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Category: Fee Caps / Fee Limits

American Airlines' 11th-Hour Demand to Cap Attorney Fees in Class Action

November 28, 2018

A recent Daily Business Review story by Raychel Lean, “Documents Reveal American Airlines’ Alleged ‘11th Hour Campaign’ to Dodge Attorney Fees,” reports that a class action lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida against Texas-based American Airlines Inc. has reached new heights after a last-minute disagreement over attorney fees sent a $25 million settlement agreement into limbo.

Named plaintiff Kristian Zamber sued AA in 2016, alleging that it encouraged consumers to buy travel insurance from third-party company Allianz Global Assistance, while quietly receiving commission for each sale.  According to the complaint, AA’s website encouraged customers to purchase the insurance by forcing them to click “yes” or “no” before continuing with their booking, and by including a bright-green checkmark with the words “highly recommended” next to the policy.

In September, AA agreed to establish a $25 million common fund, allowing anyone affected to submit a claim and receive $11, and agreed to disclose its financial interest in Allianz on it website.  Allianz, under its contract with AA, would be responsible for footing the bill.  But on Oct. 17 — deadline day — AA and Allianz tried to bring additional baggage aboard the settlement, claiming they’d back out unless attorney fees were capped at $2.5 million — 10 percent of the $25 million fund.

Plaintiffs attorney Alec Schultz of Leon Cosgrove in Coral Gables filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, prompting U.S. Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman on Nov. 20 to unseal all documents related to the settlement that AA had asked remain sealed.  “American resolved this case, and it knows it,” the motion said.  According to Schultz’ motion, AA and Allianz’s “eleventh hour campaign” was aimed at “forcing plaintiff’s counsel to collude with them on an attorney’s fees award.”  AA denied any wrongdoing throughout the proceedings.

Though AA has the right to object to attorney fees, Schultz argued that only a judge can decide on the amount awarded — after the terms of a settlement have been agreed, not before.  “American does not, and it cannot usurp this court’s power to try and leverage a better deal for itself,” the motion said.  The unsealed documents include declarations from Zamber and his attorney Schultz about the agreement and the alleged eleventh-hour demand, as well as email chains between the defense and plaintiffs attorneys arranging settlement discussion.

Special Fee Master Recommends $500M in Fees in Syngenta MDL

November 27, 2018

A recent Law.com story by Amanda Bronstad, “Syngenta Special Master Rejects $150M in Fees for Texas Attorney Mikal Watts,” reports that a special master reviewing fee requests from hundreds of law firms in the $1.51 billion settlement with Syngenta has recommended that lead counsel get half the estimated $500 million in legal fees but rejected the idea that attorney Mikal Watts, who represents 60,000 farmers in the deal, should get $150 million.

U.S. District Judge John Lungstrum on Nov. 15 approved the class action settlement, which resolved lawsuits alleging Syngenta sold genetically modified corn seed that China refused to import, causing about 600,000 farmers and other producers to lose billions of dollars.  Lungstrum oversaw the multidistrict litigation coordinated in Kansas federal court, but many other cases were pending in federal and state courts in Minnesota and Illinois.  Some were class actions, while others were individual lawsuits.  That led to a big battle over attorney fees. On Nov. 21, special master Ellen Reisman issued a report and recommendation on how to allocate fees to about 400 law firms.

“Here, the settlement agreement recognizes that the successful result in this case was obtained through the work of multiple counsel in multiple jurisdictions who collectively applied litigation pressure in multiple forums that ultimately persuaded Syngenta to resolve the various litigations through a nationwide class action settlement,” wrote Reisman, of Reisman Karron Greene in Washington, D.C. “How to allocate the attorneys’ fee award among plaintiffs’ counsel is less straightforward.”

Objections to the report are due Dec. 5, and a hearing is set for Dec. 17.  Reisman’s report largely reflects a suggestion from lead counsel in the multidistrict litigation in Kansas on how to divvy up the fees, much of which was based on a fee sharing agreement in the settlement.  Although other lawyers played key roles in reaching the settlement, 50 percent of the fees should go to 95 law firms in the multidistrict litigation in Kansas, Riesman wrote.  That included lead counsel Patrick Stueve of Kansas City, Missouri-based Stueve Siegel Hanson; Don Downing of Gray, Ritter & Graham in St. Louis; Scott Powell of Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton in Birmingham, Alabama; and William Chaney of Dallas-based Gray Reed & McGraw.

Reisman particularly praised the work of a lead settlement counsel Chris Seeger of New York’s Seeger Weiss.  “Mr. Seeger was the clear leader of the settlement effort on the plaintiffs’ side, and without his efforts a settlement would not have been achieved,” she wrote.  She rejected arguments from Watts, of Watts Guerra in San Antonio, that he and a group of 224 associated law firms, representing primarily individual farmers with cases in Minnesota state court, should get one third of the pie.

The dispute mirrors similar fee fights that have erupted in mass torts between plaintiffs attorneys appointed to represent the class and those who have brought individual suits on behalf of their clients.  Reisman, in her report, acknowledged those other cases, predominantly the $1 billion concussion settlement with the National Football League.  In that case, she wrote, the judge allowed some portion of attorney fees to go to lawyers with individual clients, and not just lead class counsel, but capped their contingency rates.  “There is significant legal support for the proposition that the courts have the required personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and the legal and equitable authority to modify contingent fee arrangements,” she wrote.

But she found that the Syngenta litigation had some key differences—most notably, the pressure that a large chunk of individual cases had on reaching a settlement.  In her report, she wrote that “no single event or group of plaintiffs’ counsel was solely responsible for pushing this litigation to resolution.”

The Syngenta multidistrict litigation, created in 2014, involved subclasses of farmers in eight states planned for trials.  Last year, a mistrial aborted the first bellwether trial, in Minnesota, but a federal jury awarded $217.7 million to a class of Kansas farmers in a second trial.  Another trial, on behalf of a class of Minnesota farmers, was ongoing when both sides struck a deal.

Watts Guerra partner Francisco Guerra was co-lead plaintiffs counsel in Minnesota state court, but no one from the firm had a lead role in the multidistrict litigation.  The firm did work on the Minnesota trial, however, and Watts was one of four lawyers appointed to the plaintiffs’ negotiating committee.  Watts did not sign the fee sharing agreement in the settlement but instead based his request on a 2015 joint prosecution agreement with lead counsel in the multidistrict litigation.  He calculated his request using a reduced contingency rate of less than 24.2 percent and $12.8 million in reimbursements for common benefit expenses he paid in the Minnesota state court litigation.

His request for fees got some pushback.  Some lawyers representing individual farmers, including one who filed a lawsuit with Watts earlier this year, accused the Texas lawyer of cutting them out of negotiations and luring farmers to retain him in order to get fees. Watts called the suit “frivolous.”

In court documents, lead counsel in the multidistrict litigation argued that the 2015 joint prosecution agreement had nothing to do with the class actions and would set Watts up to get as much as $200 million.  They sought 50 percent of the $500 million, with Seeger Weiss getting at least 10 percent, but suggested that 12.5 percent go to the lead lawyers in Minnesota state court and 17.5 percent to attorneys in Illinois.  The remaining $100 million would be reserved for other lawyers.

Reisman agreed on the 50 percent and, as to the arguments from Watts, found that the 2015 agreement was “irrelevant” to the fee award in a nationwide class action.  But she doubled the allocation to the Minnesota group, which includes Watts, assigning 24 percent, or about $120.8 million.

“Unquestionably, the Minnesota state court litigation both advanced the cause of pressuring Syngenta on multiple fronts and, through coordination with Kansas counsel, assisted the nationwide class effort,” Reisman wrote.  Lawyers in the Illinois cases, whose award totaled $80.5 million, or about 16 percent, “presented an important third pressure point on Syngenta,” she wrote.

She also allocated 10 percent to lawyers with individual clients, capping their contingency rates at 10 percent.  She said most of those firms recruited clients and filled out fact sheets, while lawyers in leadership in Kansas, Minnesota and Illinois did the “vast majority” of the work.  “A 10 percent contingent fee is obviously a significant reduction from the typical 30-40 percent contingent fee,” she wrote. “However, it is appropriate given the history of this litigation.”

SCOTUS Considers Attorney Fee Caps in Social Security Disability Claims

November 5, 2018

A recent SCOTUS Blog post by Kathryn Moore Guest, “Argument Preview: Justices Consider Cap on Attorney’s Fees for Successful Representation of Social Security Disability Claimants,” reports that attorney Richard Culbertson successfully represented several Social Security disability claimants both before the Social Security Administration and in federal court.  Prior to his representation, he entered into fee agreements that provided that the clients would pay him attorney’s fees equal to 25 percent of past-due benefits for successful representation before the court as well as separate attorney’s fees for successful representation before the agency.  Following longstanding precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, the court below capped his attorney’s fees at 25 percent of past-due benefits for representation before both the Social Security Administration and the court.

In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed to resolve a split among the federal courts of appeals as to whether the Social Security Act imposes an aggregate cap on attorney’s fees of 25 percent of past-due benefits for representation before both the court and the Social Security Administration, or instead the 25 percent cap applies separately to representation before the court.

The Social Security Act regulates the amount and manner in which an attorney may collect fees from a disability claimant for successful representation before the agency and the court.  42 USC § 406(a) governs attorney’s fees for successful representation before the agency, while 42 USC § 406(b) governs attorney’s fees for successful representation before the court.  The Equal Access to Justice Act also authorizes a court to order recovery of “reasonable attorney’s fees” from the government in certain cases in which the claimant is successful and the government’s position was not “substantially justified.”  If attorney’s fees are awarded under the EAJA and under Section 406(b), the attorney must refund the lesser fee to the claimant.  The Social Security Administration withholds a single pool of 25 percent of past-due benefits from which to certify for payment any and all attorney’s fees awarded under Section 406(a) and/or 406(b).

Section 406(a) authorizes two avenues for recovery of attorney’s fees from a claimant for successful representation before the agency.  Under Section 406(a)(1), an attorney may file a “fee petition” with the Social Security Administration.  Alternatively, under a more recent and more commonly used, streamlined process, an attorney may seek approval of a “fee agreement” with a claimant under Section 406(a)(2).  No cap is imposed under Section 406(a)(1).  Section 406(a)(2) limits attorney’s fees to the lesser of 25 percent of past-due benefits or a specified dollar amount, currently set at $6,000.

For successful representation before a court, Section 406(b)(1)(A) provides in relevant part:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [Title II] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.  Section 406(b)(1)(A) further provides that “no other fee may be payable or certified for payment for such representation except as provided in this paragraph.”

Focusing on the “plain meaning” of Section 406(b), Culbertson argues that the term “such representation” in Section 406(b)(1)(A) clearly refers to the antecedent phrase “represented before the court,” and thus under the plain meaning of Section 406(b), the 25 percent cap applies to representation “before the court by an attorney” and does not include representation before the agency.  Culbertson also argues that a separate cap on attorney’s fees for representation before the court is consistent with the structure of Section 406 as well as the purpose of the statute and its legislative history.

Almost 40 years ago, in the first circuit-court decision to address this issue, Dawson v. Finch, the 5th Circuit held that Section 406(b) imposes an aggregate cap on attorney’s fees for representation in the administrative proceedings as well as before the court.  In reaching this result, the 5th Circuit looked to the legislative history of the provision in order to discern Congress’ intent.  Specifically, the court focused on the fact that Congress added Section 406(b) to address two goals.  First, Congress sought to encourage effective legal representation by “insuring lawyers that they will receive reasonable fees directly through certification by the Secretary.”  Second, Congress sought to protect claimants against excessive attorneys’ fees, which in the past had reached one-third to one-half of claimants’ past-due benefits, by imposing the 25 percent cap on fees.  In 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit also looked to this legislative history to hold in Morris v. Social Security Administration that Section 406(b) imposes a cumulative 25 percent cap on attorney’s fees.

More recently, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th, 9th and 10th Circuits have focused on the text of section 406(b) to hold that the 25 percent cap only applies to representation before a court.  See Horenstein v. Secretary of Health and Human Services; Clark v. Astrue; and Wrenn v. Astrue, respectively.

The commissioner’s position on this issue has flipflopped over the years. Almost 40 years ago, the commissioner sided with the 5th Circuit in interpreting Section 406(b) to impose an aggregate cap and opposed the grant of certiorari in Dawson.  Then about 15 years later, the commissioner sought and obtained 6th Circuit en banc review of the panel’s decision in Horenstein v. Secretary of Health and Human Services based on arguments that were logically inconsistent with an aggregate 25 percent cap.  Almost 15 years after that, the commissioner argued in briefs before the 9th and 10th Circuits that an aggregate cap honors congressional intent and it would be inappropriate to permit attorneys to potentially collect up to 25 percent of a disability claimant’s past-due benefits at both the agency and court levels.

In this case, the acting commissioner initially supported the 11th Circuit’s rule imposing an aggregate cap.  Then, after requesting four extensions to file a response, the acting commissioner filed a response siding with Culbertson and arguing that the text of Section 406(b) unambiguously applies the 25 percent cap only to attorney’s fees for representation before a court.  The acting commissioner further argues that a 25 percent cap would be inconsistent with other provisions of Section 406(a) and that the absence of an aggregate cap does not mean that the agency and courts should approve fees that in the aggregate are equal to or greater than 50 percent of a claimant’s past-due benefits.

Because the acting commissioner agrees with Culbertson, the Supreme Court appointed Amy Levin Weil, an experienced 11th Circuit appellate litigator, to serve as amicus curiae in support of the 11th Circuit’s decision. Weil argues that the statute itself does not specifically state whether combined attorney’s fees may exceed 25 percent, and that the text of Section 406(a) and Section 406(b), read together, supports the aggregate rule.  She also points to the legislative history on which the 4th and 5th Circuits relied in support of an aggregate 25 percent cap.  She contends that permitting attorney’s fees to exceed 25 percent in the aggregate could lead to attorneys suing their clients to collect fees out of their present or future Social Security benefits contrary to the Social Security Act’s purpose of ensuring beneficiaries a protected source of income.  She also argues that rejecting the 25 percent aggregate rule would lead to absurd results, with fees of up to 75 percent of past-due benefits if a favorable district court opinion is appealed and the applicant is successful in the court of appeals.  She contends that the aggregate cap allows a logical division of agency and court fees from the 25-percent-of-accrued-benefit pool in a manner that recognizes that a portion of the accrued benefits is attributable to the time that the case was pending before the agency while the other portion is attributable to the time the case was pending before the court.

The National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives filed an amicus brief in the case.  The NOSSCR does not address the plain meaning of the statute.  Instead, it contends that Section 406(b) cannot impose an aggregate 25 percent cap on attorney’s fees for representation before a court and the agency because Section 406(a)(1) does not impose a cap on fees before the agency.  NOSSCR further argues that a court has no discretion to impose an aggregate cap.  NOSSCR informs the court that in circuits without an aggregate cap, the prevailing market rate includes a cumulative cap either by contract or in practice.

Weil faces an uphill battle in convincing the Supreme Court to uphold the 11th Circuit’s decision.  The plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation currently favored by the court supports Culbertson’s position.  Moreover, amici curiae appointed by the Supreme Court typically only win about 25 percent of their cases.  If, however, Weil can convince the court to look beyond the text of the Section 406(b) in isolation, it may, like Chief Judge Geoffrey Crawford of the District of Vermont, find that “it would be strange indeed to believe that Congress would in 1965 denounce 50% contingency fees as excessive and enact a statute to stop them, and then, in 1968, pass a law with the effect of permitting 50% contingency fees.”

Judge Erred By Limiting Attorney Fees in Probate Matter in California

September 7, 2018

A recent Metropolitan News story, “Judge Erred By Limiting Fee to 10 Percent of Minors’ Recovery,” reports that the law firm founded by veteran personal injury Ian “Buddy” Herzog was shortchanged by a Los Angeles Superior Court who awarded it only 10 percent of the $18 million settlement it negotiated for its minor clients, despite a contingency fee agreement calling for 40 percent, the Court of Appeal for this district has held.

The unpublished opinion was filed Wednesday.  In it, Presiding Justice Frances Rothschild of Div. One noted that under Probate Code §3600 and §3601, a court, in approving the compromise of a minor’s claim, must determine what are “reasonable” attorney fees, and pointed to California Rules of Court, rule 7.955, which sets forth guidance for trial judges in determining reasonableness.  A 10 percent fee, she said, was unreasonable in light of the contingency fee agreement, the risk the company took in taking the case on a contingency basis, and other factors.

Herzog, Yuhas, Ehrlich & Ardell of Santa Monica represented the wife and four minor children of Rainer Schulz in a wrongful death suit, after the wealthy German businessman crashed his Cessna 750 jet while attempting to land at a small German airport.  The action against various companies was brought on a products liability theory.  Los Angeles Superior Court Judge William F. Fahey apportioned $1 to Schulz’s widow, Silke Schulz, and the remainder of the $18,125,000 to the couple’s four minor sons.

He did not credit the contingency fee agreement which the widow and the chief executive of a company the Schulzes owned negotiated with the Herzog firm.  Under it, the firm was to receive 31 percent of the proceeds if the case were settled at least 30 days before trial and 40 percent after that point.  Although settlement came a few days before trial, the Herzog firm indicated its willingness to accept a 31 percent share.

Fahey said:  “Turning to the issue of attorney’s fees, the Court is not bound by a contingency agreement when considering the best interests of the minors.  Attorney fees must be carefully scrutinized and adjusted if warranted.  Here, the attorneys hired by Silke did a good job in investigating this case.”  He added:“But paying these attorneys their requested $5 million in fees out of the settlement proceeds would be excessive, to the substantial detriment of Rainer’s sons and contrary to this Court’s duty [to] assure that no injustice is done to them.”

Two of the Schulzes’s sons have permanent disabilities as a result of being born prematurely.  Rule 7.955(a)(2) sets forth: “The court must give consideration to the terms of any representation agreement made between the attorney and the representative of the minor.…”

Rule 7.955(b) lists 14 non-exclusive factors for courts to consider when determining what fee will be reasonable, including the amount of the fee in proportion to the value of services, the experience of the attorney and the amount of time and labor involved.

Rothschild declared: “We conclude the trial court gave too little consideration to California Rules of Court, rule 7.955(a)(2).…In addition, the court did not acknowledge the factors listed in California Rules of Court, rule 7.955(b).  Although these factors are not mandatory, they provide a guide to the considerations relevant to determining whether a fee protects the interests of a minor while allowing an attorney to obtain a fair recovery.”

She continued: “All of these factors support a recovery greater than 10 percent.  One of the two attorneys who primarily worked on the case, Ian Herzog, had 47 years of experience in aviation accident cases, and the other, Thomas Yuhas, had 37 years of experience.  Both attorneys also have many years of experience as pilots, which undoubtedly gave them insight as to the causes of the crash.  In this case, both sides agree that the risk of loss was substantial.  When viewed from the perspective of the time it was signed, the representation agreement thus realistically evaluated the high risk that there could be no recovery at all or one substantially lower than was achieved.”

She noted that the firm advanced more than $300,000 in costs.  In determining the potential for a minor being taken advantage of, the rule counsels, the court should look to the “relative sophistication of the attorney and the representative of the minor.  Rothschild said that Silke Schulz is a highly sophisticated executive who took over the company after her husband’s death.  And who made an informed decision to enlist the services of a firm willing to take the case on a contingency basis.

The jurist noted that rule 7.955 had superseded prior local rules setting the baseline contingency award for minor clients, often at 25 percent.  She drew an analogy to class action attorney fee awards, which have a 25 percent starting point in the Ninth U.S. Circuit and some California courts.  She wrote: “We acknowledge that what is reasonable in applying the factors in California Rules of Court, rule 7.955 in any particular case may comprise a range of percentages.  Under the facts of this case, however, 10 percent was not within that reasonable range.  Although the trial court would be acting within its discretion to award less than 31 percent, we note that 31 percent is not out of line with awards in class actions, which, like this case, involve attorney fees to be paid by a protected class and that require court approval.”

The case is Schulz v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., B277493.

Fee Agreement Issues in Opioid Litigation in Some Texas Counties

August 23, 2018

A recent Forbes story by Daniel Fisher, “Lawyers for Texas Counties in Opioid Cases May Not Have Valid Contracts, reports that a number of Texas counties including Montgomery County, a sprawling suburb north of Houston, may have invalid contracts with their outside lawyers because they haven’t been approved by the Texas Comptroller as required under state law.  More than a dozen counties represented by the law firms Haley & Olson and Harrison Davis Steakley Morrison Jones filed suit without first obtaining the Comptroller’s approval for their contingency fee contracts.  Months later, those contracts still haven’t been approved, possibly putting the suits in peril.

In a 2012 decision involving similar litigation by counties over the mortgage crisis, a federal court stated the requirements under Texas law “must be satisfied before a Texas county can retain outside counsel on a contingency fee basis.”  In another decision that year, a Texas state court judge declared the contract between Harris County and its contingency fee lawyers void because it hadn’t been approved.

Texas passed extensive reforms to its rules on hiring outside lawyers starting in 1999, after private attorneys caused a political uproar by collecting $3.3 billion in fees for representing the state in its lawsuit against the tobacco industry.  Former Texas Attorney General Dan Morales ultimately went to prison for illegally attempting to divert $500 million of those fees to a friend.

The new rules in Texas included a maximum contingency fee of 35%, strict requirements for keeping time and expense records, and a hybrid method of calculating fees that includes a “base fee” determined by actual hours worked times a multiplier of up to four to reflect the risk of taking on the case.  The final fee charged to the government must be the lower of the percentage of the award or the base fee and multiplier, and the fee can only reflect work done by partners and employees of the contracting firms.

Texas legislators were concerned about the possibility of excessive fees and political payoffs in the wake of the scandals surrounding the tobacco litigation and Morales’ criminal trial, said Charles Silver, a professor at the University of Texas Law School and prominent legal affairs expert.  Most trial lawyers in Texas are Democrats and the governor at the time was George W. Bush, a Republican.  “The legislature was dominated by Bush and the Republicans, and they just didn’t want to be supporting plaintiff attorneys who were supporting the Democratic party,” Silver said.

Regardless of the motivating factors, comptroller approval and billing records are the law in Texas, and even considered public records.  Montgomery County’s lawyers seem to agree: The contract says they will comply with Section 2254.104(a) of the Texas Government Code, including maintaining “current and complete written time and expense records” that will be available to county or state officials “at any time upon request.”

Despite this requirement, Montgomery County Assistant District Attorney John J. McKinney, in an Aug. 14 letter, said “no documents exist that are responsive” to a request for billing records.  It’s not surprising counties might balk at complying with the recordkeeping requirements of Section 2254, Silver said.  “Lawyers don’t like others knowing how much time and effort they’re expending, whether on the plaintiff or defense side,” he said.

The hours compiled to calculate the base fee could be an issue in opioid litigation, however.  Unlike many lawsuits in which a law firm represents a single government entity suing over a single claim, opioids law firms have bundled large numbers of municipal clients and are working closely with national law firms that control the federal multidistrict litigation in the court of U.S. District Judge Dan Aaron Polster in Ohio.

One sign of the cooperation among law firms is Montgomery County’s lawsuit, filed Dec. 13 in federal court in Houston.  It is an almost word-for-word copy of the lawsuit filed by three different law firms, including Dallas-based Simon Greenstone, on behalf of Bowie County more than two months before.

A close examination of the billing records might reveal how much time Montgomery County’s lawyers spent in the early stages of the litigation, and whether that is justified given evidence they used a borrowed complaint.  The other 12 counties might also want to compare their base fee calculations with each other to make sure their lawyers aren’t double-billing hours across the entire group.

Other Texas counties including Dallas and Harris have obtained Comptroller approval of their contracts.  And an attorney retained by Clay County (another client of Haley & Olson and Harrison Davis Steakley Morrison Jones) said they would submit the contract to the state during a January meeting when Clay County Commissioners Court approved hiring the firms. Clay County’s contract has not yet been approved.

The stakes for the counties could be high if defendant companies challenge the status of their representation.  When private lawyers representing several Texas counties attempted to assemble a statewide class action in litigation against Merscorp, a mortgage registry, the federal judge who examined Texas law said it wasn’t possible because each county needed the Comptroller’s approval before joining the class.  Under the law of the Fifth Circuit, which includes Texas, so-called “opt-in” class actions aren’t allowed under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Texas judge who declared Harris County’s contract with private lawyers void nevertheless allowed the case to proceed because the complaint was also signed by the county attorney’s office. Montgomery County’s complaint is signed only by the private lawyers.

Law’s $1,000-Plus Hourly Rate Club

July 23, 2018

A recent Wall Street Journal story by Vanessa O’Connell, “Big Law’s $1,000-Plus an Hour Club,” reports that leading attorneys in the U.S. are asking as much as $1,250 an hour, significantly...

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Law Firm Can’t Avoid Contingency Fee Cap

February 2, 2018

A recent New Jersey Law Journal story by David Gialanella, “Law Firm Can’t Skirt Contingency Fee Cap, Court Rules,” reports that a New Jersey plaintiff firm seeking a 45 percent contingency fee...

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