A recent Law 360 story by Rose Krebs, “Law Professor Say $150M Fee is Fair in Dell Suit Deal,” reports that a group of law professors says the Delaware Chancery Court should award less than the $285 million fee sought for stockholder attorneys who secured a $1 billion class settlement after challenging a $23.9 billion conversion of Dell Technologies stock, saying a $150 million award would "adequately" compensate counsel.  In a brief submitted to the court, five professors assert that using a "declining-percentage" fee award structure — by which the percentage of fees awarded are reduced the larger the settlement size — in this case would be prudent.

"Even under the declining-fee approach, these mega-settlements are extremely profitable, demonstrating the winner-take-all reality of shareholder litigation," the brief said.  The professors, who said they "publish extensively on representative stockholder litigation," argue that a fee award equal to 15% of the settlement amount is warranted, rather than the 28.5% class attorneys seek.

"Plaintiffs pursue large settlements because they tend to have the highest multiplier to lodestar — in other words, they're more profitable than the alternatives," the professors said.  "Thus, class counsel have adequate incentive to take risk, even on a declining-percentage fee basis.  Overcompensating class attorneys simply diminishes class recovery."  The professors said they "respectfully suggest that a declining-percentage fee award adequately compensates Plaintiff's counsel while preserving funds for the class."  A 15% award would preserve an additional $135 million for the class, while still compensating counsel at a reasonable rate for time spent working on the case, the professors said.

Earlier this month, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster said in a letter to Pentwater Capital Management LP and other Dell institutional investors who oppose the fee request that the Chancery Court was considering a 20% floor for an award, to be adjusted if warranted.  The vice chancellor asked for additional briefing from Pentwater, and also said it would be helpful to know what "law professors say in favor of or against the declining percentage method."

In a filing, Pentwater, citing several studies, argued that "empirical research uniformly confirms that in federal class actions, as settlement amounts rise, fee percentages fall."  "Contrary to concerns about the decreasing percentage model, scholarship indicates that lowering fee percentages does not reward lawyers marginally less compensation for the same work," Pentwater said.  Pentwater contends that the 28.5 percent award being sought "is unfair to the class."

On Tuesday, Vice Chancellor Laster allowed the professors to submit a brief as amici curiae.  In their brief, the professors also said that "a declining-fee approach may not always be best."  They gave as an example cases that sophisticated institutional investors "negotiate for a 'baseline' recovery (i.e., a settlement amount that a typical plaintiffs' firm could likely achieve given the facts known at the start of the litigation) with a relatively low fee percentage for achieving this baseline and a larger percentage for achieving a greater recovery."

"This approach, however, would require the investor to determine this baseline amount when selecting lead counsel and incorporate it into the retainer agreement," the brief said.  "There is no indication of such an ex ante agreement in this case, and it would be difficult to judicially replicate the incentives of such an agreement after the fact."

The professors added that "absent such an agreement, the declining-percentage award matches risk and return, adequately compensates contingency counsel, and preserves settlement value for the class."  They also suggested the court "should consider requesting other information before setting a fee, including any ex ante agreements Plaintiff's counsel has reached with clients and fee-sharing arrangements with any other counsel."

In an order, Vice Chancellor Laster DIRECTED each firm representing the investor plaintiffs to submit information by detailing several issues such as: how many ex ante agreements they have negotiated in the past five years, what percentage of their representations have such agreements, the nature of any such past agreements, and if any fees awarded in the Dell case will be shared with other counsel that hasn't entered an appearance in the case.