Fee Dispute Hotline
(312) 907-7275

Assisting with High-Stakes Attorney Fee Disputes


News Blog

Category: Hourly Rates / Hourly Billing

Why Elite Law Firms Should Raise Hourly Rates

March 5, 2018

A recent Law.com article by Hugh A. Simons, “Why Elite Law Should Raise Rates,” reports on hourly rates at elite law firms.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Elite law’s self-confidence has taken a beating. First the great recession hit, and now talk of disruption abounds. But the recession is over and disruption is far from an existential threat. It’s time for elite law to rediscover belief in the value it provides and start to raise rates as it did before the recession. Specifically, elite firms should:

Raise rates across the board.
Discount from the higher rates where necessary.
Increase rates more for partners.
Increase rates more for more distinct practices.
Exit, or leverage up, practices where realized rates (i.e. after discounting) don’t rise.

Raise rates across the board

Billing rate increases have been on a roller coaster, see Figure 1. Before the onset of the great recession, standard rates rose 7 to 8 percent annually with realized (collected) rates rising 5 to 6 percent. When the recession hit, the standard rate increase dropped to between 1 and 2 percent and, as economics would predict, realized rates actually declined. Thereafter, things have steadily improved. The market now trundles along with standard rates rising at 3 percent and realized rates at 2.5 percent, comfortably above inflation at 1.5 percent.

The fact that realized rates have gone from declining to rising at a steady rate indicates that bargaining power has shifted back from clients to law firms. The question becomes: must the new steady-state rate of increase be lower than it was before the onset of the great recession? If law firms have the bargaining power to raise standard rates an average of 3 percent, and realize a rate increase of 2.5 percent, then do they have the power to raise rates at, say, 7 percent and realize a 5 percent increase?

Three conditions must be met for increasing rates to work for law firms. The first is that growth in the value clients derive from a firm’s offerings should exceed the increase in rates. On this, the value a client derives is formally equal to the change in the risk-weighted expected value of the outcome of a client’s business venture, or legal-proceeding, that results from the law firm’s services. As the business world grows more uncertain, complex, and volatile, then services which mitigate these new risks create greater value for clients. Mitigating these emerging risks is what the leading-edge offerings of elite law firms do. Hence, these firms are at liberty to raise rates.

The second condition required for raising rates to be effective relates to competition. If Firm A raises rates and Firm B offers the same service at the pre-increase rate then, in theory, clients turn to Firm B. However, in the elite law world, firms’ offerings are not that fungible—in the highly-specialized segments where elite firms play, there simply aren’t that many viable “Firm B” providers. Even where there are other technically-capable firms, different firms offer different levels of reassurance because of clients’ varying history and comfort with the idiosyncratic perspectives of individual lawyers. A related observation is that firms tend to raise rates at comparable rates. Thus, even where there is a viable Firm B, there may be little cost saving incentive for the client to switch firms.

The third condition is evidenced by the historical data: rate increases only stick when the economy is humming along. While there is always much uncertainty about the economy, and by historical standards we are overdue a recession, today’s economic fundamentals look fairly robust. Firms should be assertive in benefitting from today’s strong economic tailwinds, emboldened by the knowledge that they’ll be buffeted by the headwinds when the economy turns.

The reason elite law firms have not been increasing rates assertively may have more to do with the emotional than with the rational. Elite law firms’ belief in the value of the services they provide took a battering through the great recession, and gets beaten down daily by dire warnings of the industry’s imminent disruption. But the recession has ended and disruption is not an existential threat to elite law firms. Nor is it an existential threat to the differentiated service lines within the portfolio of services offered by the broader group of preeminent firms. Yes, it’ll hurt the commodity-only firms and commodity service lines within other firms, and it will require changes in how all firms operate, but it won’t destroy the core of the elite law firm profit engine: big bucks for bespoke mitigation of major risks.

Discount from the higher rates where necessary

When I suggest raising rates assertively some partners respond that their clients won’t pay any increase. True, some clients won’t. But many will and many more will bear part of the increase. Thus, it’s normal for an increase in standard rates to be accompanied by more discounting and hence a decline in realization (i.e. the ratio of realized, or collected, rates to standard, or rate card, rates). This is not of itself a problem as it’s realized rates that drive a firm’s economics. The important point is that, other than in the aftermath of a recession’s onset, the effect of an increase in standard rates is a significant, albeit lower, increase in realized rates. For example, standard rates rose by 33 percent from 2007 to 2017 and, although realization declined from 89 to 82 percent, realized rates still rose by a healthy 22 percent.

It’s instructive to take a closer look at the above realization decline. As shown in Figure 2, by far the biggest component of this decline was in the ratio of worked (i.e. negotiated or agreed) rates to standard rates—5 points of the 7-percentage point fall. This reflects growth of the volume of work being executed not at standard rates but at client or matter-specific discounted rates.

The dynamics of discounts are a competition between two irrationalities. On the one hand, clients have an irrational liking for discounts. They make clients feel they’re getting a bargain and they’re easy for the legal department to explain to management. The irrationality, of course, is that the focus should be on the discounted rate not on the distance between it and some putative standard rate.

On the other hand, firms have an irrational dislike for discounting. Too many firms still think of realization rate as a measure of profitability. It can be absurdly hard to get lawyers to internalize that, in order to assess profitability accurately, you have to look at the combined effect of leverage and realization using measures such as margin per partner hour.  Indeed, higher-leverage and higher-discount work is often more profitable than lower-leverage and zero-discount work. But partners have been conditioned to think of discounts as a demerit, and partners hate demerits. This unhelpful conditioning gets reinforced by finance departments reporting on hours and realization but not on leverage or margin per partner hour.

The look at realization in Figure 2 also shows that two percentage points of decline are due to increased billing write offs. These write offs reflect quality-of-work issues and budget overruns. As quality issues are probably fairly constant, it’s reasonable to attribute this increase to more budget overruns, in turn a reflection of more work being done under fixed, capped, or other alternative fee arrangements (AFAs). But here again, lower realization doesn’t mean lower profitability—increased leverage can more than offset the realization decline. Indeed, over 70 percent of firms say AFAs are as profitable, or more profitable, than work billed at hourly rates, (data source: Altman Weil’s 2017 Law Firms in Transition report).

Increase rates more for partners

Partners are often reticent to raise their own billing rates assertively. This is a problem of itself but also has severe second-order consequences. First, it effectively sets a cap on the billing rates of counsel and senior associates as there has to be headroom between their rates and those of partners. This becomes a constraint not just on revenue but on profitability. While typical businesses have their highest markup on their highest-value offerings, this billing rate cap leads many law firms to have a lower markup (i.e. the number of times a lawyer’s billing rate exceeds their comp on a cost-per-hour basis) on senior associates and counsel than they realize on their relatively low-value junior associates. By compressing markups in this way, firms are leaving money on the table. There’s consistent market feedback that indirectly corroborates this perspective: clients object most to the billing rates of junior lawyers.

Holding back on partner billing rates also makes it harder to raise leverage. Part of the reason some partners push back on raising their own rates is they feel some of the work they do is not truly partner level and hence shouldn’t be billed at full partner-level rates. This underlying failure to delegate is a disservice to clients (by not letting the work flow to the lowest-priced lawyer capable of doing it), to associates (who are left bereft of experience), and to other partners (who contribute disproportionately to a firm’s profit pool by leveraging more). Hence, part of the logic for raising partner rates is to realize the benefits of improved leverage.

Increase rates more for more distinct practices

If you offer customers something they need that you alone can provide then you can set the price close to the value they derive from your service. If, on the other hand, you offer customers something that many others offer, then you are constrained to pricing it at the level set by others. In reality, a law firm’s various offerings fall at different points along a spectrum between these theoretical extremes. This simple observation has a pricing implication that many law firms effectively ignore: billing rates, and hence billing rate increases, should vary markedly across the range of a firm’s offerings. In particular, the billing rates for a firm’s offerings that are most distinct from those competitors can provide should be priced more aggressively than those for its less-distinct offerings.

The low billing rate growth we’ve seen of late may well be a manifestation of firms adhering to a philosophy of a single firm-wide billing rate increase and having this increase be set by the rate that is appropriate for the less-distinct offerings. The reality is that market dynamics have evolved in recent years to the point that a firm’s pricing power varies sharply across its practices; adhering to a single increase set by the less-distinct offerings is now leaving serious money on the table. If internal firm harmony requires a single rate increase, then better to raise standard rates strongly across the board and discount from these as necessary for the less-distinct offerings.

Exit, or leverage up, practices where realized rates don’t rise

There is an old adage in strategy consulting: 80 percent of strategy is deciding what not to do. The ‘what not to do’ for elite law firms is offer commodity services. How does one recognize commodity services? By definition, commodity services are offerings that many other firms can provide. By extension, commodity services are those where a firm effectively cannot set the price but must adhere to the price level set by rivals. This translates to commodity offerings being those where the realized rates (i.e. after discounting) don’t rise following a standard rate increase.

To adhere to a strategy of differentiation, firms should exit practices where realized rates can’t be increased above the rate of inflation. In some circumstances, so doing is more than the fabric of a partnership can bear. Where this is the case, an alternative that may buy some time is to operate the practice at greater leverage than the rest of the firm. So doing mitigates the effect of a commodity practice on per-partner profitability. However, it is really only a holding measure as leverage can’t be increased indefinitely and managing businesses with dramatically different fundamental strategies requires an ambidexterity that few trained business leaders, let alone lawyers, possess.

Action implications

Most people make decisions based on objective facts interpreted through a lens of emotional biases and personal predispositions. Partners are alike most people in that they employ such a lens; partners are unlike most people in that they refuse to recognize they employ such a lens. There is nothing to be gained by leaders trying to get partners to recognize what they’re doing; however, there is value in leaders shaping the lens through which partners interpret the world.

At many firms today, this lens says lawyers are of declining value and the market is stagnating. While this is true perhaps at the middle and lower tiers, this is objectively untrue for elite firms and for the differentiated practices within the broader swath of preeminent firms. This lens issue needs to be addressed first before partners can analyze robustly the case for billing rate increases. Specifically, the lens should be reshaped by restoring and bolstering partners’ confidence in the value of their offerings. To this end, firm leaders should talk to clients (many of them really value you!), share more of the positive client feedback with partners, highlight firm recognition and awards, have clients come and speak at partner meetings, host alumni roundtable discussions of the value of outside counsel, etc. The forthcoming 2017 Am Law results will probably help too: despite the pervasive gloom and doom, the top end of the market is prospering; I suspect we’ll see double-digit percent increases in profitability at most elite firms.

Having reshaped the lens, the next step is to create opportunities for partners to discuss billing rate history, profitability, and future billing rate policy. The key here is to give partners the data and let them chew on it. Don’t lecture them or tell them what to do; rather give them the parameters and let them figure it out for themselves—so doing is the first step toward adoption of the desired changes.

Partners’ deliberations should perhaps start with a review of the firm’s billing rate history and dynamics, including firm-specific versions of Figures 1 and 2 here, supplemented with the same views for individual offices, practices and key clients. It would also be useful to profile how partner rates set a cap on rates for counsel and senior associates, leading to markup compression and, perversely, a firm having the lowest markups on the time of its highest value lawyers.

Partners should then discuss some of the less-obvious dynamics around billing rates. These could include, for example: the connection between leverage and partner billing rates (particularly how low partner rates suppress leverage); the pervasive observation that leverage varies more with individual partners than with practice or client type; and, in cultural contexts where it would help, partners could debate the relationship between compensation and billing rate—the two tend to correlate at professional services firms although it’s sort of misleading as it’s not a causal relationship; rather both are separately reflective of the economic value of a partner’s practice, so proceed with caution.

The final element is for partners to discuss the process by which billing rates are set. While most partners prefer control of their own rates, many recognize that having an abstract committee set the rate allows them some plausible deniability in conversations with clients.

All this is to say it’s a new billing rate world out there. Law firm leaders would do well to buy the option of increasing billing rates assertively at year end by starting to prepare partners for such increases now.

Hugh A. Simons, Ph.D., is a former senior partner and executive committee member at The Boston Consulting Group and the former chief operating officer at Ropes & Gray.

Sorry Clients: Higher Hourly Rates Really Do Pay Off

February 21, 2018

A recent American Lawyer story by Miriam Rozen article, “Sorry Client: Higher Law Firm Billing Rates Really Do Pay Off,” reports on the findings from the recent analysis by Citi Private Bank’s Law Firm Group.  The story reads:

Law firms do better when they raise their published billing rates at a faster clip, even if those increases result in a widening gap between published and realized rates, according to a recent analysis by Citi Private Bank’s Law Firm Group.

“The analysis we have is how the consistently most successful firms have increased rates versus the broader industry during 2010-17,” explained Gretta Rusanow, head of advisory services for the group.

Top-performing firms increased their rates at an average annual rate of 4.4 percent, compared with an increase of 3.3 percent for the broader sample, Rusanow said in an email. While those top performers saw a wider gap between their published and realized rates, their realized rates nonetheless grew faster than at the other, less aggressively priced firms.

At top-quartile law firms—grouped by Citi based on profitability, contribution per lawyer averages and net income margins—“realized rates grew at an average annual rate of 3.5 percent, compared to 2.8 percent for the broader industry,” Rusanow said.

“The key takeaway,” according to Rusanow: Firms continued to increase published rates while taking deeper discounts. That’s how the top echelon of firms “widened their rate advantage.”

The trend persisted in 2017. Citi’s most recent survey of law firm performance showed that for the most successful firms, published rates increased 5.6 percent, versus 4.2 percent for the broader sample. At the same time, realization rates increased 5.7 percent for the most successful firms, versus 2.9 percent for the broader sample, Rusanow said.

Billing rates overall have continued a steady climb in recent years, despite pressure from clients insisting on discounts, decreases and other cost savings.

For law firm consultant Janet Stanton of Adam Smith Esq., the Citi analysis confirms that the elites have a built-in advantage.

“This is more of the same,” Stanton said. “There has been a pulling away of firms with a stronger performance. To me it also says something about the greater value of brand strength.”

Report: Lawyers Bill Fewer Hours Than a Decade Ago

February 6, 2018

A recent Big Law Business story by Elizabeth Olson, “Lawyers Bill Fewer Hours Than a Decade Ago: Report,” reports that on a recent report that was released.  The article reads:

One figure jumps out of a new Georgetown law school report on the legal industry: $74,100. That’s the amount per lawyer that a law firm loses annually, according to the research that found an average attorney bills 156 fewer hours than was charged just a decade ago.

Flat client demand, declining profit margins, weaker bill collection and lower market share due to alternative legal service providers are undermining firm profitability, the “2018 Report on the State of the Legal Market” concludes. Despite this underwhelming climate, rates edged up.

Firms also overestimate the strength of the demand for their services, and have not taken steps to increase efficiency that clients demand, said the report by Georgetown University Law Center’s Center for the Study of the Legal Profession and the Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Institute.

“Law firms have not been stepping up and introducing bold strategies so they are unprepared for the rapid transformations sweeping the legal industry,” James W. Jones, senior fellow at the Georgetown center and the report’s lead author, told Big Law Business.

Clients are demanding more e-discovery, document review and investigative support, according to a separate study last year, also by Georgetown Law and Thomson Reuters.

Many firms “are making only cursory investments” to offset some of the market forces, said Eric Seeger, a report co-author.

The findings mirror other studies, including the annual legal industry assessment from Altman Weil, Inc. issued in May 2017.

“There’s a culture that needs a wake-up call,” said Jones. “The levels of productivity are shocking, but these are not new issues. Many of them predated the great recession in 2007.”

The Georgetown study was based on data collected monthly from 168 firms participating in the Thomson Reuters Peer Monitor tracking system for law firm metrics. It researched specifics on a variety of metrics, including hours billed, time spent on business development, and overhead expenses.

Figures cited are for an average lawyer in one of the firms, which include 56 in the American Lawyer top 100, and outside of that list, 47 in the second-tier of firms and 65 mid-size firms.

The report found a 1.3 percent increase in the number of lawyers employed by law firms last year, but overall legal business was flat. AND A slight growth of around 1 percent in demand among the largest 100 firms was offset by a drop of more than 1 percent in demand among firms ranking between 101 and 200 in size, according to the research that tapped a Thomson Reuters database of client metrics.

Most firms continue to rely on a traditional model of employment: hiring associates from the pool of top law school graduates, and then eventually promoting them to the well-paid lifetime job of partner.

While associates and equity partners rank “reasonably well” in their level of productivity, “it really falters below that,” Jones said.

The lower performers would include non-equity partners and of counsel attorney, the report found. As a result, Jones said that when comparing hours billed in January 2007 to those billed in November 2017 (the latest figures available when the study was being written), he calculated that a typical firm attorney billed 156 fewer hours by the end of that ten-year period.

The calculation was based on a rate of $475 per hour, a figure that comes from averaging the rates of lawyers ranging from associates to equity partners, Jones said.

Overall, Jones concluded that based on those figures, a 300-lawyer firm “would be experiencing an annual loss currently of $22.2 million.”

The variation could be wider, he noted, because the top layer of two dozen Big Law firms have greater revenues than those in the rest of the top 200 largest U.S. firms. The top two dozen firms have been carving away the most high-end business as corporations seek out top level expertise for complex corporate matters.

Stagnant business growth, however, occurred even as the top 100 firms hiked rates by 3.7 percent last year. The second set of 100 firms increased rates by slightly less, 2.8 percent.

Yet, even in pricing and billing for clients, law firms largely cling to tried-and-true ways of interacting with clients, according to the report. Most firms still rely on the billable hour for their client dealings. And only about 14 percent of firms use alternative fee arrangements, according to a separate study issued last August by legal technology firm Aderant North America, Inc.

Few law firms have effective models for one of their most basic services, document management, the Georgetown report found. That absence has opened the way for rapid growth of alternative legal service providers, such as UnitedLex Corp. and Axion Global, Inc.

According to the Thomson Reuters outsourcing report last year, the market for alternative legal services providers stood at $8.4 billion and was forecast to keep growing as much as 25 percent or more annually.

The reluctance to adopt new ways of billing, document management and other technologies, Jones concluded, stems in large part from “the fragility of partnerships.”

Law partnerships, he said, “are not like other businesses. They cannot protect their assets, which are their people, and they can’t impose non-compete agreements, unlike other businesses.”

A firm’s “only other asset is the client, who can leave the firm at any time” because clients have the right to have the lawyer of their choice,” Jones said.

To help solve their dilemma, he recommends that firms need to “reengineer” their models. This might include flexible staffing, redesigned work processes, partnerships with other organizations and alternative pricing.

“They say they do some of these things, but most don’t,” he said. “And their market is oozing away.”

NALFA: Serial Class Action Objectors Not Qualified in Attorney Fee Analysis

January 5, 2018

A recent The Recorder story by Amanda Bronstad, “$38M Fee Request in Anthem Data Breach Settlement Under Scrutiny” reports that an objection says the fee request, which is 33 percent of the $115 million settlement, was “outrageous on its face” and should be closer to $13.8 million.

A prospective class member has objected to the Anthem data breach settlement, specifically criticizing a fee request of nearly $38 million, and planning to ask that a special master investigate the case for potential over-billing.

Class action critic Ted Frank, of the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s Center for Class Action Fairness, filed the objection on Dec. 29 on behalf of Adam Schulman, who is an attorney at his Washington D.C. organization.  The objection said the fee request, which is 33 percent of the $115 million settlement  was “outrageous on its face” and should be closer to $13.8 million.  He particularly targeted the average $360 per hour rate for contract attorneys submitted by four lead plaintiffs firms, one of which is San Francisco’s Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein.  A special master in Boston is investigating Lieff Cabraser, along with two other law firms, for potential over-billing for staff attorneys in a $74.5 million fee request over securities class action settlements with State Street.  The special master’s report is due in March.  Frank said he planned to file a motion on Thursday asking that a special master be appointed in the Anthem case.

He wants a special master to look into “the same thing they’re investigating in State Street, which is why this billing happened and whether it’s appropriate and whether there was an attempt to mislead the court.”  He also questioned why 49 other firms not appointed by the court stood to earn a total of $13.6 million in fees and “whether there were side agreements to back scratch or trade favors in other MDLs to get work in this MDL.”

U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh, who trimmed the number of plaintiffs firms appointed to lead the Anthem case, has scheduled a Feb. 1 hearing for final approval of the settlement in San Jose, California.  Two other objections were filed on Dec. 29 that also challenged the fee request, among other things.  Class counsel is expected to respond to the objections by Jan. 25.

Eve Cervantez, of San Francisco’s Altshuler Berzon, who is co-lead counsel in the case along with Andrew Friedman of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll in Washington D.C., wrote in an email: “The three professional objectors made the same typical, boilerplate objections we often see in consumer class actions, and neglected the true value of the settlement to the class—protection of their personal data both by mandated improvements to Anthem’s cybersecurity to prevent future hacks, and by credit monitoring to prevent misuse of their personal data by the hackers that stole it.”

In the Anthem case, Koh preliminarily approved the settlement in August.  The deal provides two years of credit monitoring and identity protection services to more than 78 million people whose personal information was compromised in 2015.  It also provides a $15 million fund to pay costs that class members were forced to pay due to the breach, such as credit monitoring services and falsified tax returns.

In motions filed last month, the four lead plaintiffs firms defended their fee request as adequate compensation for obtaining the largest data breach settlement in history.  The case involved “massive discovery” and “complicated factual and legal research,” they wrote.  It also was “extraordinarily risky,” given that many data breach cases have been dismissed.  The fees also were reasonable given the total lodestar—or the amount billed multiplied by the hourly rate—was $37.8 million.  The hourly billing rates of partners were between $400 to $970—rates that Koh has approved in prior cases.

“There is no true comparator to this groundbreaking settlement,” Cervantez wrote.  “Other data breach cases have not resulted in common funds that come close to $115 million, nor have they included the comprehensive cybersecurity improvements mandated by this settlement, coupled with a major, quantifiable investment in cybersecurity.”

The other two objections, one filed by solo practitioners John Pentz in Massachusetts and Benjamin Nutley in California, and the other by a trio of law firms from Missouri and Colorado, raise additional concerns over the cash value of the settlement, a proposed $597,500 in incentive payments to 29 lead plaintiffs and a request on both sides to seal portions of the deal—in particular, the amount of money Anthem has agreed to spend on cybersecurity in the future.

Koh has slashed fee requests in past cases, some involving the same plaintiffs firms.  Last year, she cut fees in a $150 million settlement involving the poaching of animators at DreamWorks and The Walt Disney Co. to $13.8 million after finding the original $31.5 million request to be “unreasonably high.”  In that case, Koh relied on the billing records, concluding that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 25 percent benchmark in class action settlements would result in a windfall to the three plaintiffs firms, which included Cohen Milstein.

Indiana Appeals Court: Attorney Fee Records Not Protected or Confidential

December 26, 2017

A recent TheIndianaLawyer.com, by Olivia Covington, “COA: Attorney Fee Records Not Protected or Confidential” reports that an Indiana trial court did not err by denying a motion to quash a request for the production of attorney fee records because such records are not protected by attorney-client privilege or the Fifth Amendment, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled.

After Diyee Boulangger allegedly over-reported her hours and hourly rate during her three years of employment with Ohio Valley Eye Institute, P.C., her former employer filed a conversion, theft, theft by false impression, fraud and forgery complaint against Boulangger.  The state also filed criminal charges against Boulangger, but dismissed them without prejudice in February 2016.

The eye institute then moved for summary judgment in June 2015, but Boulangger responded with an affidavit from her attorney, David A. Guerrettaz, claiming the Evansville police Department had continued to investigate her even after the criminal charges were dropped.  Thus, Guerrettaz argued his client could not present facts in response to the summary judgment motion without violating her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

The Vanderburgh Superior Court eventually granted summary judgment to OVEI and awarded it a nearly $519,000 judgment, plus costs and post-judgment interest.  OVEI then moved for the trial court to order Boulangger to appear in court to testify to any non-exempt property to could be applied toward the judgment.

The eye institute also served Guerrettaz’s law firm with a non-party request for production of documents and subpoena duces tecum, seeking “(c)opies of any and all check and/or wire transfers received…for legal fees paid for (Boulangger’s) representation.”  Boulangger responded with a motion to quash, arguing the requested documents were protected by attorney-client privilege and her Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.

The trial court disagreed and ordered the firm to produce the requested documents, so Boulangger filed an interlocutory appeal in Divee Boulangger v. Ohio Valley Eye Institute, PC.  The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s order, concluding the documents in question were not protected communications. 

Specifically, Judge Rudolph Pyle rejected Boulangger’s request for an “incrimination” exception to the rule that a client’s attorney fees are not protected by attorney-client privilege.  Drawing on precedent from in cases such as Hueck v. State, 590 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) and Matter of Witnesses Before the Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984), Pyle wrote the requested information – which included the source and amount of fees Boulangger paid – was neither confidential nor protected by attorney-client privilege.

Similarly, precedent in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), defeated Boulangger’s Fifth Amendment argument because “the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not preclude compelled disclosure of information from a third party such as a defendant’s attorney,” Pyle said.

NALFA: The Four Hourly Rate Factors

December 6, 2017

Hourly rates are the engine that drives attorney fees.  Hour rates are the most important single factor in determining attorney fee awards.  There are several factors that determine hourly rates. ...

Read Full Post