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Category: Fees as Sanctions

Plaintiffs Must Pay Attorney Fees in Kwok Trustee Case

March 19, 2024

A recent Law 360 story by Emlyn Cameron, “Plaintiffs in Kwok Trustee Case Must Pay Paul Hastings’ Fees”, reports that a New York magistrate judge said a group of U.S.-based Chinese nationals must compensate Paul Hastings LLP for more than $327,000 in legal fees the firm wracked up combating a case found to be part of a harassment campaign against billionaire exile Ho Wan Kwok's Chapter 11 trustee.  U.S. Magistrate Judge Jennifer E. Willis said Tao An and other Chinese nationals owed Paul Hastings and one of its former attorneys, Luc A. Despins, more than $326,000 in attorneys fees and more than $840 in costs for employing Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP.

An and the others brought an ill-fated suit alleging the firm was a foreign agent because it represented a bank controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, but U.S. District Judge Valerie Caproni dismissed the suit and sanctioned the plaintiffs in August.  "Having sought a fight, plaintiffs cannot now complain that they've been punched in the face," Judge Willis said in her order.

Judge Caproni determined the case was part of a harassment campaign aimed at Despins, who had been appointed Chapter 11 trustee in Kwok's bankruptcy.  Since An and the others brought the case, they have to bear the costs that Despins and Paul Hastings incurred pushing back, Judge Willis said.  An and the other plaintiffs had argued against the fees, saying they were excessive and not backed by reliable evidence of the time each attorney spent on the case.  But, that wasn't true, Judge Willis said.

The way that Despins and Paul Hastings submitted the hours worked for the various Davis Polk attorneys was difficult to parse but not impossible, and the court was able to work out what each was owed.  The hours those attorneys billed were reasonable and resulted in legal successes for the defendants, the order said.  The defendants had given the court evidence that showed Davis Polk was charging rates consistent with those charged by similar firms, Judge Willis said.

The plaintiffs had also argued that the fees were too large for them to pay, with Despins and Paul Hastings retorting that it seemed like they were being bankrolled by Kwok, a self-described billionaire, and so should not have trouble paying.  Judge Willis sided with the defendants, because An and the others hadn't given the court evidence that they couldn't pay, she said.

Why Federal Circuit Affirmed Patent Attorney Fee Award

January 2, 2024

A recent Law 360 article by Thomas Makin, David Cooperberg, and Adi Williams, “Why Fed. Circ. Affirmed Attorney Fee Award in PeronalWeb”, reports on the recent patent attorney fee award in PersonalWeb Technologies case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

In the recent majority opinion In re: PersonalWeb Technologies, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California entry for a $5.2 million award of attorney fees pursuant to Title 35 of the U.S. Code, Section 285.  Federal Circuit Judges Jimmie V. Reyna, Timothy B. Dyk and Judge Alan D. Lourie reviewed the district court's exceptional case determination and fee award calculation and found no abuse of discretion.

This article explores the ramifications of the Federal Circuit's Nov. 3 decision and underscores district courts' discretion to sanction unreasonable arguments and litigation tactics.

Section 285, provides that, "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."  Attorney fees, however, are not awarded merely for "failure to win a patent infringement suit," as per the U.S. Supreme Court's 2014 Octane Fitness LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness Inc. decision.

According to the Federal Circuit's 2017 Checkpoint Systems Inc. v. All-Tag Securities SA decision, "The legislative purpose behind § 285 is to prevent a party from suffering a 'gross injustice,'" such as having to defend itself against baseless claims, and not to punish a party for losing.  But according to Octane, "The Patent Act does not define 'exceptional.'  [However, the Supreme Court has construed it] in accordance with [its] ordinary meaning."

The Supreme Court has further explained in Octane that an exceptional case is

simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated [and] District courts may determine whether a case is "exceptional" in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.

When reviewing an exceptional case, the Federal Circuit is "mindful that the district court has lived with the case and the lawyers for an extended period ... and [it is] not in a position to second guess the trial court's judgment," as per the Federal Circuit's 2011 Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp decision. 

PersonalWeb is the owner of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,978,791; 6,928,442; 7,802,310; 7,945,544 and 8,099,420 — collectively, the true name patents.  These patents are generally directed to what the inventors termed the "true name" for identifying data items.  True names are unique identifiers that depend on the content of the data item.

The activities that led to the Nov. 3 exceptional case determination started in 2011, when PersonalWeb sued Amazon.com Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, alleging that Amazon's Simple Storage Service, or S3, cloud technology infringed PersonalWeb's true name patents.  After the district court construed the claim terms, PersonalWeb stipulated to a dismissal, resulting in the district court dismissing with prejudice the infringement claims against Amazon and entering final judgment against PersonalWeb.

Seven years later, in 2018, PersonalWeb asserted the same true name patents against 85 Amazon customers across the country for their use of Amazon's S3 technology.  Amazon intervened and filed a declaratory judgment action against PersonalWeb.  The declaratory judgment action sought an order, barring PersonalWeb's infringement actions against Amazon and its customers based on the Texas action.

The declaratory judgment action and customer cases were then consolidated into a multidistrict litigation and assigned to the Northern District of California.  Upon consolidation, PersonalWeb represented that if it lost its case against Twitch, a customer case, it would not be able to prevail in the other customer cases.  The California district court then stayed the other customer cases and proceeded with Amazon's declaratory judgment action and the Twitch customer case.

In the declaratory judgment action, PersonalWeb counterclaimed against Amazon, alleging that Amazon's S3 technology infringed its true name patents and later added claims against another Amazon product, CloudFront.  The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement as to the S3 product in favor of Amazon, based on both the Kessler doctrine and claim preclusion.

The Kessler doctrine generally precludes a patentee from pursuing follow-on infringement suits against the customers of a manufacturer that previously prevailed against the patentee on the same allegedly infringing products.  The district court later granted summary judgment of noninfringement as to the CloudFront product based on PersonalWeb's concession that it could not meet its burden of proving infringement under the district court's claim construction.

The Federal Circuit affirmed both decisions.  The district court then granted Amazon and Twitch's motion for attorney fees and costs, pursuant to Title 35 of the U.S. Code, Section 285.

In determining that the case was exceptional, the district court found that:

  •     PersonalWeb's infringement claims related to Amazon S3 technology were objectively baseless and not reasonable when brought, because they were barred due to a final judgment entered in the Texas action;

  •     PersonalWeb frequently changed its infringement positions to overcome the hurdle of the day;

  •     PersonalWeb unnecessarily prolonged the litigation after claim construction foreclosed its infringement theories;

  •     PersonalWeb's conduct and positions regarding the customer cases were unreasonable; and

  •     PersonalWeb submitted declarations that it should have known were inaccurate.

PersonalWeb appealed to the Federal Circuit, contending that the district court erred as to each of its exceptional case findings.  The Federal Circuit addressed each argument, starting with PersonalWeb's alleged objectively baseless infringement claims.

Objective baselessness relates to "[t]he substantive strength of a party's litigating position" and can "independently support an exceptional-case determination," according to Octane — with these factors also cited in the Federal Circuit's 2017 Nova Chemicals Corp. (Canada) v. Dow Chemical Co. decision.  Thus, according to Octane, "a case presenting ...  exceptionally meritless claims may sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to warrant a fee award."

In this regard, the Federal Circuit said, quoting Octane, in the 2015 SFA Systems LLC v. Newegg Inc decision: "It is the 'substantive strength of the party's litigating position' that is relevant to an exceptional case determination, not the correctness or eventual success of that position."

At the Federal Circuit, PersonalWeb argued that, with respect to objective baselessnes, the reach of Kessler had not been a well-settled issue and that the Federal Circuit's affirmance of the district court's summary judgment decision extended Kessler to cover cases against manufacturers that had been dismissed with prejudice pursuant to stipulation without adjudication of noninfringement.

The majority rejected PersonalWeb's arguments, and reiterated that the Kessler doctrine precludes a patentee who is first unsuccessful against the manufacturer from then suing the manufacturer's customers for those acts of infringement that post-dated the judgment in the first action. 

The majority opined that a straightforward application of Kessler barred PersonalWeb's claims because the order in the Texas action dismissing with prejudice all claims against Amazon and its S3 product operated as an adverse adjudication on the merits of PersonalWeb's infringement claims.

The Federal Circuit likewise found that claim preclusion rendered claims of customer infringement prior to the final judgment in the Texas action objectively baseless.  The Federal Circuit's remaining exceptional case analysis relates to litigation conduct.  And under the Supreme Court 's Octane Fitness standard, "a district court may award fees in the rare case in which a party's unreasonable conduct — while not necessarily independently sanctionable — is nonetheless so 'exceptional' as to justify an award of fees."

On appeal, with respect to the district court's finding regarding PersonalWeb's "frequently changing infringement positions," PersonalWeb argued that its conduct constituted zealous advocacy.

The Federal Circuit disagreed because the record showed that PersonalWeb's alternative infringement theories were constantly changing throughout the case, ranging from emphasizing one, or the other, or both.  The Federal Circuit found that PersonalWeb's pattern of flip-flopping infringement theories made the case "stand out from others with respect to the substantive strength" and "the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated."

PersonalWeb challenged the district court's finding that PersonalWeb unnecessarily prolonged litigation on the basis that the district court had expressly credited PersonalWeb's efforts to streamline the case post-claim construction.

The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court's finding was not an abuse of discretion because:

  •     PersonalWeb refused to immediately stipulate to noninfringement despite an adverse claim construction and an obligation to continually assess the soundness of its claims; and

  •     PersonalWeb's offering of expert opinion relying on alleged ambiguity in the district court's claim construction amounted to an impermissible attempt to relitigate claim construction.  The Federal Circuit further noted that, while PersonalWeb may have taken other actions that did not prolong the case, the above misconduct sufficiently supported the district court's finding.

PersonalWeb challenged the district court's finding that PersonalWeb's conduct and positions regarding the issue of customer case representatives were unreasonable on the basis that it was only during discovery, in July 2019, that PersonalWeb discovered that Twitch was not representative of certain categories of the customer cases.

The Federal Circuit rejected this argument.  The court said PersonalWeb could not change horses in February 2020, after PersonalWeb had represented that it could not prevail against other customers if it could not prevail against Twitch, and after the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of Amazon and Twitch.

The Federal Circuit also concluded that PersonalWeb's seven-month delay in raising its allegedly newly discovered nonrepresentativeness issue was unreasonable.  PersonalWeb also challenged the district court's finding that two inaccurate declarations submitted on behalf of PersonalWeb in support of its opposition to summary judgment were relevant to the exceptionality analysis.

The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the testimony was contradicted by the record and supported a finding of unreasonable litigation conduct.  The Federal Circuit dismissed PersonalWeb's argument that the testimony was not inaccurate as frivolous.

The appellate court concluded its analysis of the district court's exceptional case determination with an admonition that counsel, as officers of the court, "are expected to assist the court in the administration of justice, particularly in difficult cases involving complex issues of law and technology." 

The Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district court's finding that PersonalWeb's counsel fell short of this expectation by litigating with "obfuscation, deflection and mischaracterization" to make the case exceptional under Section 285.

With respect to the calculation of $5.2 million in attorney fees, which PersonalWeb also challenged on appeal, the Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court's calculation.  The Federal Circuit found that the district court thoroughly analyzed the extensive record, considered conduct that both supported and detracted from its award of attorney fees, and explained the award's relation to the misconduct.

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Dyk contended that PersonalWeb's position on Kessler could not be objectively baseless because — in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court — the solicitor general agreed with PersonalWeb that the dismissal with prejudice of the Texas action should not trigger the Kessler doctrine. 

As Judge Dyk put it, "[T]he solicitor general is not in the habit of making objectively baseless arguments to the U.S. Supreme Court."  Judge Dyk asserted that the majority effectively punished PersonalWeb for making an argument on which it did not succeed rather than one that was unsupported.

Despite the dissent, this case underscores district courts' discretion to sanction unreasonable arguments and litigation tactics under Section 285.  Attorneys should be mindful when zealously representing their clients not to present to the court cases that may be deemed "exceptional" under Section 285.

When deciding to prosecute a patent infringement lawsuit, attorneys should conduct adequate pre-suit investigation, ensuring that each and every element of the claim is likely present in the accused product or process, either literally or as an equivalent, and that a prospective plaintiff is not barred from bringing suit.

The pre-suit investigation should also include researching and staying current on the controlling authority for the suit's specific fact pattern.  It naturally follows that attorneys should not ignore or mischaracterize evidence or controlling authority that undermines their clients' claims.

After filing suit, attorneys have a responsibility to dismiss the suit if subsequent developments foreclose the possibility of victory.  Importantly, attorneys should always remember that, while advocates for their clients they are also officers of the court, and owe the court a duty of candor and must abide by court rules and assist the court in the expeditious administration of justice.  Losing sight of these obligations risks exposing clients to an award of fees and costs under Section 285.

Pursuant to Section 285, a court may look to the totality of the circumstances, using, as per Octane, a "'nonexclusive' list of 'factors,' including 'frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.'"

Parties should be aware that while an individual argument or litigation tactic might be characterized as mere zealous advocacy, an award of attorney fees may be supported when that conduct is viewed under the governing totality of circumstances standard.

Thomas R. Makin is a partner, David Cooperberg is a special attorney and Adi Williams is an associate at Shearman & Sterling LLP.

Deep Attorney Fee Cuts, Judge Citing Billing Deficiencies

November 21, 2023

A recent Law 360 story by Dorothy Atkins, “’Alcon’s $1.2M Sanctions Fee Bid For Its MoFo Attys Slashed”, reports that a New York federal judge slashed Alcon Vision's $1.17 million fee request for its attorneys at Morrison Foerster LLP after securing sanctions against Lens.com over its bad faith counterclaims in a trademark dispute, instead awarding $227,000 after finding "glaring deficiencies" in the fee request.  In a 20-page opinion, U.S. District Judge Nina Gershon rejected Alcon Vision LLC's seven-figure request for attorney fees due to the numerous deficiencies and lack of supporting documentation provided by its legal team at Morrison Foerster.

Instead, the judge reduced the fee request as proposed by Lens.com, and she gave the company and its counsel 60 days to pay the fee award.  The sanctions award and fight over fees is the latest development in hotly contested intellectual property litigation that Texas-based Alcon, which was once owned by Novartis AG, kicked off in January 2018.  Alcon accused Las Vegas-based rival Lens.com of selling its trademarked products without permission and with outdated packaging in New York.

Lens.com hit back with antitrust counterclaims in February 2019, claiming Alcon was attacking it just to "ingratiate itself" with eye care providers that would "reward" Alcon by prescribing their customers its lenses.  But in July 2022, the judge slapped Lens.com Inc. and its attorneys with sanctions for filing bad faith counterclaims.  The judge found that the website's counterclaims served no legitimate purpose and were filed to "harass, and cause delay, expense and vexation to Alcon."  The judge ordered Lens.com and its counsel to pay Alcon's costs and attorney fees "caused by its bad faith and vexatious filing and maintaining" of its counterclaims, as well as fees arising from Lens.com's refusal to produce discovery.

The judge also called Lens.com's counterclaims in the dispute "problematic from the start," and ordered Alcon "to file an affidavit setting forth the costs and attorneys' fees for which I have found Lens.com and its counsel jointly and severally liable."  In response, Alcon's lead counsel of Morrison Foerster filed a seven-page declaration seeking $1.17 million in attorney fees for approximately 1,700 hours of work on behalf of 14 attorneys, including partners and associates, and four paralegals.

But Lens.com fired back, arguing that the fee request is excessive, unsupported and doesn't include time records or invoices.  Lens.com also argued that the declaration improperly seeks a single blended rate for its attorneys and an unidentified "standard hourly rate" for its paralegals, rather than the prevailing rate in the district, among other purported deficiencies.  Lens.com argued that it shouldn't have to pay anything in fees due to the legally deficient fee bid, but at most, Alcon should only be entitled to $227,000 in fees.

Judge Gershon mostly sided with Lens.com on the matter.  Her order noted that Morrison Foerster's declaration had "no supporting documentation and little detail" to support the fee calculation.  She rejected Alcon's assumption in the declaration that it is entitled to recover fees that it already paid to Morrison Foerster in connection with the sanctioned conduct, regardless of whether those fees were reasonable.  The judge concluded that ultimately Alcon's fee bid has "glaring deficiencies," including "vague" billing entries, and hundreds of hours of work invoiced in impermissible block billing, or lumping multiple distinct tasks into a single billing entry.

"Here, Alcon has not even attempted to justify, let alone sufficiently justified, as reasonable the hours or rates sought," the order says.  Although the judge noted that she could deny the fee request in its entirety due to the declaration's lack of support, she declined to do so.  However, she also refused to let Alcon submit additional support for its fee request, because the company didn't request permission to supplement the record, and it would require another round of briefing.

Instead, Judge Gershon agreed to adopt Lens.com's proposal to reduce the billable hours across the board by 62.4% and use a blended hourly rate of $355 for all attorneys and paralegals.  "Lens.com's proposal is well within the range of percentage reductions other courts have applied to requested hours for similar fee application deficiencies," the judge wrote, citing a New York federal judge's decision to slash a fee request by 80% earlier this year in Williamsburg Climbing Gym Co. v. Ronit Realty LLC.

Sixth Circuit: Bankruptcy Attorney Fee Cuts Denied Due Process

August 23, 2023

A recent Law 360 story by Alex Wittenberg, “6th Circ. Says Bankruptcy Court’s Atty Fee Cut Denied Rights”, reports that a Tennessee bankruptcy court violated two attorneys' due process rights by slashing their fees by more than $60,000 without proper notice or an opportunity for a hearing, a Sixth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel ruled, saying the move functioned as a sanction. 

The panel said in its opinion that a hearing on the fees held by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Tennessee was unfairly sprung on an unsuspecting Glankler Brown PLLC lawyer, who wasn't prepared to answer questions about the fee application because there were no objections filed to it.  Local rule and the express language of the hearing suggested that no hearing would be held on a matter to which no party had objected, the panel said.

Yet the court proceeded with a hearing anyway, telling the Glankler Brown attorney, Michael P. Coury — who was only in the courtroom for a separate matter heard earlier — that it would consider the issue despite the absence of objections.  "There is no reason to think that anyone other than the bankruptcy court expected a hearing to occur when Glankler had already submitted its certification that no objection was filed," the Sixth Circuit panel said.  "Glankler simply had no reason to suspect there might be a hearing on the fee application."

The court had decided to cut the fees for Glankler by 25% in part because its client's earlier bankruptcy case was dismissed for bad faith, a move that amounted to a sua sponte sanction for which Glankler received no notice or hearing – violating due process, the panel found.  The panel moved to vacate the bankruptcy court's order on the fee reduction.

The decision stems from a bankruptcy case involving debtor Island Industries Inc., for which Glankler served as counsel. Island Industries filed for Chapter 11 in February 2022.  Shortly after, a separate company, Sigma Corp. brought forth an adversary action alleging Island violated trade secret acts, according to the opinion.  A U.S. District Court then withdrew the reference to that action from the bankruptcy court, assuming jurisdiction over the trade secrets dispute.  Sigma then moved to dismiss Island's bankruptcy case, arguing it was filed in bad faith, and the bankruptcy court dismissed it in November 2022.

A month later, Glankler filed its final application related to compensation, with about $249,000 for fees and $7,800 for expenses, according to the opinion.  The law firm said roughly $100,000 of the fees related to its work on the bankruptcy case, while $150,000 were for the trade secrets case.

Judge Wants Sabre to Pay Attorney Fees in $1 Antitrust Win

April 14, 2023

A recent Law 360 story by Piper Hudspeth Blackburn, “Judge Wants Sabre to Pay Fees in Airline’s $1 Antitrust Win,” reports that a federal magistrate judge has recommended that airline booking giant Sabre should cover the costs of attorney fees for US Airways, which pursued antitrust claims that ultimately resulted in a mere $1 jury award after more than a decade of litigation.  In a report, U.S. Magistrate Judge James L. Cott determined that the airline is entitled to fees because of the "plain language" of federal antitrust law despite the nominal damages award. Judge Cott also noted that the amount could be reduced after looking at billing records.

Because a jury returned a verdict for US Airways on its monopolization claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, "a plain reading" of Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows US Airways to recover the cost of the suit, "including a reasonable attorney's fee," the report stated.  In 2022, a Manhattan federal jury found, after a three-week trial, that Sabre willfully maintained monopoly power through exclusionary conduct. It was a redo of a 2016 trial that had awarded US Airways $15 million in damages before the Second Circuit scrapped the verdict on technical legal grounds.

Sabre has argued that U.S. Supreme Court precedent shows that when a party recovers only nominal damages, the only reasonable fee is "usually no fee at all."  However, US Airways insists that the damages it received shouldn't affect its ability to recover costs and attorney fees.  According to Judge Cott, Sabre's argument fails because the precedent the booking company pointed towards, Farrar v. Hobby, doesn't apply to this case but rather to the reasonableness of fee awards in civil rights cases. Farrar holds that the reasonableness of a fee award is indicated by the size of damages awarded.

"Farrar concerned the entitlement to fees under § 1988 of the U.S. Code, not the Clayton Act or any other mandatory fee statute, and there is no suggestion in the opinion itself that its holding extended beyond § 1988," the report stated.  Judge Cott pointed toward a Second Circuit decision on "an identical issue" to this one, United States Football League v. National Football League, instead.  In that case, the court had to determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees "after decade-long antitrust litigation resulting in a $1 jury verdict only on Sherman Act Section 2 grounds."

Not only did the court decide that the plaintiff could recover attorney fees, it "further explained that civil rights cases are inapposite as they concern discretionary awards of fees, while Section 4 mandates them," the report continued.  Judge Cott also rejected Sabre's argument that in the event it must pay attorney fees, the amount should be reduced by 99% because US Airways only "obtain[ed] .0000003% of its alleged damages ... and no injunctive relief."

While no legal rule requires that fees be proportional to the requested amount and the recovered damages, Judge Cott, wrote that the court can reduce the requested fees after analyzing billing records.  While "a downward adjustment is undoubtedly warranted" in this case, Judge Cott noted that the court couldn't determine the amount without first calculating the lodestar.

"The court's eventual reduction will be guided by comparable cases in this circuit, which do not necessarily dictate the extreme slashing that Sabre seeks," the report stated.  The litigation began in 2011, when US Airways sued Sabre, alleging that the company had monopolized the market for systems that connect airlines to travel agents and violated federal antitrust laws.