Fee Dispute Hotline
(312) 907-7275

Assisting with High-Stakes Attorney Fee Disputes

The NALFA

News Blog

Category: Fee Agreements

U.S. Trustee Seeks More Attorney Fee Info in Sears Bankruptcy

December 7, 2018

A recent Law 360 story by Rick Archer, “US Trustee Faults Fee Info in Sears’ Request for IP Law Firm,” reports that the U.S. Trustee’s Office has asked a New York bankruptcy court to reject Sears Holding Corp.'s request to retain boutique law firm McAndrew Held & Malloy Ltd. to handle intellectual property matters unless it gets more information on what the firm will be paid.  In an objection, U.S. Trustee William Harrington said that, among other inadequacies, Sears’ request states McAndrews would receive a range of flat fees for a list of IP-related services but fails to assign specific payments to specific services.  “Accordingly, without more specific disclosure regarding the flat fee and the flat fee services, it is impossible to determine if the retention of McAndrews is reasonable,” he said.

Once one of the nation's largest retailers, Illinois-based Sears entered bankruptcy in October to reshape its physical footprint and reduce a debt load of more than $11 billion created by years of consecutive net revenue losses, store closings and unsuccessful efforts to adapt to a changing retail world.  After closing 142 of the 700 Sears and Kmart stores still in business, the company said it hopes to sell about 400 earnings-positive stores along with other potentially viable sites and assets including intellectual property while under Chapter 11 protection.

Two weeks ago, Sears applied to retain McAndrews, a Chicago-based IP firm, to handle trademark, copyright, patent and domain name issues.  The application said McAndrews has been Sears’ IP counsel for more than six years.  “By virtue of such prior engagement, McAndrews is intimately familiar with the facts and history of the company’s IP assets and coordinates the filing of IP applications in foreign jurisdictions.  The compensation proposed by McAndrews is at or below comparable rates in the IP market,” it said.

The application said Sears was proposing to pay a fixed fee of $43,750 a month, a flat fee of between $750 and $11,000 for a list of specific IP-related services, such as trademark and copyright registration, and an hourly rate for any other services.  The company also asked for permission to put $130,000 in retainers in trust to be paid to McAndrews in the event that it fails to pay any future invoices from the firm.

In his filing, Harrington said he was objecting on the grounds the application only gives the range of flat fees and does not give a specific fee for each of the specified services.  He also said the application “inexplicably” asks McAndrews be allowed to waive the requirement to file time records in six-minute increments for the fixed and flat fee services and that McAndrews had not shown why it should have a retainer in trust.

The case is In re: Sears Holding Corp, case number 7:18-bk-23538, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.

Firms Must Evenly Split $11.3M in Fees in Century 21 Class Action

December 6, 2018

A recent Law 360 story by Bill Wichert, “3 Firms Must Evenly Split $11.3M Fees in Century 21 Suit,” reports that three law firms representing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. franchisees in a class action against the company and its former parent must evenly split roughly $11.3 million in attorneys’ fees awarded in connection with a settlement in the case, a New Jersey appeals court ruled in nixing one firm’s bid for a larger share.

A three-judge appellate panel upheld a trial court order that confirmed an arbitration award dividing the money equally between Zwerling Schachter & Zwerling LLP, Keefe Law Firm and Kopelowitz Ostrow PA, rejecting Zwerling Schachter’s argument that it deserved more than a third of the fees due to its work and responsibility in the litigation.  The arbitrator, a former federal judge, correctly found that representation agreements between the firms and franchisees required the firms to equally share the attorneys’ fees even if they did not share the work and responsibility in the class action equally, according to the panel.

The class action, which was initially filed in 2002, alleged that Century 21’s then-parent, Cendant Corp., breached a contract by diverting Century 21 advertising funds to competitors.  The franchisees claimed that Cendant, which also owned Coldwell Banker and ERA Real Estate, misappropriated funds to try to sink Century 21 and build up its other units.  In 2002 and 2004, Zwerling Schachter, Kopelowitz Ostrow and McElroy Deutsch & Mulvaney LLP entered into "attorneys-class representative agreements" with plaintiffs in the case, according to the appellate opinion.

Those agreements said that each firm would receive “33⅓ percent” of any attorneys’ fees awarded in the case and that “each of the law firms named herein shall share the fee which is in accordance with their anticipated division of work and responsibility in this matter,” the opinion said.  McElroy Deutsch withdrew from the matter in 2004, and the firm that ultimately became Keefe Law Firm joined the case, the opinion said.  The parties have agreed that Keefe, Zwerling Schachter and Kopelowitz Ostrow have a right to share in the attorneys’ fees, with McElroy Deutsch to receive its fees out of Keefe’s share, according to the opinion.  After the class action settled in 2012, the three firms could not agree on how to split up the attorneys’ fees, the opinion said.

Zwerling Schachter said the apportionment should be based on the hours worked and the responsibility assumed during the case, while Keefe and Kopelowitz Ostrow said the attorneys-class representative agreements required the firms to divide the money equally.  Keefe and Kopelowitz Ostrow in 2013 made an offer of judgment to Zwerling Schachter, under which that firm would have received $600,000 more than if the firms split the fees equally, but Zwerling Schachter rejected the offer, the opinion said.

The firms agreed in 2014 to submit their fee dispute to arbitration.  In 2016, the arbitrator found that “the attorneys-class representative agreements ‘require[d] the parties to share the attorneys' fee award in equal thirds, even if the parties did not share the work and responsibility in the underlying class action equally,’” the opinion said.

The trial court in June 2016 entered orders confirming the arbitration award and denying Zwerling Schachter’s motion to vacate the award.  In November 2016, the court denied a motion from Keefe and Kopelowitz Ostrow seeking to recoup the attorneys’ fees and costs they incurred after Zwerling Schachter rejected their offer of judgment, the opinion said.  On Zwerling Schachter’s appeal of the June 2016 orders, the appellate panel affirmed those decisions by citing in part the attorneys-class representative agreements, saying the panel agreed with the arbitrator that the first sentence of those agreements “is clear in providing that each of the three firms was to receive one-third of a fee award."

“We also agree with the arbitrator that the key phrase in the second sentence is ‘anticipated division of work and responsibility,’” the panel said.  “Finally, we agree with the arbitrator's reasoning that the second sentence did not undercut or modify the clearer first sentence.”  The panel also noted the arbitrator’s findings that there was no evidence that “any of the firms had ‘failed to contribute at all toward earning the fee award,’” and that “the evidence showed ‘each party contributed thousands of hours to the class litigation.’”

“In short, the plain language of the attorneys-class representative agreements and the extrinsic evidence supports an equal apportionment of the fee award,” the panel said.  Keefe and Kopelowitz Ostrow appealed the November 2016 order, but the panel affirmed that ruling as well, saying “the amount of the arbitration award was not sufficient to trigger the shifting of fees and costs under Rule 4:58, the offer of judgment rule.”

The case is Frank K. Cooper Real Estate #1 Inc. et al. v. Cendant Corp. et al., case numbers A-1482-16T3 and A-1579-16T3, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Article: Attorney Fee Collection Suits Bring Mixed Results

December 4, 2018

A recent New York Law Journal article by Christine Simmons, “Collection Lawsuits Bring Mixed Results in Law Firms; Quest for Fees,” reports on attorney fee collection lawsuits by law firms.  The article reads:

It’s the time of year when may law firm managers are fretting about collections—and maybe even thinking of taking clients to court over unpaid bills.  But while suing ex-clients to recover legal fees has become increasingly common, recent court decisions show that such lawsuits can be a gamble.

Take two recent cases, one brought by Arent Fox and another by Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf.  In the Windels Marx case, a Manhattan judge wound up sanctioning the firm for its lawsuit—potentially a substantial penalty—prompting Windels Marx to file a notice of appeal.  Arent Fox, meanwhile, saw its breach of conflict claims dismissed against two of three defendants it targeted in a breach of contract suit over fees.  While law firms often do obtain judgments against former clients in collection suits, the rulings show that success is hardly guaranteed, even when the firms are sophisticated business litigators.

Windels Marx was seeking $380,833 in unpaid legal fees in its collection suit against several entities in Manhattan Supreme Court.  The midsize law firm in New York had defended a housing entity and a former officer in a civil lawsuit over control of several housing development fund corporations.  Those funds own and manage residential real estate in West Harlem that is rented out to low-income tenants, according to court papers.  Windels Marx, in court papers, said it was also retained to advise in multiple government investigations.

Windels Marx withdrew from the civil case and then sued its former client and the related housing development funds that it was adverse to in the underlying case, seeking unpaid fees.  Ultimately, Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Gerald Lebovits granted summary judgment to the four housing development fund entities sued by Windels Marx.

Knocking out the breach of contract claim against the four funds, the judge took issue with the fact that the officer who signed the firm’s retainer agreement, Joednee Copeland, was not authorized to retain the firm on behalf of the funds.  Copeland was previously president of the entity, formerly represented by Windels Marx, that had sought to control the four housing development funds.

The firm’s “billing records show that, at the time that plaintiff drafted the agreement, it knew that Copeland had been terminated from her position,” said Lebovits, in decision posted Nov. 7.  In denying Windels Marx’s other claims against the four housing development funds, Lebovits said the law firm’s invoices showed work adverse to the interests of the housing development funds.

Lebovits granted only a default judgment of $380,833 for Windels Max against the entity that retained the firm and did not respond to the suit.  It’s not clear whether that entity is still active or has assets to cover the judgment.  Copeland, the president of the entity who signed the firm’s retainer agreement, has been criminally charged in Manhattan Supreme Court under felony counts, according to court records.

In allowing the housing development funds to pursue fees against Windels Marx, the judge said the funds’ “request for sanctions, in the form of payment of their attorney fees, incurred in defending this action … is amply justified, not merely by the lack of merit in [Windel Marx’s] complaint, but by [the law firm’s] attempt to collect attorney fees for work directly adverse to defendants’ interests.”  The judge referred the decision on the amount of fees to a special referee.

William Fried, a Herrick Feinstein partner who represented the housing development funds pro bono, said his firm spent between $50,000 and $100,000 on the case.  “We’re going to be seeking every dime that we spent,” he said.  “We’re pleased with the judge’s decision. We thought the lawsuit never had any merit from day one,” Fried said.  Windels Marx filed a notice of appeal Thursday, stating in court documents that attorneys’ fees were not warranted because Herrick Feinstein worked on a pro bono basis.

In the Arent Fox matter, the law firm saw a mixed result in a recent court ruling, holding on to some claims against an ex-client.  The firm sued three car dealership entities, JDN AA, LLC; Subaru 46 LLC; and DCN Automotive LLC, seeking $278,128 in legal fees.  The firm had represented JDN AA in a lawsuit against Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. challenging the attempted termination of JDN AA’s Audi dealership, according to court documents.

The ex-clients sought to dismiss Arent Fox’s claim for breach of contract, claiming the firm did not allege there was an executed retainer agreement between the parties.  They argued that the March 2014 “engagement agreement” was with only one of the defendants, JDN AA, and was not signed, and that a 2015 “conflict waiver” letter did not involve all defendants and related to one specific engagement.

In a decision last month, Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Joel M. Cohen knocked out a breach of contract claim against two of the three defendants. Cohen said two defendants, Subaru 46 LLC and DCN Automotive LLC, are not referenced by name in any of the engagement documents submitted by Arent Fox.  Nor did Arent Fox submit any evidence that describes the terms of any alleged contract between Arent Fox and either of those entities, the judge said.  Cohen, in his November decision, called the firm’s allegations against the two entities “conclusory.”

Special Fee Master Recommends $500M in Fees in Syngenta MDL

November 27, 2018

A recent Law.com story by Amanda Bronstad, “Syngenta Special Master Rejects $150M in Fees for Texas Attorney Mikal Watts,” reports that a special master reviewing fee requests from hundreds of law firms in the $1.51 billion settlement with Syngenta has recommended that lead counsel get half the estimated $500 million in legal fees but rejected the idea that attorney Mikal Watts, who represents 60,000 farmers in the deal, should get $150 million.

U.S. District Judge John Lungstrum on Nov. 15 approved the class action settlement, which resolved lawsuits alleging Syngenta sold genetically modified corn seed that China refused to import, causing about 600,000 farmers and other producers to lose billions of dollars.  Lungstrum oversaw the multidistrict litigation coordinated in Kansas federal court, but many other cases were pending in federal and state courts in Minnesota and Illinois.  Some were class actions, while others were individual lawsuits.  That led to a big battle over attorney fees. On Nov. 21, special master Ellen Reisman issued a report and recommendation on how to allocate fees to about 400 law firms.

“Here, the settlement agreement recognizes that the successful result in this case was obtained through the work of multiple counsel in multiple jurisdictions who collectively applied litigation pressure in multiple forums that ultimately persuaded Syngenta to resolve the various litigations through a nationwide class action settlement,” wrote Reisman, of Reisman Karron Greene in Washington, D.C. “How to allocate the attorneys’ fee award among plaintiffs’ counsel is less straightforward.”

Objections to the report are due Dec. 5, and a hearing is set for Dec. 17.  Reisman’s report largely reflects a suggestion from lead counsel in the multidistrict litigation in Kansas on how to divvy up the fees, much of which was based on a fee sharing agreement in the settlement.  Although other lawyers played key roles in reaching the settlement, 50 percent of the fees should go to 95 law firms in the multidistrict litigation in Kansas, Riesman wrote.  That included lead counsel Patrick Stueve of Kansas City, Missouri-based Stueve Siegel Hanson; Don Downing of Gray, Ritter & Graham in St. Louis; Scott Powell of Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton in Birmingham, Alabama; and William Chaney of Dallas-based Gray Reed & McGraw.

Reisman particularly praised the work of a lead settlement counsel Chris Seeger of New York’s Seeger Weiss.  “Mr. Seeger was the clear leader of the settlement effort on the plaintiffs’ side, and without his efforts a settlement would not have been achieved,” she wrote.  She rejected arguments from Watts, of Watts Guerra in San Antonio, that he and a group of 224 associated law firms, representing primarily individual farmers with cases in Minnesota state court, should get one third of the pie.

The dispute mirrors similar fee fights that have erupted in mass torts between plaintiffs attorneys appointed to represent the class and those who have brought individual suits on behalf of their clients.  Reisman, in her report, acknowledged those other cases, predominantly the $1 billion concussion settlement with the National Football League.  In that case, she wrote, the judge allowed some portion of attorney fees to go to lawyers with individual clients, and not just lead class counsel, but capped their contingency rates.  “There is significant legal support for the proposition that the courts have the required personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and the legal and equitable authority to modify contingent fee arrangements,” she wrote.

But she found that the Syngenta litigation had some key differences—most notably, the pressure that a large chunk of individual cases had on reaching a settlement.  In her report, she wrote that “no single event or group of plaintiffs’ counsel was solely responsible for pushing this litigation to resolution.”

The Syngenta multidistrict litigation, created in 2014, involved subclasses of farmers in eight states planned for trials.  Last year, a mistrial aborted the first bellwether trial, in Minnesota, but a federal jury awarded $217.7 million to a class of Kansas farmers in a second trial.  Another trial, on behalf of a class of Minnesota farmers, was ongoing when both sides struck a deal.

Watts Guerra partner Francisco Guerra was co-lead plaintiffs counsel in Minnesota state court, but no one from the firm had a lead role in the multidistrict litigation.  The firm did work on the Minnesota trial, however, and Watts was one of four lawyers appointed to the plaintiffs’ negotiating committee.  Watts did not sign the fee sharing agreement in the settlement but instead based his request on a 2015 joint prosecution agreement with lead counsel in the multidistrict litigation.  He calculated his request using a reduced contingency rate of less than 24.2 percent and $12.8 million in reimbursements for common benefit expenses he paid in the Minnesota state court litigation.

His request for fees got some pushback.  Some lawyers representing individual farmers, including one who filed a lawsuit with Watts earlier this year, accused the Texas lawyer of cutting them out of negotiations and luring farmers to retain him in order to get fees. Watts called the suit “frivolous.”

In court documents, lead counsel in the multidistrict litigation argued that the 2015 joint prosecution agreement had nothing to do with the class actions and would set Watts up to get as much as $200 million.  They sought 50 percent of the $500 million, with Seeger Weiss getting at least 10 percent, but suggested that 12.5 percent go to the lead lawyers in Minnesota state court and 17.5 percent to attorneys in Illinois.  The remaining $100 million would be reserved for other lawyers.

Reisman agreed on the 50 percent and, as to the arguments from Watts, found that the 2015 agreement was “irrelevant” to the fee award in a nationwide class action.  But she doubled the allocation to the Minnesota group, which includes Watts, assigning 24 percent, or about $120.8 million.

“Unquestionably, the Minnesota state court litigation both advanced the cause of pressuring Syngenta on multiple fronts and, through coordination with Kansas counsel, assisted the nationwide class effort,” Reisman wrote.  Lawyers in the Illinois cases, whose award totaled $80.5 million, or about 16 percent, “presented an important third pressure point on Syngenta,” she wrote.

She also allocated 10 percent to lawyers with individual clients, capping their contingency rates at 10 percent.  She said most of those firms recruited clients and filled out fact sheets, while lawyers in leadership in Kansas, Minnesota and Illinois did the “vast majority” of the work.  “A 10 percent contingent fee is obviously a significant reduction from the typical 30-40 percent contingent fee,” she wrote. “However, it is appropriate given the history of this litigation.”

SCOTUS Considers Attorney Fee Caps in Social Security Disability Claims

November 5, 2018

A recent SCOTUS Blog post by Kathryn Moore Guest, “Argument Preview: Justices Consider Cap on Attorney’s Fees for Successful Representation of Social Security Disability Claimants,” reports that attorney Richard Culbertson successfully represented several Social Security disability claimants both before the Social Security Administration and in federal court.  Prior to his representation, he entered into fee agreements that provided that the clients would pay him attorney’s fees equal to 25 percent of past-due benefits for successful representation before the court as well as separate attorney’s fees for successful representation before the agency.  Following longstanding precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, the court below capped his attorney’s fees at 25 percent of past-due benefits for representation before both the Social Security Administration and the court.

In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed to resolve a split among the federal courts of appeals as to whether the Social Security Act imposes an aggregate cap on attorney’s fees of 25 percent of past-due benefits for representation before both the court and the Social Security Administration, or instead the 25 percent cap applies separately to representation before the court.

The Social Security Act regulates the amount and manner in which an attorney may collect fees from a disability claimant for successful representation before the agency and the court.  42 USC § 406(a) governs attorney’s fees for successful representation before the agency, while 42 USC § 406(b) governs attorney’s fees for successful representation before the court.  The Equal Access to Justice Act also authorizes a court to order recovery of “reasonable attorney’s fees” from the government in certain cases in which the claimant is successful and the government’s position was not “substantially justified.”  If attorney’s fees are awarded under the EAJA and under Section 406(b), the attorney must refund the lesser fee to the claimant.  The Social Security Administration withholds a single pool of 25 percent of past-due benefits from which to certify for payment any and all attorney’s fees awarded under Section 406(a) and/or 406(b).

Section 406(a) authorizes two avenues for recovery of attorney’s fees from a claimant for successful representation before the agency.  Under Section 406(a)(1), an attorney may file a “fee petition” with the Social Security Administration.  Alternatively, under a more recent and more commonly used, streamlined process, an attorney may seek approval of a “fee agreement” with a claimant under Section 406(a)(2).  No cap is imposed under Section 406(a)(1).  Section 406(a)(2) limits attorney’s fees to the lesser of 25 percent of past-due benefits or a specified dollar amount, currently set at $6,000.

For successful representation before a court, Section 406(b)(1)(A) provides in relevant part:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under [Title II] who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.  Section 406(b)(1)(A) further provides that “no other fee may be payable or certified for payment for such representation except as provided in this paragraph.”

Focusing on the “plain meaning” of Section 406(b), Culbertson argues that the term “such representation” in Section 406(b)(1)(A) clearly refers to the antecedent phrase “represented before the court,” and thus under the plain meaning of Section 406(b), the 25 percent cap applies to representation “before the court by an attorney” and does not include representation before the agency.  Culbertson also argues that a separate cap on attorney’s fees for representation before the court is consistent with the structure of Section 406 as well as the purpose of the statute and its legislative history.

Almost 40 years ago, in the first circuit-court decision to address this issue, Dawson v. Finch, the 5th Circuit held that Section 406(b) imposes an aggregate cap on attorney’s fees for representation in the administrative proceedings as well as before the court.  In reaching this result, the 5th Circuit looked to the legislative history of the provision in order to discern Congress’ intent.  Specifically, the court focused on the fact that Congress added Section 406(b) to address two goals.  First, Congress sought to encourage effective legal representation by “insuring lawyers that they will receive reasonable fees directly through certification by the Secretary.”  Second, Congress sought to protect claimants against excessive attorneys’ fees, which in the past had reached one-third to one-half of claimants’ past-due benefits, by imposing the 25 percent cap on fees.  In 1982, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit also looked to this legislative history to hold in Morris v. Social Security Administration that Section 406(b) imposes a cumulative 25 percent cap on attorney’s fees.

More recently, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th, 9th and 10th Circuits have focused on the text of section 406(b) to hold that the 25 percent cap only applies to representation before a court.  See Horenstein v. Secretary of Health and Human Services; Clark v. Astrue; and Wrenn v. Astrue, respectively.

The commissioner’s position on this issue has flipflopped over the years. Almost 40 years ago, the commissioner sided with the 5th Circuit in interpreting Section 406(b) to impose an aggregate cap and opposed the grant of certiorari in Dawson.  Then about 15 years later, the commissioner sought and obtained 6th Circuit en banc review of the panel’s decision in Horenstein v. Secretary of Health and Human Services based on arguments that were logically inconsistent with an aggregate 25 percent cap.  Almost 15 years after that, the commissioner argued in briefs before the 9th and 10th Circuits that an aggregate cap honors congressional intent and it would be inappropriate to permit attorneys to potentially collect up to 25 percent of a disability claimant’s past-due benefits at both the agency and court levels.

In this case, the acting commissioner initially supported the 11th Circuit’s rule imposing an aggregate cap.  Then, after requesting four extensions to file a response, the acting commissioner filed a response siding with Culbertson and arguing that the text of Section 406(b) unambiguously applies the 25 percent cap only to attorney’s fees for representation before a court.  The acting commissioner further argues that a 25 percent cap would be inconsistent with other provisions of Section 406(a) and that the absence of an aggregate cap does not mean that the agency and courts should approve fees that in the aggregate are equal to or greater than 50 percent of a claimant’s past-due benefits.

Because the acting commissioner agrees with Culbertson, the Supreme Court appointed Amy Levin Weil, an experienced 11th Circuit appellate litigator, to serve as amicus curiae in support of the 11th Circuit’s decision. Weil argues that the statute itself does not specifically state whether combined attorney’s fees may exceed 25 percent, and that the text of Section 406(a) and Section 406(b), read together, supports the aggregate rule.  She also points to the legislative history on which the 4th and 5th Circuits relied in support of an aggregate 25 percent cap.  She contends that permitting attorney’s fees to exceed 25 percent in the aggregate could lead to attorneys suing their clients to collect fees out of their present or future Social Security benefits contrary to the Social Security Act’s purpose of ensuring beneficiaries a protected source of income.  She also argues that rejecting the 25 percent aggregate rule would lead to absurd results, with fees of up to 75 percent of past-due benefits if a favorable district court opinion is appealed and the applicant is successful in the court of appeals.  She contends that the aggregate cap allows a logical division of agency and court fees from the 25-percent-of-accrued-benefit pool in a manner that recognizes that a portion of the accrued benefits is attributable to the time that the case was pending before the agency while the other portion is attributable to the time the case was pending before the court.

The National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives filed an amicus brief in the case.  The NOSSCR does not address the plain meaning of the statute.  Instead, it contends that Section 406(b) cannot impose an aggregate 25 percent cap on attorney’s fees for representation before a court and the agency because Section 406(a)(1) does not impose a cap on fees before the agency.  NOSSCR further argues that a court has no discretion to impose an aggregate cap.  NOSSCR informs the court that in circuits without an aggregate cap, the prevailing market rate includes a cumulative cap either by contract or in practice.

Weil faces an uphill battle in convincing the Supreme Court to uphold the 11th Circuit’s decision.  The plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation currently favored by the court supports Culbertson’s position.  Moreover, amici curiae appointed by the Supreme Court typically only win about 25 percent of their cases.  If, however, Weil can convince the court to look beyond the text of the Section 406(b) in isolation, it may, like Chief Judge Geoffrey Crawford of the District of Vermont, find that “it would be strange indeed to believe that Congress would in 1965 denounce 50% contingency fees as excessive and enact a statute to stop them, and then, in 1968, pass a law with the effect of permitting 50% contingency fees.”