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Category: Fee Entitlement / Recoverability

Illinois Justices Ask Whether Rule Violation Merits Fee Award

March 25, 2024

A recent Law 360 story by Lauraann Wood, “Ill. Justices Weigh Whether Rule Violation Merits Fee Award”, reports that the Illinois Supreme Court has questioned whether two law firms should be allowed to preserve their $1.7 million fee award for their work on a family dispute that settled after they were fired, as the justices asked whether fees are appropriate if the firms never disclosed how they would split the money.

Every justice on the state high court bench offered either a question or a criticism during oral argument as they weighed whether the quantum meruit claim by Stephen J. Schlegel Ltd. and Andrew W. Levenfeld & Associates Ltd. was correctly sent back to the trial court for an award that ignores their illegal fee agreement with former clients Maureen V. O'Brien and her nephew Daniel O'Brien III.

Some justices highlighted on one hand the 3,000 hours and years of work the firms put into the O'Briens' underlying family dispute before they were fired and the case settled about two weeks later.  Other justices, including Justice Joy Cunningham, noted the firms' failure to properly disclose their fee-sharing agreement to the O'Briens and questioned whether allowing them to recover fees essentially rewards them for violating a rule of professional conduct.

"Rules exist for a reason," Justice Cunningham said.  "It seems to me from looking at the figure that … they basically got what they would have gotten anyway, so the rule means nothing, and as a Supreme Court, are we supposed to agree that it's OK not to follow our rules?"

Representing the firms, Jeremy Boeder of Tribler Orpett & Meyer PC argued that his clients should receive an equitable fee award for their work because the trial court considered their rule violation and its potential effects before awarding their fees.  Pressed by Justice Cunningham to identify the consequence they would then face for violating the state's fee-sharing disclosure rule, Boeder said there would be none.  "And it's our position that there shouldn't always be a consequence in a case like this for a violation of a rule of professional conduct," he argued.

Acknowledging Justice Lisa Holder White's suggestion that the trial court could award the firms the same amount in fees even without considering their client contract, Boeder argued that spending the time "to get to the point that we've already reached" is unnecessary.  That process would also be wrong because sending the case back would essentially tell the trial court that it "has to go with the second-best option" despite considering all the relevant evidence in a six-day bench trial, he told the justices.  "Why should that be a command upon a trial court of equity, who really was in the best position to evaluate all of the issues here?" the attorney said.

The O'Briens' counsel argued that the firms should not receive any fees even if the justices agree they should go back to the trial court for a new award. Indeed, the O'Briens believe the firms' work is worth "less than zero," partly because they advised Maureen O'Brien to resign as the coexecutor of her parents' estate, which was her "only source of leverage, or power, or control" in the underlying dispute, John Fitzgerald of Tabet DiVito & Rothstein LLC told the justices.  "It is impossible to overstate how catastrophic that legal advice was," he told the court.

The state high court has previously voided a fee agreement that violated professional conduct rules in a case between a litigation consultant and an expert search firm, and the reasoning then should still apply because "there's no public policy reason or any other reason to treat lawyers differently from anyone else who enters a contract that violates public policy," Fitzgerald argued.  "Quantum meruit means 'as much as he or she deserves. 'No one deserves anything that violates public policy," he said.

Fees are also inappropriate because although the firms litigated some issues in the O'Briens' underlying dispute and made some settlement offers, there is no proof the O'Briens' subsequent counsel relied on the firms' earlier work to eventually reach their $16.85 million settlement, Fitzgerald argued.  Any outstanding settlement offers had been withdrawn, and no new offers had been made for weeks by the time the firms were fired, so any potential numbers had gone back to zero by the time the O'Briens' subsequent counsel began handling their case, he said.  "The fact that the next lawyer was able to settle the case on certain terms, I don't think that necessarily means these plaintiffs could have gotten that deal done on the same terms or comparable terms," Fitzgerald said.

Blasting that contention on rebuttal, Boeder argued that it was the firms' settlement back-and-forth that ultimately brought the underlying litigants to their agreeable meeting points and resolve their family dispute.  The firms had made an $18.3 million demand that was met with a $16.25 offer, which then prompted a $16.75 million counter-demand the firms were prepared to send back before they were ultimately fired, he said.  "The settlement was on almost exactly the same terms as the counter-demand that my client proposed," Boeder argued.  "Why wasn't that counter-demand made?  Because Dan and Maureen O'Brien refused to allow my clients to make it on their behalf."

New Florida Ruling for Attorneys Serving as Their Own Fee Expert

March 22, 2024

A recent Law.com story by Lisa Willis, “New Ruling Affects Fees For Lawyers Who Serve as Expert Witnesses”, reports that, an appeal in Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeals— challenging a trial court’s decision to award appellate attorney fees and include an expert witness fee as a cost—has been affirmed.

One South Florida attorney said this appeals case ruling seemingly undid the Florida Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Travieso v. Travieso, which had found that such fees were awarded at the court’s discretion.  Now, the new opinion clarifies whether an expert witness is necessary to confirm the amount of fees being claimed.

“Basically, they said they’re kind of overruling the 1985 Supreme Court case, saying that if you have an attorney testifying as an expert, [the] fees must be awarded as costs,” Palm Beach County attorney Peter M. Feaman said.  Feaman and Nancy E. Guffey of Peter M. Feaman P.A. in Boynton Beach represented the appellee, Suzanne J. Trombino.  The ruling was entered pursuant to the Fourth DCA’s reversal opinion and attorney’s fees order in Trombino v. Echeverria from 2022.

In affirming the lower court ruling, the appeal court stated, “Our order permitted the trial court to award attorney’s fees to appellate Suzanne J. Trombino (individually and as trustee of two family trusts) if it found that the equities favored the imposition of fees. … The trial court determined Trombino was entitled to fees.”

Feaman, who has been practicing law more than 40 years, said the body of case law that has developed since the 1985 ruling says attorneys must have an independent expert every time to testify to the reasonableness of fees.  “So that’s why the 1985 Supreme Court opinion can be interpreted differently now because the law has changed and been clarified via this ruling as to whether an expert witness is necessary to corroborate the amount of fees being claimed,” Feaman said.  “The Fourth DCA appears to be saying is not discretionary any longer.”  “I think that’s a significant part of the ruling, which is kind of a departure from the 1985 Supreme Court case, where they ruled it was discretionary with the trial court,” Feaman said.

The appeal was Dale Echeverria v. v. Suzanne J. Trombino as trustee of The Family Trust Created Under the Jose I Echeverria 2006 Trust, and as trustee of the Dorothy Jeanne 2006 Trust.  It stems from a prior decision in Trombino v. Echeverria, where the appeals court had reversed a ruling and allowed for the potential awarding of attorney’s fees to Suzanne J. Trombino under specific statutory conditions.  Palm Beach County Circuit Court Judge Charles E. Burton was the presiding judge in the Palm Beach County case.

Judge Alan O. Forst wrote the opinion with judges Martha C. Warner and Dorian K. Damoorgian concurring specially with opinion.  “Hearings for the assessment of reasonable attorney’s fees have become much more complicated and time consuming since 1985 when the supreme court decided Travieso,” Warner wrote in concurring with opinion.

The jurist said that time spent reviewing an attorney’s work and testifying at a fee hearing has increased substantially.  “No longer does one find an attorney at the courthouse on the day of the hearing to briefly review the case file and opine on the fee,” Warner said.  “More likely, this case is an example of a typical contested fee hearing.”

The appellee’s attorney is in agreement.  “When an attorney is testifying as an expert, his fees must be taxed as costs as part of the award,” Feaman said.  “Previous to this, all the judges thought that it was discretionary.  I think in the fourth district, that’s no longer the case.”

Upon remand to the trial court, Trombino sought attorney’s fees, arguing that the circumstances warranted such an award.  However, the trial court sided with Trombino, finding she was entitled to the fees.  Echeverria appealed.

Feaman said this ruling makes sense because, in 1985, the law was unsettled as to whether you needed an expert witness to corroborate your fee request.  “Since that time, the law has developed now quite clearly, you must have an expert witness,” Feaman said. “So now that you must have an expert witness to corroborate your fee requests, it only makes sense that those fees incurred by that expert be taxed as cost because now it’s mandatory that you have an expert fee witness.  So his charges or her charges should be mandatory as well that those charges get taxed.”

Trombino presented evidence of the costs incurred during the appeal process and introduced an expert in attorney’s fees, who testified that the requested amount was reasonable.  Dale Echeverria also brought forth an expert, advocating for a lower fee, but the court ultimately ruled in favor of Trombino’s original request and included the full amount of the expert’s fee as a taxed cost.

Echeverria’s appeal raised three primary issues: the timing of the equity determination for the fee award, the evidence supporting the fee award, and the inclusion of the expert’s fee as a taxable cost.  In affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court noted Echeverria’s own use of an expert witness to challenge the fee amount, which further justified the trial court’s discretion in this matter.

“The parties getting fees shouldn’t have to bear the brunt of the expert that now must testify to support those fees,” Feaman said. “Because if you’re the prevailing party and you’re getting fees, why should you have to be penalized for bringing in an expert witness? It should all be part of the cost incurred.”

$5B Alternative Fee Proposal in Tesla Case Tests Chancery

March 20, 2024

A recent Law 360 story by Jeff Montgomery, “Epic Tesla Fee Bid May Blaze Extraordinary Chancery Path”, reports that an unprecedented $5 billion-plus stock-based fee award sought by class attorneys who recently short-circuited Tesla CEO Elon Musk's 12-step, $51 billion compensation package has set up an equally unprecedented test for Delaware Court of Chancery fee guidelines and a potential award one law expert described as "dynastic wealth."

Class attorneys who have battled Tesla's compensation scheme for Musk since mid-2018 last week sought more than 11% of the 266,947,208 Tesla shares freed up Jan. 30, when Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick ordered rescission of the options that Tesla's board awarded to Musk in an all-stock compensation plan.  The value had been estimated initially at $5.6 billion, but would fluctuate with the value of Tesla's stock.

While the process of seeking a stock fee award instead of cash is not unprecedented, it is an unusual posture for Delaware Chancery litigation, and its scale is likely to reopen what were once considered settled questions over counsel risks, rewards, and just how much attorneys can command for corporate benefit fees, experts told Law360.

"Given the order of magnitude here, I suspect that the case will not set any records in terms of percentage of the recovery awarded to the plaintiffs attorneys, but in absolute terms it'll still amount to dynastic wealth," said University of Connecticut School of Law professor Minor Myers. He described the fee as "destined to be epic, if only because it involves the invalidation of a pay package that was itself comically large."

Chancellor McCormick put the fee in play with an order rescinding Musk's 12-tranche, all-stock compensation plan Jan. 30, after a week-long trial in November 2022.  The ruling cited disclosure failures, murky terms, conflicted director architects and Musk's own conflicted influence in Tesla's creation of an Everest-sized mount of fast-triggering stock options.

"Plaintiff won complete recission of the largest pay package ever issued," the fee motion, filed last week, said.  "Our research demonstrates that the court's decree of recission, conservatively valued, was the largest compensatory award in the history of American jurisprudence by multiples," driven by "the gargantuan size of the tort underlying this action."

But class attorneys are seeking an equally gargantuan fee, even after departing from calculation customs that Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster stressed last year in declining to apply a size reduction to a nearly 27%, $267 million award to stockholders who challenged a Dell Technolgies stock swap in 2018.  In his fee ruling, the vice chancellor said the calls to reduce the Dell fee conflicted with court efforts to reward attorneys for going deeper into litigation and taking greater risks in pursuit of legitimate claims.

"Of course, everyone involved will try to fit this into an existing framework, but the reality is that a $5.6 billion fee award is staggeringly high, whatever factors are considered," said Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Robert O. Bentley professor of law, emeritus, at Washington and Lee School of Law.  "I think Chancellor McCormick will find a way to go a fair bit lower, while still providing the attorneys with a very high award of some amount."  Johnson added: "The shock of Musk's compensation, undone by the chancellor, is unlikely to be followed by what many would regard as a shockingly high $5.6 billion fee award."

Vice Chancellor Laster's most recent big fee ruling established, pending appeal, a $266.7 million fee last year for attorneys who secured a $1 billion settlement for minority stockholders who sued over a $23.9 million Dell Technologies stock swap in 2018.

In Dell, the vice chancellor rejected investor arguments that large "mega-fund" settlements justified throttling back on fee payouts because customary fee percentages can produce massive, windfall payouts.  Instead, Vice Chancellor Laster defended the use of customary, variable percentages, including 15% to 25% shares of awards for settlements after "meaningful litigation and motion practice" and up to 33% post-trial.  He also acknowledged the tension between successful plaintiffs' counsel seeking appropriate compensation and large investors working to minimize carve-outs from court awards.

In Tesla, class attorneys, wary of blowback over big recoveries borne of typical fee ratios, acknowledged the Dell ruling's guidance, but also pointed to an earlier ruling that produced the current largest court-approved fee, a $304 million award approved in 2011 by then-Chancellor Leo E. Strine and upheld by Delaware's Supreme Court a year later.

That decision required Grupo Mexico to return to Southern Peru Copper Corp. nearly $1.3 billion worth of Southern Peru stock — rather than cash — after finding that Southern Copper had been coerced by a conflicted, controlling stockholder into overpaying for a Grupo Mexico mine in 2005.  With pre- and post-judgment interest, the award reached more than $2 billion, with class attorneys awarded 15%, or $304 million, for fees and expenses.

Tesla class attorneys referenced the 15% fee carve-out approved in Southern Peru, but adjusted even that percentage downward — to just over 11% — to reflect value added by the absence of a holding period for any award of Tesla shares before they could be sold.  Case costs included more than $13.6 million in attorney fees and more than $1.1 million in expenses during the multi-year Chancery action.  Requested fees would equal a $288,888 hourly rate that the fee motion said was justified by the case's complexity, results and attorney skill levels, among other factors.

Jill E. Fisch, Saul A. Fox distinguished professor of business law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, said use of stock for attorney fees was once "kind of frowned upon," but is not unprecedented.  "They are repeat players" in Delaware's courts, Fisch said of the attorney teams that prevailed in the Tesla case.  "They want credibility before the court.  The numbers, I think, reflect the benefit and risk of this kind of litigation, and traditionally, Chancery Court has acknowledged those risks."

The suit, led by stockholder Richard Tornetta, branded Musk's compensation package as unprecedented and unfair, noting that Musk had already qualified for some $20 billion in awards by the time the suit was filed, "making him one of the richest men on Earth" at the time.  It alleged in part that he relied on two in-house Tesla attorneys for work on the plan before the board's conflicted compensation committee took up the issue.

Ann M. Lipton, the Michael M. Fleishman associate professor in business law and entrepreneurship at Tulane University Law School and associate dean, pointed to another Tesla- and Musk-related case to illustrate the risks stockholder attorneys take.

Last year, after about seven years of litigation, Delaware's Supreme Court upheld a post-trial dismissal of a suit filed by stockholders of rooftop solar venture SolarCity, seeking damages tied to Tesla's $2.6 billion purchase of the company, for which Musk was CEO and also held a big share of company stock.

At one point during the case, the SolarCity stockholders suggested a damage award amounting to a $13 billion giveback of Tesla stock Musk received for his SolarCity shares. Dismissal of the case and rejection of class claims, however, wiped out class attorneys' hopes for a share of a big award.

In the more-recent scuttling of Musk's Tesla stock awards, Lipton said, shareholders benefited from the stock award cancelations by being dramatically less diluted in their holdings.  "That the attorneys are asking for a little bit of dilution" through their fee, "but far less than the shareholders would otherwise have suffered, seems like a real benefit that was provided, from a financial point of view."

Lipton said she was not familiar enough with the current Tesla fee motion to comment on the percentage sought, but cited the enormous risk and stockholder counsel loss in SolarCity and said that "attorneys deserve to be compensated" when they prevail.

University of Michigan Law School professor Gabriel Rauterberg said the fee bid in Tesla appears excessive, despite the importance of fee as a motivator.  "It seems to me extremely implausible that an award this large is necessary to provide the right incentives, given that plaintiffs attorneys' fixed costs for investigating lawsuits, conducting research, and prosecuting cases can be significant but not on this scale," Rauterberg said.  "It seems like a windfall to me. You can give the attorneys a large award, while still falling short of billions."

Counsel for the Tesla stockholders have pointed out that Delaware's Supreme Court has in the past declined to replace the current fee approach with declining percentages.  "Under Delaware law, the unprecedented size of the benefit conferred does not alter plaintiff's counsel's entitlement to 33% of that benefit," attorneys for the Tesla stockholders wrote.  They also pointed to voluntary concessions reducing the total ask to around 11%, with features that reduce the cost to the company.

Some of the sting felt by Tesla, the brief indicated, could be taken away by federal tax law terms that will make 21% of the fee award cash tax-deductible, reducing the post-tax fee award cost from $5.63 billion to $4.45 billion.  State corporate income tax and payroll tax deductions and allowances also could offset the share payout.

UConn's Myers said the Tesla stockholder attorneys won a landmark victory and "deserve to be compensated handsomely" for taking a risky case through trial, while also predicting that the court will "take a hard look at the magnitude of the benefit actually achieved here — that may be a figure in some dispute."  The case nevertheless also stands as an example of "how the Delaware system effectively harnesses the efforts of folks like the plaintiffs attorneys to generate powerful incentives for good governance at public companies," Myers said.

$43M Trust Not on the Hook for Attorney Fees in Georgia

March 12, 2024

A recent Law 360 story by Emily Johnson, “Ga. Panel Finds $43M Trust Not On Hook For Legal Fees”, reports that the Georgia Court of Appeals rejected a request from beneficiaries of a $43 million furniture fortune, finding that the trust's ex-trustees should not be saddled with attorney fees and litigation costs while the trust's beneficiaries sued them for allegedly mishandling the trust and overpaying themselves.

At the same time, an appellate panel said that former trustees Phillip Faircloth and Ted Sexton were not faced with a threat of irreparable injury, so the lower court erred in granting the interlocutory injunction that ordered the trust to pay for Faircloth and Sexton's attorney fees while the trust sues them.  The lower court's interlocutory injunction required the current trustees to take up the cost of the former trustees' legal battle, including attorney fees and litigation costs.  "In sum, the record lacks evidence to support a finding that the interlocutory injunction is necessary to prevent an irreparable harm having no adequate legal remedy," the appellate panel said.

Beneficiaries of a trust tied to furniture tycoon Sherwin Glass, who founded Farmers Furniture Co., sued Faircloth and Sexton in 2017.  The appellate court panel found that because the trust has been lending money to Faircloth and Sexton for their legal costs, they were not harmed, a requirement for an interlocutory injunction.  "Due to the loan by Farmers, they have not been harmed by going unrepresented, and any monetary harm can be remedied by repayment of interest paid pursuant to the loan," the appellate panel said.

The appellate panel left in place a lower court's rejection of the request that the former trustees reimburse the trust about $4.6 million in legal fees that had already been paid.  This is the third time the case has been before the state's Court of Appeals, according to the decision.

Counsel for the Glass Dynasty Trust told the panel in September that the injunction required the trust to pay 50% of attorney fees and costs incurred by two of the firms representing Faircloth and Sexton, as well as 100% of the fees incurred by another, within 14 days of receiving an invoice.

Representing Faircloth and Sexton, J. Randolph Evans, partner at Squire Patton Boggs LLP, told Law360 Pulse on Monday that the court's decision is one of the biggest decisions this year in the state, saying this has "turned indemnity/insurance law on its head."

"The whole purpose of us having [a] duty to defend is so we don't have to front money to the lawyer," Evans said. "They pay the lawyer. Now they're saying, you pay the lawyer, and sue the insurance company and get back the money."  Evans said that the decision means that the former trustees and others won't be able to enforce a duty to defend from insurance carriers or indemnitors unless you can't pay for your defense.

The implications of the panel's decision for Georgia are enormous, he said.  "They went one step further, which made people really react," Evans said. "It's not just that you don't have the money; if you can borrow the money, you can't enforce the duty to defend."

Article: Why the Catalyst Theory Matters in Class Actions

March 11, 2024

A recent Law.com article by Adam J. Levitt, “Arguing Class Actions: Why the Catalyst Theory Matters”, examines the catalyst theory in class action litigation.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

The story presents a conundrum.  Plaintiffs file a class action, which the defendant initially resists.  Plaintiffs counsel spends hundreds of thousands of dollars (or more) in lodestar and costs prosecuting the case, but after potentially years of hotly contested litigation, the defendant issues a recall or announces a refund program that fixes the problem and then argues that the case is moot.  The question: Should those who filed this case, and consequently induced (or “catalyzed”) the defendant to fix the problem, be paid?

The right answer is obvious.  Of course the plaintiffs lawyers should be paid.  Without plaintiffs counsel’s actions and active litigation threat, the defendant would have never changed its behavior, ultimately for consumers’ benefit.  The law routinely rewards those who confer benefits on others, even in the absence of, say, a contractual guarantee (as with the doctrine of quantum meruit).  In short, nobody works for free.  Nobody, as some would have it, except plaintiffs lawyers.

The Rise and Fall of the Catalyst Theory

Rewarding lawyers for catalyzing a change used to be noncontroversial. See, e.g., Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 1995) (“a plaintiff whose lawsuit has been the catalyst in bringing about a goal sought in litigation, by threat of victory … has prevailed for purposes of an attorney’s fee claim…”); Pembroke v. Wood Cnty., Texas, 981 F.2d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing viability of catalyst theory); Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1991) (same).

But the law became murkier in May 2001, with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).  There, an assisted living facility sued West Virginia, arguing that a regulation violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act.  After the suit was filed, the Legislature removed the regulation, mooting the case.

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff was not a “prevailing party” for purposes of the applicable fee-shifting statute.  Discarding the “catalyst theory,” it ruled that: “A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change” sufficient to make the plaintiff a “prevailing party.” Id. at 605.  As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained in her dissent, the Buckhannon decision frustrates the goals of the catalyst theory because it “allows a defendant to escape a statutory obligation to pay a plaintiff’s counsel fees, even though the suit’s merit led the defendant to abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on, to accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the principal redress sought in the complaint.” Id. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

The Catalyst Theory Today

Notwithstanding the Buckhannon decision, the catalyst theory remains a powerful tool outside of Buckhannon’s specific context.

First, Buckhannon has no bearing on state causes of action.  In California, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1021.5 allows a court to award fees to a “successful” party.  The California Supreme Court has explained it takes a “broad, pragmatic view of what constitutes a ‘successful party,’” Graham v. DaimlerChrysler, 34 Cal. 4th 553, 565 (2004), and explicitly endorsed the “catalyst theory [as] an application of the … principle that courts look to the practical impact of the public interest litigation in order to determine whether the party was successful.” Id. at 566.  In short, it disagreed with the U.S. Supreme Court regarding what it means to “prevail” or “succeed” in a litigation.

The catalyst theory has also largely survived in the context of favorable settlements.  For example, in Mady v. DaimlerChrysler, 59 So.3d 1129 (Fla. 2011), the Supreme Court of Florida considered an award of attorney fees to a consumer who accepted defendant’s offer of judgment, an offer that neither conceded liability nor plaintiff’s entitlement to fees, in a case filed under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), which guarantees fees to a “prevailing party.” Id. at 1131.  Explicitly considering and distinguishing Buckhannon, the court found that a party may “prevail” with a settlement.  In doing so, it rearticulated the logic underpinning the catalyst theory:

[The plaintiff] achieved the same result with a monetary settlement only after being forced to bear all of the costs and expenses associated with litigation and facing the statutory penalty if the offer of judgment had not been accepted. DaimlerChrysler could have resolved this dispute during the “informal dispute settlement” phase, but instead waited until after [plaintiff] was forced to commence this action and incur the expenses of this litigation. Id. at 1133.

Further, even in federal court, attorney fees may be awarded under statutes other than those limiting such awards to “prevailing” parties.  For example, in Templin v. Indep. Blue Cross, 785 F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 2015), the Third Circuit explained that a fee may be awarded for an Employee Retirement Income Security Act claim under the catalyst theory, because ERISA does not limit fee awards to the “prevailing party.” 785 F.3d at 865.  Including the Third Circuit, at least five circuits have endorsed the catalyst theory under such statutes: Scarangella v. Group Health, 731 F.3d 146, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2013); Ohio River Valley Env’l Coalition v. Green Valley Coal, 511 F.3d 407, 414 (4th Cir. 2007); Sierra Club v. Env’l Protection Agency, 322 F.3d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty. Council, 307 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002).

Despite the ongoing recognition of the catalyst theory in many contexts, there remains the risk that courts may apply the catalyst theory narrowly, or that defendants may find a way around it. Consider Gordon v. Tootsie Roll Indus., 810 F. App’x 495, 496 (9th Cir. 2020), a “slack-fill” case in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s boxes of Junior Mints were mostly air.  After the plaintiff moved for class certification, the defendant changed the box’s label.  The plaintiffs dismissed and moved for fees.

The fee application was denied because “Gordon’s theory of the case was that the size of the box was itself misleading, and that Tootsie Roll should either fill the Products’ box with more candy to account for the size of the box … or shrink the box to accurately represent the amount of the candy product therein[, and] Tootsie Roll did not make either of these changes.” Id. at 497 (internal quotation omitted).  Considering the disincentives (or, conversely, the moral hazards) that arise from this type of narrow application of the catalyst theory, courts should take a decidedly more equitable view when adjudicating this important issue.

A Way Forward

For practitioners, a few lessons come out of this case law and history.  First, in writing their complaint, attorneys must think through the various paths that a company might take to remedy the purported harm.  Recall that in Gordon, the plaintiff focused entirely on the misleading box, but not on the misleading labeling. Second, favorable settlements and offers of judgment remain viable tools, and may support a catalyst theory attorney-fee payment even if the defendant resists paying fees in the settlement itself.  Finally, despite Buckhannon, the catalyst theory remains readily available under a host of statutes (state and federal).  In relying on citing those statutes, plaintiffs should not shy away from the catalyst theory’s compelling logic.  Courts understand that basic fairness requires that attorneys be paid if their lawsuit ultimately confers a significant benefit.  Nobody should work for free.  Not even plaintiffs lawyers.

Adam J. Levitt is a founding partner of DiCello Levitt, where he heads the firm’s class action and public client practice groups.  DiCello Levitt senior counsel Daniel Schwartz also contributed to this article.