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Category: Fee Agreements

Class Counsel Spar Over $2.3M in Attorney Fees in Citigroup 401K Case

February 14, 2019

A recent Law 360 story by Dean Seal, “Citigroup Class’ Attys Spar Over $2.3M in Fee in 401K Row,” reports that, one day after McTigue Law LLP sought court intervention for a dispute with former co-counsel Bailey Glasser LLP over $2.3 million in attorneys' fees in a case for a class of Citigroup 401(k) plan participants, Bailey Glasser told a New York federal judge the McTigue attorney "forg[ot] to mention" that the fee dispute must go to arbitration, not the courts.  Bailey Glasser’s Gregory Y. Porter asked U.S. District Judge Sidney Stein to remind James A. Moore of McTigue that in March 2009, the firms signed an agreement as co-counsel for a class of over 300,000 Citigroup Inc. 401(k) plan participants who scored a $6.9 million settlement in their long-running Employee Retirement Income Security Act suit last August.

That agreement contained a clause stating that any disputes must first be mediated and, if that failed, arbitrated, yet that agreement was unmentioned in Moore’s letter to the court asking for a status conference to discuss Bailey Glasser’s attempt to take back a percentage of the attorneys' fees award, according to Porter’s letter.  "Instead, we urge the court to convene a status conference so Mr. Moore can explain why he failed to bring the arbitration agreement to the court’s attention and why the arbitration clause should not be enforced," Porter said.

In his letter, Moore accused Porter of holding the attorneys' fees hostage as leverage in negotiating for a higher percentage of the $2.3 million award by refusing to give consent for a single dollar of the award, held in escrow, to be distributed.  According to Moore, Porter is contesting the allocation of fees because Bailey Glasser paid roughly 10 percent more in expenses than was laid out in the allocation agreement.  Moore said that Bailey Glasser had already been fully reimbursed for that amount through the total expenses award and has incurred no losses, and even if the minor dispute were merited, it would not be affected by the distribution of the majority of the fees award.

"The timing of Mr. Porter’s communications raising his objections and withholding his approval were apparently calculated to prevent my firm from seeking to have the court resolve this matter through the fee petition and final approval process,"  Moore said before asking that the court either dictate the allocation of the fees or simply order their distribution.  Porter followed up the next day, saying that he would not address Moore’s views on the fees allocations "except to note that Mr. Moore’s firm breached the agreement and its duties to the class in Spring 2018 by failing to pay its share of expert expenses (which share my firm paid)."

According to Porter, McTigue refused to respond to emails from Porter asking to confer on the management and financing of the case "given McTigue’s financial condition."  The letter goes into no further details on the expense dispute.  "In sum, the court should not entertain the issues raised in Mr. Moore’s letter without first deciding our motion to compel arbitration," Porter said.

The two firms secured a $6.9 million settlement last summer for a class of current, former and retired Citigroup employees who claimed since 2007 that a Citigroup committee stuffed the company’s 401(k) plan with Citigroup-affiliated funds even though other funds charged lower fees.  Moore, whose firm was allocated more than 77 percent of the lodestar, said in August, "the case was hard-fought for over a decade, and we think the result is an excellent one for plan participants."

The case is Leber et al. v. The Citigroup 401(k) Plan Investment Committee et al., case number 1:07-cv-09329, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

Revisiting the American Rule: Fee-Shifting Strategies for NY Litigators

February 11, 2019

A recent the New York Law Journal article by Robert S. Friedman, “Revisiting the American Rule: Fee-Shifting Strategies for NY Litigators,” examines fee-shifting options in the context of the American Rule in which parties presumptively pay their own fees regardless of the outcome, including the offer of judgment rules under FRCP 68 and CPLR 3220.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

What is the definition of “success” in a business litigation?  This is the first question a litigator should ask their client in the initial meeting.  In some cases, there are business goals that go beyond dollars and cents.  However, in most cases, businesses will define success by comparing the aggregate cost to either the total recovery (if a plaintiff) or the reasonable exposure (if a defendant).  The expense of modern day litigation mandates that a business litigator not only provide a forecast for various stages of a commercial case but also consider proactive strategies for managing expenses.  Many companies also seek modified fee arrangements including flat fees, capped fees and structures that provide an incentive for both success on the merits and in controlling expenses.  The growth of litigation funding has added more spice to the recipe.  In this environment, fee-shifting strategies take on added importance and should be considered early and often in appropriate cases.

This article examines fee-shifting options in the context of the American Rule in which parties presumptively pay their own fees regardless of the outcome, including the offer of judgment rules under FRCP 68 and CPLR 3220.  Many of these opportunities are misunderstood and underutilized.  In doing this analysis, it is helpful to begin with an overview of the historical background for fee-shifting in the United States.

Historical Background

The “American Rule” provides that each side in a litigation bears its own attorney fees in the absence of a statute or contractual prevailing party provision.  This is in contrast to the “English Rule” where the loser pays.  There is much commentary as to which system is better. See, e.g., Steven Baicker-McKee, The Award of E-Discovery Costs to the Prevailing Party: The Analog Solution in a Digital World, 63 Clev. St. L. Rev. at 420; Robert G. Bone, To Encourage Settlement: Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1561, 1597-99 (2008).  Proponents of the American Rule claim that a loser-pays regime will disincentivize plaintiffs from bringing legitimate claims.  The counter is that the American Rule provides no push for parties to take a reasonable settlement position and serves to perpetuate frivolous litigation.

The American Rule has a long tradition in U.S. jurisprudence dating back to 1796. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).  In the many years since, lawmakers and commercial actors have chipped away at the Rule.  Federal and state legislators have enacted statutes that provide for varying degrees of fee-shifting.  There are approximately 200 federal statutes and 2,000 state statutes that provide for some form of fee shifting.  Steven Baicker-McKee, The Award of E-Discovery Costs to the Prevailing Party: The Analog Solution in a Digital World, 63 Clev. St. L. Rev. at 419 & n.153-54.  In addition, at least nine states have offer of judgment rules that, contrary to FRCP 68, specifically allow for the recovery of attorney fees.  New Jersey is one of these states.  New York is not.

Strategic Options Under Federal and State Law

Federal Litigation: FRCP 68 provides that a defendant in a lawsuit may make an offer of judgement to the plaintiff; if the plaintiff accepts this offer, the court will automatically enter judgment against the defendant according to the offer’s terms.  However, if the plaintiff declines the offer, plaintiff is liable for costs that the defendant incurs during subsequent litigation if the plaintiff fails to obtain a judgment that is more favorable than the offer of judgement.  It is well-established that costs do not include attorney fees under Rule 68 and a party achieving a result below an offer of judgment under Rule 68 is therefore, not entitled to attorney fees.  See, e.g., Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981).  The result is that Rule 68 is rarely used by civil defendants because attorney fees are usually the most significant expense and the upside of an offer of judgment is therefore limited.

There remain opportunities, however, to use Rule 68 strategically.  In Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that, while attorney fees are not recoverable as part of costs, where there is statutory fee-shifting, a Rule 68 offer of judgment can establish the baseline for a successful litigant otherwise entitled to legal fees.  Marek v. Chesney 473 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).  Thus, for example, a civil defendant can stop the clock on statutory attorney fees by making an offer of judgment early in a litigation.  With the proliferation of statutory attorney fee provisions, this can be a powerful tool for defendants’ counsel in cases where the attorney fee award is the prime driver of the litigation.  See also Stancyzk v. City of New York, 752 F.3d 273, 281 (2d Cir. 2014).

Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that where there is a contractual claim for attorney fees, and the plaintiff accepts an offer of judgment that provides for dismissal of all claims that could have been made arising out of the contract, any claim for attorney fees is dismissed as well, and the question of who is the prevailing party under the contractual fee shifting agreement becomes moot.  See Steiner v. Lewmar, 816 F.3d 26, 34 (2d Cir. 2016).

Another possible tool for litigants arises out of Local Civil Rule 54.2 of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, which provides that the court may by motion or on its own initiative require a party to file a bond covering costs or risk dismissal of the action.  Courts have held that costs in this context includes attorney fees authorized by statute or authorized by a contractual provision.  See Kensington Int’l v. Republic of Congo, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4331 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 2005) (Preska, J.) (citing cases).  One court has suggested that if the party moving to require a Local Civil Rule 54.2 bond from the other side likewise offers to post its own bond in an equal amount, both including attorney fees, and the other side rejects the proposal, then the attorney fees provision would not be enforceable against the moving party from that point on. See RBFC One v. Zeeks, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19148, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2005).  Accordingly, a party may use Local Rule 54.2 to establish a baseline for success and attempt to push a recalcitrant or unreasonable adversary to put its money where its mouth is.

The New York State Analog. CPLR 3220 is the New York cousin of Rule 68.  The legislative history seems to indicate an intent to exclude attorney fees as recoverable under 3220.  In the initial draft of the CPLR during the overhaul from the Civil Practice Act in 1957, the provision for an offer to liquidate damages conditionally provided that “[i]f the damages awarded [claimant] do not exceed the sum offered, he shall pay the reasonable expenses incurred by his opponent in preparing for the trial of the question of damages, including reasonable attorney’s fees.  The expenses shall be determined by the court.” (emphasis added).  See Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure of the Temporary Commission of the Courts, First Preliminary Report 109 (1957).  The fact that the express mention of the recovery of attorney fees was removed from the final language of the CPLR, not just with regard to the CPLR 3220, but also tenders and offers of compromise under CPLR 3219 and CPLR 3221, respectively, weighs against the argument that “expenses” under CPLR 3220 includes reasonable attorney fees.  See also Weinstein Korn and Miller, 7 New York Civil Practice: CPLR 3220.03 (2018).  In addition, New York courts are historically strong adherents to the American Rule. 214 Wall Street Associates v. Medical Arts-Huntington Realty, 99 A.D.3d 988 (2d Dep’t 2012) internal citations omitted.

On the other hand, there is case law supporting the inclusion of attorney fees under CPLR 3220.  In Abreu v. Barkin and Associates Realty, 115 A.D.3d 624 (1st Dep’t 2014), the First Department directed the trial court to hold a hearing on the amount of the defendant’s legal fees after a 3220 offer was made.  The Court stated that “Susan Barkin is entitled to a hearing on the amount of her individual fees, if any, under CPLR 3220.  Defendant made an offer to liquidate.  Plaintiff then withdrew her claims against Barkin in a stipulation on the record at trial.  Having failed to obtain a more favorable judgment than the offer, plaintiff became liable for costs and fees.”  The Second Department, however, has held the opposite. Saul v. Cahan, 153 A.D.3d 947, 953 (App. Div. 2017).  Accordingly, there remains an open question and apparent conflict between the First and Second Departments which may require clarification from the Court of Appeals.

Notwithstanding the above, litigators may be able to use CPLR 3220 when there is a contractual prevailing party provision.  In McMahan v. McMahan, 53 Misc. 3d 1030, 1036 (Sup. Ct., Westchester Co. 2016), the court held that the term “costs” in CPLR 3220 includes attorney fees that are properly recoverable in the action by agreement of the parties.  The court further held that when attorney fees are recoverable by agreement, and the offer of judgment is silent as to the treatment of attorney fees, the offer must be deemed to include attorney fees as an element of costs.  Id. at 1036.  The import of this decision in the ability of parties to create a baseline to determine the prevailing party remains to be seen.

Conclusion

The American Rule has an honored history in New York.  Still, there are opportunities for creative litigators facing unreasonable adversaries to implement strategies which put attorney fees in play.  These strategies can lead to faster, more efficient and just resolutions.

Robert S. Friedman is a partner at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton and heads the New York litigation group.  Bradley Rank, the managing attorney of the New York office, and Aditya Mitra, a law clerk awaiting admission, contributed to the preparation of this article.  Reprinted with permission from the “February 8, 2019” edition of the “New York Law Journal”© 2019 ALM Media Properties, LLC.  All rights reserved.  Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com877-257-3382 - reprints@alm.com.

Receiver Attorneys Awarded $15.5M in Fees in Stanford Ponzi Scheme

February 1, 2019

A recent Law 360 story by Reenat Sinay, “Attys Awarded $15.5M in Fees After Stanford Ponzi Deal,” reports that a Texas federal judge has awarded fees of nearly $15.5 million to the attorneys representing a court-appointed receiver and a group of investors in their suit against Proskauer Rose LLP over its former partner's participation in R. Allen Stanford's $7 billion Ponzi scheme.  A team of lawyers from Castillo Snyder PC, Clark Hill Strasburger PLC and Neligan LLP led the investors to a $63 million settlement with Proskauer in August, bringing six years of litigation to a close.

U.S. District Judge David C. Godbey said that the award, which represents 25 percent of the settlement amount, was warranted due to the "extraordinarily complex" litigation involved in the case.  "The court finds that the 25 percent contingency fee agreements between plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel is reasonable and consistent with the percentage charged and approved by courts in other cases of this magnitude and complexity," Judge Godbey said.  "The attorneys' experience, reputation and ability also support the fee award."

The court-appointed receiver for the investors, Ralph S. Janvey, and the official Stanford investors committee had Proskauer in their sights because Thomas V. Sjoblom, a former attorney with the firm, allegedly helped R. Allen Stanford's bank hide his shady dealings from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission beginning in 2005.  The former financier defrauded tens of thousand of investors in a $7 billion Ponzi scheme in which he misused or misappropriated certificates of deposit purchased by investors and administered by Stanford International Bank.

Stanford Financial Group retained Sjoblom, then a partner at Chadbourne & Parke LLP, to represent several Stanford-affiliated entities in connection with the SEC investigation.  Sjoblom joined Proskauer in August 2006 and continued to represent Stanford Financial until February 2009, when the SEC accused R. Allen Stanford of running the multibillion-dollar fraud.  Sjoblom left Proskauer in September 2009. Stanford was convicted in 2012 and is serving a 110-year prison sentence.

Judge Godbey pointed to the "nature and length" of the investors' relationship with their counsel as further justification for the requested attorneys’ fees.  The investors' lawyers have collectively invested more than $16 million and more than 14,600 hours of work in the Stanford case overall since 2009, according to the order.

"Plaintiffs' counsel have represented the receiver, the committee and investor plaintiffs in numerous actions pending before the court in connection with the Stanford receivership since 2009," the judge said.  "The Stanford receivership and the litigation are extraordinarily complex and time-consuming and have involved a great deal of risk and capital investment by plaintiffs' counsel as evidenced by the declarations of plaintiffs' counsel submitted in support of the request for approval of their fees," Judge Godbey said.

Judge Godbey also held that the requested fees were far less than what many firms would have asked for in a similar situation.  "The 25 percent fee requested is also substantially below the typical market rate contingency fee percentage of 33 percent to 40 percent that most law firms would demand," Judge Godbey said.

The case is Janvey et al. v. Proskauer Rose LLP et al., case number 3:13-cv-00477, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Article: Defense Costs Coverage 101

January 16, 2019

A recent New York Law Journal article by Howard B. Epstein and Theodore A. Keyes, “Defense Costs Coverage 101,” reports on defense fees and costs in the insurance coverage practice area.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Upon receipt of a claim, the risk manager or in-house counsel should coordinate with the company’s insurance broker to make sure notice is submitted to the insurer.  However, even earlier, in anticipation of claims, counsel should review the terms of the relevant insurance policies and develop an understanding of the defense cost coverage provisions.

An insurance company’s obligation to pay defense costs incurred by its insured in response to a claim typically falls into one of two categories: (1) a duty to defend or (2) a duty to advance defense costs. The duty to defend is most often included in general liability (GL) policies while the duty to advance is more likely to be included in directors’ and officers’ liability (D&O) policies.  Policy forms can vary, however, and a GL or D&O policy may contain either type of defense obligation.  In addition, specialty insurance policies covering, for example, employment practices or pollution liability risks may contain either a duty to a defend or duty to advance clause.

Regardless of the type of insurance policy, an insurer may be willing to consider including either defense clause if requested by the broker or the insured.  While each of these clauses provides insurance for defense costs incurred by the insured, there are distinctions worth considering which may dictate which clause is preferable for a given insured.

Duty to Defend

While case law varies to some degree from state to state, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to advance under New York law and the law of the majority of other jurisdictions.  It is also well-settled that the duty to defend is broader than the insurer’s duty to indemnify for loss under a policy. The duty to defend is triggered “whenever the allegations in a complaint against the insured fall within the scope of risks undertaken by the insurer, regardless of how false or groundless those allegations may be.” Seaboard Surety Company v. Gillette Company, 64 N.Y.2d 304, 486 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1984).  Even where some asserted claims fall outside the scope of covered risks, as long as some of the claims are within the scope of coverage, the insurer will have a duty to defend.  Once triggered, the insurer is required to pay defense costs on behalf of the insured.

While the duty to defend is broader than the duty to advance, it also gives the insurer control over the defense of the claim.  Typically, where a policy contains a duty to defend, the insurer will have the right to appoint defense counsel.  Thus, with a duty to defend policy, the insured gets the benefit of broad defense coverage but gives up the right to choose defense counsel and, effectively, control of the defense.

An exception to this rule, in most jurisdictions including New York, is that where there is a conflict of interest between the insured and the insurer, the insured is entitled to select independent defense counsel.  Public Service Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 442 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1981).  In the case of such a conflict, the insurer is responsible to pay the reasonable defense fees of independent counsel.

Duty to Advance Defense Costs 

In contrast to the duty to defend, the duty to advance merely requires the insurer to reimburse the insured for costs incurred in defense of claims.  Moreover, while the duty to defend requires the insurer to pay defense costs on behalf of an insured whenever the claims alleged fall within the scope of the risk insured, the duty to advance only requires the insurer to advance defense costs for covered claims.

Policies that contain a duty to advance clause generally require the insurer to advance defense costs on an unspecified “timely basis” or within a specified period of time that can range from 30 to 120 days after submission of invoices.  Such policies also typically permit the insurer to allocate defense costs to covered and uncovered claims and thus, in some cases, provide a basis for the insurer to advance only a percentage of the defense costs.  In addition, a duty to advance is conditional—in the event that it is subsequently determined that there is no coverage for the claims, the insurer may have a right to seek recoupment of the defense costs from the insured.

On the other hand, in the context of a duty to advance, the insured is typically entitled to select its own defense counsel and has control of the defense as well as the responsibility to defend the claim.  In addition, a duty to advance will typically be triggered by a written demand seeking monetary relief whereas a duty to defend, in some policies, will only be triggered by an actual suit.

Key Considerations

Whether a duty to defend or duty to advance is a better fit for a particular insured may depend on several factors including the insured’s profile and the types of potential claims.  For example, a cost-conscious insured may prefer a duty to defend because defense costs will be paid directly by the insurer and because the insurer is more likely to pay 100 percent (or close to 100 percent) of the defense costs above the applicable deductible or retention.  In contrast, under a policy with a duty to advance, there is likely to be considerable lag time between the submission of legal invoices and payment by the insurer, and there is also a stronger possibility that the insurer will pay less than 100 percent of the invoices—either based on an allocation between covered and uncovered claims or persons or based on the insurer’s defense counsel guidelines.

Where choice of counsel is important to the insured, a duty to advance will likely be the preferred option.  Choice of counsel may be of primary importance to an insured if the insured has a relationship with counsel in whom they have developed confidence.  Similarly, if the claims at issue require a particular expertise or in-depth understanding of a specific industry, the insured may believe it is better positioned to select counsel than the insurer.  Likewise, where the claims asserted threaten the continued viability of the insured’s business, the insured will likely prefer to retain counsel with whom they have substantial experience or counsel with a reputation for expertise in the relevant area.

While a duty to advance clause typically grants the insured the right to select counsel, in some cases selection of counsel will be subject to insurer approval, such approval not to be unreasonably withheld.  In the case of either a duty to defend or advancement policy, it may also be possible to negotiate pre-approval of defense counsel.

Where control of the defense is the primary concern, a duty to advance policy will likely be a better fit for the insured.  Control may be the primary concern where the insured is involved in a regulated industry and where it may be the subject of investigations or claims by government agencies.  Similarly, where the insured operates in an industry in which litigation is relatively common or routine, the insured may prefer to have control over its defense.  Likewise, where a claim concerns private, confidential or even potentially embarrassing issues, the insured will likely prefer to have control of the defense.

Timely Notice and Tender

In any event, regardless of the type of defense obligation, the risk manager or in-house counsel should be sure to give timely notice of claim in order to avoid jeopardizing the right to coverage.  In addition, it is crucial to give notice as soon as possible because an insurer’s obligation to pay defense costs is not typically triggered until notice has been submitted.  So while a couple of weeks’ delay in providing notice may not jeopardize coverage, the defense costs incurred prior to the notice will not be recoverable from the insurer.  Further, to the extent that an opportunity for early settlement negotiations may arise, it will be necessary to coordinate those discussions with the insurer.  Consequently, notice should always be provided before any significant defense costs are incurred.

Howard B. Epstein is a partner at Schulte Roth & Zabel, and Theodore A. Keyes is special counsel at the firm.

Saveri Firm Wins Fight Over $54M Fee Award in Fourth Circuit

January 15, 2019

A recent The Recorder story by Scott Flaherty, “San Francisco’s Saveri Wins Fight Over $54M Fee Award,” reports that San Francisco’s Joseph Saveri Law Firm, a specialist in antitrust class actions, has prevailed in a dispute with another plaintiffs firm over fees from a price fixing case that settled in 2013 for $163.5 million.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled in the Saveri firm’s favor, shooting down a bid by Miami’s Criden & Love for additional fees from an underlying antitrust case in Maryland federal court that accused titanium dioxide suppliers of fixing prices.  The fee dispute began after a class settlement in the antitrust litigation that led to a $54 million award for plaintiffs lawyers involved in the case.

Criden & Love had argued that it deserved a referral fee from Joseph Saveri, a former Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein partner who split off in 2012 to start his own firm.  But the appeals court held that Saveri, who served as lead counsel in the price fixing case, never actually entered a referral agreement with Criden & Love and had no obligation to pay.  “The appellant [Criden & Love] asserts a number of claims in this case, all of which ask for the same thing: a referral fee payment from Saveri’s law firm,” the Fourth Circuit wrote in a per curiam opinion.  “There is simply no basis on this record for finding the appellant entitled to such a payment.”

In reaching its decision, the appeals court first walked through the basics of referral fee arrangements among plaintiffs lawyers.  The court explained that antitrust legal precedent allows only consumers who purchased goods or services from a supplier to challenge alleged anti-competitive conduct on that supplier’s part.  Because many buyers are hesitant to sue their suppliers and potentially disrupt their businesses, there’s a relative shortage of plaintiffs for antitrust class actions, the Fourth Circuit continued. Firms such as Criden & Love “step into the void,” finding purchasers willing to sue and referring them to larger antitrust specialist firms that have the resources to pursue a major class action.  Criden & Love, in turn, typically earns a referral fee equal to 12.5 percent of whatever the larger firm earns.

In this case, Criden & Love in 2010 referred a purchaser of titanium dioxide, a substance used in paints and inks, to Lieff Cabraser and a second plaintiffs firm, Berger & Montague.  At the time, Saveri was still at Lieff Cabraser and entered an appearance on behalf of the referred client, a business called Isaac Industries.  Saveri left Lieff Cabraser in 2012 to start his own firm, effectively ending his representation of Isaac Industries as an individual client, and his firm later filed an appearance for another titanium dioxide purchaser called Breen Color Concentrates, the Fourth Circuit wrote.

Saveri eventually became co-lead plaintiffs counsel in the price fixing litigation, alongside Lieff Cabraser and Cera LLP.  When the case settled in 2013 for some $163.5 million, it opened the door for a sizable fee award.  In all, the plaintiffs lawyers made $54 million and Saveri, as lead counsel, earned about $10 million of that, the Fourth Circuit wrote.  Criden & Love, for its part, took in about $2.8 million, with $900,000 of that coming as referral fees from Lieff Cabraser and Berger & Montague.  But the firm believed Saveri, too, owed Criden & Love a referral payment, setting off a string of legal proceedings that led to the ruling.

The Fourth Circuit found that Saveri explicitly did not enter a referral deal with the other plaintiffs firm, and that Saveri’s $10 million in lead counsel fees compensated him only for his work once he was at his new firm and had left Lieff Cabraser.  “Saveri’s relationship to Isaac Industries was identical to his relationship to all other class members; he never represented the company’s individual interest,” the Fourth Circuit wrote.  “That role continued to be filled by his old firm, Lieff Cabraser, which paid C&L the full fee the firm was owed.”