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Article: Two Overlooked Advantages of Hourly Billing

January 20, 2020

A recent Law 360 article by J.B. Heaton, “2 Overlooked Advantages of Hourly Fees,” reports on hourly billing advantages.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

I was happy to see that my former colleagues at Bartlit Beck LLP prevailed at arbitration on a large fee dispute with a contingency client.  However, it appears that the dispute remains active, and that the firm is now forced to seek confirmation of the award (Bartlit Beck LLP v. Okada, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois) before beginning what may be a long fight to enforce it against a Japanese billionaire.

Bartlit Beck was a forerunner in the effort to move clients away from hourly fees toward alternative fees.  While most of the firm’s work while I was there (1999-2017) was on a flat monthly fee with bonuses, some work was on a contingency of the type now at issue in the arbitration recently reported.  Those flat monthly fees and bonuses were also a source of tension with clients who sometimes felt (wrongly, in my view) they were not getting good value for their money.  The firm hurt its relationship with Microsoft Corp. when it insisted on the payment of a relatively small promised bonus.  And the firm has been in a similar arbitration before like the one now at issue, where a client, EchoStar Corp., unsatisfied with its payment obligation to the firm found itself in arbitration.

While alternative fees continue to get attention in the legal press, there is no question that such fees remain overshadowed by the hourly fee.  Fee disputes like the one Bartlit Beck finds itself in again may tell us something about the reasons for the continued vitality of the hourly fee, especially among clients who have the wherewithal to pay.  It is no coincidence that most of the very large fee disputes we read about involve alternative fees.  What we don’t read about, but what is well-known to plaintiff-side lawyers such as I used to be, is the additional problem that large contingency fees can cause in generating suspicion of the lawyer recommending that the client take a large, pretrial settlement offer.

Fee arrangements for litigation require picking between two bad choices.  Hourly fees come with the incentive problem that lawyers make more money with every hour for which the client is willing to pay.  Since clients are usually not in the best position to determine the efficiency of undertaking a particular task (that is, it’s impact on the expected value of the litigation), the possibility exists that lawyers will respond to their incentives to undertake tasks that are not worth doing.

Flat fees address this problem by removing the incentive to work on inefficient tasks, but flat fees bring their own serious problem: They create an incentive to underwork the case, again taking advantage of the client’s poor positioning to see that a worthwhile project was left undone.  This allows the flat-fee lawyer to either use those hours on another flat-fee or hourly case or use the time in leisure, not working at all.  Contingency fees create an even more powerful incentive to end a case on terms that generate a large return for the lawyer on few hours worked.

The possibility of high-stakes fee disputes may be a relatively unexplored reason why alternative fees have not caught on among well-funded clients in high-stakes cases.  Clients may say — on the front end — that they want to pay for performance, but it can be hard sometimes to judge the importance of the lawyers’ actions in resolving high-stakes business disputes.

Where a dispute is resolved for reasons unrelated to the work of the lawyers, it is difficult for a client to pay a walloping fee that was, perhaps, based on the assumption that the resolution would have depended more on the lawyers’ work.  In the place where huge contingency fees reign supreme — class action litigation — the court has the power to set the fee, and virtually never ignores the hours worked in doing so.

Even where the lawyers have generated huge value by identifying a novel legal theory and bringing a defendant to the table for serious settlement talks, even the most sophisticated of clients can and do question the incentives of the lawyers advising them.

In some cases, a defendant can be brought to the table with a very large settlement offer based on the legal risk it faces in a relatively untested area of law.  The client, however, may question the lawyer’s advice to take the settlement where the lawyer stands to make millions of dollars on only a few hundred hours' work.  This suspicion, in turn, may lead the client to reject the settlement, only to find out later that the lawyer was right, the theory was too risky to have a large enough possibility of prevailing, and the huge settlement was the best that could have been obtained.

Discussions of hourly versus alternative fees will no doubt continue in 2020.  The market has spoken rather clearly, however.  The legal market seems to prefer hourly fees, especially in high-stakes cases for clients that can pay the fees as they go.  The bad incentives are controlled by long-term relationships with lawyers and firms, and by more and more sophisticated review of bills and descriptions.  Especially for high-stakes cases, the cost of not doing a valuable task is higher than the cost of doing some additional tasks that may be inefficient or unnecessary.  There are exceptions, of course, but they remain the outliers.

Here, I suggest that hourly fees have two advantages not yet adequately focused on: minimizing large-scale fee disputes, and maintaining the perceived integrity of the lawyers’ advice.

J.B. Heaton is President of J.B. Heaton PC in Chicago.

Bankruptcy Court Denies Fee Enhancement Under Common Fund Doctrine

January 17, 2020

A recent Legal Intelligencer article by Rudolph J. DiMassa, Jr. and Geoffrey A. Heaton, “Bankruptcy Court Denies Motion for Fee Enhancement Under ‘Common Fund Doctrine’,” reports on a bankruptcy court that recently denied creditors’ counsel’s motion for a fee enhancement under the common fund doctrine.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

In a bankruptcy case filed 91 years ago (and reopened 85 years later), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia recently denied creditors’ counsel’s motion for a fee enhancement under the “common fund doctrine,” finding it could not award the requested fees absent statutory authority.  In particular, the court determined it would be an abuse of its equitable powers to award fees beyond the scope of applicable bankruptcy law in In re Yellow Poplar Lumber, Case No. 605 B.R. 416 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2019).

Background

In July 1928, White Oak Lumber Co. filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of South Carolina, seeking to have Yellow Poplar Lumber Co., Inc. “adjudged a bankrupt” under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.  n 1931, the district court adjudged Yellow Poplar as bankrupt and closed the case.

In 2013, the case was reopened in connection with a dispute over ownership rights in certain gas estates on parcels of land in Virginia, and it ultimately found its way to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia.  The dispute resulted in a settlement whereby Yellow Poplar’s bankruptcy estate stood to receive approximately $2 million in gas royalties.  The Chapter 7 trustee appointed in the reopened case, with the assistance of a genealogist, identified several of the original creditors’ existing heirs or successors-in-interest.  The bankruptcy court, in turn, directed the trustee to file a brief addressing the appropriate interest rate on the anticipated distribution to creditors, and invited any other party-in-interest to do the same.  While the trustee contended that the interest rate should be 2.4%, counsel for the heirs of two creditors advocated a 7% rate, which reflected the legal rate in effect in South Carolina when Yellow Poplar’s bankruptcy case was filed.  The court ultimately ordered the application of a rate of 3.6%.

Creditors’ counsel, however, successfully appealed the court’s ruling, which resulted in general unsecured creditors receiving 7% interest on their distributions, and increasing the asset pool to be distributed to general unsecured creditors by approximately $740,000.  Notably, the efforts of creditors’ counsel did not increase the amount of funds in the bankruptcy estate, but rather increased just the proportion of estate funds going to the class of general unsecured creditors, effectively diverting funds from one class of constituents to another.  Creditors’ counsel then filed a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking a fee enhancement of $164,164.90 under the “common fund doctrine.”  The trustee opposed the motion, arguing, among other things, that the common fund doctrine does not apply in bankruptcy cases.

Common Fund Doctrine

The common fund doctrine is an exception to the American Rule, i.e., the general rule prevailing in the United States that each litigant is responsible to pay its own attorney fees.  The doctrine generally applies where a litigant, acting to recover on its own claim, recovers property from which others may satisfy their claims as well, entitling the litigant to payment of attorney fees and costs from the “common fund” used for payment of all claims.

Based upon principles of equity, the common fund doctrine recognizes that one who benefits from a lawsuit without contributing to its cost is unjustly enriched at the expense of the successful litigant who bore the costs.  In addition to payment of a litigant’s attorney fees and costs, the doctrine also allows the litigant’s attorney to collect an extra award of fees from the common fund, even if the attorney is merely performing services for his client per the terms of his engagement.

Court Analysis

The court determined that the operative question was not whether the common fund doctrine applies, but rather whether the court had authority to grant the requested fee enhancement from estate assets.  To that end, the court considered precedent under both the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Bankruptcy Code currently in effect: although the Bankruptcy Act governed Yellow Poplar’s case, the court considered cases applying the Bankruptcy Code for additional guidance.

Quoting at length from In re Fesco Plastics, 996 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1993), a case filed under the Bankruptcy Code that denied a fee request under the common fund doctrine, the court highlighted the central problem with counsel’s requested fee enhancement: a bankruptcy court cannot award attorney fees without statutory authority, such as that found in Bankruptcy Code Sections 327-330, 1103 and 503(b)(4).  The court concluded that an award of fees outside the context of applicable statutory provisions is beyond a bankruptcy court’s mandate.  In the words of the Fesco Plastics court, “a bankruptcy court is simply not authorized to do whatever is necessary to reach an equitable result; it may only do whatever is necessary to enforce the Code.”

The court noted that prevailing case authority decided under the Bankruptcy Act was in accord with Fesco Plastics.  In particular, the court highlighted Cox v. Elliott (In re Calhoun Beach Club Holding), 122 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1941), which rejected the argument that a bankruptcy court “has inherent equitable power” to authorize payment of a creditor’s attorney fees from estate assets.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained in Cox, the Bankruptcy Act “carefully regulates the compensation and expenses that may be allowed in bankruptcy,” and contains an implied exclusion of other fee allowances not expressly set out in the Bankruptcy Act.

After considering Fesco Plastics, Cox and several other cases under both the Bankruptcy Act and the Bankruptcy Code, the court concluded it could not “abuse the equitable power Congress bestowed upon it to award fees for services outside the scope of applicable bankruptcy law.”  The bankruptcy court noted that, even were it to conclude that it had the authority to award fees under the common fund doctrine, counsel might nonetheless remain ineligible for the additional fees: as noted above, counsel’s efforts did not increase funds flowing into the bankruptcy estate, but rather reallocated estate funds among classes of creditors.

Although acknowledging that the common fund doctrine might apply in exceptional circumstances, the court confirmed that a fee award or enhancement would still have to be made pursuant to statutory authority, such as section 64(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, allowing a “reasonable attorney fee” to petitioning creditors in an involuntary case, or section 64(b)(2), allowing for payment of “reasonable expenses” of creditors who recover property transferred by a bankrupt.

Here, however, no provision of the Bankruptcy Act or the Bankruptcy Code existed to authorize “fees for creditor’s attorneys whose actions incidentally benefited some creditors, to the detriment of others, while pursuing their clients’ best interests.”  The court noted, moreover, that counsel had not identified any provision of the Bankruptcy Act or the Bankruptcy Code that authorized the fee award, and the authorities it did cite were either distinguishable, were not on point, or supported the court’s analysis.  Accordingly, the court denied counsel’s motion for a fee enhancement.

Conclusion

Viewed through the equities of the case, it is arguably unfair that all members of the general unsecured creditor class benefited without having to contribute to the legal fees and expenses incurred by just a few creditors in the class.  Indeed, the court confessed that it was “not unsympathetic” to counsel’s fee request.  Nevertheless, Yellow Poplar provides valuable guidance to creditors seeking payment of attorney fees from estate funds: asserting equitable theories such as the “common fund doctrine” may engender judicial sympathy, but they are no substitute for statutory authority.  Consequently, creditors’ counsel seeking any fee enhancement should make their request pursuant to a Bankruptcy Code section that explicitly authorizes such an enhancement.

Rudolph J. Di Massa, Jr. is a partner at Duane Morris in Philadelphia.  Geoffrey A. Heaton, is a special counsel at Duane Morris in San Francisco.

Article: Ten Ways That Outside Counsel May Hide Overbilling

January 16, 2020

A recent Corporate Counsel article by Ryan Loro, “10 Ways That Outside Counsel Disguise Overbilling,” reports on overbilling from outside counsel.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Legal invoices can be overwhelming and nearly impossible to understand. The task of sifting through line after line of attorney time entries from outside counsel is time consuming, and more times than not, in-house legal and accounting teams may miss billing errors. Despite the complexity of legal invoices, there are ways to spot overbilling if you know what you are looking for.

According to recent industry research, large companies with big legal departments go over budget by about 37% every single year. Why do they go over budget? A big reason is overbilling from the outside law firms they hire to do work for them.

It’s become such an issue that entire companies have been formed to help businesses analyze and help organizations manage their legal spend. That’s right, lawyers sometimes pad their billable time—and there is now a growing industry to ensure that businesses pay a fair amount for their legal services.

Here are the top 10 ways law firms can hide overbilling:

Block Billing. Block billing is when a lawyer enters multiple tasks under one time period, without separating the time each task took. Here is an example from an actual time entry reviewed by SIB Legal Bill Review:

7.6 Hours: Telephone call with client regarding assignment of rents; review lease agreement of [company]; draft agreement; emails with opposing counsel; revise agreement accordingly.

Block billing obscures the value to the client and the reasonableness of the charges for a given task. If you don’t know how long it took to draft the contract (because drafting the contract is one of five tasks within a 7.6-hour block of time), you can’t tell if the charge for drafting the contract is reasonable. One study by the California Bar Association concluded that block billing increases the time charged by an average of 23%.

Intra-Office Communications. Intra-office communications is when multiple attorneys within the same firm discuss the client’s matter with each other or seek advice from a colleague about a legal issue. One of the major selling points for larger law firms is that they have a breadth of knowledge in specialized subjects. But when a lawyer seeks a colleague’s advice, the client should not have to pay for one attorney to educate another—just have the specialist handle that part of the matter.

Higher-Rate Staff Used Inappropriately. Sometimes lawyers will do work that is more appropriate for a lower-rate attorney or a paralegal. For example, if a partner’s rate is $900/hour and they perform a task that, more than likely is work that a second-year associate attorney who’s rate is $300/hour should be doing, the client will be paying an additional $600 per hour.

Excessive Time. This is the most common complaint of clients, yet has historically been the easiest for law firms to justify. Many clients have a “feeling” that a certain task took too long, but cannot explain why. SIB Legal Bill Review explains in detail the reasons a law firm should reconsider specific charges on an invoice. Here is an example:

The law firm charged 5.1 hours for work on a confidentiality agreement where opposing counsel had already provided a comprehensive draft agreement for comment and markup. This time is excessive. We propose the charge be revised to a total of 2.5 hours: 2.0 for analysis and markup of the draft agreement, and 0.5 for negotiation of points with opposing counsel.

Junior Lawyer Training. Law firms have been known to charge clients for a junior lawyer’s on-the-job training. We believe that the law firm carries the financial responsibility for training its lawyers; it is for the law firm’s long-term benefit. On an invoice we reviewed, one law firm actually charged $1,084 to the client for a junior lawyer’s time to “investigate how to file an appeal.” Of course, there is a point in the junior lawyer’s career when they need to learn how to file an appeal, but the client should not have been asked to pay for that training.

Inadequate Description. When a lawyer does not adequately describe his activity, there is no way for the client to determine if that activity added value for the client or if the charges for that activity are reasonable. Attorneys are paid to be precise in their language. It is not unreasonable to require lawyers to accurately describe how they spent their time and the client’s money. More problematic, inadequately described time can be camouflaging the fact that the attorney invented the time entry to fill his time card or increase the bill. Here is an example of a real time entry:

Attention to licensing files and review of licenses and leases; attention to pro-forma license transfer structure; additional review of proposed structure; attention to fees and timing relevant to pro-forma and non-pro forma assignment; address related licensing matter.

At first glance, it appears that this associate has done a lot of work for the client. But notice that the task descriptions are all nebulous: “attention to … ; analysis of … ;” and so on. In this particular time entry, no actual work product was produced. The client has no way of knowing what value was delivered because of this inadequate description.

Over-staffing a Given Task. Many times, a law firm will over-staff a task, using three attorneys for something that should have only taken one. More often than not, the time for all three attorneys is billed to the client. Defending a deposition and arguing a discovery motion are usually one-lawyer tasks and should be billed as such.

Duplicative Work. Duplicative work is an issue that occurs when one attorney will charge for the same task in more than one billing period, or two attorneys will charge for the same task in the same billing period. Here is our response to an instance of duplicative work:

Junior lawyer charged 25.1 hours ($6,149.50) to draft motion for summary judgment. Senior lawyer charged 14.6 hours ($4,844) to draft the same motion at a later date.

In this particular case, the client did not receive 39.7 hours of work. If the law firm decided to push a motion for summary judgment draft onto a junior lawyer, only to have it rewritten by a senior lawyer, this is not the responsibility of the client.

In fact, according to a study conducted by Samford University Law School in 2007, 48.2% of lawyers believed double billing was ethical, which was up nearly 13% from 10 years prior. It would not be surprising to learn that 12 years removed from the study that the percentage of lawyers who believe double billing is ethical and acceptable has exceeded the 50% mark.

Administrative Tasks. Sometimes law firms will charge attorney or paralegal rates for tasks that could and should be done by administrative staff. The client should not pay $300 an hour for filing a court document. That type of task should be done by a legal secretary at no charge, as part of the firm’s overhead costs.

Discrepancies Between Time Entries. A simple mistake that happens more often than you would think is when two lawyers attend the same meeting but charge different amounts of time for doing so. Another example in discrepancies between time entries occurs when one lawyer charges for an in-office task when another time entry shows she was not in the office that day. The variations of discrepant time entries are many, but the conclusion is singular: one of the time entries is probably inaccurate.

Analyzing the line item charges on legal bills is no small task. The analysis itself is 60% experience in legal practice, 30% psychology, and 10% mechanics and mathematics. Unfortunately for many businesses, computers can only assist in the last and smallest category. Then, when the analysis is done, someone has to negotiate with the billing attorney to convince him that certain charges are unreasonable and should be removed from the bill.

All of this is a daunting task. There is hope for businesses who fear they are being overcharged. Even if you don’t have the resources inside your organization, these functions can be outsourced. Legal bill review services help to increase efficiency and take the burden away from in-house teams and businesses so that they can focus on their work. Finding a legal bill review service that analyzes every line item of all of your invoice every single month is an important and efficient way to help reduce your organization’s legal spend with outside counsel.

Ryan Loro is the president of SIB Legal Bill Review.

One Law Firm’s Fee Collection Nightmare

January 1, 2020

A recent Law.com article by Jack Newsham, “The Dog Ate My Legal Bills: One Law Firm’s Collection Nightmare,” reports on one law firm effort to collect unpaid legal fees.  The article reads:

No one goes into the practice of law dreaming of chasing down clients for unpaid legal bills.  But that’s what dominated discussions in the past year between New York firm Kent, Beatty & Gordon and former client Theodore B. Owen, according to a lawsuit the firm filed Tuesday against Owen, seeking nearly $190,000 in legal fees.

While many law firms have sued clients for unpaid fees, the firm’s collection suit stands out for its lengthy documentation of all the excuses that Owen allegedly used.  Owen is an esports businessman whose legal tussles with his landlady landed on Page Six. 

“Owen … represented on various occasions that Owen (a) was selling bitcoin, (b) had received a large inheritance check, (c) sold ‘offshore assets’ and (d) sold a $5,000,000 investment so as to make all of his payables current,” said the firm’s suit, filed in Manhattan Supreme Court.

The firm went on to list a chronology of Owen’s alleged excuses that stretched on for two pages.  According to the firm, Owen or someone at his company, Dead Waltons LLC, gave the following excuses over the course of 2019:

On Jan. 16, “if the money is not already there, it should be tomorrow.”
On the morning of Jan. 29, “Your money should arrive today.”
On the evening of Jan. 29, “It should be there.”
On Saturday, Feb. 2, “Friday.”
On Thursday, Feb. 7, “I said Friday.”
On Feb. 11, “Jack, you get paid this week.”
On Feb. 23, “Listen I have money … no games just settle down.”
On Mar. 1, “Thanks it will be done.”
On Mar. 25, “Money … will go out tomorrow am.”
In response to an April 10 email, “Please be a little more patient.”
In an April 16 email, “destroying my reputation is not the way to go about getting this resolved. I am going to oay [sic] you.”
Upon being confronted with a $100,000 invoice May 1, “Tuesday I can make a dent … it won’t be all of it but a nice dent.”

“Notwithstanding these and many, many other promises made by Owen … each and every one of the above-referenced dates passed without even partial payment from defendants,” the suit said.  Jonathon Warner of the firm Warner & Scheuerman, who replaced Kent Beatty in one of Owen’s lawsuits, said Monday afternoon that he’d ask his client if he wanted to comment.  Nothing was heard as of press time Tuesday.

Attorney Fee Award Analysis in Section 285

December 10, 2019

A recent Mintz law firm blog post by Andrew H. DeVoogd and Kara E. Grogan of Mintz Levin PC, “Counterproductive and Cost-Increasing Litigation Tactics are Objectively Unreasonable in Section 285 Attorney Fee Award Analysis,” reports on attorney fee awards under Section 285.  This story was posted with permission.  The post reads:

Nearly six years ago, the Supreme Court in Octane Fitness v. ICON Health & Fitness promulgated a “totality of the circumstances test” for awarding reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in exceptional cases under 35 U.S.C. §285.  As lower courts have applied this standard, it has become clear that the motivation and conduct of the losing party is a focal point of the exceptionality analysis.  However, two recent decisions emphasize that bad faith arguments and litigation tactics—by both parties and in all stages of litigation—are critical to the exceptionality analysis in Section 285 attorney fee awards. 

By way of background, Section 285 permits courts, in exceptional cases, to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.  Using the totality of the circumstances test, courts consider factors such as frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case).  However, exceptional cases are rare—reserved for circumstances where a party’s unreasonable conduct—while not necessarily independently sanctionable—is nonetheless so “exceptional” as to justify an award of fees. 

First, the Western District of Louisiana in Total Rebuild Inc. v. PHC Fluid Power, LLC, concluded that although the plaintiff’s patent was found unenforceable due to inequitable conduct, the case was not exceptional, due to the defendant’s “counter-productive and cost-increasing litigation tactics.”  The defendant’s unscrupulous actions included: (1) not informing the court in its opening brief that the plaintiff proposed a “walkaway” settlement offer; (2) evidence suggesting that the defendant’s motive was to deny the “walkaway” settlement, seek judgment against the plaintiff, and file a motion for sanctions to hit the plaintiff—a competitor—with a large judgment; and (3) not engaging in any meaningful settlement discussions.  This amounted to “objective unreasonableness.”  Due these bad faith litigation tactics, the court refused to allow the defendant to “benefit from fueling an environment that increased the cost to litigate this case.”  

Second, a magistrate judge in the Southern District of New York in EMED Technologies v. Repro-Med Systems, recommended finding the case exceptional and granting nearly $1 million in attorney fees due to the plaintiff’s bad faith shortly after granting a summary judgment of noninfringement.  Surprisingly, the magistrate judge based its attorney fee analysis in large part on the plaintiff’s claim construction position.  According to the magistrate, based on Federal Circuit precedent and the patent’s prosecution history, it was bad faith to initiate the litigation despite knowing the “conventional” construction of the claim term “consisting of” as used in the claim.  And, although the court ruled in plaintiff’s favor on other claim terms, “EMED’s success in that regard does not render any less unreasonable its objectively baseless construction and application of the closed mechanical fastener element.”  The court also cited additional examples of the plaintiff’s bad faith, including: (1) filing the action in the incorrect venue; (2) filing a motion for preliminary injunction; and (3) pressing on with the litigation “even after claim construction and the Court’s ruling against it.”  Although the district court judge has yet to affirm this report and recommendation, the magistrate’s opinion is instructive.

Taken together, these cases illustrate that practitioners should be mindful of reasonableness and decorum.  Courts are unlikely to find a case exceptional and award attorney fees if the prevailing party refuses reasonable requests for extensions of time or calls opposing counsel inappropriate names, as in Total Rebuild.  Along those same lines, practitioners should also avoid counterproductive and cost-increasing litigation tactics.  Tactics such as filing useless motions, taking objectively unreasonable positions, refusing to engage in meaningful settlement discussions, and excessive billing are all not only unprofessional (and potentially unethical), but may be used as fodder by an adversary to support an exceptional case fee award.  It is important to also remember that the entire record is scrutinized in a Section 285 analysis.  Baseless or unsupportable motions or positions, even at the start of a case, may come back to bite you and your client.

Andrew H. DeVoogd is a Member at the Boston office of Mintz Levin. Drew is an experienced intellectual property litigator and trial attorney whose work encompasses a broad range of technologies.  He regularly represents clients in high stakes patent disputes, including at the International Trade Commission, involving some of the world's largest technology companies. Kara E. Grogan is an Associate at the Boston office of Mintz Levin.  Kara focuses her practice on Section 337 cases in the International Trade Commission and district court patent litigation.  She has experience in, for example, motion practice, written discovery, and drafting license agreements.

Three Places Overbilling May Be Lurking

December 2, 2019

A recent Law 360 article by Andrew Strickler, “3 Places Overbilling May Be Lurking,” reports on overbilling.  The article reads: By most accounts, the wild ol’ days of lawyer invoicing —...

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