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Law’s $1,000-Plus Hourly Rate Club

July 23, 2018

A recent Wall Street Journal story by Vanessa O’Connell, “Big Law’s $1,000-Plus an Hour Club,” reports that leading attorneys in the U.S. are asking as much as $1,250 an hour, significantly more than in previous years, taking advantage of big clients' willingness to pay top dollar for certain types of services.  A few pioneers had raised their fees to more than $1,000 an hour about five years ago, at the peak of the economic boom.  But after the recession hit, many of the rest of the industry's elite were hesitant, until recently, to charge more than $990 an hour.

While companies have cut legal budgets and continue to push for hourly discounts and capped-fee deals with their law firms, many of them have shown they won't skimp on some kinds of legal advice, especially in high-stakes situations or when they think a star attorney might resolve their problem faster and more efficiently than a lesser-known talent.  Harvey Miller, a bankruptcy partner at New York-based Weil, Gotshal & Manges, said his firm had an "artificial constraint" limiting top partners' hourly fee because "$1,000 an hour is a lot of money."  It got rid of the cap after studying filings that showed other lawyers surpassing that barrier by about $50.

Today Mr. Miller and some other lawyers at Weil Gotshal ask as much as $1,045 an hour.  "The underlying principle is if you can get it, get it," he said.  "Not many attorneys can command four figures hourly, and I do have trouble swallowing that," said Thomas L. Sager, general counsel at chemical maker DuPont Co. Still, he added, DuPont pays more than $1,000 an hour to a "select few," particularly for mergers-and-acquisitions advice.

Janine Dascenzo, associate general counsel of General Electric Co. said that her company is willing to pay what it must when it needs a lawyer with "unique" expertise.  "We'll keep paying them a lot of money, because they're worth that," she added.  Industrywide, attorneys in finance-related practices such as M&A, bankruptcy law and taxes, tend to command a premium to their peers in other specialties.

One of the priciest attorneys over the past year, according to court filings, has been Kirk A. Radke, whose specialty at Kirkland & Ellis LLP in New York is advising clients on leveraged buyouts and forming private-equity funds.  As of early 2010, Mr. Radke, whose clients include private-equity firm Avista Capital Partners, had an hourly fee of $1,250.  Mr. Radke and Kirkland & Ellis declined to comment, as did Avista Capital.

Such rates are contributing to inflation across the $100 billion-a-year global corporate-law industry as the slow economic recovery has left many law firms struggling to finance the hefty pay packages they award their stars.  Since most law partners bill roughly 2,000 hours, those asking $1,100 hourly will bring in $2.2 million, a few million short of the $3 million or $4 million in annual compensation star attorneys get at many big firms.

To help fill the gap, the firms rely on the profit they often reap on the work of junior attorneys, or associates.  Dozens of associates at a time can work on a single case, and some firms bill as much as $700 an hour for their time, according to Valeo Partners, a Washington consulting firm that maintains a database of hourly legal rates in fields such as litigation, corporate law and intellectual property.  That strategy can fuel tensions with clients. "We are much less willing to pay an army of associates at the ever-increasing rate," said GE's Ms. Dascenzo.

"Plenty of clients say to me, 'I don't have any problems with your rate,' " said William F. Nelson, a Washington-based tax partner at Bingham McCutchen, who commands $1,095 an hour, up from $1,065 last year.  "But there is price pressure for associates, especially junior lawyers.  A small but growing number of top lawyers are using other arrangements in place of hourly billing.  David Boies, chairman of Boies, Schiller & Flexner and a prominent trial lawyer, charges $960 an hour, a spokeswoman for the firm said.  But just a third of his time is devoted to matters that are billed hourly.  More often his deals with clients involve alternatives such as pegging fees to his success, she said.

More typically, big law firms' managing partners dictate hourly rates annually, often studying what their rivals charge, according to disclosures in their attorney-fee filings in corporate-bankruptcy cases, which provide a rare public peek at the industry.  Such cases involve more than just bankruptcy lawyers; they frequently draw in a range of attorneys, including specialists in such areas as taxes, product liability and environmental and intellectual-property law.

This year, top litigators at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, a Philadelphia-based firm, are asking as much as $1,200 an hour.  A spokeswoman for the firm said "less than 1% of our partners are at rates of $1,000 or more."  Gregory B. Craig, a former counsel to the Obama White House who joined Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP a year ago as a Washington-based litigation partner, is asking $1,065 an hour, according to a court filing last month.

M&A lawyer John M. Reiss, from White & Case in New York, started billing $1,100 an hour last year.  "Some clients do focus on the hourly rate, but in the end what really matters is their total cost and whether they got a fair price," said Mr. Reiss.  In recent years, pressure from clients for discounts has made it increasingly difficult for law firms to increase their lawyers' fees across the board.  Hourly rates for partners rose by an average 3% in 2009 and 2010, and 2.3% this year, compared with an 8% increase in 2008, according to Hildebrandt Baker Robbins.  The average law-firm partner now asks $635 an hour and bills $575, the firm said.  But a small group of attorneys in some specialties command significantly more.

Nearly 2.9% of partners at a group of 24 large U.S. and British law firms asked for $1,000 an hour or more in U.S. cases last year, up from 1.5% in 2009, according to Valeo.  London-based lawyers have tended to charge higher per-hour rates than their U.S.-based counterparts.  However, London attorneys typically don't bill as many hours on a case as do U.S. attorneys, some lawyers say.

Texas Companies Spend Record Legal Fees in 2017

May 4, 2018

A recent Texas Lawbook story by Mark Curriden, “Texas Companies Paid Record Legal Fees in 2017,” reports that Texas companies paid law firms that represent them a record-setting amount of money in 2017 and an increasing percentage of those legal fees are going to national law firms that have recently opened offices in Houston, Dallas and Austin.

Exclusive new financial data collected by The Texas Lawbook shows that the 50 largest corporate law firms operating in Texas – nearly all of them with offices in Houston – employed essentially the same number of lawyers in 2017 as they did in 2016 and 2015, but those law firms are charging higher rates and making considerably more money.

Nearly two-dozen law firms in Texas, led by Houston-based Vinson & Elkins and national firms Kirkland & Ellis and Winston & Strawn, generated record high revenues last year as a result of them routinely charging corporate clients $1,000 an hour or more.

At the same time, several large Texas legacy law firms are struggling for survival or at least seek stability.  "The Texas corporate legal market is experiencing dramatic changes and these changes are expensive," said Chicago law firm consultant Kent Zimmerman. "The numbers confirm that the rich law firms are getting richer and some long-time Texas law firms are getting left behind."

Legal industry analysts say the most important statistic in The Texas Lawbook data is the fact that revenue per lawyer at 14 law firms operating in Houston now exceed $1 million a year – an amount previously achieved by the most elite and expensive national firms. Only two of the 14 firms – V&E and Baker Botts – are headquartered in Texas.

"The formula for success is simple," Zimmerman said. "The law firms that pay the most get the best lawyers. The best lawyers get the best clients and the best work. The best clients pay the highest rates and generate the best revenues. And then you can use those revenues to pay the best lawyers and the cycle starts over again."

The 50 largest legal practices in the state generated $5.65 billion in revenues from their lawyers who office in the state – a 2.4 percent increase from 2016.

But the data also shows that elite national law firms that have opened offices in Houston and Dallas during the past few years are growing considerably faster than law firms headquartered in Texas and that growth is mostly at the expense of locally based firms.

Two excellent examples are Chicago-based Kirkland & Ellis and New York-based Simpson Thacher & Bartlett.

Kirkland opened its Houston office in April 2014, but it now has more than 130 lawyers and generated an estimated $187 million in revenues in 2017, making it the 11th largest legal operation in Texas.

Simpson Thacher, which debuted in Houston in 2011, has witnessed significant growth the past three years – from $25.6 million in revenues in 2015 to $47 million in 2017, an 83.6 percent jump.

The Texas Lawbook analysis of the exclusive data involving the 50 largest corporate law firms operating in Texas shows that:

  • Nearly 40 percent of the 7,000 corporate lawyers in Texas are now employed by law firms headquartered outside of the state;
  • The Texas offices of national law firms generated $2.57 billion in 2017 – a 38 percent increase from just two years ago;
  • By contrast, lawyers for Texas-based law firms brought in $3.1 billion in revenue in 2017, which is the same amount as the previous two years; and
  • Thirty-three of the top 50 law firms by revenue generated from their Texas offices were based outside of the state – up from three of the top 50 just seven years ago.

To be sure, large Texas legacy law firms – V&E, Baker Botts, Bracewell and Locke Lord, for example – still generate billions of dollars in combined revenues, employ thousands of lawyers and still do a huge majority of the legal work for businesses in Texas. Many of them are experiencing tremendous financial success.

The Texas Lawbook obtained the financial data from interviews with law firm leaders, law partners who recently departed the firms and legal industry analysts. Only one law firm – Houston-based Susman Godfrey – refused to provide any kind of statistics to The Texas Lawbook.

The 2017 data shows that Houston-based V&E is now the largest legal operation in Texas by revenue. V&E lawyers in Austin, Dallas and Houston brought in an estimated $484 million – a 6.6 percent increase over 2016 and a 15.5 percent jump from 2015.

"We had a truly fabulous year – a record year," said V&E Chairman Mark Kelly. "Demand was up, which was good. We have 112 summer associates coming in. So, we are ramping up for another great year and for expansion."

While national law firms have raided V&E for scores of lawyers during the past seven years, legal industry analysts say that V&E has also benefited from the national invasion in one simple way: the elite national law firms with dramatically higher rates provided cover to V&E to significantly increase the rates it charges clients.

Most Texas-based law firms decided to use their lower hourly rates as a marketing tool to retain business. But V&E, according to legal consultants, took the opposite approach.

"The challenge for law firms is attracting and keeping the best legal talent," Kelly said. "For law firms with revenues less than $1 million per lawyer, it will be tough for them to compete. We want the high-end work and that means we need the top talent."

Lawyers in the Texas offices of Baker Botts had $378 million in 2017 revenues for its Texas offices.

Haynes and Boone and Jackson Walker are two Texas-based law firms that increased their lawyer head count and their revenues at their Texas offices.

Haynes and Boone increased its Texas revenues to $272 million, which is 15.3 percent higher than in 2015. Jackson Walker's revenues hit $249 million in 2017, which is a 12.6 percent jump from two years earlier.

"2017 was our best year ever," said Haynes and Boone managing partner Tim Powers. "We saw strong performances across the board and we benefited from our clients doing some really great things.

"We are cautiously optimistic about 2018," Powers said. "The tax reform law will hopefully drive significant investment in Texas and infrastructure legislation could mean good work in the next year. But a trade war could have a devastating impact."

Thirteen law firms have seen their revenues in Texas grow by 20 percent or more from 2015 to 2017. All but one – Houston-based Gray Reed – is headquartered outside the state.

Gray Reed, which has 140 lawyers in Houston and Dallas, has seen its revenues grow from $50.4 million in 2015 to $65.7 million last year – a 30.5 percent jump.

"We've had three consecutive years of record revenues," said Gray Reed managing partner J. Cary Gray, who added that the firm has no interest in growing outside of Texas or merging with another firm. "There are certain legal services that people and businesses need handled by high quality lawyers, but they don't want to pay $1,000 an hour for it. That is our sweet spot."

Why Elite Law Firms Should Raise Hourly Rates

March 5, 2018

A recent Law.com article by Hugh A. Simons, “Why Elite Law Should Raise Rates,” reports on hourly rates at elite law firms.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Elite law’s self-confidence has taken a beating. First the great recession hit, and now talk of disruption abounds. But the recession is over and disruption is far from an existential threat. It’s time for elite law to rediscover belief in the value it provides and start to raise rates as it did before the recession. Specifically, elite firms should:

Raise rates across the board.
Discount from the higher rates where necessary.
Increase rates more for partners.
Increase rates more for more distinct practices.
Exit, or leverage up, practices where realized rates (i.e. after discounting) don’t rise.

Raise rates across the board

Billing rate increases have been on a roller coaster, see Figure 1. Before the onset of the great recession, standard rates rose 7 to 8 percent annually with realized (collected) rates rising 5 to 6 percent. When the recession hit, the standard rate increase dropped to between 1 and 2 percent and, as economics would predict, realized rates actually declined. Thereafter, things have steadily improved. The market now trundles along with standard rates rising at 3 percent and realized rates at 2.5 percent, comfortably above inflation at 1.5 percent.

The fact that realized rates have gone from declining to rising at a steady rate indicates that bargaining power has shifted back from clients to law firms. The question becomes: must the new steady-state rate of increase be lower than it was before the onset of the great recession? If law firms have the bargaining power to raise standard rates an average of 3 percent, and realize a rate increase of 2.5 percent, then do they have the power to raise rates at, say, 7 percent and realize a 5 percent increase?

Three conditions must be met for increasing rates to work for law firms. The first is that growth in the value clients derive from a firm’s offerings should exceed the increase in rates. On this, the value a client derives is formally equal to the change in the risk-weighted expected value of the outcome of a client’s business venture, or legal-proceeding, that results from the law firm’s services. As the business world grows more uncertain, complex, and volatile, then services which mitigate these new risks create greater value for clients. Mitigating these emerging risks is what the leading-edge offerings of elite law firms do. Hence, these firms are at liberty to raise rates.

The second condition required for raising rates to be effective relates to competition. If Firm A raises rates and Firm B offers the same service at the pre-increase rate then, in theory, clients turn to Firm B. However, in the elite law world, firms’ offerings are not that fungible—in the highly-specialized segments where elite firms play, there simply aren’t that many viable “Firm B” providers. Even where there are other technically-capable firms, different firms offer different levels of reassurance because of clients’ varying history and comfort with the idiosyncratic perspectives of individual lawyers. A related observation is that firms tend to raise rates at comparable rates. Thus, even where there is a viable Firm B, there may be little cost saving incentive for the client to switch firms.

The third condition is evidenced by the historical data: rate increases only stick when the economy is humming along. While there is always much uncertainty about the economy, and by historical standards we are overdue a recession, today’s economic fundamentals look fairly robust. Firms should be assertive in benefitting from today’s strong economic tailwinds, emboldened by the knowledge that they’ll be buffeted by the headwinds when the economy turns.

The reason elite law firms have not been increasing rates assertively may have more to do with the emotional than with the rational. Elite law firms’ belief in the value of the services they provide took a battering through the great recession, and gets beaten down daily by dire warnings of the industry’s imminent disruption. But the recession has ended and disruption is not an existential threat to elite law firms. Nor is it an existential threat to the differentiated service lines within the portfolio of services offered by the broader group of preeminent firms. Yes, it’ll hurt the commodity-only firms and commodity service lines within other firms, and it will require changes in how all firms operate, but it won’t destroy the core of the elite law firm profit engine: big bucks for bespoke mitigation of major risks.

Discount from the higher rates where necessary

When I suggest raising rates assertively some partners respond that their clients won’t pay any increase. True, some clients won’t. But many will and many more will bear part of the increase. Thus, it’s normal for an increase in standard rates to be accompanied by more discounting and hence a decline in realization (i.e. the ratio of realized, or collected, rates to standard, or rate card, rates). This is not of itself a problem as it’s realized rates that drive a firm’s economics. The important point is that, other than in the aftermath of a recession’s onset, the effect of an increase in standard rates is a significant, albeit lower, increase in realized rates. For example, standard rates rose by 33 percent from 2007 to 2017 and, although realization declined from 89 to 82 percent, realized rates still rose by a healthy 22 percent.

It’s instructive to take a closer look at the above realization decline. As shown in Figure 2, by far the biggest component of this decline was in the ratio of worked (i.e. negotiated or agreed) rates to standard rates—5 points of the 7-percentage point fall. This reflects growth of the volume of work being executed not at standard rates but at client or matter-specific discounted rates.

The dynamics of discounts are a competition between two irrationalities. On the one hand, clients have an irrational liking for discounts. They make clients feel they’re getting a bargain and they’re easy for the legal department to explain to management. The irrationality, of course, is that the focus should be on the discounted rate not on the distance between it and some putative standard rate.

On the other hand, firms have an irrational dislike for discounting. Too many firms still think of realization rate as a measure of profitability. It can be absurdly hard to get lawyers to internalize that, in order to assess profitability accurately, you have to look at the combined effect of leverage and realization using measures such as margin per partner hour.  Indeed, higher-leverage and higher-discount work is often more profitable than lower-leverage and zero-discount work. But partners have been conditioned to think of discounts as a demerit, and partners hate demerits. This unhelpful conditioning gets reinforced by finance departments reporting on hours and realization but not on leverage or margin per partner hour.

The look at realization in Figure 2 also shows that two percentage points of decline are due to increased billing write offs. These write offs reflect quality-of-work issues and budget overruns. As quality issues are probably fairly constant, it’s reasonable to attribute this increase to more budget overruns, in turn a reflection of more work being done under fixed, capped, or other alternative fee arrangements (AFAs). But here again, lower realization doesn’t mean lower profitability—increased leverage can more than offset the realization decline. Indeed, over 70 percent of firms say AFAs are as profitable, or more profitable, than work billed at hourly rates, (data source: Altman Weil’s 2017 Law Firms in Transition report).

Increase rates more for partners

Partners are often reticent to raise their own billing rates assertively. This is a problem of itself but also has severe second-order consequences. First, it effectively sets a cap on the billing rates of counsel and senior associates as there has to be headroom between their rates and those of partners. This becomes a constraint not just on revenue but on profitability. While typical businesses have their highest markup on their highest-value offerings, this billing rate cap leads many law firms to have a lower markup (i.e. the number of times a lawyer’s billing rate exceeds their comp on a cost-per-hour basis) on senior associates and counsel than they realize on their relatively low-value junior associates. By compressing markups in this way, firms are leaving money on the table. There’s consistent market feedback that indirectly corroborates this perspective: clients object most to the billing rates of junior lawyers.

Holding back on partner billing rates also makes it harder to raise leverage. Part of the reason some partners push back on raising their own rates is they feel some of the work they do is not truly partner level and hence shouldn’t be billed at full partner-level rates. This underlying failure to delegate is a disservice to clients (by not letting the work flow to the lowest-priced lawyer capable of doing it), to associates (who are left bereft of experience), and to other partners (who contribute disproportionately to a firm’s profit pool by leveraging more). Hence, part of the logic for raising partner rates is to realize the benefits of improved leverage.

Increase rates more for more distinct practices

If you offer customers something they need that you alone can provide then you can set the price close to the value they derive from your service. If, on the other hand, you offer customers something that many others offer, then you are constrained to pricing it at the level set by others. In reality, a law firm’s various offerings fall at different points along a spectrum between these theoretical extremes. This simple observation has a pricing implication that many law firms effectively ignore: billing rates, and hence billing rate increases, should vary markedly across the range of a firm’s offerings. In particular, the billing rates for a firm’s offerings that are most distinct from those competitors can provide should be priced more aggressively than those for its less-distinct offerings.

The low billing rate growth we’ve seen of late may well be a manifestation of firms adhering to a philosophy of a single firm-wide billing rate increase and having this increase be set by the rate that is appropriate for the less-distinct offerings. The reality is that market dynamics have evolved in recent years to the point that a firm’s pricing power varies sharply across its practices; adhering to a single increase set by the less-distinct offerings is now leaving serious money on the table. If internal firm harmony requires a single rate increase, then better to raise standard rates strongly across the board and discount from these as necessary for the less-distinct offerings.

Exit, or leverage up, practices where realized rates don’t rise

There is an old adage in strategy consulting: 80 percent of strategy is deciding what not to do. The ‘what not to do’ for elite law firms is offer commodity services. How does one recognize commodity services? By definition, commodity services are offerings that many other firms can provide. By extension, commodity services are those where a firm effectively cannot set the price but must adhere to the price level set by rivals. This translates to commodity offerings being those where the realized rates (i.e. after discounting) don’t rise following a standard rate increase.

To adhere to a strategy of differentiation, firms should exit practices where realized rates can’t be increased above the rate of inflation. In some circumstances, so doing is more than the fabric of a partnership can bear. Where this is the case, an alternative that may buy some time is to operate the practice at greater leverage than the rest of the firm. So doing mitigates the effect of a commodity practice on per-partner profitability. However, it is really only a holding measure as leverage can’t be increased indefinitely and managing businesses with dramatically different fundamental strategies requires an ambidexterity that few trained business leaders, let alone lawyers, possess.

Action implications

Most people make decisions based on objective facts interpreted through a lens of emotional biases and personal predispositions. Partners are alike most people in that they employ such a lens; partners are unlike most people in that they refuse to recognize they employ such a lens. There is nothing to be gained by leaders trying to get partners to recognize what they’re doing; however, there is value in leaders shaping the lens through which partners interpret the world.

At many firms today, this lens says lawyers are of declining value and the market is stagnating. While this is true perhaps at the middle and lower tiers, this is objectively untrue for elite firms and for the differentiated practices within the broader swath of preeminent firms. This lens issue needs to be addressed first before partners can analyze robustly the case for billing rate increases. Specifically, the lens should be reshaped by restoring and bolstering partners’ confidence in the value of their offerings. To this end, firm leaders should talk to clients (many of them really value you!), share more of the positive client feedback with partners, highlight firm recognition and awards, have clients come and speak at partner meetings, host alumni roundtable discussions of the value of outside counsel, etc. The forthcoming 2017 Am Law results will probably help too: despite the pervasive gloom and doom, the top end of the market is prospering; I suspect we’ll see double-digit percent increases in profitability at most elite firms.

Having reshaped the lens, the next step is to create opportunities for partners to discuss billing rate history, profitability, and future billing rate policy. The key here is to give partners the data and let them chew on it. Don’t lecture them or tell them what to do; rather give them the parameters and let them figure it out for themselves—so doing is the first step toward adoption of the desired changes.

Partners’ deliberations should perhaps start with a review of the firm’s billing rate history and dynamics, including firm-specific versions of Figures 1 and 2 here, supplemented with the same views for individual offices, practices and key clients. It would also be useful to profile how partner rates set a cap on rates for counsel and senior associates, leading to markup compression and, perversely, a firm having the lowest markups on the time of its highest value lawyers.

Partners should then discuss some of the less-obvious dynamics around billing rates. These could include, for example: the connection between leverage and partner billing rates (particularly how low partner rates suppress leverage); the pervasive observation that leverage varies more with individual partners than with practice or client type; and, in cultural contexts where it would help, partners could debate the relationship between compensation and billing rate—the two tend to correlate at professional services firms although it’s sort of misleading as it’s not a causal relationship; rather both are separately reflective of the economic value of a partner’s practice, so proceed with caution.

The final element is for partners to discuss the process by which billing rates are set. While most partners prefer control of their own rates, many recognize that having an abstract committee set the rate allows them some plausible deniability in conversations with clients.

All this is to say it’s a new billing rate world out there. Law firm leaders would do well to buy the option of increasing billing rates assertively at year end by starting to prepare partners for such increases now.

Hugh A. Simons, Ph.D., is a former senior partner and executive committee member at The Boston Consulting Group and the former chief operating officer at Ropes & Gray.

Report: New Jersey Hourly Rates Near the Top Nationwide

October 31, 2017

A recent New Jersey Law Journal story by David Gialanella, “NJ Hourly Rates Near the Top Nationwide, Report, Report Finds” reports that New Jersey trails only a handful of markets when it comes to average hourly billing rates for law firms, a recent report has found.  The state’s $272 average hourly rate for 2016, which takes into account both lawyer and nonlawyer rates, ranks sixth in the nation, behind New York ($297), Connecticut ($296), the District of Columbia ($292), Nevada ($285) and California ($277), according to the “2017 Legal Trends Report” issued by Clio, a Canadian cloud-based researcher that tracks legal industry metrics.

New Jersey’s $272 average combined rate placed it ahead of markets such as Illinois ($261), Maryland ($257) and Pennsylvania ($243), the report stated.   New Jersey also was sixth in lawyer hourly rates, at $288, again behind the same five markets, which all topped $300 per hour.

The average nonlawyer billing rate for New Jersey was $199 — second only to Connecticut, whose $228 rate was highest by far. New Jersey’s average nonlawyer rate put it firmly ahead of Nebraska ($175) and Nevada ($174), as well as Pennsylvania and New York (each $171), according to the report.

“Real” hourly billing rates, which are adjusted for cost of living in 2016, also are included: In New Jersey, that rate is $251 for lawyers, $174 for nonlawyers and $237 combined.  The latter number trails the same five markets mentioned above, as well as Florida, Illinois, Texas, Georgia, Arizona and Pennsylvania.  The data was collected from some 60,000 Clio users, as well as surveys of legal professionals and consumers of legal services, the report notes.

The report is critical of law firms for what it calls poor “utilization” rates—contending that lawyers on average nationwide spend only 2.3 hours of the eight-hour workday on billable tasks.  It pegs the utilization rate in New Jersey at 30 percent, which is one point higher than the national rate of 29 percent (meaning that a New Jersey lawyer spends 2.4 hours per day on billables, rather than 2.3 hours).  The report ranks lawyers in West Virginia and Maine at the top in this category, with realization rates of about 40 percent.

New Jersey is toward the back of the pack when it comes to realization rates, the report finds: At 79 percent, the state ranks 34th and is well behind Utah, South Dakota, South Carolina, Wyoming and New Hampshire, which approach or eclipse 90 percent, but still ahead of such large markets as New York (39th), Florida (43rd), Delaware (46th) and D.C. (48th), according to the report.

New Jersey also fares badly in collection rate, according to the report.  At 82 percent, it was ahead of only six markets in that category: Arizona, New York, West Virginia, D.C., Mississippi and Michigan.

NALFA Analysis: Partner Bankruptcy Rates

October 27, 2017

NALFA conducted a survey of partner hourly rates in bankruptcy cases.  NALFA examined dozens of court filings in bankruptcy cases over the past couple years.  The following results of our survey are the average of partner hourly rate ranges in major legal markets:

2017: $1005-$878
2016: $921-$807
2015: $886-$783

Key findings:  Not only have partner rates increased every year, but the variance (i.e. the range of rates) has increased as well.

National Law Journal Cites NALFA Program

September 11, 2017

A recent NLJ article by Amanda Bronstad, “Judges Look to Profs in Awarding Lower Percentage Fees in Biggest Class Actions,” quotes NALFA’s CLE program, “View From the Bench: Awarding Attorney...

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