A recent Law.com article by Adam J. Levitt, “Arguing Class Actions: Why the Catalyst Theory Matters”, examines the catalyst theory in class action litigation.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

The story presents a conundrum.  Plaintiffs file a class action, which the defendant initially resists.  Plaintiffs counsel spends hundreds of thousands of dollars (or more) in lodestar and costs prosecuting the case, but after potentially years of hotly contested litigation, the defendant issues a recall or announces a refund program that fixes the problem and then argues that the case is moot.  The question: Should those who filed this case, and consequently induced (or “catalyzed”) the defendant to fix the problem, be paid?

The right answer is obvious.  Of course the plaintiffs lawyers should be paid.  Without plaintiffs counsel’s actions and active litigation threat, the defendant would have never changed its behavior, ultimately for consumers’ benefit.  The law routinely rewards those who confer benefits on others, even in the absence of, say, a contractual guarantee (as with the doctrine of quantum meruit).  In short, nobody works for free.  Nobody, as some would have it, except plaintiffs lawyers.

The Rise and Fall of the Catalyst Theory

Rewarding lawyers for catalyzing a change used to be noncontroversial. See, e.g., Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 1995) (“a plaintiff whose lawsuit has been the catalyst in bringing about a goal sought in litigation, by threat of victory … has prevailed for purposes of an attorney’s fee claim…”); Pembroke v. Wood Cnty., Texas, 981 F.2d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing viability of catalyst theory); Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1991) (same).

But the law became murkier in May 2001, with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).  There, an assisted living facility sued West Virginia, arguing that a regulation violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act.  After the suit was filed, the Legislature removed the regulation, mooting the case.

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff was not a “prevailing party” for purposes of the applicable fee-shifting statute.  Discarding the “catalyst theory,” it ruled that: “A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change” sufficient to make the plaintiff a “prevailing party.” Id. at 605.  As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained in her dissent, the Buckhannon decision frustrates the goals of the catalyst theory because it “allows a defendant to escape a statutory obligation to pay a plaintiff’s counsel fees, even though the suit’s merit led the defendant to abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on, to accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the principal redress sought in the complaint.” Id. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

The Catalyst Theory Today

Notwithstanding the Buckhannon decision, the catalyst theory remains a powerful tool outside of Buckhannon’s specific context.

First, Buckhannon has no bearing on state causes of action.  In California, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1021.5 allows a court to award fees to a “successful” party.  The California Supreme Court has explained it takes a “broad, pragmatic view of what constitutes a ‘successful party,’” Graham v. DaimlerChrysler, 34 Cal. 4th 553, 565 (2004), and explicitly endorsed the “catalyst theory [as] an application of the … principle that courts look to the practical impact of the public interest litigation in order to determine whether the party was successful.” Id. at 566.  In short, it disagreed with the U.S. Supreme Court regarding what it means to “prevail” or “succeed” in a litigation.

The catalyst theory has also largely survived in the context of favorable settlements.  For example, in Mady v. DaimlerChrysler, 59 So.3d 1129 (Fla. 2011), the Supreme Court of Florida considered an award of attorney fees to a consumer who accepted defendant’s offer of judgment, an offer that neither conceded liability nor plaintiff’s entitlement to fees, in a case filed under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), which guarantees fees to a “prevailing party.” Id. at 1131.  Explicitly considering and distinguishing Buckhannon, the court found that a party may “prevail” with a settlement.  In doing so, it rearticulated the logic underpinning the catalyst theory:

[The plaintiff] achieved the same result with a monetary settlement only after being forced to bear all of the costs and expenses associated with litigation and facing the statutory penalty if the offer of judgment had not been accepted. DaimlerChrysler could have resolved this dispute during the “informal dispute settlement” phase, but instead waited until after [plaintiff] was forced to commence this action and incur the expenses of this litigation. Id. at 1133.

Further, even in federal court, attorney fees may be awarded under statutes other than those limiting such awards to “prevailing” parties.  For example, in Templin v. Indep. Blue Cross, 785 F.3d 861 (3d Cir. 2015), the Third Circuit explained that a fee may be awarded for an Employee Retirement Income Security Act claim under the catalyst theory, because ERISA does not limit fee awards to the “prevailing party.” 785 F.3d at 865.  Including the Third Circuit, at least five circuits have endorsed the catalyst theory under such statutes: Scarangella v. Group Health, 731 F.3d 146, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2013); Ohio River Valley Env’l Coalition v. Green Valley Coal, 511 F.3d 407, 414 (4th Cir. 2007); Sierra Club v. Env’l Protection Agency, 322 F.3d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty. Council, 307 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002).

Despite the ongoing recognition of the catalyst theory in many contexts, there remains the risk that courts may apply the catalyst theory narrowly, or that defendants may find a way around it. Consider Gordon v. Tootsie Roll Indus., 810 F. App’x 495, 496 (9th Cir. 2020), a “slack-fill” case in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s boxes of Junior Mints were mostly air.  After the plaintiff moved for class certification, the defendant changed the box’s label.  The plaintiffs dismissed and moved for fees.

The fee application was denied because “Gordon’s theory of the case was that the size of the box was itself misleading, and that Tootsie Roll should either fill the Products’ box with more candy to account for the size of the box … or shrink the box to accurately represent the amount of the candy product therein[, and] Tootsie Roll did not make either of these changes.” Id. at 497 (internal quotation omitted).  Considering the disincentives (or, conversely, the moral hazards) that arise from this type of narrow application of the catalyst theory, courts should take a decidedly more equitable view when adjudicating this important issue.

A Way Forward

For practitioners, a few lessons come out of this case law and history.  First, in writing their complaint, attorneys must think through the various paths that a company might take to remedy the purported harm.  Recall that in Gordon, the plaintiff focused entirely on the misleading box, but not on the misleading labeling. Second, favorable settlements and offers of judgment remain viable tools, and may support a catalyst theory attorney-fee payment even if the defendant resists paying fees in the settlement itself.  Finally, despite Buckhannon, the catalyst theory remains readily available under a host of statutes (state and federal).  In relying on citing those statutes, plaintiffs should not shy away from the catalyst theory’s compelling logic.  Courts understand that basic fairness requires that attorneys be paid if their lawsuit ultimately confers a significant benefit.  Nobody should work for free.  Not even plaintiffs lawyers.

Adam J. Levitt is a founding partner of DiCello Levitt, where he heads the firm’s class action and public client practice groups.  DiCello Levitt senior counsel Daniel Schwartz also contributed to this article.

A recent Law.com story by Abigail Adcox “ ‘D.C. Was Our Best-Performing Region’: Billing Rate Increases and Demand Growth Drive Strong Year in the Beltway”, reports that law firms based in Washington, D.C., finished out 2023 with a strong financial performance, propelled by billing rate increases, expense control and robust demand within regulatory and litigation practices, according to results from a bank survey.

Among D.C.-based firms, gross revenue was up 7.6% in 2023 over the previous year, higher than the industry average of 6%, as the average billing rates in the region rose 8.8% compared with the industry average of 8.3%, according to Wells Fargo’s Legal Specialty Group’s year-end survey results.  Those results included eight firms headquartered in the D.C. region.

“D.C. was our best-performing region,” said Owen Burman, senior consultant and managing director with the Wells Fargo Legal Specialty Group.  “When talking to firms to really find out what drove it, the regulatory side was on fire for so many firms. And litigation overall has been supporting many firms this past year.”  In average revenue growth, D.C. firms exceeded peers in New York City (7%), California (6.6%), Texas (6.3%), Florida (5.9%), Chicago (5.2%), Philadelphia (4.7%) and Atlanta (4.4%), according to Wells Fargo data.

“The practice mix was very much in favor of D.C.-headquartered firms” in 2023, Burman said, citing robust demand within restructuring, antitrust and litigation practices, as other firms saw the impact of slowdowns in the transactional market.  It follows a lackluster 2022 for D.C. firms, which “underperformed,” as anticipated enforcement activities under the Biden administration didn’t come to fruition as expected, according to Burman.

However, in 2023, as demand picked up within regulatory and litigation practices, D.C. firms were able to control expenses and were less aggressive in hiring, contributing to their revenue growth.  Profits per equity partner were up 10.7%, compared with the industry average of 4.9%.  The number of full-time equivalent lawyers at D.C. firms also grew by 2%, slightly below the industry average of 2.8%. However, productivity at D.C. firms was down 1%, still better than the industry average (down 2.1%).

Demand among all lawyers was also slightly better at D.C. firms (0.9%) than the industry average (0.7%), but fell short of peers in New York City, which saw a 2% increase in demand.

Controlling Expenses

Meanwhile, total expenses grew 4.1%, the best out of all eight regions tracked, and above the industry average of 6%.  “They were able to control the expense growth much better than peers,” Burman said.  “Last year they were able to control the lawyer compensation pressures a bit more than other markets.”

Billing rate increases were in large part able to compensate for increases in lawyer compensation at D.C. firms last year.  “All together the rate increases are covering it.  The problem is that they were hoping it would cover other investments and now they have to redirect that money into supporting the lawyer compensation,” said Burman, adding that artificial intelligence and innovation investments are other top priorities for firm expenses.

Because of these expenses and other priorities, in 2024, D.C.-based firms may see more expense pressure, and they may be more in line with the industry averages in expense growth, he said.  Still, entering the year, D.C. firms are “optimistic,” Burman added, expecting strong demand within litigation and regulatory practices to continue.  “Their growth estimates are quite optimistic,” Burman said.  “Litigation, restructuring practices are still quite strong.  So those haven’t tailed off as we’re anticipating this rebound in transactions.”

Every year, NALFA conducts a survey of prevailing market rates in civil litigation in the U.S.  Today, NALFA has released the results from its 2023 hourly rate survey.  The survey results, published in the 2023 Litigation Hourly Rate Survey & Report, shows billing rate data on the factors that correlate to hourly rates in litigation:

City / Geography
Years of Litigation Experience / Seniority
Position / Title
Practice Area / Complexity of Case
Law Firm / Law Office Size

This empirical survey and report provides micro and macro data of current hourly rate ranges for both defense and plaintiffs' litigators, at various experience levels, from large law firms to solo shops, in regular and complex litigation, and in the nation's largest markets.  This data-intensive survey contains hundreds of data sets and thousands of data points covering all relevant billing rate categories and variables.  This is the nation's largest and most comprehensive survey or study of hourly billing rates in litigation.

This is the fourth year in a row NALFA has conducted this hourly rate survey.  The 2023 Litigation Hourly Rate Survey & Report contains additional categories and more accurate variables.  These updated features allow NALFA to capture new and more precise billing rate data.

Through its propriety email database and digital infrastructure, NALFA surveyed over 495,000 attorneys from thousands of law firms and law offices from across the U.S.  Over 24,800 qualified litigators participated in this hourly rate survey over a 10-month period.  This data-rich survey was designed to aid litigators in proving prevailing market rates in court and comparing their billing rates to their litigation peers.

A recent Reuters story by David Thomas, “Top Bankruptcy Firm Kirkland Boost Billing Rates, Nearing $2,500 an Hour”, reports that one of the world's busiest bankruptcy practices is raising its top hourly billing rates to $2,465, as law firms press for higher and higher fees in major corporate restructurings.  U.S. law firm Kirkland & Ellis disclosed the new maximum rate in a series of court filings in bankruptcy cases involving its clients Rite Aid, We Work and Yellow Corp.

Hourly lawyer rates reaching $2,000 were nearly unheard of just a decade ago, but more recently they have been steadily creeping above that mark for some attorneys.  U.S. litigator David Boies’ hourly billing rates this year in a class action lawsuit against Deutsche Bank was $2,110. Covington & Burling said last year in a filing that senior partners’ top rate at that firm was $2,500 an hour.

The $2,465 top rate for Kirkland, which lists 329 restructuring lawyers on its website, matches what prominent Hogan Lovells appellate lawyer Neal Katyal charged for his time last year in a high-stakes bankruptcy case involving a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary.  Bankruptcy work can be a major source of revenue for large law firms, as corporate restructurings often require armies of lawyers and sometimes drag on for many years.

Under the new ranges unveiled by Kirkland, bankruptcy partners will charge between $1,195 to $2,465 an hour; of counsel bill $820 to $2,245 an hour; and associates bill $745 to $1,495 an hour. The rates will be in effect by Jan. 1, court filings said.  The filings said Kirkland's billing rates are "subject to periodic adjustments to reflect economic and other conditions," as well as lawyer promotions.  Its top hourly rate was previously $2,245, according to a Nov. 20 filing in the We Work Case.

Chicago-founded Kirkland is the highest-grossing law firm in the United States, according to data collected by The American Lawyer, with revenues of $6.5 billion in 2022 and more than 3,400 lawyers.

Kirkland has represented more than 120, or 10%, of the large public companies that filed for bankruptcy since Oct. 1, 1979, according to a research database co-created by University of California, Los Angeles law professor Lynn LoPucki.  Nearly half of those cases were filed between 2013 and Dec. 31, 2022, according to the database.

A recent Law.com story by Allison Dunn, “Judge Rejects Quinn Emanuel’s $1700 Hourly Rate Request, Slashing Fees for Virginia Settlement By Nearly 80%”, reports that a federal judge in Virginia drastically reduced Quinn Emanuel attorneys’ requested fees related to enforcing a $6 million settlement agreement they successfully obtained for a client over a fraud scheme involving the Model Tobacco Building in Richmond, Virginia.  Some of the rates requested by Quinn Emanuel—$1,690 per hour for a lead partner or $1,385 per hour for associates—were unrealistic for the Richmond market in the present case, the court found.

Quinn Emanuel attorneys based out of Washington, D.C., who served as plaintiffs’ counsel, sought prejudgment interest at a rate of 6%, as well as $236,641.18 attorney fees and costs relating to enforcing a $6 million settlement agreement between the plaintiffs, SS Richmond and MK Richmond, against Christopher A. Harrison, the owner and manager of several entities including, The C.A. Harrison Cos., CAH Model Tobacco and the McKenzie Blake Development Co.  Under the settlement agreement, the Harrison defendants were obligated to pay the $6 million payment by June 8, but the plaintiffs maintain that they have failed to do so, according to the district court’s opinion.

The plaintiffs had accused the defendants of “‘a pattern of bank fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud and money laundering in an effort to seize control and interest in a project to purchase and refurbish’” the Model Tobacco Building, which previously served as a factory for the United States Tobacco Co.  Harrison’s counsel from midsize firms Mahdavi Bacon Halfhill & Young, as well as Fraim & Fiorella, opposed the plaintiffs’ request.  The defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to establish the reasonableness for such hourly rates.

The judge agreed in part with the plaintiffs that, in addition to the prejudgment interest, they were also entitled to attorney fees and costs, but Novak also sided with the defendants in finding Quinn Emanuel’s more than $1,000-per-hour rates for both partners and associates in post-settlement motions were ”not reasonable in accordance with the Court’s prior decisions and the Richmond legal market,” the opinion said.  Considering the reasonable rates for attorneys in Richmond with comparable skills, experience, reputation, as well as other factors, Novak reduced Quinn Emanuel’s total fee award to $50,380.

“Our client is focused on the Model Tobacco project.  As to fees, we don’t agree with everything the judge wrote, but Judge Novak obviously took the time to write a thoughtful opinion,” said George R. A. Doumar, an attorney with Mahdavi Bacon, representing the defendants.  “The local market dictates hourly rates awarded, and Quinn Emanuel was seeking rates far higher than I’ve encountered for fee awards in Virginia courts.  The lawyers I see day in and day out are billing at much lower rates.  The judge also seemed to be aware of law firm billing practices such as block billing and multiple reviews, and took that into account.”

Novak concluded that a rate of $650 for the lead partner and $400 for associates was a reasonable rate based 12 factors such as time and labor expended; the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; the customary fee for like work; the amount in controversy and the results obtained; the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; attorney fee awards in similar cases and more.

“Here, Plaintiffs have failed to rebut the presumption that the hourly rates should be derived from the community in which the court sits. While Plaintiffs argue that this case has factual connections to Washington, D.C., and that the underlying case involved ‘complicated, high-stakes claims in financial fraud and RICO claims,’ … they present no evidence that a local attorney could not have provided competent representation,” Novak wrote, citing Rehabilitation Association of Virginia, Inc. v. Metcalf (1998).  “Because Plaintiffs have not made the requisite showing to apply out-of-town rates, the Court will consider the proper market from which to determine reasonable hourly rates as the market where the Court sits—Richmond, Virginia.”

The plaintiffs failed to file any affidavits from other law firms regarding “the prevailing market rates in Richmond for similar work,” and said Quinn Emanuel proffered no cases concerning fee awards within the district, Novak held.  Additionally, the law firm cited a news article from Law.com publication The American Lawyer titled, “What $1,000 an Hour Gets You in the AM 200 Today.”  The judge, however, said the article didn’t weigh in the law firm’s favor since it “cut against the reasonableness of the Plaintiff’s requested fees.”

In one of the cases cited by the plaintiffs, Proofpoint v. Vade Secure, a 2020 opinion by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, the requested hourly rates ranged from $590 to $675 per hour for associates, and $880 to $915 per hour for more senior attorneys, the opinion said.

“Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs charged $1,305 per hour (Paul Henderson) and $1,385 per hour (Nicholas Inns) for the associates who performed most of the work and $1,690 per hour (Keith H. Forst) for the lead partner. … Even after accounting for inflation and the 15 percent discount applied here, Proofpoint does not support the hourly rates requested in this case,” Novak wrote, further concluding no fee would be awarded for paralegal work because the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of the customary rates billed in Richmond.  Novak concluded that the majority of the plaintiffs’ expenses were reasonable and included them in the award, bringing the total to $51,271.86 in fees and costs.

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