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Category: Fee Award Factors

Tesla Investors Weigh in on $5B Alternative Fee Proposal

March 13, 2024

A recent Law 360 story by Jeff Montgomery, “Tesla Investors Weigh In On $5B Fee Proposed For Class Attys”, reports that Tesla Inc. stockholders are sounding off to Delaware's chancellor after class attorneys sought a stock-based fee potentially worth more than $5 billion at current share prices following the Court of Chancery's reversal of Elon Musk's $55.8 billion stock-based pay plan on Jan. 30.  Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick said in a letter that the judicial code bars her from considering communications outside the case process.  But she directed attorneys for the class to come up with a method for "handling" the stockholder communications ahead of a yet to be scheduled hearing and argument on the fee.

Nothing in the chancellor's letter characterized the aims or identities of those attempting to contact the court.  Founder Elon Musk owns 20% of Tesla's shares followed by institutional investors, with individuals accounting for less than 1%.  The proposed fee seeks just over 11% of the total formerly earmarked for Musk and now available for company use, well below the 33% sometimes awarded in complex cases that proceed through a full trial.

"I have not read these communications because, as you all are aware, Rule 2.9 of the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits me from considering ex parte communications concerning a pending proceeding," the chancellor wrote in the latest entry of a derivative action launched in 2018.  Some of the letters apparently originated with small stockholders, some of whom have gravitated to X, formerly known as Twitter, to share thoughts on Tesla, Musk, the case, the fee and letters sent to the chancellor.  Some, using the hashtag #DelawareCourt81, have proposed sending letters directly to the parties or to Tesla for forwarding.

Tesla's top five institutional holders hold about 19% of the business, led by The Vanguard Group at nearly 7%.  Blackrock accounts for 5.8%, with State Street Corp. at 3.3%, Geode Capital Management at about 1.6% and Capital World Investors at about 1.3%.  None of the top five immediately responded to requests for comment and counsel for the stockholders did not provide details.

Lawrence Hamermesh, former director of the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School's Institute for Law and Economics and professor emeritus at Widener University Delaware Law School, said he would not be surprised if the letters Chancellor McCormick referred to were sent by larger investors opposing the requested fee.

"That'd be my guess," Hamermesh said. "Without knowing everything about it, I harbor a certain lack of sympathy with them.  The upshot of the case is they're avoiding dilution" that would have resulted had Musk won.  "The award would dilute them back in a real small way, at least in terms of proportional interest. They're way better off" with the decision.  Nevertheless, Hamermesh said, given the 29,402,900-share cut of the 266,947,208 shares freed up by Chancellor McCormick's decision, the court is certain to be pondering the billions involved.

"She has to be thinking to herself: 'There's no case, no effort, no measure of success that's worth that much to lawyers. You don't need to give them that much to incentivize them to take this case."  In the absence of precedent or clear rules, he added, "it's a gut-level, gut-check thing. How much is enough? Either they become more rich, or fabulously rich."

Chancellor McCormick put the fee in play with an order rescinding Musk's 12-tranche, all-stock compensation plan on Jan. 30 after a week-long trial in November 2022. The ruling cited disclosure failures, murky terms, conflicted director architects and Musk's own conflicted influence in Tesla's creation of a mountain of fast-triggering stock options.

At the time of the ruling, Tesla's stock was trading at more than $191 per share, putting the potential maximum award at around $5.6 billion.  Slipping since has pruned the potential maximum by hundreds of millions.  Costs for the derivative case included more than $13.6 million in attorney fees and more than $1.1 million in expenses during the multi-year Chancery action.  Requested fees would equal a $288,888 hourly rate that the fee motion said was justified by the case's complexity, results and attorney skill levels, among other factors.

Article: Why the Catalyst Theory Matters in Class Actions

March 11, 2024

A recent Law.com article by Adam J. Levitt, “Arguing Class Actions: Why the Catalyst Theory Matters”, examines the catalyst theory in class action litigation.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

The story presents a conundrum.  Plaintiffs file a class action, which the defendant initially resists.  Plaintiffs counsel spends hundreds of thousands of dollars (or more) in lodestar and costs prosecuting the case, but after potentially years of hotly contested litigation, the defendant issues a recall or announces a refund program that fixes the problem and then argues that the case is moot.  The question: Should those who filed this case, and consequently induced (or “catalyzed”) the defendant to fix the problem, be paid?

The right answer is obvious.  Of course the plaintiffs lawyers should be paid.  Without plaintiffs counsel’s actions and active litigation threat, the defendant would have never changed its behavior, ultimately for consumers’ benefit.  The law routinely rewards those who confer benefits on others, even in the absence of, say, a contractual guarantee (as with the doctrine of quantum meruit).  In short, nobody works for free.  Nobody, as some would have it, except plaintiffs lawyers.

The Rise and Fall of the Catalyst Theory

Rewarding lawyers for catalyzing a change used to be noncontroversial. See, e.g., Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 1995) (“a plaintiff whose lawsuit has been the catalyst in bringing about a goal sought in litigation, by threat of victory … has prevailed for purposes of an attorney’s fee claim…”); Pembroke v. Wood Cnty., Texas, 981 F.2d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing viability of catalyst theory); Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1991) (same).

But the law became murkier in May 2001, with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).  There, an assisted living facility sued West Virginia, arguing that a regulation violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act.  After the suit was filed, the Legislature removed the regulation, mooting the case.

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff was not a “prevailing party” for purposes of the applicable fee-shifting statute.  Discarding the “catalyst theory,” it ruled that: “A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change” sufficient to make the plaintiff a “prevailing party.” Id. at 605.  As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained in her dissent, the Buckhannon decision frustrates the goals of the catalyst theory because it “allows a defendant to escape a statutory obligation to pay a plaintiff’s counsel fees, even though the suit’s merit led the defendant to abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on, to accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the principal redress sought in the complaint.” Id. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

The Catalyst Theory Today

Notwithstanding the Buckhannon decision, the catalyst theory remains a powerful tool outside of Buckhannon’s specific context.

First, Buckhannon has no bearing on state causes of action.  In California, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1021.5 allows a court to award fees to a “successful” party.  The California Supreme Court has explained it takes a “broad, pragmatic view of what constitutes a ‘successful party,’” Graham v. DaimlerChrysler, 34 Cal. 4th 553, 565 (2004), and explicitly endorsed the “catalyst theory [as] an application of the … principle that courts look to the practical impact of the public interest litigation in order to determine whether the party was successful.” Id. at 566.  In short, it disagreed with the U.S. Supreme Court regarding what it means to “prevail” or “succeed” in a litigation.

The catalyst theory has also largely survived in the context of favorable settlements.  For example, in Mady v. DaimlerChrysler, 59 So.3d 1129 (Fla. 2011), the Supreme Court of Florida considered an award of attorney fees to a consumer who accepted defendant’s offer of judgment, an offer that neither conceded liability nor plaintiff’s entitlement to fees, in a case filed under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), which guarantees fees to a “prevailing party.” Id. at 1131.  Explicitly considering and distinguishing Buckhannon, the court found that a party may “prevail” with a settlement.  In doing so, it rearticulated the logic underpinning the catalyst theory:

[The plaintiff] achieved the same result with a monetary settlement only after being forced to bear all of the costs and expenses associated with litigation and facing the statutory penalty if the offer of judgment had not been accepted. DaimlerChrysler could have resolved this dispute during the “informal dispute settlement” phase, but instead waited until after [plaintiff] was forced to commence this action and incur the expenses of this litigation. Id. at 1133.

Further, even in federal court, attorney fees may be awarded under statutes other than those limiting such awards to “prevailing” parties.  For example, in Templin v. Indep. Blue Cross, 785 F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 2015), the Third Circuit explained that a fee may be awarded for an Employee Retirement Income Security Act claim under the catalyst theory, because ERISA does not limit fee awards to the “prevailing party.” 785 F.3d at 865.  Including the Third Circuit, at least five circuits have endorsed the catalyst theory under such statutes: Scarangella v. Group Health, 731 F.3d 146, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2013); Ohio River Valley Env’l Coalition v. Green Valley Coal, 511 F.3d 407, 414 (4th Cir. 2007); Sierra Club v. Env’l Protection Agency, 322 F.3d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty. Council, 307 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002).

Despite the ongoing recognition of the catalyst theory in many contexts, there remains the risk that courts may apply the catalyst theory narrowly, or that defendants may find a way around it. Consider Gordon v. Tootsie Roll Indus., 810 F. App’x 495, 496 (9th Cir. 2020), a “slack-fill” case in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s boxes of Junior Mints were mostly air.  After the plaintiff moved for class certification, the defendant changed the box’s label.  The plaintiffs dismissed and moved for fees.

The fee application was denied because “Gordon’s theory of the case was that the size of the box was itself misleading, and that Tootsie Roll should either fill the Products’ box with more candy to account for the size of the box … or shrink the box to accurately represent the amount of the candy product therein[, and] Tootsie Roll did not make either of these changes.” Id. at 497 (internal quotation omitted).  Considering the disincentives (or, conversely, the moral hazards) that arise from this type of narrow application of the catalyst theory, courts should take a decidedly more equitable view when adjudicating this important issue.

A Way Forward

For practitioners, a few lessons come out of this case law and history.  First, in writing their complaint, attorneys must think through the various paths that a company might take to remedy the purported harm.  Recall that in Gordon, the plaintiff focused entirely on the misleading box, but not on the misleading labeling. Second, favorable settlements and offers of judgment remain viable tools, and may support a catalyst theory attorney-fee payment even if the defendant resists paying fees in the settlement itself.  Finally, despite Buckhannon, the catalyst theory remains readily available under a host of statutes (state and federal).  In relying on citing those statutes, plaintiffs should not shy away from the catalyst theory’s compelling logic.  Courts understand that basic fairness requires that attorneys be paid if their lawsuit ultimately confers a significant benefit.  Nobody should work for free.  Not even plaintiffs lawyers.

Adam J. Levitt is a founding partner of DiCello Levitt, where he heads the firm’s class action and public client practice groups.  DiCello Levitt senior counsel Daniel Schwartz also contributed to this article.

Attorney Fees as Stock Options in Tesla Case?

March 4, 2024

A recent Law 360 story by Lauren Berg, “Tesla Stock for Fees? Attys Who Got Musk’s Pay Cut Say Yes”, reports that the lawyers who convinced the Delaware Chancery Court to scuttle Elon Musk's proposed $55 billion Tesla compensation package filed a request for legal fees that came with a twist — they want to be paid in Tesla stock that rounds out to about $5.6 billion.

The attorneys from Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Friedman Oster & Tejtel PLLC and Andrews & Springer LLC, who represent the shareholders who in November 2018 challenged Musk's pay package as unfair, asked for more than 29 million Tesla shares and an additional $1 million to cover their litigation expenses, according to the motion.

They are seeking about 11% of the 267 million shares they say are now available for Tesla's use as a result of Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick's decision in January striking down Musk's 10-year compensation plan, the motion states.  She found that disclosure failures, murky terms, conflicted director architects and Musk's own hand on the tiller warranted an order to roll back the award.

"Rather than debate the value conferred to Tesla by canceling the options or the value of the underlying stock returned to the Tesla treasury free of restriction, plaintiff's counsel instead seeks a fee award in kind — a percentage of the shares returned for unrestricted use by Tesla (rather than cash)," the lawyers said.  "In other words, we are prepared to 'eat our cooking.'"

"This structure has the benefit of linking the award directly to the benefit created and avoids taking even one cent from the Tesla balance sheet to pay fees," they added. "It is also tax-deductible by Tesla."  The plan went to a week-long trial in November 2022 after it was challenged by stockholders led by plaintiff Richard J. Tornetta.  The compensation scheme included 12 tranches or performance milestones that Musk had to meet before qualifying for a portion of the total, once estimated at as much as $56 billion.

In her order squashing the plan, Chancellor McCormick found that "Musk dictated the timing of the process, making last-minute changes to the timeline or altering substantive terms immediately prior to six out of the ten board or compensation committee meetings during which the plan was discussed."  Although the defendants argued that Musk was "uniquely motivated by ambitious goals," with Tesla desperately needing him to succeed, the opinion observed, "these facts do not justify the largest compensation plan in the history of public markets."

The price was no better than the process, the chancellor concluded, observing that "Musk owned 21.9% of Tesla when the board approved his compensation plan.  This ownership stake gave him every incentive to push Tesla to levels of transformative growth — Musk stood to gain over $10 billion for every $50 billion in market capitalization increase."

In their motion for attorney fees, the shareholders' attorneys from the three firms said they collectively logged nearly 19,500 hours throughout the case, which came out to about $13.6 million in lodestar, as well as $1.1 million in out-of-pocket expenses.  And although a typical attorney fee request seeks about one-third of a settlement or verdict won in favor of their client, in this case, the attorneys said they are asking for a conservative 11% of the recovery.

"We recognize that the requested fee is unprecedented in terms of absolute size," the attorneys said.  "Of course, that is because our law rewards counsel's efforts undertaken on a fully contingent basis that, through full adjudication, produce enormous benefits to the company and subject the lawyers to significant risk."

"And here, the size of the requested award is great because the value of the benefit to Tesla that plaintiff's counsel achieved was massive," they added.  And this isn't the first time a court has awarded plaintiffs a fee of recovered shares, according to the motion.  The attorneys point to the 2000 case Sanders v. Wang, in which the Chancery Court granted plaintiffs judgment on the pleadings over the improper issuance of 4.5 million shares, approved a settlement and then awarded the plaintiffs a fee comprising 20%, or 900,000, of the 4.5 million recovered shares.

Overall, the attorneys said their fee request is supported by their history as experienced stockholder advocates, the substantial effort they put forth, the complexity of the case, and the "unprecedented result" they achieved in this case.

Connecticut State Worker Seeks Fees After Trial Win

March 1, 2024

A recent Law 360 story by Brian Steele, “Conn. State Worker Wants Atty Fees After Noose Trial Win”, reports that a Black employee of Connecticut's state energy and environmental regulator is asking a federal judge to award more than $200,000 in attorney fees after he prevailed in a lawsuit alleging that he was racially tormented and exposed to nooses in a hostile work environment.

The Law Office of W. Martyn Philpot Jr. represents Omar Tyson, who won $5,000 in a Feb. 14 jury verdict on his claims that his supervisors at the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, or DEEP, failed to protect him from a co-worker's racial hostility.  Tyson asked U.S. District Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer of the District of Connecticut for a ruling that recognizes certain "economic realities" of prosecuting the suit, arguing further that he is entitled to the award under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and court rules.

"It is not hyperbole to suggest that civil rights cases such as the one at bar are often lost, with no recovery," Tyson's memorandum said.  "The results of a loss of this sort can often be calamitous for both the client and a small firm where there has been a substantial expenditure of time and expense.  Moreover, the incentive created by Congress was to attract competent attorneys to take on socially significant, yet difficult cases, on a contingent fee basis."  The motion asks for $200,750 in fees based on a $500 hourly rate, and about $7,700 in expenses like taking depositions and issuing subpoenas.

Tyson claimed in his November 2021 amended complaint that he suffered race-based mistreatment starting in 2011, also alleging that on two occasions, he found a hangman's noose near his workstation.  A colleague taunted and bothered Tyson at work, once pointing a cane at him as if it were a gun, and referred to the Black community as "you people" and "your people" when Tyson was present, among other offensive comments and behavior, according to the complaint.

A rate of $500 per hour "is the prevailing rate in the community" and similar to the fees charged by comparable attorneys, according to Tyson, who paid a $5,000 retainer.

"In this matter, the plaintiff's attorney's fee award should be determined in accordance with the well-established lodestar calculation method," the memo said.  "The pertinent factors for calculating the lodestar include, but are not expressly limited to: the novelty and complexity of the litigation involved, the skill and experience of the attorney, the overall quality of the representation, and the understanding that payment of fees will generally not come until the end of the case, if at all."

Chancery Court: No More Fee Windfalls for Easy Cases

February 28, 2024

A recent Law 360 story by Jeff Montgomery, “Chancery Says ‘Game Over’ On Fee Windfalls For Easy Cases”, reports that a Delaware vice chancellor has publicly slammed stockholder attorneys who sought an $850,000 fee for "minuscule" hours spent on a corporate benefit case after a recent string of suits filed to police stockholder rights to separate class votes on company transactions.

Vice Chancellor Morgan T. Zurn, in an unusual and blunt "Statement of the Court" transcript made public, declared that the "game is over" on relatively large fee claims based on limited hours devoted to enforcing common shareholder rights to vote as a stand-alone, rather than consolidated, class on some deals and charter amendments.

The comments, given in court Feb. 15, called out Smith Katzenstein & Jenkins LLP and Purcell & Lefkowitz LLP in a ruling that rejected an $850,000 fee request for efforts that prompted car-sharing venture Getaround Inc. to revise voting plans for a share increase developed as part of its reverse, take-public merger, approved by stockholders in December 2022.

After Getaround relented and lined up a separate vote for common stockholders, the battle shifted instead to the size of the fee for the corporate benefits gained in stockholder Robert Garfield's suit.  On that issue, the vice chancellor described David Jenkins of Smith Katzenstein and his plaintiffs attorney colleagues as having "lost all perspective" after "having had a really good run making a literal fortune off a minuscule number of hours of work" on charter cases and class vote challenges.

"Seeking a fee that a company CFO has affirmed in a sworn affidavit would render the company insolvent appears to be a betrayal of the stockholders you purport to represent and a betrayal of the functions that plaintiffs counsel plays in the broader ecosystem," the vice chancellor said.  In a brief filed with the court in October, attorneys for Getaround argued that the $850,000 fee requested equals $35,789.47 per hour "for 23.75 hours worked with no disclosure of how the time was actually spent."

The company also argued that more than 94% of Class A shareholders redeemed their holdings for $10.11 per share before closing, and only 181,199 remaining shares were traded on the single day afterward when the price was higher than $10.11, equating to a combined $10,872, or 6 cents per share, loss.

 "In this case, plaintiff does not contend, nor could he, that the outcome of the stockholder vote was altered in any way" because of objections raised before the vote in July 2022 by the attorneys who would later sue, the company argued.  "The Class A stockholders, in a class vote, approved the charter amendment with 89% approval (as compared to the 92% approval of all stockholders)."

Getaround hit the court months after Vice Chancellor Zurn's relatively earthshaking decision in Garfield v. Boxed in December 2022, which found that common shareholders have a right to vote as a single class, rather than in a multiclass pool, on proposals to increase the number of company shares under Delaware's General Corporation Law.  The finding triggered a surge in charter changes and litigation aimed at revising charters and correcting share counts.

The Boxed decision also upheld an $850,000 attorney fee for counsel representing stockholder Garfield, also represented by Smith Katzenstein and Purcell & Lefkowitz. Vice Chancellor Zurn concluded at the time that the Boxed case "conferred a substantial benefit" to shareholders and prevented a cloud or "ticking time bomb" of invalid shares from hanging over the company's capital structure.

Vice Chancellor Lori W. Will weeks later applied a fix to part of the threatened chaos in a ruling on In re: Lordstown Motors Corp., declaring that companies can retroactively validate wrongly issued shares.  In the Getaround transcript, Jenkins pointed out to the vice chancellor that the $850,000 fee in Boxed disappeared when the company sought bankruptcy protection, "and we got nothing."