit award to the attorneys, with an additional $7 million for litigation expenses.  Although the settlement was approved in November 2021, appeals have held up distribution of the funds until recently.

In June, the attorneys filed a motion for additional fees and expenses. The motion seeks reimbursement for post-settlement litigation expenses, a $5 million fund for future litigation expenses, and interest that had accumulated on the $47 million already disbursed — as well as on any awards moving forward.  It also seeks the disbursement of an already-approved fee award of 10% of the programmatic relief fund, which is a subcategory of money to be used for special education services for school children exposed to lead.

The state blasted the request, calling it an "egregious overreach" and saying settlement dollars should not be put toward the plaintiffs' litigation against the remaining defendants in the case — Veolia North America and Lockwood Andrews & Newnam PC. LAN said last week it had reached a tentative settlement with the plaintiffs.  The settlement is "not a litigation fund for plaintiffs' counsel's expenses pursuing non-settling defendants," the state said.

In its motion seeking expenses incurred since February 2021 and the $5 million fund, the residents said the settlement agreement stated plaintiffs' counsel "shall be reimbursed and paid solely out of the FWC qualified settlement fund for all expenses and fees, including but not limited to: attorneys' fees [and] past, current or future litigation and administration expenses," highlighting that the deal explicitly provided for future expenses.

The plaintiffs cited an Eastern District of Michigan case, In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., in which the court "authorized class counsel to utilize up to $750,000 of the settlement fund to pay expenses incurred in the litigation going forward, including 'in prosecuting the claims against the remaining non-settling defendants.'"  The Flint plaintiffs said the judge would have oversight to approve any disbursements from the $5 million fund and that any money leftover that wasn't used for litigation expenses would revert to the settlement fund.

"Plaintiffs' counsel have incurred millions in additional lodestar in continuing to prosecute this case but are not presently seeking any additional award of attorneys' fees, nor requesting a disbursement related to future reasonable litigation expenses," the lawyers said.  "When additional common benefit expenses are incurred and become known, and in consultation with the special master, plaintiffs' counsel may make further applications for disbursements from the $5 million portion of the FWC qualified settlement fund requested herein to be set aside for continuing reasonable litigation expenses," they added.

The state also opposed the request for a 10% fee award from the special education services fund, arguing it can't be calculated until the claims administrator finalizes the list of claimants and the value of the main qualified settlement fund is determined.

The state also said the attorneys aren't entitled to interest on their fee awards, pointing to a provision in the settlement agreement that "requires that all interest earned by the FWC qualified settlement fund or the sub-qualified settlement funds become and remain part of each such fund and may be used to pay any fees and expenses incurred to implement this settlement agreement."

The state argued this provision means interest that accrues in the settlement fund should be put toward the costs of the administration process, not attorneys.  "If any interest remains after implementation of the settlement is complete, then those funds should enure to the benefit of the claimaints," the state argued.  Lawyers for the class are ultimately expected to receive about $200 million for their work on the case.

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