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Category: Fee Entitlement

London Arbitration Firm Recovers Costs from UAE Fee Dispute

March 13, 2017

A recent Law 360 story by Jimmy Hoover, “London Arbitration Firm Recovers Costs From UAE Fee Spat,” reports that a London-based international arbitration firm won back nearly all of the costs it spent pursuing around $2 million in legal fees from its representation of a wealthy United Arab Emirates (UAE) family in a commercial contract dispute, when a U.K. court found the family was drawing out the appeal process to delay payment of the fees.

The England and Wales High Court ruled that Shackleton and Associates Ltd., a firm founded by sole shareholder and solicitor advocate Stewart Shackleton, is entitled to 80 percent of the costs incurred from a proceeding to enforce the fee award against the Bin Kamils, a wealthy business family in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.  The fee award, handed down by a London tribunal of the International Court of Arbitration in 2013, stems from Shackleton’s representation of the family in an earlier ICC proceeding over a cement plant joint venture gone bad in the Arab nation.

The evidence in the case suggests that “the defendants lacked any realistic defence to the enforcement of the [fee award] and that the steps they took in the proceedings were taken not in pursuit of a genuine defence but solely for the purpose of delaying payment to the claimant of the fees to which it had been held to be entitled,” Justice Nigel John Martin Teare said in a judgment.  “That takes the case out of the norm and is a very significant level of unreasonable conduct which undoubtedly justifies an order for indemnity costs.”

The underlying ICC arbitration involved a joint venture between the Bin Kamils and Cypriot company Terna Bahrain Holding Co. WLL involving a cement plant with a capacity of up to 1.8 million tons.  Terna, which purchased a 40 percent stake in an entity holding a 25-year lease of the property in Hamriyah Free Zone in Sharjah where the plant was being built, alleged that the Bin Kamils failed to procure permits to allow the construction of a cement import-export terminal.

A previous decision from the High Court maintained that Shackleton “had been most heavily involved in conducting the case on behalf of the Bin Kamils in the arbitration” but was “was not available to assist” with the Terna arbitration award after a falling-out with the firm Galadari & Associates in 2011.  On Monday, Shackleton disputed the court's characterization of a falling out with Galadri & Associates, insisting in an email to Law360 that the non-payment of fees was "the only reason" that his firm ceased acting in the summer of 2011.

Shackleton won an award for £1.4 million ($1.76 million) in fees plus interest from the ICC tribunal in 2013 after the Bin Kamils refused to participate in the proceeding other than to say that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the claims.  Challenging a Paris appeals court’s order granting “permission” to enforce the award, the family unsuccessfully applied to set aside the award, but the Cour de Cassation dismissed the application in March 2016.

“The impression one gains from this history is that the defendants were intent on delaying payment into court as long as was possible,” Justice Teare said.  The court did not assess Shackleton’s costs but noted that his normal hourly rate of £800, or roughly $1,000, was “more than double” of what appears to be the “guideline rate.”  Though the court can exceed the guideline rate for sufficiently complex cases, “proceedings to enforce an arbitration award do not fall into that category,” the judge said.

MetLife Faces $6.2M in Attorney Fees

March 9, 2017

A recent Law 360 story by Bonnie Eslinger, “MetLife Faces $6.2M in Atty Fees Over Ponzi Scheme Ruling,” reports that a California judge tentatively ordered MetLife Inc. and various subsidiaries to pay $6.2 million in attorneys’ fees on top of a $7.2 million judgment in a “hotly contested" case blaming the insurer for the loss of a retired woman’s savings in a Ponzi scheme.

Christine Ramirez claimed the insurer and its subsidiaries, along with an agent who ran MetLife’s Los Angeles operations, sold her unregistered securities alongside her insurance policies.  Those unregistered promissory notes put her money into an alleged $216 million Ponzi scheme, the suit said.

In August, a jury found the defendants liable for Ramirez's losses in the amount of $240,000 and awarded her $15 million in punitive damages saying MetLife owed $10 million, unit MetLife Securities owed $2.5 million and unit New England Life Insurance Co. owed $2.5 million.  A state court judge subsequently reduced the award to $7,196,710, telling Ramirez that if she didn’t consent to the remittitur, he would grant the insurer's motion for a new trial on grounds of excessive punitive damages.

A hearing was held on Ramirez’s motion for attorneys' fees of $7 million.  At the start, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Kenneth Freeman issued a tentative written ruling, shaving fees related to attorney hours spent working on a separate, related case against MetLife, in which Ramirez was a putative class member, but finding the time invested in the case to be reasonable.

“In assessing reasonableness, the time required by the opposing party's tactics may also be highly probative,” Judge Freeman wrote in his written tentative opinion.  "Here, it goes without saying that this case was, and remains, very hotly contested.  The MetLife defendants litigated their clients’ case extensively, and there were never any frivolous arguments raised.”

The judge also doubled Ramirez’s lodestar attorneys' fees figure of $3,112,138, saying the requested 2.0 multiplier is appropriate in light of the novelty of the issues presented in the case, the skill of counsel, the extent that the case precluded the attorneys from taking on other clients, and the fact that the case was taken on a contingency basis.  Additionally, the results achieved in the litigation were notable, the judge said, even with the award reduction.  “The significant result warrants a multiplier in this case,” he wrote.

During oral arguments, an attorney for MetLife, Cheryl Haas of McGuireWoods LLP, disputed that any multiplier should be awarded, calling the $6 million a “windfall.”  “A multiplier is simply not justified,” Haas said.  “The prevailing party is only entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees.”

Judge Freeman said he would issue a final ruling after he considered supplemental filings from the parties, but he didn’t offer much hope for a different outcome.  "The tentative is very clear on the court’s reasoning and frankly I doubt there’s anything you’re going to offer in the way of a supplemental brief that will change the court’s tentative,” the judge said.

The case is Hartshorne et al. v. MetLife Inc. et al., case number BC576608, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles.

Attorney Fees Not Subject to Damages Cap in Wage Case

March 8, 2017

A recent Legal Intelligencer story by Zack Needles, “Attorney Fees Not Subject to Damages Cap in Wage Case, Court Says,” reports that attorney fees can be awarded under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL), even if they cause the total recovery to exceed a voluntary $25,000 damages cap, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled in a case of first impression.

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1311.1, a plaintiff can elect to limit the maximum amount of damages recoverable to $25,000 in exchange for looser evidence admission requirements at a trial following compulsory arbitration.  In a published opinion in Grimm v. Universal Medical Services, a three-judge Superior Court panel unanimously ruled that such a cap does not preclude an award of attorney fees under the WPCL that pushes the total recovery above $25,000.

The decision affirmed a Beaver County trial court's award of $43,080.66, comprising an $11,683.92 jury award, plus $2,920.98 in liquidated damages and $28,475.76 in attorney fees and costs under the WPCL.  The appeals court upheld Beaver County Court of Common Pleas Judge James J. Ross' ruling, which reasoned that attorney fees in excess of the damages cap should be permitted because "a prevailing plaintiff in a [WPCL] claim must be made whole and not be required to expend his or her award to pay his or her attorney."

Judge John T. Bender, writing for the Superior Court, agreed with Ross' rationale, noting that Rule 1311.1 is intended to streamline litigation in order to make it more economically feasible for plaintiffs, while the WPCL is meant to allow plaintiffs to collect unpaid wages and compensation without having to spend their entire recovery on legal fees.

"In this way, both Rule 1311.1 and the WPCL aim to make litigation more accessible and affordable to aggrieved litigants, particularly those with meritorious claims," Bender said.  "In this case, we believe we are promoting this overarching policy by interpreting 'damages recoverable' in Rule 1311.1(a) to exclude attorneys' fees under the WPCL."  Bender was joined by Judges Mary Jane Bowes and Carl A. Solano.

In Grimm, plaintiff Jeffrey P. Grimm sued defendants Universal Medical Services Inc. and Roderick K. Reeder, alleging breach of contract against Universal for failure to reimburse business expenses and a WPCL claim against both defendants on the same basis, according to Bender.

The case proceeded to compulsory arbitration, with an award in favor of the defendants.  Grimm appealed to the Beaver County Court of Common Pleas, electing to cap damages at $25,000 under Rule 1311.1, and the case proceeded to a jury trial, Bender said.

The jury awarded damages to Grimm in the amount of $11,683.92 and, finding that Universal acted in bad faith in failing to reimburse him, the court added 25 percent, or $2,920.98, to the jury award, resulting in a total of $14,604.90, according to Bender.  Grimm then sought attorney fees in the amount of $25,946.25 and litigation costs in the amount of $2,529.51 under the WPCL.

While the defendants argued that the phrase "damages recoverable" in Rule 1311.1 encompassed attorney fees, Grimm contended that attorney fees are payments in addition to a jury award intended to make the plaintiff whole.

Bender noted that Ross, in his analysis, looked first at the analogous 2001 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case Allen v. Mellinger, in which then-Justice Ralph Cappy wrote in a concurring and dissenting opinion that delay damages in cases involving bodily injury, death or property damage under Pa.R.Civ.P. 238 should not be subject to the statutory cap of $250,000 when the state is a defendant in a bodily injury claim.

In the 2005 case LaRue v. McGuire, as Ross also noted in his opinion, the Superior Court relied on Cappy's reasoning in Allen to find that delay damages under Rule 238 were not subject to the Rule 1311.1 damages cap.

While the defendants attempted to distinguish Grimm from Allen and LaRue by arguing that delay damages are an extension of compensatory damages intended to make the plaintiff whole, while attorney fees serve no such purpose, Bender disagreed.

"It is clear that the award of attorneys' fees under the WPCL accomplishes the purpose of making a plaintiff whole, just like the delay damages in Allen and LaRue," Bender said.

Read This Before You Go the Contingency Fee Route

March 3, 2017

A recent CEBblog article by Julie Brook, “Read This Before You Go the Contingency Fee Route,” discusses some of the pitfalls of contingency fees in California.  This article was posted with permission.  The article reads:

Among the several alternatives to the traditional hourly fee arrangement, contingency fees have been commonly used for decades.  Under a contingent fee agreement, the attorney and client agree that the attorney will receive a particular percentage of the client’s recovery or of the savings obtained for the client as a fee for legal services, if there is a recovery.  The attorney takes on the risk with the potential for significant reward.  Not surprisingly, there are statutory requirements for these types of agreements—and failing to comply with them is risky, too.

Follow these statutory requirements whenever you enter into a contingent fee agreement:

  1. Put it in writing. Contingent fee agreements must be in writing to be enforceable, except those for the recovery of workers’ compensation benefits or certain merchants’ claims. Bus & P C §§6147-6147.5.
  2. Include certain specific provisions.  In addition to a description of the contingencies entitling the attorney to a fee, the agreement must specify such matters as (Bus & P C §6147(a)):
    • The fee rate agreed on;
    • How the costs of prosecuting and settling the case will affect the fee and the client’s recovery (e.g., in the event of a structured settlement, whether the attorney is paid from first funds);
    • A statement as to what extent the client is required to pay compensation for related matters arising out of his or her relationship with the attorney that aren’t covered by the contingency fee agreement; and
    • A statement that the fee is negotiable.
  3. Follow additional requirements for medical malpractice claims.  If the claim is for medical malpractice and is subject to the maximum fee limits on contingent fees (see Bus & P C §6146), then the fee agreement must include a statement that the rates set out in §6146 are the maximum limits for the contingent fee arrangement and that the attorney and the client may negotiate a lower rate.  Bus & P C §6147(a)(5).  You may want to attach a copy of Bus & P C §6146 to the fee agreement to ensure that the client is informed of its content.
  4. Specify the contingent fee rate.  Contingent fee agreements must specify the contingent fee rate (Bus & P C §6147(a)(1)) and how disbursements and costs in connection with the prosecution or settlement of the claim will affect the contingent fee and the client’s recovery (Bus & P C §6147(a)(2)).  Unless the claim is for medical malpractice and the agreement is thus subject to Bus & P C §6146, the agreement must also include a statement that the fee isn’t set by law but rather is negotiable between the attorney and the client.  Bus & P C §6147(a)(4).
  5. Provide an hourly rate just in case.  The agreement should provide an hourly rate so that the attorney may establish a baseline to recover quantum meruit in the event the attorney is discharged by the client before the completion of the representation.  The hourly rate will also assist the attorney in providing a basis for attorney fee recovery in any potential attorney fee motion.
  6. Anticipate deferred payments or structured settlements.  Whenever payment of the recovery, or any part of it, may be deferred, the fee agreement should specify when the attorney fees must be paid and, when appropriate, how they should be calculated.  Otherwise, the agreement invites dispute and may be subject to being voided by the client for failing to fully comply with Bus & P C §6147.  If the award for future damages in an action for injury or damages against a health care provider is at least $50,000 and either party requests that the award be paid by periodic payments, then the court must order that the future damages be paid, in whole or in part, by periodic payments rather than by a lump-sum payment. CCP §667.7.  In that event, the court must also place a total value on the periodic payments and include that amount in computing the total award from which attorney fees are calculated for purposes of determining the statutory maximum fee. Bus & P C §6146(b).
  7. Provide for noncash awards.  When the award might be partially or entirely in a form other than cash (e.g., reinstatement in a wrongful termination action), the fee agreement should provide for that possibility.  This might be done by providing for a specified hourly fee if the award is not entirely in cash and a contingent fee if it is.  It may also be accomplished by providing for a method for valuing noncash awards.

Failure to include any of the required items makes the agreement voidable at the option of the client (but you would still be entitled to a reasonable fee). Bus & P C §6147(b).  See, e.g., Arnall v Superior Court (2010) 190 CA4th 360, 366 (failure to state in fee agreement that fees were negotiable rendered fee agreement void; fees recoverable by way of quantum meruit).

Judge Denies Fee Award to State AGs in Antitrust Case

March 2, 2017

A recent NLJ story by C. Ryan Barber, “Judge Refuses Fee Award to State AGs in Antitrust Case,” reports that nearly a year after striking down Staples Inc.’s proposed takeover of Office Depot, a federal judge in Washington refused to award $175,000 in legal fees to the Pennsylvania and District of Columbia attorneys general for their role in challenging the office supply chains’ $6.3 billion deal.

The two offices teamed up with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in a suit that alleged the proposed deal would hurt competition in the market for office supplies sold in bulk to large corporate clients.  In May, U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan sided with regulators and granted a preliminary injunction.  Staples and Office Depot abandoned their merger plans.

Pennsylvania and D.C. argued they were entitled to fees under a provision of the Clayton Act that allows for the reimbursement of legal costs when the plaintiff “substantially prevails.”  Sullivan said there was one problem: Regulators prevailed not under the Clayton Act but the FTC Act, which does not grant legal fees to winning plaintiffs.

"Simply put, moving plaintiffs cannot have it both ways,” Sullivan wrote in a 10-page opinion.  “They cannot ride the FTC’s claim to a successful preliminary injunction under the more permissive [FTC Act] standard and then cite that favorable ruling as the sole justification for fee-shifting under the more rigorous Clayton Act standard."

Pennsylvania and District of Columbia offices had argued that the preliminary injunction directly broke up the merger, allowing them to recoup costs under the so-called “catalyst rule.”  But Sullivan was not persuaded.

As Staples and Office Depot pointed out, Sullivan wrote, “the catalyst rule as a mechanism for obtaining attorneys’ fees in certain circumstances was rejected by the Supreme Court in 2001,” in the case of Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources.

The FTC had taken the lead in the antitrust challenge—a fact Staples and Office Depot raised to belittle the two offices’ role in the case.  The two companies described the work from Pennsylvania and D.C. as duplicative of the FTC’s, poorly documented and “largely spent on non-determinative issues (to the extent it is possible to determine what they worked on with any specificity at all).”

The Pennsylvania attorney general’s office requested $142,548, the District of Columbia $33,547—amounts that, if granted, would have represented an “unprecedented windfall,” Staples and Office Depot argued.  Weil, Gotshal & Manges represented Staples, and Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett represented Office Depot.

Sullivan said Pennsylvania and D.C. “effectively ask this court to take an unprecedented step.”  The choice to challenge the deal under the FTC Act was a “strategic one,” Sullivan wrote.  “Nonetheless, moving plaintiffs cannot bring a petition for fee-shifting under a provision under which they did not prevail,” he wrote.