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Category: Fee Award Data

$5B Alternative Fee Proposal in Tesla Case Tests Chancery

March 20, 2024

A recent Law 360 story by Jeff Montgomery, “Epic Tesla Fee Bid May Blaze Extraordinary Chancery Path”, reports that an unprecedented $5 billion-plus stock-based fee award sought by class attorneys who recently short-circuited Tesla CEO Elon Musk's 12-step, $51 billion compensation package has set up an equally unprecedented test for Delaware Court of Chancery fee guidelines and a potential award one law expert described as "dynastic wealth."

Class attorneys who have battled Tesla's compensation scheme for Musk since mid-2018 last week sought more than 11% of the 266,947,208 Tesla shares freed up Jan. 30, when Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick ordered rescission of the options that Tesla's board awarded to Musk in an all-stock compensation plan.  The value had been estimated initially at $5.6 billion, but would fluctuate with the value of Tesla's stock.

While the process of seeking a stock fee award instead of cash is not unprecedented, it is an unusual posture for Delaware Chancery litigation, and its scale is likely to reopen what were once considered settled questions over counsel risks, rewards, and just how much attorneys can command for corporate benefit fees, experts told Law360.

"Given the order of magnitude here, I suspect that the case will not set any records in terms of percentage of the recovery awarded to the plaintiffs attorneys, but in absolute terms it'll still amount to dynastic wealth," said University of Connecticut School of Law professor Minor Myers. He described the fee as "destined to be epic, if only because it involves the invalidation of a pay package that was itself comically large."

Chancellor McCormick put the fee in play with an order rescinding Musk's 12-tranche, all-stock compensation plan Jan. 30, after a week-long trial in November 2022.  The ruling cited disclosure failures, murky terms, conflicted director architects and Musk's own conflicted influence in Tesla's creation of an Everest-sized mount of fast-triggering stock options.

"Plaintiff won complete recission of the largest pay package ever issued," the fee motion, filed last week, said.  "Our research demonstrates that the court's decree of recission, conservatively valued, was the largest compensatory award in the history of American jurisprudence by multiples," driven by "the gargantuan size of the tort underlying this action."

But class attorneys are seeking an equally gargantuan fee, even after departing from calculation customs that Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster stressed last year in declining to apply a size reduction to a nearly 27%, $267 million award to stockholders who challenged a Dell Technolgies stock swap in 2018.  In his fee ruling, the vice chancellor said the calls to reduce the Dell fee conflicted with court efforts to reward attorneys for going deeper into litigation and taking greater risks in pursuit of legitimate claims.

"Of course, everyone involved will try to fit this into an existing framework, but the reality is that a $5.6 billion fee award is staggeringly high, whatever factors are considered," said Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Robert O. Bentley professor of law, emeritus, at Washington and Lee School of Law.  "I think Chancellor McCormick will find a way to go a fair bit lower, while still providing the attorneys with a very high award of some amount."  Johnson added: "The shock of Musk's compensation, undone by the chancellor, is unlikely to be followed by what many would regard as a shockingly high $5.6 billion fee award."

Vice Chancellor Laster's most recent big fee ruling established, pending appeal, a $266.7 million fee last year for attorneys who secured a $1 billion settlement for minority stockholders who sued over a $23.9 million Dell Technologies stock swap in 2018.

In Dell, the vice chancellor rejected investor arguments that large "mega-fund" settlements justified throttling back on fee payouts because customary fee percentages can produce massive, windfall payouts.  Instead, Vice Chancellor Laster defended the use of customary, variable percentages, including 15% to 25% shares of awards for settlements after "meaningful litigation and motion practice" and up to 33% post-trial.  He also acknowledged the tension between successful plaintiffs' counsel seeking appropriate compensation and large investors working to minimize carve-outs from court awards.

In Tesla, class attorneys, wary of blowback over big recoveries borne of typical fee ratios, acknowledged the Dell ruling's guidance, but also pointed to an earlier ruling that produced the current largest court-approved fee, a $304 million award approved in 2011 by then-Chancellor Leo E. Strine and upheld by Delaware's Supreme Court a year later.

That decision required Grupo Mexico to return to Southern Peru Copper Corp. nearly $1.3 billion worth of Southern Peru stock — rather than cash — after finding that Southern Copper had been coerced by a conflicted, controlling stockholder into overpaying for a Grupo Mexico mine in 2005.  With pre- and post-judgment interest, the award reached more than $2 billion, with class attorneys awarded 15%, or $304 million, for fees and expenses.

Tesla class attorneys referenced the 15% fee carve-out approved in Southern Peru, but adjusted even that percentage downward — to just over 11% — to reflect value added by the absence of a holding period for any award of Tesla shares before they could be sold.  Case costs included more than $13.6 million in attorney fees and more than $1.1 million in expenses during the multi-year Chancery action.  Requested fees would equal a $288,888 hourly rate that the fee motion said was justified by the case's complexity, results and attorney skill levels, among other factors.

Jill E. Fisch, Saul A. Fox distinguished professor of business law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, said use of stock for attorney fees was once "kind of frowned upon," but is not unprecedented.  "They are repeat players" in Delaware's courts, Fisch said of the attorney teams that prevailed in the Tesla case.  "They want credibility before the court.  The numbers, I think, reflect the benefit and risk of this kind of litigation, and traditionally, Chancery Court has acknowledged those risks."

The suit, led by stockholder Richard Tornetta, branded Musk's compensation package as unprecedented and unfair, noting that Musk had already qualified for some $20 billion in awards by the time the suit was filed, "making him one of the richest men on Earth" at the time.  It alleged in part that he relied on two in-house Tesla attorneys for work on the plan before the board's conflicted compensation committee took up the issue.

Ann M. Lipton, the Michael M. Fleishman associate professor in business law and entrepreneurship at Tulane University Law School and associate dean, pointed to another Tesla- and Musk-related case to illustrate the risks stockholder attorneys take.

Last year, after about seven years of litigation, Delaware's Supreme Court upheld a post-trial dismissal of a suit filed by stockholders of rooftop solar venture SolarCity, seeking damages tied to Tesla's $2.6 billion purchase of the company, for which Musk was CEO and also held a big share of company stock.

At one point during the case, the SolarCity stockholders suggested a damage award amounting to a $13 billion giveback of Tesla stock Musk received for his SolarCity shares. Dismissal of the case and rejection of class claims, however, wiped out class attorneys' hopes for a share of a big award.

In the more-recent scuttling of Musk's Tesla stock awards, Lipton said, shareholders benefited from the stock award cancelations by being dramatically less diluted in their holdings.  "That the attorneys are asking for a little bit of dilution" through their fee, "but far less than the shareholders would otherwise have suffered, seems like a real benefit that was provided, from a financial point of view."

Lipton said she was not familiar enough with the current Tesla fee motion to comment on the percentage sought, but cited the enormous risk and stockholder counsel loss in SolarCity and said that "attorneys deserve to be compensated" when they prevail.

University of Michigan Law School professor Gabriel Rauterberg said the fee bid in Tesla appears excessive, despite the importance of fee as a motivator.  "It seems to me extremely implausible that an award this large is necessary to provide the right incentives, given that plaintiffs attorneys' fixed costs for investigating lawsuits, conducting research, and prosecuting cases can be significant but not on this scale," Rauterberg said.  "It seems like a windfall to me. You can give the attorneys a large award, while still falling short of billions."

Counsel for the Tesla stockholders have pointed out that Delaware's Supreme Court has in the past declined to replace the current fee approach with declining percentages.  "Under Delaware law, the unprecedented size of the benefit conferred does not alter plaintiff's counsel's entitlement to 33% of that benefit," attorneys for the Tesla stockholders wrote.  They also pointed to voluntary concessions reducing the total ask to around 11%, with features that reduce the cost to the company.

Some of the sting felt by Tesla, the brief indicated, could be taken away by federal tax law terms that will make 21% of the fee award cash tax-deductible, reducing the post-tax fee award cost from $5.63 billion to $4.45 billion.  State corporate income tax and payroll tax deductions and allowances also could offset the share payout.

UConn's Myers said the Tesla stockholder attorneys won a landmark victory and "deserve to be compensated handsomely" for taking a risky case through trial, while also predicting that the court will "take a hard look at the magnitude of the benefit actually achieved here — that may be a figure in some dispute."  The case nevertheless also stands as an example of "how the Delaware system effectively harnesses the efforts of folks like the plaintiffs attorneys to generate powerful incentives for good governance at public companies," Myers said.

Article: The Changing Landscape of Fees in Securities Class Actions

December 11, 2023

A recent Law 360 article by Edward Flores, The Shifting Landscape of Securities Class Action Fees”, reports on the changing landscape of attorney fees in securities class actions.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

A recent Law360 article notes that there appears to be a growing shift in how class action fees are awarded, with the benefits secured for class members taking an increasing role in determining fees rather than fees simply being a function of the settlement amount.  An examination of data on the percentage of the recovery awarded to attorneys in securities class actions shows that while the percentage declines as recoveries get larger, that percentage also increases as recoveries grow relative to a statistically predicted recovery.

As part of the settlement stage of a securities class action, plaintiffs file motions for approval of the settlement, as well as attorney fees and expenses.  In these motions, the attorney fees sought are typically based on a percentage of the proposed settlement, with the proposed figures often based on a sample of recent cases, the case's lodestar multiplier or relevant benchmarks.  For example, a June case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, In re: Electric Last Mile Solutions Inc., noted that "Lead Counsel intends to seek an award of attorneys' fees of no more than one third of the Settlement Amount.  This fee request is in line with other settlements approved in recent cases."

In another case in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in July, Bond v. Clover Health Investments Corp., the plaintiffs' counsel noted that the "request for 25% of the Settlement Fund ... amounts to a lodestar multiplier of 3.53, which is within the range of multipliers commonly awarded in securities class actions and other complex litigation."

Finally, the plaintiffs' counsel in a U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California case in August, Purple Mountain Trust v. Wells Fargo & Co., noted that "Lead Counsel seeks an award of attorneys' fees of 25% of the Settlement Amount.  This fee request ... is consistent with the benchmark for attorneys' fee awards in this Circuit."

Plaintiffs counsel also typically highlights the recovery they have obtained for the class and their work to obtain that recovery.  For example, in the aforementioned case involving Clover Health, counsel for the plaintiffs noted that the "recovery represents approximately 13.2% of the likely recoverable damages in this case, well above the median recovery of 1.8% of estimated damages for all securities class actions settled in 2022."

However, those recoveries are, at best, benchmarked as a percentage of some estimate of losses suffered by the class.  An important question is whether plaintiffs counsel receives a higher fee when they obtain an unexpectedly large settlement, potentially indicating productive work on their part.  Moreover, it may be of interest to see what other factors drive attorney fees awarded in securities class actions, both in terms of examining the direction and magnitude that certain factors have on attorney fees, as well as for purposes of estimating or cross-checking proposed fees given certain characteristics of a case.

Data and Analysis

To examine what factors can help explain attorney fees awarded, we analyzed securities class actions with alleged violations of Rule 10b-5 involving common stock that settled during the period from January 2012 through June.  In addition to the logarithm of the actual settlement amount, some of the variables analyzed include a potential proxy for attorney performance and the strength of a case, the time to resolution of a case, and the status of certain motions as of the time of settlement.

As a potential proxy for attorney performance and the strength of a case, we calculated the ratio of the actual settlement value to its mean predicted settlement value to examine if better-than-expected settlements are reflected in attorney fees received.  For each case, the mean predicted settlement value was calculated using an econometric model that uses as inputs variables that are historically known to drive settlement values.[8] For the middle 95% of cases in the dataset, the value of this ratio ranges from 0.2 to 3.8.

We also examined the effect that the time to resolution has on attorney fees, based on the filing of the first complaint of a case.  Finally, we examined the effects that the filing and outcome of the motion to dismiss and the motion for class certification have on attorney fees.  In measuring attorney fees, we used two different variables: attorney fees as a percentage of the settlement, and total attorney fees and expenses as a percentage of the settlement.  As these variables range from 0 to 1, a fractional logistic regression model is used to analyze the relationship between attorney fees and the independent variables.

As the coefficients of this model can be hard to interpret, we examined the marginal effects of the independent variables in order to get an idea of the effect that a change in one variable has on attorney fee percentage, holding all others constant.

Results

From Table 1, we see that the ratio of the actual settlement to the mean predicted settlement has a positive and statistically significant effect, possibly highlighting how a better-than-expected outcome is rewarded in attorney fees.  In terms of magnitude, we find that a 0.1 increase in this ratio results in an additional 0.1% in attorney fee percentage.

One interesting question that our data does not let us answer is whether higher-than-predicted settlements reflect a particularly strong prosecution of the case by plaintiffs counsel or case factors favorable to the class that are not captured by our model.  Overall, we find that the variables in the model using attorney fee percentage as the dependent variable can explain nearly 20% of the total variation in attorney fee percentage.

Looking at the individual variables beyond the ratio of the actual to predicted recovery, the logarithm of the settlement value is unsurprisingly the strongest predictor of attorney fees, with higher settlement values being associated with a lower attorney fee percentage, consistent with prior research.

On the other hand, the time-to-resolution variable had a small and statistically insignificant effect, with each year contributing an additional 0.22% in attorney fee percentage.  Thus, to the extent that courts are rewarding plaintiffs counsel — or plaintiffs counsel are willing to ask for more — through the fee percentage, that would appear to be based more on results than time spent.

When analyzing the motion variables, we find that the filing of a motion to dismiss has a statistically significant negative effect on attorney fees.  Meanwhile, the effect of a motion to dismiss being denied or partially granted is positive and statistically significant, contributing an additional 1.5% in attorney fee percentage and again potentially showing that plaintiffs counsel is rewarded for achieving outcomes favorable to the class.

As over 90% of settled cases have a motion to dismiss filed, this means that cases where the motion to dismiss is denied or partially granted tend to have a 1.5% higher attorney fee percentage relative to cases that settle before a court decision was reached in the motion to dismiss.

The filing of a motion for class certification has a small and not statistically significant effect on attorney fees.  However, the effect of a motion for class certification being granted is positive and statistically significant, contributing an additional 1.6% in attorney fee percentage, again consistent with the idea that plaintiffs counsel is being rewarded for achieving outcomes favorable to the class.

We also performed this analysis using total attorney fees and expenses as a percentage of the settlement size as the dependent variable.  Under this model, the explanatory variables explain roughly 40% of the total variation in total attorney fees and expenses.

While the results look similar for several of the variables analyzed, there are a few notable differences. For example, the time-to-resolution variable was statistically significant in this model, with each year contributing an additional 0.62% in attorney fee percentage and expenses.  In other words, plaintiffs counsel appear to be compensated for actual expenses, but are not being compensated through the fee percentage for time spent.

The filing of a motion for class certification was also positive and statistically significant, contributing to an additional 2.8% in attorney fee percentage and expenses.

Conclusion

Our analysis of settled cases shows that in addition to the settlement size, plaintiffs counsel in securities class actions appear to be rewarded for good settlement outcomes relative to a statistical prediction, with certain outcomes for the motion to dismiss and motion for class certification also affecting attorney fees awarded.

As a starting point, this means that in securities class actions, attorney fees are not just based on "the amount of money involved in a settlement," but also to at least some degree on the difference between that amount of money and the expected amount of money based on characteristics of the case.

That said, it is possible that analyses such as those described here may also be useful for purposes of estimating or cross-checking proposed fees given certain characteristics or outcomes in a case, particularly if one would like to reward successful advocacy by plaintiffs counsel. 

As noted above, however, while our proxy variable for attorney performance and strength of case incorporates several quantitative factors that drive settlement values, it may not account for other qualitative strengths and weaknesses of a case.

Nevertheless, given that there are some areas that we can measure, it may make sense to see how a proposed settlement compares to a statistical prediction as part of the consideration of the relevant amount of attorney fees.

Edward Flores is a senior consultant at NERA Economic Consulting.

Ethical Questions for Bankruptcy Judge on Fee Issues

November 3, 2023

A recent Law 360 story by Daniel Connolh, “US Trustee Moves to Reverse ‘Tainted’ Jackson Walker Fees”, reports that, in the ethics fallout involving former U.S. Bankruptcy Judge David R. Jones of the Southern District of Texas and his undisclosed intimate relationship with a Jackson Walker LLP bankruptcy partner, the federal agency that oversees the bankruptcy court system filed multiple motions to strip millions of dollars in fee awards from the firm.  Writing that "all orders awarding fees and expenses are tainted and should be set aside," the U.S. Trustee's Office for the region that covers the Southern District filed motions to undo fee awards in at least 11 cases, including the bankruptcies of J.C. Penney Co. and Neiman Marcus.

The trustee, Kevin Epstein, cited Jones' cohabitation with Elizabeth Freeman, a former Jackson Walker bankruptcy partner who now leads her own small firm.  The relationship was recently revealed through litigation and media reports, and led to a formal ethics complaint filed Oct. 13 against Jones, who has resigned.  "Judge Jones' secret relationship with Ms. Freeman created an unlevel 'playing field' for every party in interest in every case Jackson Walker had before Judge Jones, including this one, and in Jackson Walker cases mediated by Judge Jones," Epstein wrote in Thursday's motion in the J.C. Penney case.

In the J.C. Penney bankruptcy alone, Judge Jones had signed orders compensating Jackson Walker for its work as debtor's local counsel and awarded about $14,000 in expenses and about $1.1 million in fees, including about $286,000 billed by Freeman, according to a summary compiled by the U.S. Trustee's Office.  The precise dollar amounts of all the proposed fee reversals weren't immediately clear, but one section of Epstein's motion describes the general scope.

"Judge Jones presided over at least 26 cases, and perhaps more, where he awarded Jackson Walker approximately $13 million in compensation and expenses while Ms. Freeman was both a Jackson Walker partner and living with him in an intimate relationship.  This includes approximately $1 million in fees billed by Ms. Freeman herself in 17 of those cases."  The U.S. Trustee's Office has filed proposed orders that call for the previous orders approving Jackson Walker's fees and expenses to be vacated.  If approved, parties would have 120 days to object to Jackson Walker's fees and expenses, and a hearing would take place.

The U.S. Trustee's Office has also moved to block a $1.3 million fee award to Jackson Walker in at least one case — the GWG Holdings Inc. bankruptcy — in which Judge Jones acted not as presiding judge, but as a mediator.  A recent document filed by the trustee highlights several other cases in which Judge Jones acted as mediator, rather than as judge.  Property records show that Judge Jones and Freeman had jointly owned a house in Houston since 2017. Earlier, Freeman had served as Judge Jones' law clerk.

In a previous interview, Wilkinson said the law firm first learned about a potential relationship between Freeman and Jones in March 2021, and took steps including consulting outside ethics counsel.  Wilkinson had forwarded an emailed statement: "Our firm acted in a timely fashion once we learned of this issue, including conducting a full inquiry and consulting independent outside ethics counsel for their guidance.  From the time we first learned of this allegation Ms. Freeman was instructed not to work or bill on any cases before Judge Jones.  We are confident that we acted responsibly."

The U.S. Trustee's recent filings say Jackson Walker didn't act responsibly.  "Notwithstanding Jackson Walker's admitted knowledge of the secret relationship between its partner, Ms. Freeman, and Judge Jones no later than March 2021, Jackson Walker never disclosed that relationship in any pending or subsequently filed case during the following 21 months while Ms. Freeman was a partner — or thereafter when she was working as a Jackson Walker contract attorney on bankruptcy cases after leaving Jackson Walker," Epstein wrote in the motion, which was signed by Millie Aponte Sall, assistant U.S. trustee.

And at least one court document suggests that Freeman was still indirectly participating in cases for Jackson Walker that were pending before Judge Jones after March 2021, by consulting with other attorneys.  A Fifth Circuit ethics complaint said that whether or not Freeman directly participated in a case before Judge Jones, she still stood to gain money.  The U.S. Trustee's Office has filed motions seeking to undo Jackson Walker's fees and expenses in the following cases, all in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas:

J.C. Penney Co. Inc., et al., case number 20-20184
Neiman Marcus Group Ltd. LLC, case number 20-32519
Westmoreland Coal Co. et al., case number 18-35672
Whiting Petroleum Corp., case number 20-32021
Stage Stores Inc., case number 20-32564
Chesapeake Energy Corp., case number 20-33233
Covia Holdings Corp., case number 20-33295
Tug Robert J. Bouchard Corp., case number 20-34758
Mule Sky LLC, case number 20-35561
Seadrill Partners LLC, case number 20-35740
Katerra Inc. et al., case number 21-31861

$267M Attorney Fee Award Appealed in $1B Dell Settlement

October 2, 2023

A recent Law 360 story by Jeff Montgomery, “Pentwater Appeals $267M Atty Fee Award in Dell Case in Del.”, reports that a private equity investor in Dell Technologies Inc. is appealing a Chancery Court's record $266.7 million fee award to class counsel that secured a $1 billion settlement for stockholders who sued over a $23.9 billion stock swap in 2018.  Pentwater Capital Management filed notice of appeal without a transcript late Friday with the Delaware Supreme Court, challenging both the attorney fee award and a $50,000 incentive award granted to Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Plan, the lead plaintiff for the suit filed in November 2018.

Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster set the fee at $266.7 million on July 31, trimming a request of $285 million.  He said in his July 31 decision and order that eight funds that had invested in Dell but were not part of the class suit, recommended a lower fee, citing concerns about "windfall" profits in the case of large awards.

Pentwater — holder of 1.6% of the Dell Class V tracking stock at issue in the Chancery Court suit — branded the fee award as massive and a potentially "dangerous" precedent. In a Chancery Court brief opposing the fee, Pentwater argued that "the requested fee in absolute and percentage terms is disproportionate to the value conferred on class members."

Settlement of the overall case prevented a trial on claims targeting Dell's effort to exchange Class V stock — created to finance much of Dell's $67 billion acquisition of EMC Technologies in 2016 — for shares of Dell common stock.  The Class V shares generally traded at only 60% or 65% of the price of VMware, a business in which EMC owned an 81.9% equity stake when Dell acquired EMC.  Public shareholders, the class had argued, were shortchanged by $10.7 billion when, in December 2018, Dell Technologies paid $14 billion in cash and issued 149,387,617 shares of its Class C common stock for the Class V shares.

When the challenged conversion closed on Dec. 28, 2018, VMware stock closed at $158.38 per share, and Class V stockholders received just $104.27 per share, fueling objections that the Dell Class C stock to be received for Class V shares had been overvalued.

In his fee opinion, the vice chancellor noted that class attorneys provided hundreds of examples of contingent fee agreements to support their original request for $285 million.  However, he noted, none of the objectors provided examples, except for Pentwater, and that example was "not for a Delaware case."  Vice Chancellor Laster also observed in his July 31 decision that investment funds that had recommended a lower amount, including Pentwater and seven others, had "a strong economic motivation for seeking a lower fee award."

The vice chancellor's decision elaborated on the idea that the investment funds that didn't go to the trouble of suing had a financial motivation now to object.  Following a 10% fee trend in federal securities actions, he noted, would have given them an extra $49 million for the equity holders, rather than sharing it with the class.  Five law professors suggested in a friend-of-the-court brief that a 15% fee would be appropriate, which still would have added $35.78 million to the objectors' recovery, the vice chancellor's decision noted.

"Having sat back and done nothing, the objectors now claim that a fee award without a sizable reduction would 'not yield equitable results,'" the vice chancellor wrote in an August filing confirming the $266.7 million fee award.  "That assertion masks self-interest with an appeal to equity.  Wanting more money for yourself is understandable, but it is not grounds for a fee objection."

New Billing Rate Matrix Adopted to Set Fees in DC Litigation

August 14, 2023

A recent Bloomberg Law story by Bernie Pazanowski, “’Fitzpatrick Matrix Adopted for Setting DC Attorneys’ Fees Awards”, reports that a government employee in Washington, who settled a discrimination lawsuit against the federal agency for which she worked, is entitled to an award of $526,101 in attorneys’ fees, a federal court in Washington said.

The correct method for establishing prevailing market rates for attorneys’ fees in the Washington area is the Fitzpatrick Matrix, which lays out a “finely tuned rate schedule that lists a different market rate for each additional year of experience a lawyer brings instead of bundling experience levels into bands,” Judge James E. Boasberg of the US District Court for the District of Columbia said.

Cindy Brackett, who worked for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, said that the court should use the Legal Services Index Matrix to compute the fees, which is a general schedule of hourly fees based on years of attorney experience.  But Boasberg rejected that method, saying that there were problems with the age of the data it used, with the sample of federal litigators it used, and the way it groups attorneys into just five experience bands.

  • District precedent established that the Fitzpatrick Matrix was more reliable than the LSI Matrix because it’s limited to the Washington market, Boasberg said
  • Fitzpatrick also employed lessons from an economics rather than a legal textbook to blend data from the cases he reviewed into a linear model that reflects common economic practice, he said
  • Computing the rates here, Boasberg noted that both parties caused delays in the case that started in 2017 and said that using the 2022 version of the Fitzpatrick Matrix was proper
  • The final award included fees for the time Brackett’s attorneys spent litigating the fee dispute