Fee Dispute Hotline
(312) 907-7275

Assisting with High-Stakes Attorney Fee Disputes

The NALFA

News Blog

Category: Fee Entitlement

US Airways Defends $122M Fee Request in Sabre Antitrust Case

April 20, 2017

A recent Law 360 story by Rick Archer, “US Airways Defends $122M Fee Bid in Sabre Antitrust Suit” reports that US Airways defended its request for $122 million in attorneys' fees for its $15 million victory against trip-planning giant Sabre Inc. in a suit over a contract giving booking access to all of the airline's seats, saying the fees are reasonable and in line with Sabre’s own legal costs.

Refuting Sabre’s argument that the fee request should be trimmed by nearly 90 percent because of unnecessary expenses, failure to get the full award sought and the dismissal of three-fourths of its claims, US Airways said the recommendation would make its fee award $40 million less than Sabre’s own reported defense costs.

“Although Sabre begrudgingly concedes that US Airways is entitled to some of what it incurred in this lengthy and aggressively defended case, reading Sabre’s opposition, one would think that Sabre — not US Airways — had won,” US Airways said.

The airline won a $5 million verdict, automatically tripled to $15 million, late last year in its case accusing Sabre — which controls 58 percent of the ticket distribution market — of restraining trade by forcing unfavorable terms on US Airways in a 2011 contract that required the airline to give Sabre access to all of its seats in order to reach the large cadre of travel agents that use the Sabre system.

US Airways has requested $122 million in attorneys’ fees and costs, arguing last month that the lengthy and complex nature of litigation justified fees that are more than eight times the amount of damages.  Sabre had argued US Airways should receive only $13 million in fees, noting three of its four original claims were rejected and the award was less than US Airways had asked for, and claiming a number of specific decisions in the airline’s legal strategy had generated unnecessary fees.

US Airways replied that the claim it ultimately won on was always the focus of their efforts, saying two of the claims were dismissed at the beginning of the case when minimal work had been done and the third had required only a fraction of the work.  “The Clayton Act does not require a plaintiff to prevail on all motions and claims in order to be entitled to a full recovery, particularly where it wins what it set out to achieve,” the airline said.

The airline said the reasonableness of the fees was justified by Sabre’s own $53 million in reported attorneys' fees, and argued this number was deceptively low because defense counsel Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP agreed to work at a discount in exchange for a success fee.

“Sabre refused our request to see Bartlit’s success-fee rate, but it appears to be nearly 50 percent based on the bonus Sabre paid for defeating declaratory relief,” it said.  “Even a 30 percent bonus would have increased Sabre’s fees to roughly $70 million had it, not US Airways, won.  That approximates US Airways’ roughly $85 million in attorneys’ fees.”

The case is US Airways Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp. et al., case number 1:11-cv-02725, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

Federal Circuit Realizes District Judges Call Shots on Fee Awards

April 6, 2017

A recent NLJ story by Scott Graham, “Federal Circuit Faces Facts: District Judges Call Shots on Fee Awards,” reports that a District Court in Texas is on the verge of overruling the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on exceptional case attorney fees.  Two Federal Circuit judges voiced serious displeasure that U.S. District Judge Rodney Gilstrap, of the Eastern District of Texas ignored their strong hint two years ago to award fees in a patent dispute between online retailer Newegg and Acacia Research Corp. subsidiary Adjustacam Inc.

But the judges recognized that sending the case back to the Eastern District of Texas a second time may not make any difference.  That's because even though appellate courts nominally have authority over trial courts, the U.S. Supreme Court has effectively reversed the balance of power on patent fee awards.  "It really seems what [Gilstrap] did here was pay lip service to our mandate, and it's very frustrating," Judge Todd Hughes said during arguments in Adjustacam v. Newegg.  "But if we send it back, he's probably going to deny fees again, and it's all going to be a big waste of time."

"It could be that we never find an exceptional case" unless the district judge does too, Judge Jimmie Reyna said.  "I'm looking at this case to see if there's any point where this court could say there's been an abuse of discretion."

Adjustacam is the latest round in a long-running battle between Acacia and Newegg over exceptional-case attorney fees.  Newegg's outspoken general counsel, Lee Cheng, left the company last year, but outside counsel Mark Lemley of Durie Tangri continued the fight, with Collins, Edmonds, Schlather & Tower partner John Edmonds representing Adjustacam.

Adjustacam sued 58 defendants in the Eastern District of Texas in 2010 over a patent on a rotatable camera mount.  Newegg insisted there was no basis for infringement, especially after U.S. District Judge Leonard Davis construed the claims in 2012.  Adjustacam dismissed its claims three months later because summary judgment briefs were imminent, according to Lemley; and because Adjustacam had settled with Newegg's suppliers, according to Edmonds.

Davis declined to award fees in 2013.  But the following year the U.S. Supreme Court eased the standard for awarding fees in its Octane Fitness decision, while giving district judges more discretion over whether to award them.  The Federal Circuit instructed Davis to reconsider Newegg's fee motion under the new standard.  Hughes' opinion for the court advised that Newegg's arguments "appear to have significant merit."

By then Davis had retired.  His successor Gilstrap adopted almost all of Davis' findings and conclusions.  In a footnote addressing the Federal Circuit opinion, Gilstrap wrote that he had tried "not to circumvent by hindsight the judgments and in-person evaluations that the trial judge who dealt with this case in the courtroom arena was best positioned to have made."

Lemley argued that Gilstrap willfully refused to follow the Federal Circuit's instructions.  "Judge Gilstrap didn't conduct his own evaluation of the facts, he block quoted and cited Judge Davis' previous determinations," Lemley said.  "He afforded no weight to this court's opinion remanding the case, even though this court went out of its way to say it saw significant merit in the frivolousness claim."  Hughes seemed to agree.  Gilstrap's decision "seems to ignore our mandate from our prior decision," he said.

But "even if we all agree" that Adjustacam's litigation position was baseless, Hughes said, "that alone doesn't entitle you to an award of the fees.  After Octane Fitness, the district courts get large discretion to look at the case and say, 'Does this stand out from all the others?'"  Lemley urged Hughes and his colleagues to simply declare the case exceptional, but Reyna also sounded hesitant.  "We have a situation here that let's say that I would find exceptional," he said.  "But yet I'm faced with this very rigorous standard of review" on appeal.

Edmonds argued that Adjustcam had solid grounds for its claims, having recovered as much as $3.7 million from one defendant.  There were "legitimate strategic reasons unrelated to the merits of the case of why Newegg was dropped," Edmonds said.  But that argument presumes that Adjustacam had a reasonable infringement theory, Hughes said.  "And post-claim construction, how can you possibly show any reasonable claim of infringement?" he said.  The Federal Circuit pointed that out in its previous opinion, and Gilstrap dismissed it "with that one-line throwaway sentence" about hindsight, Hughes said.

He was just getting started.  "We ordered the court to look at it all again, under the new standards, under Octane," Hughes said.  "And the court didn't do that.  It said I'm just wholesale adopting these factual findings and I'm not going to change the outcome."  Edmonds disagreed with that characterization.  But even if Gilstrap had found Adjustacam acted unreasonably, "within his discretion he could still find it not to be an exceptional case."

London Arbitration Firm Recovers Costs from UAE Fee Dispute

March 13, 2017

A recent Law 360 story by Jimmy Hoover, “London Arbitration Firm Recovers Costs From UAE Fee Spat,” reports that a London-based international arbitration firm won back nearly all of the costs it spent pursuing around $2 million in legal fees from its representation of a wealthy United Arab Emirates (UAE) family in a commercial contract dispute, when a U.K. court found the family was drawing out the appeal process to delay payment of the fees.

The England and Wales High Court ruled that Shackleton and Associates Ltd., a firm founded by sole shareholder and solicitor advocate Stewart Shackleton, is entitled to 80 percent of the costs incurred from a proceeding to enforce the fee award against the Bin Kamils, a wealthy business family in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.  The fee award, handed down by a London tribunal of the International Court of Arbitration in 2013, stems from Shackleton’s representation of the family in an earlier ICC proceeding over a cement plant joint venture gone bad in the Arab nation.

The evidence in the case suggests that “the defendants lacked any realistic defence to the enforcement of the [fee award] and that the steps they took in the proceedings were taken not in pursuit of a genuine defence but solely for the purpose of delaying payment to the claimant of the fees to which it had been held to be entitled,” Justice Nigel John Martin Teare said in a judgment.  “That takes the case out of the norm and is a very significant level of unreasonable conduct which undoubtedly justifies an order for indemnity costs.”

The underlying ICC arbitration involved a joint venture between the Bin Kamils and Cypriot company Terna Bahrain Holding Co. WLL involving a cement plant with a capacity of up to 1.8 million tons.  Terna, which purchased a 40 percent stake in an entity holding a 25-year lease of the property in Hamriyah Free Zone in Sharjah where the plant was being built, alleged that the Bin Kamils failed to procure permits to allow the construction of a cement import-export terminal.

A previous decision from the High Court maintained that Shackleton “had been most heavily involved in conducting the case on behalf of the Bin Kamils in the arbitration” but was “was not available to assist” with the Terna arbitration award after a falling-out with the firm Galadari & Associates in 2011.  On Monday, Shackleton disputed the court's characterization of a falling out with Galadri & Associates, insisting in an email to Law360 that the non-payment of fees was "the only reason" that his firm ceased acting in the summer of 2011.

Shackleton won an award for £1.4 million ($1.76 million) in fees plus interest from the ICC tribunal in 2013 after the Bin Kamils refused to participate in the proceeding other than to say that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the claims.  Challenging a Paris appeals court’s order granting “permission” to enforce the award, the family unsuccessfully applied to set aside the award, but the Cour de Cassation dismissed the application in March 2016.

“The impression one gains from this history is that the defendants were intent on delaying payment into court as long as was possible,” Justice Teare said.  The court did not assess Shackleton’s costs but noted that his normal hourly rate of £800, or roughly $1,000, was “more than double” of what appears to be the “guideline rate.”  Though the court can exceed the guideline rate for sufficiently complex cases, “proceedings to enforce an arbitration award do not fall into that category,” the judge said.

MetLife Faces $6.2M in Attorney Fees

March 9, 2017

A recent Law 360 story by Bonnie Eslinger, “MetLife Faces $6.2M in Atty Fees Over Ponzi Scheme Ruling,” reports that a California judge tentatively ordered MetLife Inc. and various subsidiaries to pay $6.2 million in attorneys’ fees on top of a $7.2 million judgment in a “hotly contested" case blaming the insurer for the loss of a retired woman’s savings in a Ponzi scheme.

Christine Ramirez claimed the insurer and its subsidiaries, along with an agent who ran MetLife’s Los Angeles operations, sold her unregistered securities alongside her insurance policies.  Those unregistered promissory notes put her money into an alleged $216 million Ponzi scheme, the suit said.

In August, a jury found the defendants liable for Ramirez's losses in the amount of $240,000 and awarded her $15 million in punitive damages saying MetLife owed $10 million, unit MetLife Securities owed $2.5 million and unit New England Life Insurance Co. owed $2.5 million.  A state court judge subsequently reduced the award to $7,196,710, telling Ramirez that if she didn’t consent to the remittitur, he would grant the insurer's motion for a new trial on grounds of excessive punitive damages.

A hearing was held on Ramirez’s motion for attorneys' fees of $7 million.  At the start, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Kenneth Freeman issued a tentative written ruling, shaving fees related to attorney hours spent working on a separate, related case against MetLife, in which Ramirez was a putative class member, but finding the time invested in the case to be reasonable.

“In assessing reasonableness, the time required by the opposing party's tactics may also be highly probative,” Judge Freeman wrote in his written tentative opinion.  "Here, it goes without saying that this case was, and remains, very hotly contested.  The MetLife defendants litigated their clients’ case extensively, and there were never any frivolous arguments raised.”

The judge also doubled Ramirez’s lodestar attorneys' fees figure of $3,112,138, saying the requested 2.0 multiplier is appropriate in light of the novelty of the issues presented in the case, the skill of counsel, the extent that the case precluded the attorneys from taking on other clients, and the fact that the case was taken on a contingency basis.  Additionally, the results achieved in the litigation were notable, the judge said, even with the award reduction.  “The significant result warrants a multiplier in this case,” he wrote.

During oral arguments, an attorney for MetLife, Cheryl Haas of McGuireWoods LLP, disputed that any multiplier should be awarded, calling the $6 million a “windfall.”  “A multiplier is simply not justified,” Haas said.  “The prevailing party is only entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees.”

Judge Freeman said he would issue a final ruling after he considered supplemental filings from the parties, but he didn’t offer much hope for a different outcome.  "The tentative is very clear on the court’s reasoning and frankly I doubt there’s anything you’re going to offer in the way of a supplemental brief that will change the court’s tentative,” the judge said.

The case is Hartshorne et al. v. MetLife Inc. et al., case number BC576608, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles.

Attorney Fees Not Subject to Damages Cap in Wage Case

March 8, 2017

A recent Legal Intelligencer story by Zack Needles, “Attorney Fees Not Subject to Damages Cap in Wage Case, Court Says,” reports that attorney fees can be awarded under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL), even if they cause the total recovery to exceed a voluntary $25,000 damages cap, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled in a case of first impression.

Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1311.1, a plaintiff can elect to limit the maximum amount of damages recoverable to $25,000 in exchange for looser evidence admission requirements at a trial following compulsory arbitration.  In a published opinion in Grimm v. Universal Medical Services, a three-judge Superior Court panel unanimously ruled that such a cap does not preclude an award of attorney fees under the WPCL that pushes the total recovery above $25,000.

The decision affirmed a Beaver County trial court's award of $43,080.66, comprising an $11,683.92 jury award, plus $2,920.98 in liquidated damages and $28,475.76 in attorney fees and costs under the WPCL.  The appeals court upheld Beaver County Court of Common Pleas Judge James J. Ross' ruling, which reasoned that attorney fees in excess of the damages cap should be permitted because "a prevailing plaintiff in a [WPCL] claim must be made whole and not be required to expend his or her award to pay his or her attorney."

Judge John T. Bender, writing for the Superior Court, agreed with Ross' rationale, noting that Rule 1311.1 is intended to streamline litigation in order to make it more economically feasible for plaintiffs, while the WPCL is meant to allow plaintiffs to collect unpaid wages and compensation without having to spend their entire recovery on legal fees.

"In this way, both Rule 1311.1 and the WPCL aim to make litigation more accessible and affordable to aggrieved litigants, particularly those with meritorious claims," Bender said.  "In this case, we believe we are promoting this overarching policy by interpreting 'damages recoverable' in Rule 1311.1(a) to exclude attorneys' fees under the WPCL."  Bender was joined by Judges Mary Jane Bowes and Carl A. Solano.

In Grimm, plaintiff Jeffrey P. Grimm sued defendants Universal Medical Services Inc. and Roderick K. Reeder, alleging breach of contract against Universal for failure to reimburse business expenses and a WPCL claim against both defendants on the same basis, according to Bender.

The case proceeded to compulsory arbitration, with an award in favor of the defendants.  Grimm appealed to the Beaver County Court of Common Pleas, electing to cap damages at $25,000 under Rule 1311.1, and the case proceeded to a jury trial, Bender said.

The jury awarded damages to Grimm in the amount of $11,683.92 and, finding that Universal acted in bad faith in failing to reimburse him, the court added 25 percent, or $2,920.98, to the jury award, resulting in a total of $14,604.90, according to Bender.  Grimm then sought attorney fees in the amount of $25,946.25 and litigation costs in the amount of $2,529.51 under the WPCL.

While the defendants argued that the phrase "damages recoverable" in Rule 1311.1 encompassed attorney fees, Grimm contended that attorney fees are payments in addition to a jury award intended to make the plaintiff whole.

Bender noted that Ross, in his analysis, looked first at the analogous 2001 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case Allen v. Mellinger, in which then-Justice Ralph Cappy wrote in a concurring and dissenting opinion that delay damages in cases involving bodily injury, death or property damage under Pa.R.Civ.P. 238 should not be subject to the statutory cap of $250,000 when the state is a defendant in a bodily injury claim.

In the 2005 case LaRue v. McGuire, as Ross also noted in his opinion, the Superior Court relied on Cappy's reasoning in Allen to find that delay damages under Rule 238 were not subject to the Rule 1311.1 damages cap.

While the defendants attempted to distinguish Grimm from Allen and LaRue by arguing that delay damages are an extension of compensatory damages intended to make the plaintiff whole, while attorney fees serve no such purpose, Bender disagreed.

"It is clear that the award of attorneys' fees under the WPCL accomplishes the purpose of making a plaintiff whole, just like the delay damages in Allen and LaRue," Bender said.