A recent Law 360 story by Celeste Bott, “Ill. Judge Needs More Info To OK $57M Chicken Antitrust Fee”, reports that an Illinois federal judge overseeing a sprawling antitrust litigation against broiler chicken producers said he couldn't rule on class counsel's renewed bid for a $57 million attorney fee award thrown out by the Seventh Circuit last year without more information on one of the firm's graduated fee arrangements in a similar 2015 antitrust case, which wasn't disclosed in the first go-around.

U.S. District Judge Thomas Durkin said during a remote hearing that he wanted more briefing from the both plaintiffs' firms — Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP and Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC — and from class objector John Andren as to what effect the 2015 case has had in assessing the attorney fee award in the $181 million deal for chicken buyers.

In the earlier case, Cohen Milstein took on some of the nation's largest investment banks while representing the Public School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of Chicago, a sophisticated plaintiff which negotiated attorney fees ex ante, or ahead of case resolution.

In that case, the plaintiff adopted a graduated scale.  If the same scale were to be used in the chicken case, class counsel estimated they would be entitled to $44 million for the $181 million settlement, or roughly 26%.  But the counsel argued they would have negotiated a higher rate in the broiler chicken case because it doesn't involve a trillion-dollar financial market.

Andren, meanwhile, said Judge Durkin should apply a similar fee schedule agreed to by Chicago Teachers, which entail fee brackets that decline both by the size of the settlement and by the stage of settlement.

"The latter is as important as the former, because sophisticated plaintiffs realize that trials are expensive and risky," Andren said in his opposition to the firms' renewed bid for a $57 million fee award in the chicken case.  "To align the incentives of class and counsel, attorneys need to receive a larger share of the recovery for more procedurally-advanced settlements and verdicts. This cannot occur when relatively early settlements are paid at 33%."  Judge Durkin also noted Tuesday that both are large, complex antitrust cases with many defendants and astronomical damages.  "There's enough similarities where I want to hear from both sides," he said.

The law firms, however, have contended "there is an ocean" between the size of the potential recovery, and potential fee awards, in both cases, and noted that in the chicken case, they represent indirect purchasers, which increases the risk relative to the banking cases.

"Indirect purchasers face defendant attacks that direct purchasers do not, and these attacks increase the chance of waking away with nothing.  And even though they take on this additional risk, the total damages indirect purchasers can recover based on state law claims is about half of what direct purchasers can recover for their federal claims," the firms said in a renewed fee motion filed in September 2023.

In that motion, they argued the court applied the correct methodology for determining fees the first time and came to the correct conclusion in awarding just over 33% of the settlement fund.  "Not only does the original award align with other awards in this specific case, it also aligns with the best available data on negotiated rates in antitrust cases," the class counsel said.  The fee award is back for reconsideration by Judge Durkin after the Seventh Circuit held last year that he failed to adequately consider bids made by class counsel in auctions in other cases and fee awards in different circuits.

Andren had taken issue with the roughly one-third cut of the settlement that Hagens Berman and Cohen Milstein were to receive in a deal the firms had struck with Fieldale Farms Corp., Peco Foods Inc., George's Inc., Tyson Foods Inc., Pilgrim's Pride Corp. and Mar-Jac Poultry.

Private plaintiffs began suing the nation's largest broiler-chicken producers in September 2016, claiming the producers coordinated and limited chicken production to raise prices and exchanged detailed information about capacity, sales volume and other data through statistical research compiler Agri Stats Inc.

The settlements at issue in this appeal were reached with Tyson for $99 million, Pilgrim's for $75.5 million, Peco for $1.9 million, George's for $1.9 million, Fieldale for $1.7 million and Mar-Jac for $1 million.  The agreements were awarded final approval by a district judge in December 2021.

A three-judge Seventh Circuit panel complimented the lower court in August 2023 for its "fine job of shepherding" the complex litigation, but said it made a mistake when it discounted bids made by one of the two firms serving as class counsel in other cases because the proposals had declining fee scale award structures.

Andren had also argued that the lower court should have taken into account that class counsel frequently did work in Ninth Circuit district courts, which employ a lower 25% "benchmark" for presumptively reasonable attorney fees.  The Seventh Circuit panel agreed the Illinois district judge shouldn't have categorically assigned less weight to Ninth Circuit cases in which counsel was awarded fees under a mega-fund rule.  In addition to vacating the fee award, the panel remanded the matter for "greater explanation and consideration" of the factors it laid out, noting it expressed no preference as to the amount or structure of the award, just the need for further review.

A recent Law 360 story by Lauraann Wood, “Ill. Justices Weigh Whether Rule Violation Merits Fee Award”, reports that the Illinois Supreme Court has questioned whether two law firms should be allowed to preserve their $1.7 million fee award for their work on a family dispute that settled after they were fired, as the justices asked whether fees are appropriate if the firms never disclosed how they would split the money.

Every justice on the state high court bench offered either a question or a criticism during oral argument as they weighed whether the quantum meruit claim by Stephen J. Schlegel Ltd. and Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates Ltd. was correctly sent back to the trial court for an award that ignores their illegal fee agreement with former clients Maureen V. O'Brien and her nephew Daniel O'Brien III.

Some justices highlighted on one hand the 3,000 hours and years of work the firms put into the O'Briens' underlying family dispute before they were fired and the case settled about two weeks later.  Other justices, including Justice Joy Cunningham, noted the firms' failure to properly disclose their fee-sharing agreement to the O'Briens and questioned whether allowing them to recover fees essentially rewards them for violating a rule of professional conduct.

"Rules exist for a reason," Justice Cunningham said.  "It seems to me from looking at the figure that … they basically got what they would have gotten anyway, so the rule means nothing, and as a Supreme Court, are we supposed to agree that it's OK not to follow our rules?"

Representing the firms, Jeremy Boeder of Tribler Orpett & Meyer PC argued that his clients should receive an equitable fee award for their work because the trial court considered their rule violation and its potential effects before awarding their fees.  Pressed by Justice Cunningham to identify the consequence they would then face for violating the state's fee-sharing disclosure rule, Boeder said there would be none.  "And it's our position that there shouldn't always be a consequence in a case like this for a violation of a rule of professional conduct," he argued.

Acknowledging Justice Lisa Holder White's suggestion that the trial court could award the firms the same amount in fees even without considering their client contract, Boeder argued that spending the time "to get to the point that we've already reached" is unnecessary.  That process would also be wrong because sending the case back would essentially tell the trial court that it "has to go with the second-best option" despite considering all the relevant evidence in a six-day bench trial, he told the justices.  "Why should that be a command upon a trial court of equity, who really was in the best position to evaluate all of the issues here?" the attorney said.

The O'Briens' counsel argued that the firms should not receive any fees even if the justices agree they should go back to the trial court for a new award. Indeed, the O'Briens believe the firms' work is worth "less than zero," partly because they advised Maureen O'Brien to resign as the coexecutor of her parents' estate, which was her "only source of leverage, or power, or control" in the underlying dispute, John Fitzgerald of Tabet DiVito & Rothstein LLC told the justices.  "It is impossible to overstate how catastrophic that legal advice was," he told the court.

The state high court has previously voided a fee agreement that violated professional conduct rules in a case between a litigation consultant and an expert search firm, and the reasoning then should still apply because "there's no public policy reason or any other reason to treat lawyers differently from anyone else who enters a contract that violates public policy," Fitzgerald argued.  "Quantum meruit means 'as much as he or she deserves. 'No one deserves anything that violates public policy," he said.

Fees are also inappropriate because although the firms litigated some issues in the O'Briens' underlying dispute and made some settlement offers, there is no proof the O'Briens' subsequent counsel relied on the firms' earlier work to eventually reach their $16.85 million settlement, Fitzgerald argued.  Any outstanding settlement offers had been withdrawn, and no new offers had been made for weeks by the time the firms were fired, so any potential numbers had gone back to zero by the time the O'Briens' subsequent counsel began handling their case, he said.  "The fact that the next lawyer was able to settle the case on certain terms, I don't think that necessarily means these plaintiffs could have gotten that deal done on the same terms or comparable terms," Fitzgerald said.

Blasting that contention on rebuttal, Boeder argued that it was the firms' settlement back-and-forth that ultimately brought the underlying litigants to their agreeable meeting points and resolve their family dispute.  The firms had made an $18.3 million demand that was met with a $16.25 offer, which then prompted a $16.75 million counter-demand the firms were prepared to send back before they were ultimately fired, he said.  "The settlement was on almost exactly the same terms as the counter-demand that my client proposed," Boeder argued.  "Why wasn't that counter-demand made?  Because Dan and Maureen O'Brien refused to allow my clients to make it on their behalf."

A recent Law.com story by Abgail Adcox, “Big Law Takes Bigger Bet on Contingency Fee Practices”, reports that, in a quest to maximize profitability, Am Law 200 law firms have grown their share of business tied to contingency fees, a gamble that has paid off for some firms in recent years.  Kirkland & Ellis, Crowell & Moring, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan and Susman Godfrey are among the firms that have represented plaintiffs on a contingency fee basis, agreeing to take on certain litigation in return for a portion of any recovery in a settlement or judgment.

And it’s not just these firms, say litigation funders.  ”It’s fair to say we’ve seen a noticeable increase in interest in building out plaintiff side practices among the more traditional defense-oriented law firms,” said Evan Meyerson, director at Burford Capital, in an interview.  “There’s a growing desire to become—and comfort level with becoming—truly the one-stop shop for their institutional clients.”

Last year, Burford executed multiple portfolio-style transactions with first-time counterparties in the Am Law 50, Meyerson reported.  Firms are seeking new ways to “differentiate their businesses,” with plaintiff-side litigation being a “pretty powerful differentiator in the marketplace,” according to Meyerson.  ”We’re definitely seeing an increase in appetite among what were traditionally the more risk-averse law firms in growing their contingency practices.”

Law firms such as Kirkland & Ellis have trumpeted a concerted effort to expand its contingency docket in recent years.  In 2021, Kirkland brought home a $200 million contingency fee for its representation of client Huntsman Corp. in a dispute.  Overall, in 2022, Kirkland said it had secured more than $2 billion in recoveries in trials for clients such as Motorola and Trizetto.

“We launched what’s now a very successful plaintiff-side practice on the view that we’re uniquely positioned in the market to arm our top trial lawyers with unlimited resources and a willingness to invest whatever it takes for the right cases,” Andrew Kassof, a leader of Kirkland’s litigation practice and a member of its executive committee, said in a statement this week.  “This practice has remained really active, with a number of new litigation matters filed last year and more coming in 2024,” Kassof added.

Other firms are also seeking out more contingency fee work.  For instance, at DLA Piper, the firm is “looking to exploit contingency fee opportunities more.  That’s part of our strategy for the firm.  We’re not going to do it wholesale, but where the opportunity works for our philosophy, we’re going to do it,” said global co-CEO, co-chair and Americas chair Frank Ryan.

Financial Swings

However, due to the unpredictable nature of when cases lead to recoveries, firms’ contingency practices have sometimes resulted in sharp swings in financial performances over the years for some.  A slow year for contingency collections contributed to Fish & Richardson’s 2.4% decline in gross revenue, firm president and CEO John Adkisson said.

“At a high level, I’m thrilled with where our business levels are,” said Adkisson, noting that the firm’s “core” or non-contingent revenue rose for the seventh year in a row.  “On the contingent side, our principals here recognize that that is going to ebb and flow.  We have a number of very exciting opportunities in the pipeline but 2023 was a slower year in terms of contingency fee recoveries.”

Crowell & Moring’s gross revenue growth slowed last year, inching up 0.9% to $595.5 million, as receipts from the firm’s contingency docket returned to lower levels in 2023.

In previous years the firm has reported hefty contingency fees supporting double-digit percentage revenue growth.  In 2020, a year in which the firm recovered more than $2.2 billion for clients in affirmative recoveries, the firm posted an 18.7% increase in gross revenue.

Crowell chair Phil Inglima said in an interview that the firm is “balancing prudently how much we’re investing in contingent docket versus how much we’re deriving from the traditional strengths of the firm.”

Inglima reported that the firm only factors a “small amount” of contingency matters into the firm’s budget each year and that attorneys spend no more than 10-12% of their time overall on the matters.  “We do anticipate with some precision when the claim funds will be paying, when distribution events will occur from that.  So that’s the only part that we really budgeted at all,” Inglima said about 2023.  “We did achieve at the level that we expected in the budget last year, but we didn’t have extraordinary receipts to have a windfall of any kind in 2023 for the contingent docket.”

Meanwhile, at Quinn Emanuel, gross revenue increased nearly 28% to $2.07 billion in 2023.  Approximately 8% of the firm’s revenue came in the form of contingency fees, a slightly higher proportion than 2022, but not materially, Michael Carlinsky, one of three co-managing partners at the firm, told The American Lawyer in an interview.

Trial firm Susman Godfrey nearly doubled its revenue in 2023 and more than doubled its profits per equity partner.  According to Kalpana Srinivasan, co-managing partner at Susman, 71% of the firm’s fees in 2023 came from contingent-fee work, compared with 43% contingent-fee in 2022.

Those percentages reflect the lifecycle of litigation, Srinivasan said. “We have 40-plus years of experience in contingent-fee matters.  We know you can’t precisely designate when a case is going to resolve or generate revenue, but that’s OK, because we have so many of them in the pipeline,” she said.

King & Spalding and Dorsey & Witney leaders also said contingency fee cases contributed to their firm’s financial gains last year.  For 2022, Lowenstein Sandler cited litigation and contingency fee work as a driver of a double-digit percentage gains in revenue and profits that year.

Lit Funding Terms

In light of the risks that come with contingency work, firms have increasingly sought out funders such as Burford Capital, which will fund a portion of their fees and expenses.  “Our deals are what we call non-recourse,” said Meyerson, adding that means, “if a case we finance loses, our counter-party on that deal keeps that financing and has no further obligations to repay Burford.”

“Probably unsurprisingly, our pricing reflects that risk,” he added.  “We’re usually seeking some combination of a multiple on our investment amount, percentage of the outcome or an interest rate that in aggregate typically resembles a law firm contingency rate.”  As a result, there is not a “one-size-fits-all model” for Burford’s pricing, Meyerson said.

“It is typical for firms to come to us asking for something close to full coverage on expenses, whereas on fees, there’s greater variability with firms who are willing to take on more or less of that risk,” Meyerson later said.  While, overall law firms typically only see a small portion of their revenue derived from alternative fee arrangements, which includes contingency work, the percentage has grown in recent years.

The Citi Law Firm Leaders Survey found that 20.6% of 2022 revenue came from AFAs, which is the highest average the survey has recorded.  In 2023, similar proportions are expected, according to the 2024 Citi Hildebrand Client Advisory.  By 2025, 72% of law firms expect revenue from AFAs to increase, the advisory said.

A recent Law 360 story by Emily Sawicki, “NJ Ethics Board Says Referral Fees Only For In-State Attys”, reports that new guidance provided by the New Jersey Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics recommends against the payment of referral fees for out-of-state lawyers, reasoning that such fees, considered payment for legal services, can only be provided to attorneys licensed to practice law in the state.

The opinion on referral fees, Opinion 745, came as a response to inquiries regarding attorneys from outside New Jersey requesting referral fees, the advisory committee said, including instances in which in-state attorneys who spend their winters in Florida "present local lawyers with legal issues that involve New Jersey law," and attorneys from neighboring states represent New Jersey clients. Opinion 745 was issued March 7 and made available.

In both of these instances, it is generally not appropriate to pay out-of-state lawyers referral fees, the opinion stated, unless the attorney is eligible and licensed to practice law in New Jersey.  The opinion also detailed limitations on who should pay such fees.  "Only New Jersey lawyers who are certified trial lawyers … may pay a referral fee," according to the opinion, which clarified that the state's professional conduct rules "prohibit other New Jersey lawyers from paying referral fees."

New Jersey's Rules of Professional Conduct also detail the limited scope under which referral fees should be paid, pointing out such fees are only appropriate for attorneys who are not part of the same law firm.  Clients must consent to each of the lawyers involved and be notified of the fee division, and the fee must be "reasonable," the ethics rules dictate.  "The division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer, or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation," according to the professional conduct rules.

The ethics committee clarified that the fee is "considered payment for legal services rendered in the case," but is not payment "in proportion to actual services rendered."  Because of this distinction, only New Jersey lawyers are eligible to collect such fees.  "People who are not permitted to practice law in New Jersey may not receive fees for legal services rendered," the opinion said.

The referral fee guidance also notes that it is not appropriate to pay a referral fee to a lawyer who is unable to take up a case or must bow out of a case due to a conflict of interest.  However, if a certified New Jersey lawyer must exit because an "unforeseen conflict arises in the midst of litigation and was not foreseeable," it is appropriate to pay the lawyer for legal services rendered, the opinion stated.

"Certified lawyers may pay referral fees to lawyers who were in good standing and eligible to practice law at the time of the referral but who later were suspended or disbarred at the time the case was concluded and the referral fee was payable," the opinion stated, citing precedent set in 2008 in the New Jersey Appellate Division case Eichen Levinson & Crutchlow LLP v. Weiner.

In that case, the opinion said, "the court reasoned that the referring lawyer was not required to have performed any legal work on the referred cases to obtain the referral fee and, at the time of the referral, the lawyer was eligible to practice."

The payment and acceptance of referral fees are dictated by individual state ethics rules and, therefore, there may be instances in which a New Jersey lawyer may accept a referral fee when doing work in other states.  It is up to the lawyer to ensure such fees are permitted, and that services fit the "specific needs of the client."

A recent Law 360 story by Carolina Bolado, “11^th Circ. Says Broker Can’t Collect Fees in Copyright Case”, reports that the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that a Florida real estate broker cannot collect attorney fees incurred for defending himself from a copyright infringement suit by an aerial photography company because the broker was not a prevailing party once the photography company voluntarily dismissed the case.

In an opinion issued Feb. 28, the appeals court affirmed a district court decision denying a request by real estate broker John Abdelsayed and his company Trends Realty USA Corp. for an award of their attorney fees and costs from Affordable Aerial Photography Inc.  That company had sued over the use of a copyrighted photograph on Trends Realty's website.

Abdelsayed and Trends Realty argued that they are entitled to fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which mandates a fee award if an offer to settle is not accepted and ends up being more favorable than the judgment obtained, and under the Copyright Act's cost-shifting provision.

But the Eleventh Circuit said they are not entitled to fees under Rule 68 because it only applies when a plaintiff has obtained a judgment for an amount less favorable than the defendant's settlement offer.  It does not apply in cases where the defendant wins a judgment, the appeals court said.  And because Abdelsayed and Trends Realty did not obtain a judgment, they are not prevailing parties in the suit and are therefore not eligible for a fee award under the Copyright Act, according to the Eleventh Circuit.

"The order of dismissal does not prevent AAP from refiling its claims," the appeals court said.  "And even assuming future action by AAP may be unlikely or now barred by the statute of limitations, those facts are irrelevant because the court did not rebuff or reject AAP's claims on any grounds."

Abdelsayed, who operates in the Palm Beach County market, was sued in August 2021 in the Southern District of Florida by Affordable Aerial Photography for using a copyrighted photograph on Trends Realty's site.  AAP moved to voluntarily dismiss the suit without prejudice a year later.

After briefing and a hearing, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. The court ruled that if AAP were to refile its case, it would have to pay the defendants' reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending this case.  Two months later, Abdelsayed and Trends Realty asked the court to reconsider that order, claiming they were entitled to immediate recovery of their fees under Rule 68 and the Copyright Act. But the court denied the request.

On appeal, the defendants argued to the Eleventh Circuit that allowing this would create an incentive for a plaintiff to drop a case just before an expected adverse ruling, but the appeals court pointed out that the plaintiff can't do this unilaterally and that a dismissal must be approved by the court.  In this case, the district court held a hearing and found that the defendants would not suffer legal prejudice because their counsel was pro bono or on a contingency agreement, according to the appeals court.

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